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iii ABSTRACT: 
Despites Franck's claim that public international law (PIL) has moved into its "post-
ontological state", where controversy no longer surrounds its status as law, controversies 
over the ontology ofPIL, and especially of  customary international law (CIL) remain 
endemic. These controversies concern the ontology of  the law itself; its status as a brute 
or an empirical fact. They have been internalised within different theories of  law, and 
between theories within the discourse of  legal theory; but they have not been resolved. 
These controversies fuel the attack by CLS, and New Approaches to International Law 
(NAIL), scholars against a liberal-legal order all too easily portrayed as fundamentally 
indeterminate, a cover for its subjects' political interests. 
This indeterminacy is unavoidable within any theory which understands law as a brute 
fact, because the 'brute fact' of  the social practice oflaw cannot reduce complexity in a 
manner adequate to the production of  determinate legal norms. As a direct consequence 
of  this, law is best understood as an institutional fact, or more precisely, as an ideal idea. 
To understand law in this way is also to attenuate its relationship to empirical reality. This 
involves identifying the specificity of  the legal, and that involves taking a stance on what 
the law is for. Only once we have determined what the law is for can we analyse how this 
purpose is manifested in the reality of  the legal system. 
It is from this point that we can determinately identify legal norms, because the 
relationship between the form and purpose of  law determines the empirical identifiers by 
which the presence of  the specifically legal can be signified. The specificity itself is the 
manifestation of  law's unique role, of  the additional utility that law brings to human life. 
It could be understood as the legitimatory promise, or the ideological apology, oflaw. 
Where CLS, and other critical discourses, seek to "uncover" and "explode" the ideologies 
and biases oflaw, to demonstrate its inability to fulfil its promises, the present work is 
intended to initiate the task of  demanding that law, and especially CIL, live up to those 
very promises. But first, the nature of  these promises, and the structure and purpose of 
law must be examined, analysed, and where necessary contested and decided, or rather, 
defined. In this regard, the hidden assumptions of  legal theory must be uncovered and 
problematised; the debates over law must be disaggregated, before law itself can be 
properly determined. Only after these tasks have been completed can the nihilist 
challenges of  NAIL be met. 
This thesis argues that CIL is best understood as an independent system of  rules, against 
which state conduct may be assessed; rather than as a necessarily authoritative 
institutional reality. This highlights the distinction between law-creative, and merely 
legally evaluable, state actions. The theory presented in the final chapter - which is 
developed from the methodology outlined in the preceding four chapters - acts as a lens 
through which those actions of  states which alter or develop CIL may be distinguished 
from those actions which ought, merely, to be judged in the light of  CIL. This allows us 
to distinguish legal from illegal state conduct, regardless of  the absence or presence of 
enforcement. This distinction between the legal and the illegal is distinct from, 
analytically prior to, and more important than, the enforcement of  legal commands. 
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xii INTRODUCTION 
My thesis was initiated in an attempt to understand the structure and function of 
customary international law: where its rules come from, and how they may be 
identified. It was driven by what I perceived as the personalisation oflegal doctrine, 
and the consequent descent into idiosyncrasy; the way in which the rules of  customary 
law appeared to reflect little more than the desires and pet projects of  its analysts. This 
can be readily appreciated by anyone working in the field, and is easily illustrated. 
Amnesty International, in a report on the Palestinian Authority entitled Silencing 
Dissent,
l  stated that: "The UDHR is considered to be part of  customary international 
law.,,2 This makes the declaration - which was specifically designed as a non-binding 
statement of  aspiration - legally binding on all states. Similarly, many authors have 
suggested a customary 'right' to humanitarian intervention/ others that the 
"precautionary principle" of  environmental law has entered the corpus of customary 
internationallaw.
4 
Yet more authors,S and indeed the International Court of  Justice itself, have claimed 
customary status for the Geneva Conventions of 1949, in whole or in part: 
With regard to international humanitarian law, the Court recalls that in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons, it 
1 Available at: http://www.amnestv.orq.i1/reDorts/PASDO.html 
2 Section 2: SAFEGUARDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org.ilireports/PASD2.html 
3 Teson F., "Collective Humanitarian Intervention" 17 Michigan Journal of  International Law (1996) 
323. 
4 See Birnie P. and Boyle A. International Law and the Environment, p. 118. 
5 Meron T., "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law", 81  AJIL (1987) 348. 
1 stated that "a great many rules of  humanitarian law applicable in armed 
conflict are so fundamental to the respect of  the human person and 
'elementary considerations of  humanity' ...  ", that they are "to be observed by 
all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, 
because they constitute intransgressible principles of  international customary 
law" 6 
However, no authors, academics, or practitioners of  international law (of  whom I am 
aware) have suggested customary rights to torture, to genocide, or to racial 
segregation. But torture is an endemic aspect of  international life; genocides occur; 
and racial segregation seems to be becoming a reality, at least in the UK and USA. 
Meanwhile, human rights are offered scant respect in practice; 'humanitarian 
interventions' on those rare occasions they occur, or are claimed, provoke protest; and 
we continue to gamble with our ecological future. 
It would appear that only 'nice' rules can become customary international law; or, 
perhaps more plausibly, that these authors are quite simply making it up as they go 
along. Personal preferences are being passed-off as legal rules; but that would seem to 
deny the specificity of  the legal. It  would seem to subvert law's claims to transcend 
personal preference and desire. This process, and the academic discourses it has 
spawned, have an air of  the unreal, of  the absurd. Legal norms are being plucked from 
thin air, and that set the ground for my enquiry. 
6 Advisory Opinion of  the International Court on the Legal consequences of  the construction of  a wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Delivered 9 July 2004.  The text of  the Opinion, may be found 
on the Court's website - <www.icj-cij.org>.  The text of the opinion is also available as UN Doc.AlES-
10/273, and at 43 ILM 1009 (2004). 
2 Not that anyone actually admitted to offering no more than a personal preference. All 
hid behind a veneer oflegal formality, and yet their answers nonetheless held that 
unmistakable air of  unreality. The answers were simply 'given', taken for granted, 
and assumed to obviously exist. And yet - to make matters worse - different 
participants gave different, and conflicting, answers. None developed the premises 
from which those answers flowed; certainly none appeared to engage that process of 
development itself. There seemed no reasonfor the competing answers; afortiori 
there appeared no way to choose between them. This left us with an unconstrained 
choice as to the content of  international law, and that conflicted with my basic 
understandings of  what law did, of  what law was for. 
Therefore, I set out to make sense ofthis question (what is the meaning oflaw?), to 
develop a schema of  understanding within which the competing accounts ofthe nature 
and content oflaw could be developed. I sought the premises, and the 'workings out' 
which had to lie latent behind the asserted answers. I sought, ultimately to make the 
answers intelligible, to locate them, make them commensurable, and to allow for their 
evaluation. 
However, what I do not do - though in honesty I did set out to do - is to claim to have 
the final say. Instead, I merely identify a question, and endeavour to demonstrate why 
that question is important. Beyond that, I can merely elucidate the conditions under 
which the question can be engaged; though I do also sketch an outline of  my preferred 
answer. 
This enquiry is subdivided into five distinct sections: 
3 In chapter one, I engage theories oflegal positivism. I do this for three related 
reasons: firstly, because legal positivism is the legal theory which most obviously 
claims to be able to just 'identify' legal norms; secondly because, despite that fact, 
legal positivism is my favoured theory; and thirdly, to demonstrate the heterogeneity 
of  legal positivism as a movement, and the superiority of  its conceptual variant. 
In chapter two, I discuss David Dyzenhaus' fundamental critique of  legal positivism, 
in an attempt to demonstrate that its force is restricted to empirical legal positivism. 
However, in doing so, I also unearth the task facing conceptual legal positivism: not 
to show that it is the correct legal theory; but rather to demonstrate that it is the best 
(available), the most preferable, legal theory. 
Chapter three elaborates upon this task, illustrating how legal theories can be made 
commensurable, and therefore, how the preferability oftheories may be assessed. 
Finally, this chapter demonstrates how the tools developed in Neil MacCormick's 
institutional theory of  law (which are examined in chapter two) can be used to 
'operationalise' his thesis on rational reconstruction as an abstract form of  the best 
available theory. 
Chapter four shifts analysis from legal theory per se to the theory of  customary 
international law. Using the evaluative grid developed in chapter three, but 
augmenting this with Martti Koskenniemi's devastating critique of  international law 
as caught between apology and utopia, I demonstrate why all extant theories of 
4 customary international law are flawed. I also demonstrate why these flaws - which 
are structural in nature - had to occur. 
Finally, in chapter five, I move from critique to possibility, from deconstruction to 
reconstruction. In this chapter I move from utilising to inverting Koskenniemi's 
critique. I attempt to develop a theory of customary international law, capable both of 
adopting the premises and denying the conclusions of  Koskenniemi's critique. To do 
so, I develop a specific implementation of  chapter three's fully operational rational 
reconstruction. The aim here is to demonstrate how conceptual legal positivism could 
operate (and, in practice, does partially operate) at the international level, to produce 
determinate legal norms. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate why this is the preferable 
legal theory, but also to draw attention to some of  the costs inherent in understanding 
and developing law in this "best light". 
CHAPTER 1: WHOSE POSITIVISM? WHICH OBJECTIVITY? 
Introduction: 
Although often portrayed as a unified entity, legal positivism is in fact a broad and 
deeply divided enterprise. Even among those who acknowledge these divisions, 
emphasis is generally placed on the hard-soft divide within legal positivism. 
However, there is another, deeper, division, this time of a methodological nature 
between empirical and conceptual legal positivists. This divide generally goes 
5 unnoticed due to an exclusive focus on municipal law, as the paradigm oflaw per se. 
This limited focus has allowed substantive agreement to overwhelm and disguise 
irreconcilable methodological differences. 
A brief glance at public intemationallaw allows a broadening of  perspective which 
brings this methodological divide, and the pathological consequences of  overlooking 
it, into clearer relief. The argument toward which this thesis builds is that the 
agreement on focussing on "the empirical aspects" of  the law, which pertains in legal 
positivism, in fact disguises a much deeper disagreement over both what is to be 
observed, and the nature of  observation itself. Moreover, this disagreement neatly, but 
completely, fractures the unity oflegal positivism as a school oflegal theory; it 
obliges us to take sides within legal positivism, even before the term can be given a 
coherent meaning. This chapter represents a preliminary step toward a more accurate 
mapping of  legal positivism, rejecting empirical legal positivism, before ultimately 
endeavouring to demonstrate the superiority ofthe conceptual strand oflegal 
positivism. 
LEGAL POSITIVISM: A UNITY SUNDERED? 
Legal theory today is a fractured and disjointed discourse, with the classic divide 
between "legal positivism" and "natural law" providing the most obvious dichotomy. 
However, this dichotomy, as well as simplifying debate, also functions to disguise 
divisions within both camps, to present their unifying features as central, the 
distinguishing features of  each specific theory as marginal. At least as regards legal 
positivism, this is tenuous at best; if  not downright false. 
6 As Gardner has pointed out,
l legal positivism is both a broad church, and a much 
maligned one. Before locating myself  within this movement, it is first worth briefly 
delimiting the movement as a whole. Iflegal positivists are to be understood or 
classified as a group or a school (at least within legal philosophical debate) they must 
be "united by a thesis rather than merely a theme"? That is, it is not enough that legal 
positivists emphasise focus "on certain aspects oflegal thought and experience 
(namely the empirical aspects)"/ but we must also have a unifying philosophical 
proposition. Gardner kindly provides this: 
(LP*) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence 
whether it forms part of  the law ofthat system, depends on its sources, not its 
merits (where its merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of  its 
sources).4 
In other words, legal positivism's prime concern is to identify what the law is, not 
what it ought to be. Of course this is also true of  "anti-positivist" theories, as critics of 
legal positivism are also concerned with what the law is; the specific claim oflegal 
positivism is that what the law is is in no way dependent upon what the law should be; 
whereas anti-positivist theories would hold that what the law is, is in some manner 
dependent on what the law ought to be. However, this legal positivist claim, as 
Gardner once again emphasises, does not preclude criticism oflaw on moral grounds, 
I Gardner J. "Legal Positivism: 5 Yz  Myths" 46 American Journal of  Jurisprudence (2001) p. 199. 
2 Ibid p. 199. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid p. 201. 
7 but rather emphasises the fact that the content oflaw must be known before it can be 
understood, evaluated, and ultimately critiqued. 
5 
This is an important point, as one of  the classic myths about legal positivism is that its 
focus on validity precludes other forms of  criticism and thus 'validates' evil regimes 
and legal systems. Legal positivism says no such thing, but instead denies that 
normativity (as opposed to systemic membership) derives directly from validity.6 
(LP*) then possesses a "comprehensive normative inertness", which many 
misunderstand or refuse to accept.
7 It does not endorse norms, neither does it advocate 
conduct in accordance with legal norms: (LP*) is simply a foundation for these 
further evaluative moves.
8 
This thesis can be easily reconciled with the Hartian camp of  legal positivism, as it is 
compatible with the belief that legal positivism is an exercise in "descriptive 
sociology",9 and philosophically concerned only with the conditions under which 
legal knowledge (whose existence and 'legalness' are simply assumed) can be 
understood. "Legal philosophy is not wholly (or even mainly) the backroom activity 
of  identifying what is good or bad about legal practice, and hence of  laying on 
practical proposals for its improvement (or failing that, abandonment)."lo Legal 
5 Ibid pp. 223-4. 
6 Validity is another apparent agreement masking deep disagreement, especially as to the ontological 
status of  rules, norms, and law; and especially between Hartian and Kelsenian approaches to legal 
theorising. See notes 133-7 and accompanying text, infra; see also chapter 5 notes 65-8 and 
accompanying text. 
7 Gardner, supra note 1, p. 203. 
8 In this sense, Gardner appears to share his pre-theoretical commitments with Kelsen rather than Hart 
(see note 111 supra, and accompanying text). However, and this is one ofthe paradoxes of  positivist 
theory, despite their deeply antithithetical methodological and ontological commitments, Hart and 
Kelsen actually reach many similar conclusions on the nature and functioning of domestic legal 
systems. Again an apparent agreement disguising far more deep-rooted and important disagreements. 
9 Hart H. L. A.  The Concept of  Law (2nd ed.) p. v. 
10 Gardner, supra note 1, p. 203. 
8 positivism is the part of  legal philosophy which is not about separating good from 
bad. Legal positivism is simply about identifying what the law is, which nonns are 
legally valid in any given area, and this is the prerequisite for any evaluation of  the 
content ofthose nonns. Even an anarchist could endorse LP*.l1 However, Gardner 
also acknowledges the necessarily interpretative nature of all observation: 
Philosophers who defend (LP*), like all other philosophers, are offering an 
interpretation of  their subject matter that plays up the true and important and 
plays down the true but unimportant. But what is important about legal nonns, 
even what is important for their evaluation, need not be something that lends 
value or merit to them. 12 
So although legal positivism is a value free process of  nonn identification, it is not an 
empirically neutral one. The legal observer does not acquire-an Archimedean 
perspective, but can only emphasise his own evaluation of  the important over the 
unimportant, having of course first decided what to observe; or rather, having first 
advanced his own definition (whether articulated or unarticulated, recognised or 
unrecognised, conscious or unconscious) of  the subject matter itself. 
Once more an apparent agreement hides a centrally important point of  disagreement. 
This disagreement concerns the nature and differentiation ofthe "subject matter" 
itself; it concerns what should be observed? In other words, what is "the true"? That 
is: what actually exists, what is known to exist? How should "the true" of  law be 
11  Ibid p. 207. 
12 Ibid p. 206. 
9 understood? How should we detennine what is true oflaw, what is known to exist 
about law? What is the (correct) subject matter for legal observation? 
However, Gardner's central point here is simply that what is important need not be 
what is valuable or good. This aspect oflegal positivism, this understanding oflaw, 
assumes the reality oflaw "as it is" and contrasts this to (what legal positivists 
perceive as) the ideological illusion of  "law as it ought to be". However, this contrast, 
especially if  made evaluatively (good legal positivism against bad natural law) is not 
really an aspect of  LP*, but rather a manifestation of  positivity welcoming (PW).13 
That is, a belief in the necessary redeeming merit of  all law in treating like cases alike. 
However, PW is not an integral part of (LP*) which is nonnatively inert. Naturally 
enough the anarchist adopting (LP*) will not also endorse PW. (LP*) then is posited 
as a nonnatively inert claim, not a legal claim as such, but a claim as to what makes a 
legal claim legal; no more, no less. 
This links (LP*) closely to Austin's (in)famous claim that "the existence oflaw is one 
thing, its merit or demerit quite another".  14 However, while Austin, and of course 
Bentham, largely founded Anglo-American legal positivism, the subsequent history of 
that school has been one of  refinement of, rejection of, and even flight from their 
ideas. These refinements have led to a degree of  fragmentation within legal positivism 
itself, most noticeably the divide between hard and soft legal positivists, and 
secondarily a divide between what I shall tenn conceptual and empirical legal 
positivists. 
13 Ibid pp. 205-7. 
14 Austin J.  The Province of  Jurisprudence Determined p. 157. 
10 For present purposes the conceptual/empirical divide is the most important sub-
division within legal positivism, however the hard/soft divide does merit a brief 
explanation. The hard/soft divide was first explicated by Coleman  15  and is a response 
to legal positivist difficulties in accurately theorising adjudicative practices. 16 
Essentially, soft positivists allow for moral factors in the identification oflaw 
provided only that some other legally valid norm provides for this. Hard positivists 
deny such a possibility, believing instead (appearances notwithstanding) that a norm 
which appears to allow legal validity on the basis of  merit (in the following example, 
merit being defined as reasonableness) in fact "delegates to some official (say a 
judge) the task of  validating further norms himself or herself by declaring them 
reasonable".17 Only those norms declared valid (e. g. because of  their reasonableness) 
are legally valid (or indeed legally reasonable). Therefore, any given norm's validity 
remains contingent solely on its source (the judge) rather than its merits in any real 
sense; i.e. in any sense opposable to the judge's declaration.18 In other words, the 
decision (on the putative norm's reasonableness) is purely intra-systemic, in the sense 
that the extra-systemic factors, (e.g. the judge's views on reasonableness) which are 
necessary to the decision, only become legally relevant, (the putative norm only 
becomes law) once (and because) the judge (qua system official) has determined that 
it is reasonable, and thus is law. 
15 Coleman J. "Negative and Positive Positivism" Journal of  Legal Studies 11  (1982) 139. Coleman 
uses the phrase "hard fact positivism", but not "soft" positivism, in this essay. Nonetheless, the 
distinction between hard and soft - synonymous with that between positive and negative - has become 
standard nomenclature. 
16 These difficulties will be explicated infra, and the beginnings of  a solution will be developed in 
chapter 2. 
17  Gardner, supra note 1, p. 20l. 
18 This only applies to the highest point in the legal system, as a lower court decision can, of course, be 
reversed by a higher court. However, on the hard positivist view this would not entail that the norm 
was validated or invalidated by its content per se, but only by the higher court's declaration of  (e.g. the 
reasonableness of) its content. 
11 Hart is ambiguous on the hard/soft divide,19 but clearly exemplifies the empirical 
observational (descriptive) strand of  legal positivism. However, the conceptual! 
empirical divide is itself a more complex matter. As Gardner noted, legal positivists 
are by and large interested in the "empirical" aspects of  legal practice, the law as it is, 
not as it might or should be. However, this focus presupposes a definition oflaw as 
something which can, in some sense, be observed. Moreover, law must be understood 
as something quite specific, differentiated from other social systems, and thus 
susceptible to analysis as a distinct phenomenon. Empirical legal positivists must 
assume that law can be identified through unstructured, pure, observation; that "the 
true" unproblematically exists, and thus displaces analysis entirely to "the important". 
In other words, empirical legal positivism makes a number of  foundational 
assumptions, assumptions which are neither disclosed nor defended; and furthermore, 
assumptions which can be problematised. The basic assumption is the factual 
existence of  the rule of  recognition in institutional practice, as Hart notes in the 
Concept of  Law:
20 
By providing an authoritative mark it [the rule of  recognition] introduces, 
although in embryonic form, the idea of a legal system (95) 
The assertion that it [the rule of  recognition] exists can only be an external 
statement of  fact (110) 
its [the rule of  recognition's] existence ... must consist in an actual practice 
19 Gardner disagrees, arguing that Hart conceptually relies upon soft-positivism, at least in the 
postscript to the second edition of The Concept of  Law: see Gardner, supra note 1, p. 201, esp. note 3. 
12 (111) 
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of  a legal system  .... those rules of  behaviour which are valid 
according to the system's ultimate criteria of  validity must be generally 
obeyed, and ... its rules of  recognition specifying the criteria oflegal validity 
... must be effectively accepted as common public standards of  official 
behaviour by its officials. (116) 
These assumptions, which must precede even understanding and so description, are 
captured, in their evaluative setting, by Raz: 
It turns on evaluative conceptions about what is significant and important 
about central social institutions: i.e. legal institutions. But in claiming that 
these features are important one is not commending them as goOd. 21 
Raz is an extremely careful writer, which makes a particular point of  interest out of 
his use of  "i.e." id est ("that is") in the above quotation. Raz does not claim that 
central social institutions might be legal but rather that the central social institutions 
are (by definition) legal institutions?2 This is, in Gardner's terms, "the true" for 
Hartian theory. It is not the empirical world as such, but merely the elision oflaw with 
central social institutions (that is, the elision oflaw and the exercise of  centralised 
20 These, and all other references, are to the 2
nd Edition. 
21  Raz J, "Authority, Law, and Morality" in Raz J., Ethics in the Public Domain p.  236. 
22 This seems to be confirmed in Practical Reason and Norms, esp. p 154; but is placed alongside the 
enigmatic (and unexpanded) claim that "There can be human societies which are not governed by law 
at all". This claim is manifestly ambiguous in that it could refer to societies with centralised institutions 
which apply something other than law (though what this might be, and how it might be differentiated 
13 authority), which is taken to be unproblematically "true"; inherent in the idea oflaw 
as such. 
Law, from this perspective, is what courts, and other legal officials and institutions, 
do, and therefore is to be discovered, delimited, and defined through empirical 
observation of  actual legal practices. At its extreme point, this would become a 
methodological approach indistinguishable from ethnomethodology or any other form 
of social scientific empiricism. However, legal positivism rarely3 goes to such 
extremes, preferring instead to observe particular practices on the assumption that 
they are law and will provide coherent data about the existence and nature of  law: 
One who makes an internal statement concerning the validity of  a particular 
rule of  a system may be said to presuppose the truth of  the external statement 
of  fact that the system is generally efficacious.
24 
Conceptual legal positivists - and indeed other conceptual theorists of  law - deny the 
possibility of  such 'pure' observation, noting instead that law must be defined-
differentiated as a specific social phenomenon - before it can be observed. In other 
words, for conceptual legal positivists "the true" is itself a problematic category, 
which must be resolved before analysis can move to "the important"; and yet it may 
be truth that makes something important, or even importance which functions to make 
something (appear) true. Fundamentally, however, from this conceptual perspective, 
from law is unclear). Therefore the alternative, that "societies not governed by law" refers to human 
societies lacking institutional centralisation, appears the more likely meaning. 
23 Morrison has suggested that the New Haven project is precisely a legal positivism of  this type, a 
legalisation of  the strictly social scientific positivism of  the American Legal Realist movement. See 
Morrison 1. L. John Austin, esp. chapter 6. 
24 Hart, supra note 10, p. 104. 
14 the elision of  law and centralised authority on which "the true" of  empirical legal 
positivism is founded, is itself  an act of  choice. 
Thus the conceptual position entails the belief  that empirical legal positivists are 
labouring under a complete misapprehension of  their own projects, which are in fact 
impossible. Therefore conceptual legal positivists start with a definition of  law which 
underpins and structures their subsequent observations ofthe practice oflaw?5 In 
other words, even before he had formulated it, conceptual legal positivists had already 
rejected Raz's claim that "the concept oflaw is not a product of  the theory oflaw.,,26 
Conceptual positivists also prospectively rejected Hart's claim that "legal norms have 
no "essence", nothing that makes them distinctively legal".27 This search for an 
essence of  law, this descriptive technique, was adopted by John Austin, and 
subsequently developed and refined by Hans Kelsen. It is to Austin's work, and the 
beginnings of  Anglo-American legal positivism that attention must first be turned. 
CONCEPTUAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (1); AUSTIN: 
Austin sought to define law first and then identify its scope and limits, to determine 
the "province of  jurisprudence". Thus Austin's work is primarily analytic,28 or 
25  This may be problematic for (LP*), as a definition must come close to - if it is not in fact already 
synonymous with - a call for "formal merits"; a call Gardner specifically notes as being at odds with 
legal positivism. See Gardner, supra note 1, at p. 208. 
26 Raz "Two Views of  the Nature ofthe Theory of  Law: A Partial Comparison" in Coleman J. (ed.) 
Hart's Postscript 1 at p. 36. 
27 Gardner J. "The Legality of  Law" 17 Ratio Juris (2004) 168 at p. 170. 
28 Austin can, perhaps, be credited with inventing the school of  analytic jurisprudence, however I have 
chosen to reject this term on the basis of  what I perceive as subsequent misuse, but at any rate because 
the term can too easily give rise to misunderstanding. This is because Hart (whom I see as the exemplar 
of  empirical legal positivism, or "descriptive sociology" in his own designation) is often termed - and 
indeed in certain respects is - an analytic jurist. For the purposes of  the present work the crucial 
distinction is between the conceptual and the empirical, with the possibility that the analytic in fact 
straddles this border denying that term utility here. 
15 conceptual, in nature. His first aim is to distinguish "law, simply and strictly so 
called" from things with which it "is often confounded".29 That is Austin sought to 
clearly differentiate law from those "objects to which it is related by resemblance [or] 
... analogy". Put simply, not everything called or considered to be law actually is law, 
and failure to recognise and combat this leads to confusion and the failure oflegal 
theory. Austin's task, therefore, was to define for law "the largest meaning which it 
has, without extension by metaphor or analogy".  30 Austin had to, and did, posit a 
definition oflaw: 
A rule laid down for the guidance of  an intelligent being by an intelligent 
being having power over him.3
! 
For Austin, "laws or rules, properly so called, are a species of commands",32 and 
commands are significations of  desire "distinguished from other significations of 
desire ... by the power and the purpose of  the party commanding to inflict an evil or 
pain in case the desire be disregarded,,?3 This gives rise to Austin's infamous sanction 
based model of  duty: 
Being liable to evil from you if! comply not with a wish which you signify, I 
am bound or obliged by your command, or I lie under a duty to obey it.  34 
29 Austin, supra note 15, p. 18. 
30 Ibid. 
31  Ibid. 
32 Ibid. p. 21 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. p. 22. 
16 The first thing which should be noted here is that, despite its importance to law and 
legal theory, this is a general definition of  obligation. The definition is not restricted 
to legal obligation, and therefore is separable from Austin's definition oflaw, which 
may in tum be separable from his definition of  obligation. Thus, even if  law has to be 
obligatory in an Austinian model, this does not entail that Austin's particular 
definition of  obligation has to apply. 
There are two distinct problems with Austin's definition of  obligation. The first, as 
Hart notes, is its unrootedness, or circularity, in that the sanction is both the cause and 
effect of  obligation. Austin draws no distinction between obligation and compulsion.
35 
However, contra Hart, this (alone) does not undermine Austin's definition of  law as 
such. This is because not all commands, and less still all obligations, count as law in 
the Austinian modeL Nonetheless, I do agree with Hart that Austin's definition of 
obligation - and consequently even his definition of  positive legal obligation - is 
wrong. 
Hart is surely correct that the presence, and breach, of an obligation legitimates 
sanctions. This being so, the existence of  obligation cannot be predicated on the threat 
of  sanction. However, this does not escape the second point, that the re-enforcement 
of  the obligation (the reconstruction ofthe obligation) as a strictly legal obligation can 
be rooted in the nexus between obligation and sanction (in the form of  centralised 
violence) a necessity indeed which Hart himself seems implicitly to acknowledge
36
. 
The key point here is that regardless of  the initial source of  the obligation, the 
peculiarly legal force of  the obligation is the liability to sanction for breach. 
35 See Hart, Concept, pp. 80-1 This is the distinction that Hart confusingly fe-labels as that between 
"having an obligation" and (merely) "being obliged". 
17 This is the second (the distinctly legal) problem with Austin's definition: it is 
problematic insofar as it entails that, absent a sanction no obligation (or at least no 
specifically legal obligation) exists to be breached. The two issues (obligation and 
sanction) remain conceptually distinct, but the duty to obey law remains a central 
aspect of  the definition oflaw. Absent a duty of  obedience there would be no 
command, absent a command there would be no law: a law is a command backed by 
the threat of  a sanction in the event of  non-compliance. 
However, although for Austin all laws are commands, not all commands are laws: 
"Commands are of  two species",37 viz. the general and the particular. Laws are 
general commands only, a law or rule "obliges generally to acts or forbearances of a 
class".38 Other commands are occasional or particular, aimed at specific people or 
events. Finally, Austin sought to separate laws from other forms of  rules. A rule is 
laid down by a superior to an inferior, but the status of  superior and inferior is a 
relative one.39 Rules can have one of  two sources, they can come from God or from 
men. Those emanating from God are styled "divine,,4o and are not relevant to the 
present study. What is important is the key distinction in those rules emanating from 
men, rules Austin terms "positive", the distinction between "positive law" and 
"positive morality,,:41 
36 Ibid pp. 82-4, and 110. 
37 Austin, supra note 15, p. 25. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid p. 30. 
40 See, e.g. ibidp. 110. 
41  Ibid. 
18 By the common epithet positive, I denote that both classes flow from human 
sources. By the distinctive names law and morality, I denote the difference 
between the human sources from which the two classes respectively 
emanate.
42 
Jurisprudence is the science of  positive laws, not of  positive rules, but is uninterested 
in the moral merits of  those laws, merely their existence: 
Jurisprudence ... is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so 
called, as considered without regard to their goodness or badness.
43 
However, the key to the science of  jurisprudence remains the differentiation of  law 
from other normative orders, and particularly from other general rule based normative 
orders: 
In order to [  facilitate] an explanation of  the marks which distinguish positive 
laws, I must analyse the expression sovereignty, the correlative expression 
subjection, and the inseparably connected expression independent political 
society. For the essential difference of  a positive law (or the difference that 
severs it from a law which is not a positive law) may be stated thus. Every 
positive law ... is set by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body of  persons, to 
a member or members of  the independent political society wherein that person 
b  d ..  44  or  0  y IS sovereIgn or supreme. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. p. 112. 
19 In other words, laws properly so called (positive laws) do not emanate from just any 
superior, but only from the supreme superior, the sovereign. The sovereign is the 
"determinate political superior" of  a given territory, that is of  an "independent 
political society". The sovereign must be habitually obeyed by the bulk of  the 
population of  that society, while offering habitual obedience to no determinate human 
superior.  45 The sovereign is thus understood as the legally illimitable political superior 
in a given territory.46 Thus, the key distinctions between positive law and positive 
morality are that the latter does not emanate from a sovereign, and is not backed by 
sanction in the event of  non-compliance. Therefore, determining the province of 
jurisprudence accurately involves consistently applying these criteria to delimit the 
scope oflaw properly so called, and then to determine its relationship with other 
normative orders.47 
However, emanation from the sovereign can occur directly or indirectly; i.e. a law is 
"a direct or circuitous command of  a ... sovereign".48 This does, however, entail that 
every law - as a species of  commands - "flows from a determinate source, or 
emanates from a determinate author".49 Thus, "every positive law ... is a direct or 
circuitous command of  a ... sovereign ... in the character of  political superior: that is 
to say ... a command ... to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.,,5o 
44 Ibid. pp. 116-7. 
45 Ibid. pp. 166-9. 
46 This is a logical entailment of the Austinian definition oflaw, see ibid pp. 211-3, however, does not 
imply that the sovereign be factually, morally, or politically unconstrained. This notion of  sovereignty 
as absolute (de/acto) unlimited power is specifically dismissed by Austin, see ibid p.  182. Moreover, 
contra Hart, the sovereign is not outside or above the law, Austin is in fact clear that the sovereign is 
bound by the law, but that the sovereign remains free to change the law should he wish; this distinction 
can be very important, especially when the sovereign is a collegiate body (e.g. the British Parliament). 
Here each member is bound by the law (in the normal way) until the collegiate body (as a unity) elects 
to change that law. 
47 Ibid p.  165. 
48 Ibid. p. 109. 
49 Ibid p. 117. 
50 Ibid. p. 118. 
20 Austin's understanding oflaw is essentialist, only those rules possessing specifically 
defined characteristics are laws properly so called: 
But of  positive moral rules, some are laws proper, or laws properly so called: 
others are laws improper or improperly so called. Some have all the essentials 
of  an imperative law or rule: others are deficient in some of  those essentials, 
and are styled laws or rules by an analogical extension of  the term.
51 
The primary task of  the jurist then is to enumerate those essentials, and using the 
definition thus developed to differentiate law from non-law. However, it is important 
to realise that this distinction is not (necessarily) an evaluative one, between good law 
and less good positive morality. It is simply a matter of  definition and analytic 
consistency and accuracy. For Austin, the essential characteristics oflaw (the 
necessary and sufficient criteria for recognising something as law) are: a sovereign 
command, backed by a sanction in the event of  non-compliance, laid down as a 
general rule applying to a class of  people or actions. 
International law is not law properly so-called according to this definition, having 
neither emanated from a sovereign body, nor being supported by sanctions in the 
event of  non-compliance.  52 Instead public international law is a branch of  positive 
morality in the Austinian system, but no less a science of  rules because ofthis.
53 Nor 
is it necessarily less efficacious: 
51  Ibid p. 119. 
52 See ibid. e.g. pp. 112 and 123. 
53 Ibid. p.  112. 
21 The given society may form a society political and independent, although that 
certain superior be habitually affected by laws which opinion sets or 
.  54  Imposes. 
This is not a (positive) legal limitation because it is not obedience to rules posited. In 
other words, public international law does not emanate from a determinate source, and 
so cannot be understood as a command.  55 Thus public international law forms a 
branch of  positive morality, this is a direct implication of  the consistent application of 
Austin's definition of  law to the data of  international intercourse. It  is not, however, a 
pejorative classification. The Austinian task, as noted is conceptual in nature. He set 
out to differentiate law from other normative orders, and in order to do so, he realised 
that he had first to define law. Law was a confused object of  observation, and 
therefore pure observation could not help to define law. This is why Austin finally 
decides that definition is the key to understanding law, and that laws properly 
understood as the imperative commands of  a determinate sovereign provide "the key 
to the science of  jurisprudence".  56 
A NEW BEGINNING? THE LEGACY ofH.L.A. HART: 
If Austin exemplifies the conceptual strand of  legal positivism - even though we may 
dispute, and shall certainly have occasion to refine, some of  his central ideas, 
54 Ibid p.  170 
55  See ibid. e.g. pp. 117-8. It  is, I believe, possible to define public international law as law within a(n 
at least) neo-Austinian model. This is because Austin accepts that the "members of  a Sovereign body" 
are subjects in relation to that body as a corporate entity. There is no reason not to perceive this as an 
accurate description of (the ideal of) the relationship between independent states and the "international 
community", although of  course, Austin does not do so. On this possibility, see ibid pp. 218-23. 
56 Ibid p. 21. 
22 definitions, and their necessary implications
57 
- H. L. A. Hart equally exemplifies the 
empirical strand. In contra-distinction to Austin's logical application of  abstract 
definitions to observation, Hart defines the legal positivist project as an exercise in 
"descriptive sociology". Where Austin sought logical consistency - in the face of 
common understandings oflaw - by the application of  a definition oflaw, Hart sought 
descriptive accuracy in the true identification or description of  law. 
Hart's Concept of  Law: 
The basis of  Hart's criticism of  Austin is that he did not adequately describe the law. 
In particular, the dogmatic Austinian definition oflaw as the sovereign command is 
perceived and portrayed as simply too unitary and too simplistic to describe plausibly 
an institution as complex as a modem legal system. Specifically, Austin's definition 
of  law (command backed by sanction) could not incorporate or explain legal powers 
(e.g. contract law, or wills) and had to reconstruct these unrealistically to stay within 
his dogmatic definition. Austin's intellectual crime, in Hart's eyes, was to allow his 
category choices to dominate over his empirical observations. However, of  course, 
this leaves open the question of  what to observe; and why to do so, i.e., how to justify 
that choice. 
Hart's solution to this was to focus less on abstract dogma (definitions) and to 
concentrate instead on observing and interpreting the actual actions oflegal officials, 
whatever or whoever they might be. In essence, law, for Hart, was to be understood as 
the ordered distillation ofthe acts oflegal officials. Law, for Hart, is observed as a 
57 This is one of  several tasks attempted by Hans Kelsen, and is elaborated upon infra. 
23 real feature of  real reality, it is not defined or accepted in its own counter-factuality or 
idealised existence, nor, obviously, is its functioning observed in the ideal- as it is for 
Austin or Kelsen - but only in certain regularities of actual empirical conduct. 
Thus, for Hart, positivist legal theory is primarily descriptive; empirical rather than 
normative. Hart focussed on what legal officials actually did, rather than on what 
could be (syllogistically) derived from abstract moral orders, or dogmatic definitions. 
However, Hart's theory also remained rooted in the idea of  rules, and more 
particularly oflaw as general rules,58 legal norms. Thus Hart's focus on the conduct of 
officials was generic, not specific. Hart was a legal positivist, not a legal realist in the 
guise of  sociological positivist.  59 He was not predicting the outcomes of  particular 
cases in particular courts, but instead developing the concept of  a legal system (in 
abstracto  ).60 
Drawing on his own observations Hart acknowledged both a degree of  discretion in 
the acts oflegal officials, and a degree of  constraint brought about by the law. Law 
determined some decisions, while it merely conditioned others. This is the origin of 
the famous Hartian distinction between cases falling (respectively) into the core and 
penumbra of  legal rules.
61  However, this theory of  interpretation is of  secondary 
importance, at least until the theory of  norm identification is itself more fully 
explored. Unfortunately, Hart does not really offer a definition of  the object of  his 
58 Hart "Positivism and the Separation of  Law and Morals" in Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy 49 at p. 81; see also The Concept of  Law chapter 8. 
59 See Hart, supra note 9, p. 64 and also pp. 132-4. 
60 Hart is not a conceptual legal positivist in my sense of  that term, simply because his focus is on the 
'empirical reality' of  a legal system assumed to be factually extant. Consequently, although he terms 
the object of  his analysis the concept oflaw, that object is, itself, empirical in nature. Hart's project 
remains descriptive; empirical, not conceptual. On Hart's focus on legal systems rather than law, see 
note 87, and accompanying text, infra. 
61  Supra, note 9, pp. 121-32. 
24 analysis; in fact he expressly notes that his "purpose is not to provide a definition of 
law".62 Despite the title of  his central text, Hart does not offer a Concept of  Law as 
such. This, I believe, is because his primary focus was not law as such, but the 
evolution from pre-legal to legal thought, and the necessity of creating an 
institutionalised legal system to ensure this.63 
What is clear is that, for Hart, the legal system is the advanced legal order, the mere 
set oflegal rules the primitive, having only the potential to evolve into a legal system, 
and only a true legal system will (indeed can) have surmounted all the defects of  pre-
legal decision making.64 The defining element of  such a system is that it is formed 
from "the union of  primary and secondary rules" unified by a rule of  recognition. This 
union is described by Hart as: 
Not only the heart of  a legal system, but a most powerful tool for the analysis 
of  much that has puzzled ... the jurist65 
That is: 
In the combination of  these two types of  rules there lies what Austin wrongly 
claims to have found in the notion of  coercive orders, namely, 'the key to the 
.  f··  d  '  66  SCIence 0  Junspru  ence . 
62 Ibidpp. 16-7. 
63 Ibid, pp. 91-9. 
64 Ibid esp. p. 93. 
65 Ibid p. 97. 
66 Ibid p. 79. 
25 Primary rules are direct legal obligations, the type of  rule Austin claimed formed the 
whole oflaw, orders backed by sanctions. Secondary rules are rules about rules, about 
how to find rules, how to alter rules, and who may apply those rules, and how they 
may do so. Secondary rules give institutional existence to primary rules (even when 
those primary rules are not generally followed in practice), but can themselves only be 
discovered through observation of  official actions.67 What the union of  primary and 
secondary rules does is to allow us to structure and focus our observation of  judicial 
practice, and thus to describe the law more accurately. This is achieved, in no small 
part, by our newly enriched and nuanced understanding of  rules. However, it also 
relies - in complex societies - on a second distinction between system officials and 
legal subjects.68 
However, it is equally important to understand the role of  rules in Hartian legal 
theory. Law is not simply a description of  what people actually do,69 any more than it 
is a description of  what they morally ought to do. Law is a description of  what people 
are legally obligated to do, as understood by the rules against which legal officials 
will judge the conduct of  others.  70 This creates a distinction between conduct and 
(legal) obligation, and between (legal) duty and habit,11 which can only be explained 
in terms of  a distinction between the internal and external points of  view.  72 
67 This is true even for the so-called private powers, the secondary rules allowing e.g. for the creation 
of  contracts or wills. The question is not, is never, how private individuals use these rules, but rather 
which private changes will be officially sanctioned; which private exercises of  powers will be 
recognised and, thus enforced, by legal officials. 
68  Ibid pp. 59-60. 
69 Actually, this is exactly what law in a primitive society is for Hart; the role of  validity in the Hartian 
schema is to preserve the existence of  a rule even in the face of  endemic non-compliance. This is not 
possible in simple societies, where laws just are, rather than in complex societies where they exist by 
virtue of  their pedigree (validity), see p. 69 ibid. 
70  Concept (2
nd ed.) pp. 136-41. 
71  Hart, supra note 12, pp. 54-6. 
72 Actually, Hart's main disciples Raz and MacCormick seem to agree that Hart's distinction here, 
although a good start, is too crude, as the internal perspective can itself  be divided into two, a 
26 An external point of  view is a purely empirical observation of  the conduct of  citizens, 
and would, as Hart explains, draw no distinction between the observation that drivers 
tend to stop at red lights and the observation that they tend to listen to the radio whilst 
so stopped.
73 It is the perspective of  an extra-terrestrial visitor, and of  limited utility to 
understanding social organisation generally, and the law in particular.
74 The internal 
point of  view is another matter entirely. The internal point of  view in relation to 
complex modern societies requires another distinction be drawn, that between 
officials and subjects ofthe legal order, as only the former require an internal 
perspective, the latter simply obey the law (for whatever reason) playing an 
essentially passive role in the legal system. Austin's "habit of  obedience" covers 
citizens well, but: 
The weakness of  the doctrine is that it obscures or distorts the other relatively 
active aspect, which is seen primarily ... in the law-making, law-identifying, 
and law-applying operations of  officials or experts of  the system.
75 
It  is thus from the actions of  such "officials and experts" that the true content of  the 
legal system is to be abstracted. This is where the inherent weaknesses of  the 
perspective of  understanding and one of  commitment. This is well captured in the postscript to 
MacCormick's Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (2
nd ed.) 
73  See MacCormick N., HLA Hart p. 30. 
74 Ibid pp. 86-7. It should be noted that Hart does make reference to three points of  view here, two 
external and an internal view of commitment to the system. One external view acknowledges and 
factors in the commitment of others to the system. These seem essentially analogous to Raz's "Sl, S2, 
S3" perspectives. See Raz J., Practical Reason and Norms pp. 171-7. 
75 Ibid p. 60. It  is also worth noting the very visual implications of  Hart's analysis here, the phrase 
"obscure or distort" in particular seems to imply an object of  direct observation, and further to imply 
that the weakness of Austin's theory is its limited utility as a grid of intelligibility. Where Austin 
understands observation as a metaphor, Hart takes it to be a concept. This will be developed infra; in 
the terms to be deployed there, Hart is basically accusing Austin of  providing analysts with a poor 
quality microscope. 
27 observational approach to legal theory begin to surface. The rule of  recognition is the 
ordered distillation of  the pronouncements oflegal officials. This leads firstly to 
difficulties in identifying legal officials,76 and secondly in ordering their actions so as 
to uncover underlying rules. No-one but system officials can create an institution, and 
only an institution can give law institutional (counter-factual) existence. However, if 
the existence is counter-factual, it can only be demonstrated by reference to the 
institution, but the institution is justified and identified only by reference to the rules it 
produces and applies. This is patently circular. 
The issue of  counter-factual existence, and the different senses in which this may be 
understood, explained, and recognised is clearly crucial to the present project. With 
that in mind, a brief explanation of  what this term means, and how it is to be used, is 
necessary. Counter-factual entities have no real existence, no direct presence in the 
corporeal world. They are precisely not "brute facts". Instead, their existence is 
dependent on human agency and human belief; consequently they exist (at least 
ultimately) because, and therefore as, they are defined by human beings. Law has 
such a counter-factual existence. It is not real in the sense that an undiscovered (or 
uncharted) island is real. Consequently legal theories are not evaluated by descriptive 
accuracy, because the object of  their analysis is - at least in part - constituted by their 
description. 
However, laws can be understood as counter-factual in at least two distinct ways. 
They can be purely counter-factual, identifiable only through their congruence with an 
agreed definition (as in Kelsen, Austin, and, most notably, in Fuller). Alternatively, 
76 This is of  particular pertinence in theorising international law, where the institutionalised monopoly 
of  violence is theoretical only. 
28 laws could be understood as counter-factual only in the more limited sense that they 
do not have a direct existence, observable in the actual regularities of  their subjects' 
conduct; but only an indirect existence in their recognition by the authoritative 
institutions of  a given political order. Here the existence is not purely counter-factual 
because it is dependent upon the factual existence of  the central institutions. It is 
dependent upon the factual existence of  the continuing authority of  those institutions 
whose beliefs and behaviour sustain the rules' existence.77 In this sense then, the rules 
have an institutional existence rather than a purely counter-factual existence.
78 
Purpose and Reality: Hartian Methodology: 
Hart's methodological commitment to the empirically verifiable led him to focus on 
the activities of  actually extant and authoritative institutions. The move from the pre-
legal to the legal is driven by the efficiency gains produced by institutionalisation. 
Consequently, Hart was principally concerned with those gains. As Dyzenhaus notes: 
Hart's account of  the rule of  recognition explains legal authority as an 
institution which comes into being to maximise the efficacy of  command 
structures in a complex societ/
9 
77 Again the direct nature of  observation should be noted here. Hart takes observation to be a concept in 
the sense of its being the real observation of  physically extant phenomena; of  a concept of  law which 
resides outside legal theory. On the two views of  observation, see notes 105-110, and accompanying 
text, infra. 
78 We could, therefore, follow Searle, and call such rules (or the ideal, e.g. law, which they comprise) 
"institutional facts". Indeed I am tempted to do just that, but again an ambiguity slips in (which shall be 
explored more fully in the next chapter) between two forms of  "institutional fact" one derived from 
actual institutional behaviour (the Hartian institutional fact), the other purely counter-factual and based 
on the idea of  a "thought-object"(MacCormick's advance on the Hartian model). See also MacCormick 
N. and Weinberger O.  The Institutional Theory of  Law. 
29 This caused Hart to perceive the law as the most important of  the institutionalised 
normative orders: 
When courts reach a particular conclusion on the footing that a particular rule 
has been correctly identified as law, what they say has a special authoritative 
status conferred on it by other rules.
8o 
As we shall have cause to consider, this may also mean that Hart was trapped by his 
own logic; forced into perceiving the (content of  the) most important of  the 
institutionalised normative orders (in any given society) as law: 
This [the rule of  recognition] will specify some feature or features possession 
of  which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication 
that it is a rule ofthe group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.
8l 
From the inefficacy of  a particular rule ... we must distinguish a general 
disregard of  the rules of  the system. This may be so complete in character and 
so protracted that we should say ... it never established itself as the legal 
system ... or ... that it had ceased to be the legal system.  82 
79 Dyzenhaus D. "Fuller's Novelty" in Witteveen and van der Burg (eds.) Rediscovering Fuller 78 at p. 
94. 
80 Hart, supra note 10, pp. 101-2. 
81  Ibid p. 94. 
82 Ibidp. 103. 
30 Hart's declared aim is to "provid[  e]  an improved analysis of  a municipal legal 
system" which he does not define, but whose existence he takes for granted.  83 
Unfortunately, there is a paradox here, an early appearance of  what may be called "the 
inductive fallacy." Hart defines law as the actions of  legal officials, and legal officials 
as those whose actions demonstrate law - but why focus on courts rather than public 
bars or laundrettes? The obvious answer is, of  course, that Courts are where "law" 
happens, but this, in tum, presupposes a definition oflaw. That is, the definition 
which Hart sets out to distil from observation in fact predates and constructs his 
observational perspective, and therefore the data of  his observation. Hart has already 
decided what he wants to understand and focus upon (the exercise of  centralised 
authority) in his analysis of  law. 
Law, for Hart, is about rules,84 and rules can be formed into either sets or systems. 
This is equally true oflegal rules. Therefore, not all legal rules (laws) are part of  a 
legal system, and law does not rely on the legal system for its existence.85 
Unfortunately, the specific quality which would advert to the existence oflaw (or the 
designation of  a particular rule as a legal rule) is not provided by Hart. That said, it is 
I believe fair to assume that (despite superficial protestations to the contrary) Hart 
implicitly adopted Austin's definition oflaw as a command (or, for Hart, rule) backed 
by a sanction (for Hart serious social sanction).86 Law then has two fixed 
characteristics, it is structured around rules, and its decisions are authoritative.  87 
83 This also shows the implicit bias in Hart's theory against perceiving public international law as 
"law", as he defines law solely in terms to be drawn from its municipal, institutionalised, paradigm 
cases. 
84 This is stated clearly, e.g. ibid p. 87. 
85  See, e.g., ibid, pp. 67, 79, and chapter 10. 
86 Ibid, esp. pp. 82-4 and 110. 
87 The idea of  rules is, of course, intended to be wider and more nuanced than that of  "Commands", 
encompassing ideas both of  obligation (as opposed to compulsion) and of  powers, of  secondary rules. 
However, the success of  this distinction depends on the assumption that Hart is correct, and Kelsen 
31 However, Hart is making two other, and more important, points here. Firstly, not 
every rule backed by a sanction is law, and secondly not every law - still less every 
breach of  law - is directly backed by a sanction. Therefore, according to Hart, we 
need a better technique to identify law, a technique which is manifested in the Rule of 
Recognition. The failure Hart detects in Austin is the latter's implicit reliance on a 
"one size fits all" rule of  recognition, which is declared by Hart to be empirically 
deficient, as he highlights: 
The failure to see that the "command" of  a sovereign is only one particular 
form of  a general feature which is no doubt logically necessary in a legal 
system, viz. some general test or criterion whereby the rules of  the system are 
identified.
88 
This is a problem, and one Hart determines to solve empirically. He does so by re-
focussing the question, instead of asking "what is law?" Hart asks "how do we 
identify a rule of  this (x) system?"; with the system simply assumed to be a legal 
system. Thus, in attempting to refine Austin's question, Hart in fact reifies the legal 
system into an empirical reality and the object of  direct observation. 
Again, this alteration in focus is well captured by Gardner: 
wrong, in claiming that powers should not be understood as "dependent norms". Moreover, Hart is, in 
fact, ambivalent about the relationship between sanctions and law. He acknowledges that sanctions are 
necessary to the concept of  municipal law (p. 213), but also acknowledges (p. 215) that they may not 
be necessary to the designation ofPIL as law; however, PIL would still require to be "'binding'"  in 
some other manner. 
88 Hart "Deflnition and Theory in Jurisprudence" 70 LQR (1954) 37 at p. 38 note 1. 
32 Hart showed how ... legal nonns have no "essence" nothing that makes them 
distinctively legal, except that they are nonns belonging to one legal system or 
another ... One needs to begin by asking what property or set of  properties all 
legal systems have in common that distinguish them from non-legal systems. 
Only when anned with that infonnation can one identify legal nonns 
(including laws) as legal nonns. One distinguishes laws ... as nonns belonging 
to legal systems. Pace Kelsen, one does not distinguish legal systems as 
systems made up oflaws ... legal systems are the basic units oflaw.89 
This paradigmatic shift in thought is evident in Hart's Inaugural Lecture "Definition 
and Theory in Jurisprudence".9o In this essay, Hart rejected the idea of  advance 
definition as a technique for reaching or improving our understanding of  legal 
concepts. Instead, he shifted the focus of  analysis to the contextualised use oflegal 
tenninology, and claimed to be elUcidating the underlying concepts.91  However, in 
order to develop and test understandings in this way the legal system must itselfbe 
presupposed as the objective domain of  analysis. In other words, absent a controlling 
definition, some other external arbiter of  truth or accuracy is required, and only a legal 
system presupposed as extant and legal, can fulfil this role. The problem, of  course, is 
that this technique cannot then be transferred to the legal system as such, unless 
another system (or category) is posited as providing the objective domain of  analysis 
in which the correct identification and elucidation oflegal systems (as such) could be 
evaluated. 
89 Gardner "Legality" 170-1 paragraph breaks suppressed, and note omitted. 
90 Supra, note 85. 
91  See e.g. Concept p. 208. 
33 Although they cannot define law as such, (after all, for Hart, nothing can92) rules are a 
very important aspect of  the Hartian legal world view. The key defect Hart perceived 
in Austin's work was the idea that only one kind of  rule, the sovereign command, 
could be considered to be law. Hart disagreed as, for him, this would "distort the ways 
in which [laws] are spoken of, thought of, and actually used in social life".  93  Austin's 
description was incomplete and inaccurate, he had allowed logical consistency to 
override empirical observation, that is, he had fallen into the classic dogmatist's 
pitfall. This was a mistake Hart would not repeat. Law existed, it could be observed 
and described, but only by focussing upon "simple truths about different forms of 
social structure [, truths which] can, however, easily be obscured by the obstinate 
search for unity and system where these desirable elements are not in fact to be 
found.,,94 Observation must be given priority over dogmatic definition, and-
assuming the "system" in the quotation to be a legal system, as no other system seems 
appropriate -law as such must be conceptually separated from the legal system.95 
A contradiction begins to surface here, as Hart seems - to say the very least - unsure 
about the relationship between law and legal system. Outwith the Concept of  Law, as 
Gardner suggests, Hart's work appears to indicate that the two are inseparable, that 
understanding of  the law is derivative on understanding of  the legal system. One way 
92 See note 62 and accompanying text supra; Concept pp. 16-7. 
93 Ibid p. 78. Here, I believe, we see the impact of  the linguistic philosophy of  Hart's friend J. L. 
Austin; Hart, following Austin, believed that "a sharpened awareness of  words [would] sharpen our 
perception of  the phenomena". (ibid p. v). Once more, the observational overtones of  Hart's language 
are revealing, Austin's work 'distorts' an object of  analysis (the law) itself extant externally to that act 
of  observation. 
94 Ibid p. 230. 
95 This seems to me to be the basic claim of  chapter X ofthe Concept; however, Hart never talks about 
primitive sets of  "laws", but only ever of  sets of "rules" (which seem in his analogies to cover 
everything from etiquette to PIL). Moreover, and more confusingly, he does at times refer to the 
international legal system but he also notes expressly "the rules [ofPIL] which are in fact operative 
constitute not a system but a set of  rules" concluding that a basic rule of  recognition does not (as yet) 
"represent an actual feature of the system"; Concept p. 231. 
34 to avoid contradiction would be to ignore chapter 10 of  the Concept, to treat it as a 
mistake, or a red herring. But, of  course, that chapter was not excised from the second 
edition, and thus we can assume Hart did not perceive it in that way. Consequently, 
we must consider other ways of  reconciling this apparent contradiction. 
They key lies in Gardner's analysis itself: 
One needs to begin by asking what property or set of  properties all legal 
systems have in common that distinguish them from non-legal systems.
96 
This "property" in Hartian analysis is the authority of  the legal system; all legal 
systems are empirically observable as the actions ofthe  factually authoritative organs 
(institutions) of  their host societies. However, a 'primitive society, i.e. a society 
lacking such centralised and authoritative institutions, can nonetheless have laws. 
Consequently, it must be assumed that these 'laws' themselves - and individually at 
that - possess this stamp of  authority. The contradiction can be resolved by assuming 
the authority ofthe legal system into each individual norm of a primitive 'set' oflegal 
rules. 
Thus, for Hart, law is, and law is what legal officials consider it to be. Law is 
discovered by observing, classifying, and understanding the activities (and rhetoric) of 
legal officials. This is accomplished through structured, but responsive, empirical 
observation and does not rely on a metaphysics of  definition nor of  morality. Law has 
96 See note 87, supra. 
35 little by way of  fixed characteristics, it has a thin ontology97 based on an idea of  rules 
and obligation or authority; (advanced) legal systems bear the additional identifying 
characteristic of  a rule of  recognition unifying a synthesis of  primary and secondary 
rules. There is, however, no necessary connection between law and legal system, nor 
between law and morality, in the Hartian universe. It is important to note that this 
claim is staked, by Hart, as a factual, not a normative, one.
98 
So, Hart's primary focus is really the institutionalisation of  the law in the form of  a 
legal system, the move from the "pre-legal to the legal world" and the societal 
advantages this brings. However, as Fuller notices, and implicitly bases much of  his 
critique upon, this raises an undeclared methodological choice or even contradiction. 
Is data to be observed because of  its legal or rather because of  its institutional 
nature?99 Although Hart acknowledges that the existence of  law does not depend on 
the existence of  an institutionalised legal system, he does not explain the specifically 
legal form of  the former, nor for that matter does he explain the specifically legal 
form of  the legal system. This is where the nexus to authority (i.e. the official 
monopoly of 'legitimate' violence) comes into relief, in what Fuller terms a 
"confusion" between "deference to constituted authority and fidelity to law".  100 
"For Hart, the foundation of  any legal system is an observable rule of  recognition that 
guides official behaviour in the ascertainment oflaws."lOl The rule of  recognition 
97 On the possible ontologies of law, see Amse1ek P. and MacCormick N., (ed.s) Controversies About 
Law's Ontology 
98 It  may also be important to note, per Gardner, that both claims are radically overstated, and indeed 
wrong, see supra note 1, pp. 222-5. 
99 Raz, see note 21  supra, appears to avoid contradiction here, but only through and act of  choice which 
completely elides the institutional and the legal, making the former the empirical identifier of  the latter. 
100 Fuller L. The Morality of  Law (2n ed.) p. 41. 
101  Kramer M., "The Rule of  Misrecognition in the Hart of  Jurisprudence" 8 OJLS (1988) 401, at p. 
406. 
36 actually exists, and is actually observable, it is observed in the regularities of  official 
conduct, the law - in its counter-factual existence - is the product, the effect, of  these 
regularities, thus it cannot be their cause. In primitive, or pre-legal,  102 societies, law 
can still exist, but it cannot do so counter-factually. In other words, in such societies, 
the existence oflaws is real, and is to be ascertained from the empirical regularities of 
actual conduct. A legal rule exists where people actually modulate their behaviour 
according to its demands; should this actual regularity wither, so would the rule. The 
rules have no distinct ontological status, only empirical existence, and when they can 
no longer be empirically observed, they no longer exist. "If, there [in a primitive 
society], the internal point of  view is not widely disseminated there could not 
logically be any rules".  103 
In advanced, or legal, societies, matters are quite different. Here the rule of 
recognition renders the actual empirical regularities of  the masses' conduct, in relation 
to any specific rule, irrelevant.  104 What counts instead are the regularities of  official 
conduct. Where legal officials customarily recognise and implement (as law) any 
particular form of  rules - generally rules from a specific source or set of  sources -
these rules can exist (regardless of  how the masses react to them) by virtue of  that 
recognition and implementation: 
102 For Hart, a pre-legal society is a society without a legal system; not, necessarily, a society without 
law. 
103 Hart, Concept, p. 114. 
104 See note 24, and accompanying text, supra. The distinction is between the existence of  individual 
rules, which does not rely on their empirical efficacy, and the existence of  the legal system as a whole, 
which does rely upon its empirical efficacy. For the legal system, as such, to exist there must be a 
general obedience of  the rules (as a whole), by the citizenry; and an acceptance of  the rule of 
recognition by system officials. Concept p. 1l3. This would seem also to entail a general acceptance by 
the subjects of  the system, of  the institutions of  the system, so that officials could be identified, and a 
rule of  recognition distilled. 
37 The rules of  the simple structure are, like the basic rule [the rule of 
recognition] of  the more advanced systems, binding if  they are accepted and 
function as such. 105 
Conceptually, in order for a legal system to exist it must have a rule of  recognition. 
However, this rule has no necessary content. In practice its content will vary from 
legal system to legal system. Nonetheless, in each system, behind the surface 
differences, is an underlying identity, rules are recognised on the basis of  an agreed 
formal regularity (their source), the legal system is identified by the existence of  a 
rule telling us how to recognise legal rules ofthat system; by a rule of  recognition. 
The rule of  recognition - itself directly derived from the observation of  actual 
institutional behaviour - facilitates the institutional existence oflaw, its counter-
factual existence, or validity. 
The rule of  recognition, like the existence of  a legal system, is a matter ofjact, an 
empirically observable reality. This is the key difference between Hart and Raz on the 
one side and Austin and Kelsen on the other. All agree that law, properly understood 
as a legal positivist thesis, is capable of  impartial observation in two senses: first, law 
can be impartially observed; second, law itself can 'impartially' observe the world. It 
is the second point, or rather the obviously metaphorical nature of  the second claim, 
which best illustrates the disagreement over the first. The key is understanding the 
specific sense of  impartiality implicit in law. This is well captured by MacCormick: 
105 Ibid, p. 230. 
38 [T]here is nothing antipositivistic about saying that law is not value-free. 
Nobody in their right mind - and there are at least some positivists who are in 
their right mind - has ever suggested or would ever suggest that the law itself 
is value-free. 106 
Rather, law is impartial in the very specific sense that it is fully cognisant of  its own 
partialities and biases and it applies these consistently. Substantively, law is arbitrary, 
it is a codification of  values, a "congealed politics,,107, or the insulated outcomes of 
political struggles. 
However, and this is just as important, the same metaphorical sense of  impartial 
observation applies to the analysis oflaw itself. Here, however, definition plays the 
role oflegal rules; definition structures observation in a consistent manner, just as 
rules· would structure evaluation in a consistent manner. Thus on the one hand, Austin 
and Kelsen understand observation as a metaphor; they seek to describe a counter-
factual ideal; the ideal idea oflaw as a product created and 'signified' by the 
existence of  defined empirical phenomena, but itself an entity additional to those 
phenomena. Hart and Raz on the other hand, take observation to be a concept; they 
seek to describe actual behaviour. This alters the focus of  observation and analysis 
quite dramatically. Austin and Kelsen focus on the legal qualities which make law 
law. That is, these theorists offer defined empirical identifiers of  law, features which 
differentiate law from other social (and even regulative) practices. lOS 
106 MacCormick, supra note 70, p. 233. 
107 Asmal K., "Truth Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Perspective" 63 MLR (2000) 1 at 
p.  15 note 72 
108 In both cases, and in my opinion inaccurately, these identifiers are defmed as the connection to 
centralised violence in the form of  sanction for breach. However, and this is the key point, it is the 
39 Hart and Raz on the other hand, focus on the institutional qualities oflaw in advanced 
societies
109 
- or in more primitive circumstances on the factual existence oflaw 
(regularities of  conduct, laws like those of  the natural sciences)-which provide law 
with an actual existence to be observed. Thus there must be some factually 
ascertainable regularity: be it the actual regularity of  conduct which gives real 
existence to legal norms in a primitive society; or the actual social centrality of  the 
norm-issuing (and therefore legal) institution. Here it is the actual existence of  the 
institution which facilitates the institutional existence oflegal norms in advanced 
societies. 
Hart has to focus on the factually ascertainable, that is the institutions, and seek "the 
law" as a unifying concept abstractable from the multiplicity of  institutionalised legal 
systems. Without a Rule of  Recognition there can be no legal system - though there 
can be law based not on the Kelsenian, or institutionalised, model of  "normative 
imputation" (an if-ought understanding) but on a purely natural scientific notion of 
causation (an if-then understanding) - but without system officials we have no-one 
from whose conduct and rhetoric a rule of  recognition could be abstracted. Moreover, 
without a legal system, we cannot have legal officials. The more we concentrate, the 
more the rule of  recognition begins to sound like a definition of  law - or perhaps it is 
legal system that is defined, and the rule of  recognition observed so as to faithfully 
portray the methodological and substantive differences between legal systems. 
presence of  the defmed identifiers, and not (necessarily) institutional location as such, which indicates 
the existence oflaws and legal systems. 
109 Perhaps this is clearest in Raz's unguarded confiation, "central social institutions: i.e. legal 
institutions" (supra note 21). It  is not the presence of  any defined empirical feature (e.g. the relation to 
sanctions), as such, which identifies law (as law), but rather the status of  the body (the institution) from 
40 For Hart, the rule of  recognition as a concept - the existence of  a rule of  recognition 
(regardless of  its particular content) - is  the identifYing mark of  a legal system. When 
there is a body oflegal officials who can be factually observed as adopting a common 
standard (whatever that might be) for the identification (the recognition) of  legal 
rules, and where this body has access to (or, more accurately, is subservient to the 
possessor of) the institutionalised monopoly on legitimate violence, then a rule of 
recognition, and hence a legal system, exists. What that body of  officials recognise is 
the law (and therefore must be law) by virtue of  their recognising (and applying) it. 
The rule of  recognition as substance facilitates the identification of  rules within a 
given legal system (which is now effectively reduced to an institutionalised coercive 
order) based on abstractly formulating what that system's officials will recognise, 
implement, apply, and enforce. So long as the system remains generally efficacious, 
the content of  the rule of  recognition remains the definition oflaw. 
There are, however, two things which can be said with confidence about law in the 
Hartian system: first, law is about rules; second, law is capable of  being observed. 
These statements are true oflaw as such, and not merely of  (laws in) legal systems. 
This means that rules must have an existence. However, this existence could be either 
factual or counter-factual, though in either case the rule must remain capable of  being 
observed. From here it is apparent that the factual existence of a rule (the pre-requisite 
of  the factual observation, identification and description of  a rule) can only refer to the 
regularities (the law-like appearances) of  actual conduct. Laws factually exist only 
where they are (at least almost) invariably obeyed. This must be the status oflaw(s) in 
which regulative commands (rules of  law) emanate. The institutional origin of  the rule, rather than any 
specific characteristics, serve to distinguish legal from non-legal rules. 
41 a primitive or pre-legal society. 
1 
10 As Hart himself  puts it "in the simpler fonn of 
society we must wait and see whether a rule gets accepted as a rule or not". III 
The move to an advanced, or legal, society - manifested through the appearance of  a 
rule of  recognition and consequently of  a legal system - allows for the counter-factual 
existence ofnonns (the laws of  the system). Hart continues this quotation thus: "in a 
system with a basic rule of  recognition we can say before a rule is actually made, that 
it will be valid ifit confonns to the requirements of  the rule of  recognition". Validity 
then is something more than existence, or rather validity is a different form of 
existence, validity is counter-factual existence.1l2 In an advanced system laws can 
exist by virtue of  their pedigree (their validity in Kelsen's sense113), regardless of 
whether or not conduct actually confonns to their demands.  114 
Put more precisely, in the Hartian system, the counter-factual existence of  these laws 
is based on the institutional recognition oftheir pedigree. This institutional 
recognition is, of  course, the source, the content, and indeed the very existence of  the 
rule of  recognition. The rule of  recognition is (and must be) capable of  being factually 
observed, and it is through that factual observation that the observation of  counter-
factually extant, valid, legal nonns is facilitated. This means that legal norms-
despite their admittedly counter-factual nature - remain capable of  factual 
observation, but only because it is not the rules, but the institutional behaviour 
110 Concept 2
nd ed. Pp. 234-5. 
III Ibid p. 234. 
112 This is confmned by Hart ibid pp. 100-110, see esp. p. 103. 
113 Again, we must be careful here. Hart and Kelsen do not agree on the nature of  validity for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, for Kelsen, validity is the only form of  existence or ontology a norm can bear, 
whereas for Hart a norm can be said to exist from the simple presence of  behavioural regularities. 
Secondly, for Kelsen, for a norm to be valid as a legal norm it requires certain formal merits (the 
connection to the grundnorm and to force), for Hart this is not true. See Gardner, supra note 1, p. 208. 
114 Concept 2
nd ed. pp. 100-110; see also notes 24 and 102, and accompanying text, supra. 
42 sustaining them, which is being observed. The key point is that any behaviour of 
authoritative institutions can be law-creative; this contrasts with the conceptual 
approach, which defines and delimits in advance those behaviours which are law-
constitutive. 
Therefore, the rule of  recognition itself  has (and must have) a real existence, it is 
supported by observation (not by logical hypothesis) it is a datum of  natural reality 
because it must "represent an actual feature of  the system".  115 The rule of  recognition 
exists only if  it is "accepted and function[s] as such".  116 This entails that the Rule of 
Recognition (though not the norms and other features of  the legal system it identifies) 
must itselfbe susceptible to natural scientific methodologies of  observation: 
One who makes an internal statement concerning the validity of a particular 
rule of a system may be said to presuppose the truth of  the external statement 
offact that the system is generally efficacious.  117 
Moreover, it is this real existence (of  the rule of  recognition, and the centralised 
authority it presupposes) which in tum creates and sustains the counter-factual 
existence oflegal norms; whether they are in fact obeyed or not; i.e. whether or not 
they retain factual existence ("are accepted and function as such"). Only if  officials 
were to fail (qua officials) to enforce - i.e. to recognise and implement - a rule (or, 
more profoundly, a rule-making procedure) could the rule's counter-factual existence 
(its claim to validity) be lost. The mere fact that the populace of any given advanced 
115  Conceptp. 23l. 
116 Ibid p. 230. 
117 Hart, supra note 10, p. 104, emphasis added. 
43 society do not obey a particular legal rule (of that society's legal system) does not 
deny that rule existence (as it would in a primitive society). 
But, what this means in practice is that the data is in fact observed - as Fuller 
suspected and charged - on its institutional nature, and not on its legal nature at all. 
The sociological observation of  the "internal point of  view" is derivative of, and 
dependent upon, the natural scientific - empirical or "external" - observation ofthe 
factual existence of authority. It is this 'fact' of  authority which identifies data as 
legally relevant. 
Law is being defined as, and so must be confused with, "deference to constituted 
authority". This leaves one central question, which is not directly addressed by Hart: 
what is the nature, or the empirical identifiers, of  this institutional existence? Nor, 
more fundamentally and importantly, does Hart appear to engage with the underlying 
issue of  which type(s) of  institution is/are capable of  conferring this institutional (i.e. 
counter-factual) existence. He is, however, clear that efficacy is a necessary 
criteria, 118 and implicitly, that it may even be a sufficient criteria.
119 
The rule of  recognition, as an analytic tool, is a general concept; i.e. legal systems 
must contain rules for recognising valid norms. This general concept is equally 
compatible with either a purely counter-factual, or an institutional, understanding of 
law. However, for Hart - and as entailed by Hartian methodology - the rule of 
recognition is also (inherently) an institutional concept. From the Hartian perspective 
the very existence of  the rule of  recognition lies in its empirical observability, and this 
118 Ibid p. 233. 
44 in tum pre-supposes a dominant centralised (judicial) institution whose behaviour or 
judgment construction can be observed. Thus the Hartian rule of  recognition can only 
focus on institutions, and never on forms oflaw alone. 
However, Hart's observation is not, in this regard, a pure observation, but a mediated 
one. Although both direct their attention to the behaviour of  actually extant (and 
actually socially central) institutions, the focus for Hart, and contra American Legal 
Realism, is on how judgments are constructed, how they are legitimated; that is, it is a 
focus on judicial rhetoric; not on the substance of  the judicial decision, let alone its 
real world impact. It is in this judicial rhetoric that the counter-factual existence of  the 
legal norms resides. 
However, the important point is that the rule of  recognition itself is a product of 
observation, because this in tum presupposes an object of  observation, in this case the 
actual institutional behaviour. This means, logically, that the rule of  recognition is an 
effect of a cause which must precede it. Therefore, the existence of  the rule of 
recognition is not a cause (nor a signifier) of  the birth or advent of  a legal system, but 
rather an effect. Hart's is, quite simply, not a theory oflaw, but rather a theory of  the 
institutional centralisation of  adjudication and force: 
The absence of  an official monopoly of  'sanctions', may be serious ... 
however ... the lack of  official agencies to determine authoritatively the fact 
of  violation ofthe rules is a much more serious defect. 120 
119 Ibid, chapter 9 and pp. 213-4. See also p. 113 where Hart suggests "general obedience" and official 
commitment as the necessary and sufficient features of  a legal system. 
45 Judges [possess] ... the exclusive power to direct the application of  penalties 
by other officials. These secondary rules provide the centralized official 
'sanctions' of  the system. 121 
It is a theory of  political power, merely masquerading as a theory oflaw, and this is 
because the "legal system" is defined as the totality of  "central social institutions: i.e. 
legal institutions". 
In this sense then, Hart's theory is essentially Hobbesian, it is the legitimation of  a 
perceived need to impose order - to substantivise
122 and determine the law. In fact, 
the Sovereign continues to haunt legal theory in its Hartian guise, because the 
Sovereign Command is the thing recognised by (and/or imposed upon) the judges. 
The sovereign command remains the cause, judicial recognition and sociological 
observation (which between them constitute the rule of  recognition) being merely the 
effect and explanation of  that underlying cause. 
To choose to focus on the officials' actions - their consent to this imposed order - is 
to fudge the issue, automatically to legitimate the institution whose actions are 
actually under observation (the Sovereign), whose order (or command) is recognised, 
with the signifier "law". Of  course, consent may seem prima facie an inaccurate, even 
an unfair, parody ofthe Hartian demand for a "critical reflective attitude". However, 
this is not necessarily so. What must be constantly borne in mind is the nature and 
meaning of  critical reflective attitude. This is not a critical reflection on the rules and 
120 Hart, supra note 10, pp. 93-4. 
121  Ibid p. 98. 
46 standards of  the legal system; indeed it is incapable of  being critical of  these. This is 
because the critical reflective attitude, the internal point of  view which judges and 
other officials must possess, is itself constructed  from the rules and standards of  the 
legal system. It is an embodiment of  these rules and standards, as so cannot form a 
point of  critique for them. The more fully this "critical reflective attitude" is 
developed, the more complete the officials' consent to the established order becomes. 
Nonetheless using the rule of  recognition to signify law carries great rhetorical force, 
most especially in the Anglo-American legal academy. Moreover, the analytical 
device (the rule of  recognition as power and duty) is very useful. Fortunately, the 
analytic tool can be separated from the methodology within which Hart constructed 
and deployed it. 
The rule of  recognition gives our observational focus a purpose - to identify "law", or 
the "rules of  the system" or changes thereto - but we must in tum give our focus 
substance, we must choose which data to observe as law. The rule of  recognition - as 
an analytic concept - is a tool. Like a microscope it focuses and changes how we see, 
how we perceive, but it cannot choose, determine, or even condition what we observe, 
which phenomena we bring within its focus. Thus, the rule of  recognition does not, 
and cannot, affect (let alone effect) how we define law. The act of  definition (the 
choice of  which data to put on the microscope's slide) is presupposed by Hart, law is 
the actions of  socially central institutions; however, this choice of  data, this definition 
oflaw, remains totally unarticulated, undisclosed. 
122 To make the law substantive, to add substance (content) to the law. I have adopted this form, the 
creation of a verb from a noun, from Ke1sen's translators, and thus it owes its etymology to the 
47 Thus, Hart chooses to focus on institutional centrality - deference to constituted 
authority as Fuller might say - and Hart chooses to call this "law". However, he then 
quickly mediates this choice by focussing on the judicial reception of  the Sovereign 
Act. Hart simply presupposes - and so legitimates, by moving beyond or behind 
critique - the acts of  the Power which imposes its will on the judges. Law then equals 
institutional control, not conceptually, not inherently, but definitionally. 
Definitionally, because Hart has chosen institutional centrality as the data from which 
legal systems, and then law, are to be "elucidated". 
BUT, WHY THATDATA en? THE DWORKINIAN CHALLENGE: 
Hart gives an account of  what the law is, a mediated realism structured through the 
notion ofrule(s). When he encounters adjudication he observes rule determined 
decisions, rule conditioned decisions of  varying degrees, and 'arbitrary' decisions, at 
the boundaries oflaw, the "margins of  rules". 123 He describes what he sees, and 
constructs the core/penumbra model to explain (i.e. thematise and structure) his 
observations. Hart refuses to give up on the dogma of  rules, but this means his 
observation is admittedly mediated, and so cannot be justified by purely empirical 
referents. Law, for Hart, appears to be definitionally about rules. Apart from that 
point, however, legal theory in its Hartian form is descriptive, rather than normative -
it is about what judges (legal officials) do; not about what they ought to do. This 
leaves open the question of  how legal officials are to be defined or identified. 
Kelsenian concept of  "concretisation". 
123 Hart, supra note 10, at p. 135. 
48 Dworkin fundamentally disagrees with the Hartian insistence on rules, arguing instead 
that all (correct) legal decisions are fully determined by law, but only once law is 
properly understood as containing rules and principles. As Gardner puts it: 
If  they [judges] did anything other than applying valid legal norms they would 
be part-time legislators, Dworkin said, and that would lay to waste the 
important doctrine of  the separation of  powers between the legislature and the 
judiciary.  124 
This means that any discretion judges appear to exercise is apparent only. 125 In other 
words, Dworkin charges Hart with the very error which Hart attributed to Austin, that 
he allowed his dogmatic definition oflaw (as a system of  rules) to obscure the reality 
of  the data, i.e. a judicial decision fully determined by law. Hart, Dworkin suggests, 
failed to see the reality ofthe law (i.e. his vision failed to correspond with Dworkin's 
'true' observation of  what law is) because his view was structured - or even fully 
constructed - by (part of) his own definition oflaw (as a body of  rules). Dworkin 
radically challenges the accuracy of  Hart's descriptive sociology, the very  foundation 
of  his (descriptive) legal theory. He challenges Hart's observations themselves. Raban 
summarises this charge perfectly: 
Dworkin. "  argues that these pervasive disagreements are legal disputes par 
excellence - that they are (as they claim to be) disagreements about what the 
law is, not about what it should be. Dworkin transforms what for the 
124 Gardner, supra note 1, at p. 214. 
125 It should be noted that the positivists have in their various ways replied to, and in my view 
successfully refuted this point, see e.g. Gardner ibid pp. 214-8; Raz The Concept of  a Legal System pp. 
24-5 and 181-7; MacCormick, supra note 70, p. 233. 
49 positivists is an unfortunate though perhaps inevitable modus operandi - the 
dirty little secret of  legal practice which Austin has branded a 'childish fiction' 
(i.e. practitioners purporting to determine what the law is while making 
normative claims about the desirability of  their own positions) into a 
fundamental aspect oflegal argumentation and legal decision-making. There is 
nothing childish about purporting to ascertain what the law is while making 
normative claims - that is precisely what ascertaining the law is about! If  the 
positivists see this as institutional deception, it is only because their 
understanding of  law is wrong.
126 
The challenge is primarily directed at the very centre of  the Hartian understanding of 
law, it disputes the fundamental presupposition that law is "determined by criteria 
shared among legal practitioners". Dworkin challenges Hart's choice of  data ("the 
true") and his evaluation of  that data ("the important"), he asserts that there is no 
necessary truth to what Hart chooses to observe, in effect there is nothing which 
demands to be observed; but only a choice of  data and focus. Dworkin disputes the 
very possibility of  (truthfully) distilling a determinate rule of  recognition from the 
observation oflegal phenomena: 
Legal practitioners, says Dworkin, habitually disagree about which rights and 
duties are legally valid and about why they are: there are no shared criteria to 
be found here. 127 
126 Raban O. "Dworkin's 'Best Light' Requirement and the Proper Methodology of  Legal Theory" 23 
OJLS (2003) 243 atpp. 261-2, footnote omitted. Emphasis added. 
127 Ibid p. 244. 
50 Therefore, law must be a question of  interpretation, a question of  preferences, and of 
perceiving law "in its best light". Thus where (Hart as) a legal positivist claims "that 
the correct legal requirements are a matter of  (non-controversial) conventional 
agreement",128 Dworkin and his followers perceive only controversy: "the 
commonness of  such disagreements is undeniable (they exist in every case arriving 
before a court, for example)"  .129 
The most important issue for present purposes is to realise that Hart and Dworkin are 
both empirical theorists oflaw. Their disagreement does not concern how to theorise 
law, but on what to take as data (in Gardner's terms: on what is "the true" (oflaw)) 
and how to interpret it (what is "the important"). From this perspective, both portray 
law as the ordered distillation of  the acts of  legal officials. The dispute arises in the 
identification of  legal officials, and the interpretation and classification of  their 
actions. Dworkin identifies Supreme Court judges as the paradigm case of  legal 
officialdom, he then postulates normatively that other judges ought to behave as 
Supreme Court judges do. The only normative commitment apparent in Hart's theory 
is to law as rules, beyond this he offers no justification for his identification of  legal 
officials. His theory is not normative, but is content to describe what legal officials 
actually do; provided only that this can be achieved while maintaining the concept of 
legal rules in some form. 
What Dworkin Reveals About Hart: 
128 Ibid p. 261. 
129 Ibidpp. 261-2. 
51 As Fuller notes in his "Reply to Critics" in the revised edition of The Morality of  Law, 
a primary function of  debate and critique is to "reveal more clearly the tacit 
presuppositions that each side brings to the debate"  .130 This is true of  the debate 
between Hart and Dworkin. What does the Dworkinian challenge reveal about the 
Hartian perception of  law? 
Hart's initial formulation ofthe Rule of  Recognition, formulated in response to 
Austin,131 actually appears to be little more than a description of  the necessary 
conditions for the operation of  (Hart's sources based conception of) legal reasoning. If 
we assume that the immediate task oflaw is to provide authoritative answers to 
socially contested questions, then law must function by reducing complexity, by 
eliminating variables and argumentative techniques, by focussing the question. Thus 
the emphasis on sources, and their recognisability, is a description of  some ofthe 
features which law must possess in order to facilitate legal reasoning. However, this 
initial formulation is not a definition oflaw; but an abstract claim about what the law 
does. 
To discover the content of  any given body oflaw we must discern the definition of  a 
legal system,132 and Hart's final formulation ofthe Rule of  Recognition provides this. 
This tells us how to identify the rules of  the system (the substantive law) but, in doing 
so, relies on the existence of  a legal system, and so must, implicitly, define that legal 
system. The criteria for a legal system would appear to be as follows: 
1.  The existence of  a stable community 
130 Fuller, supra note 95, p. 20l. 
131  See note 81, supra, and accompanying text. 
52 2.  With dominant central institutions 
3.  Which apply rules 
4.  Which are generally obeyed, or give rise to centralised sanctions for 
disobedience 
These four criteria define the idea of  "general obedience" (Conceptp. 113) 
5.  The rules must be identifiable 
6.  The criteria for identifying rules must be agreed (The truth of  this is where 
Dworkin disagrees with Hart) 
7.  These criteria must be applied in practice (Again, Dworkin disagrees that this 
occurs) 
These three criteria define the legal system as unified by its Rule of 
Recognition 
8.  The factual application of  the shared criteria can be observed (The functioning 
of  the Rule of  Recognition) 
9.  The criteria can therefore be enumerated, and tested for correspondence 
against empirical data (The conclusion, and thus content, of  the Rule of 
Recognition.  ) 
These two criteria identify the norms of  the legal system; the law. 
132 See note 82, supra, and accompanying text. 
53 None of  this seems inherently problematic. Indeed the dispute can be clearly 
understood, and consequently become susceptible to objective resolution. This is 
because the data against which the dispute should be evaluated is identified. The 
dispute concerns only "the important"; not "the true". The primary questions concern 
the existence of  the indeterminacy Dworkin perceives in the upper echelons of  legal 
reasoning. And their effect upon reasoning in the lower echelons. However, it is in the 
agreement on the data that the problem arises. 
Because Hart and Dworkin focus on the disputed points (5) and (6), they focus on 
institutional behaviour. That is, they observe the fact of  adjudicative processes and 
seek to identify the form and function oflaw from these. This is back to front: 
adjudication is the application of  law to specific disputes. The form and function of 
law should determine (or at least condition) the structure of adjudication. As Fuller 
noted, and Dyzenhaus attempts to put into practice, attention should be directed to the 
law as SUCh,133  and how that should affect adjudicative practice. That is, we should 
focus on what adjudication ought to be like, iflaw is to live up to its own ideological 
claim, or legitimatory promise. But neither Hart nor Dworkin do this; and their debate 
paradoxically both disguises and illuminates this fact. 
Ultimately, the key differences between Hart and Dworkin are not so much 
methodological as purposive. Both agree that law is subject to factual observation, 
and is to be found in the actions and rhetoric of  legal officials. Their disagreement is 
over what this data comprises,134 and how to describe and classify it. In particular they 
disagree over the relative strength of  rules and principles in non-exceptional cases. 
133 In chapter 2, I shall pursue this idea of  the law as such, or the "thought object" oflaw, more fully. 
54 Dworkin openly admits that some aspects oflaw are governed by convention,135 Hart 
admits that others are not.136 The question becomes one of  degree, of  focus, and of 
telos, of  why we are doing legal theory, and why we are doing law. The question, in 
other words is how to identify and classify data, in simpler terms, what to look at, and 
how to describe it - what is "the true", and what among "the true" is "important". 
No non-normative theory oflaw (except perhaps those premised on sociological 
methods, e.g. legal realism or even ethnomenthodological approaches to data 
collection) can offer a non-recursive solution to these questions. Only by postulating a 
purpose for law (taking a normative stance on what law is for) can we construct a 
defensible definition of  our data choice. It is only in deciding what law is for
l37 that 
we can structure our understanding of  what is to count as law, our understanding of 
what law is; our definition of  "the true" of  law. Even the sociological approaches can 
at best only stipulate what is to be considered a legal official or institution. Do we 
focus on the cases where law does not provide a uniquely (legally) correct answer so 
as to undermine the cases where such an answer is provided? If  so, why, how, and 
when? Moreover, absent an initial definition, how do we identify a legal decision at 
all? 
134 This is true only to the very limited extent that Dworkin perceives principles as part of ("the true" 
of) law and Hart does not. 
135 See, Law's Empire at, e.g., pp. 3-5, 34-6, 39, and esp. 88. 
136 Hart, supra note 10, p. 135. 
137 This refers to the purpose of law as such; not to the purpose of  the legal system, nor to the 
(substantive) purpose of  (legal) regulation in any given society. A key difference between my approach 
and that espoused by Dworkin is this focus on the formal purpose of  law - the defmition of  the 'tool', 
law - rather than the substantive purpose of  legal regulation - the 'best' use of  that tool, in Dworkin's 
case the pursuit of  liberal individualism. My understanding of  purpose is directed toward what counts 
as law, Dworkin's to how law should be interpreted. In Dworkinian terms, my focus is on the 
"pre  interpretative stage", in which, despite raising the issue, he has no apparent interest: "we may 
therefore abstract from this stage in our analysis by presupposing that the classifications it yields are 
treated as given". (Law's Empire p. 66). In other words, for all practical purposes, the law remains for 
55 This, surely, is the key issue: is it, in any way, possible to identify a legal decision (or 
any other datum of  "legal reality") without first defining law? Even ifit is enough to 
consider the actions of  central social institutions to be the source oflaw, is it entailed 
that everything these institutions do be understood as law; be accommodated within 
the definition, the concept, oflaw? Moreover, without disputing either the necessity 
or sufficiency of  socially central institutions to the identification oflaw, can we not 
fairly ask why the actions of  these institutions are necessarily law? Gardner notes that 
"it is an objection to the explanation of  the nature oflaw that according to it the laws 
of  Sweden are not laws",  138 but this fudge the issues; it presupposes that the laws of 
Sweden are laws. 
This may not be an unfair presupposition, but it may also be eliding several distinct 
assumptions: that there is an independent country called Sweden; that that country has 
centralised social institutions; that these institutions seek to regulate the behaviour of 
Sweden's citizens; that those citizens generally obey the institutions. The final 
assumption is that if  the above assumptions are correct, then Sweden necessarily has a 
legal system. But what if  that system relied purely on "Khadi justice"  139 in Weber's 
sense? What if  the system produced no rules, failed to treat like cases alike, or even 
denied the idea of  "like cases"? Centralised order could be maintained, and we could 
call this legal order (or the order of  a legal system), but there would seem to be no 
necessity that we do so. In other words, and this is the point that Gardner appears to 
me to fudge, it may not be "an objection to an explanation of  the nature of  law" that 
Dworkin what it is for Hart, a matter of  social fact. The distinction between the two purposes, and the 
two levels of analysis to which they give rise, is more fully analysed in chapter 2. 
138 Supra, note 27, p. 168. 
139 Cf. Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society, Rheinstein M. (ed.), pp. 212-3. 
56 according to it, the techniques adopted by the centralised authority regulating the 
populace of  a given territory are not considered to be law. 
History affords us a clear example of  this: iflaw becomes, solely, the provision of  the 
correct answer - rather than merely the legal one - does it remain law? This was the 
foundation of  the question Carl Schmitt posed for German jurisprudence, when he 
challenged orthodox theory and demanded an end to the 'evil' of  the Rechtstaat in 
favour of  the (non-rule-bound) idealism of  the total state.
140 
CONCEPTUAL LEGAL POSITIVISM (II): KELSEN: 
To answer this challenge, Kelsen sought to explain and defend the ideal of  the 
Rechtstaat. Coming from the conceptual strand of  legal positivism, Kelsen asks how 
we can tell what the law is, but to make this question intelligible, he also asks what it 
means to know what the law is. He starts with the foundational question "how can we 
know what law is?". In this sense then, Kelsen's project is both cognitive and 
epistemic
l41
, but this is not all. Every epistemology presupposes an ontology - to 
understand something, we must first be able to identify its existence, and this also 
involves defining or stipulating that existence. This entailed that Kelsen provide an 
ontological status for law, or perhaps more accurately, for laws. 
A Refined Conceptual Legal Positivism? Hans Kelsen and a Small Step Forward: 
140 See, e.g. Political Theology or The Concept of  the Political. 
141 I use the term epistemic in a wide sense, to cover not only the procedure for verification of true 
knowledge, but also the processes through which sensory data are translated into perception, cognition, 
and understanding. This fits well with my overarching enquiry into how particularity, the stuff of 
sensory data, the ongoing stream of  "spatio temporal event[  s]", is translated (or transformed) 
"reconstructed" into perception, understanding, and ultimately action. Because, although obviously the 
57 For Kelsen, law is a normative order, a system of  norms. The cognitive question 
toward which his attention is ultimately directed is: what is the law on x in y? That is: 
which norm governs the proposed conduct in the stated place? As a legal positivist, 
Kelsen believed that such questions could be answered cognitively and without 
reference to morality. However, he also realised that the question was not purely 
factual or empirical-in the way a proposition of  natural science, or the existence of a 
law in a Hartian pre-legal society, may be - but rather a question of  identifying the 
"relevant" data, and finding a technique to organise it. The ontological status oflaw 
was neither empirical nor historical nor moral nor metaphysical, and yet law required 
empirical identifiers, ifthe project oflegal positivism was to be maintained. Thus 
Kelsen's methodology is resolutely Kantian, asking as its foundational question, 
under what circumstances (under which conditions) can we know what the law is? 
What are the necessary preconditions for cognising a law (or any other norm)? 
Kelsen's solution was to accept normativity as a separate epistemological system, i.e. 
one freed from both factual correspondence and metaphysical speculation. He argued 
that the specific ontological status of  norms was validity. "By the word "validity" we 
designate the specific existence of  a norm.,,142 For Kelsen, for a norm to be valid is for 
that norm to exist; for a norm to exist it must be valid; and so an invalid norm does 
not exist. This is true not only oflaw, but of  all norms and all systems of  norms: 
validity =  existence. 143 The two are inseparable, in a sense they are synonyms. "That a 
norm is 'valid' means that it exists. A norm which is not 'valid' is not a norm since it 
law is implicated in this process, it must also be recognised that the very cognition of something like a 
legal system is also an effect of  this process. 
14?  - The Pure Theory of  Law p. 10 
143  General Theory of  Norms chapter 1 V (p. 2). 
58 is not an existing nonn.,,144 Kelsen's theory then demands that the science oflaw act 
like a natural science, it must show fidelity to the object of  its observation; in the case 
oflaw, this means accepting and accommodating the counter-factual nature ofthe 
object of  analysis (the law) itself; legality, confonnity to law, which Kelsen tenns the 
"objective meaning of  an act" is a quality "that cannot be perceived by the senses". 145 
This is where Kelsen and Hart so dramatically diverge from one another. For Kelsen, 
a simple recurrence or regularity of  conduct is itself an is, however, a theory of  nonns 
deals not with is, but with ought. Thus, the regularity could be either evidence of  the 
existence of  a nonn (itself actually, though counter-factually, extant because of  its 
validity) or completely irrelevant to the nonnative sciences. Nonns, having a counter-
factual nature, are not subject to, or derived from natural scientific facts or rules. That 
a law exists does not mean that people will obey it; that people act in a particular 
manner need not mean that a nonn exists. Thus Kelsen, to remain true to both the 
natural scientific method and the object of  his observation, replaced the idea of 
causation with that of  "nonnative imputation". 
Where natural science relies on a cause-effect (if-shall) relationship, nonnative 
science relies on imputation (if-ought). So, ifI release a pencil it shall fall, should the 
pencil fail to fall (without adequate reason, e.g. it is already lying on a table or desk) 
the entire rule (the 'law of  gravity') would be undennined. Such rules can be observed 
from actual reality, they reside within the "is" half ofthe is/ought dichotomy. Nonns 
make up the other half of  that dichotomy. So if  I break a rule I ought to be punished; 
but ifI am not punished (for whatever reason, barring that a court holds the rule 
144 Ibid chapter 8 VI (p. 28). 
145 Supra, note 142, pp. 2-4, esp. p. 4. 
59 invalid) this has no effect on the rule; the rule continues its (counter-factual) existence 
as if  I had never acted: 
For in the system ofthe Law, that is, owing to the law, punishment follows 
always and without exception from the delict, even if, in the system of  nature 
[i.e. in real life  ], punishment may fail to materialise for some reason or 
another. 146 
My actions and the rule have no ontological relationship whatsoever. This means that 
rules cannot be distilled from actions any more than actions can be determined by 
rules. For Kelsen, legal rules bind officials, they do not emanate from officials. 
Kelsenian rules exist solely by virtue oftheir validity, which in turn is a systemic and 
normative, not a factual or observable, concept. Kelsenian observation is 
metaphorical, not conceptual, in nature. It observes data which is not physically 
extant, the counter-factual as it has been defined into reality (the 'extra' phenomenon 
created and 'added' to reality by the concept): 
The legal meaning of  an act, as an external fact, is not immediately perceptible 
to the senses - such as, for instance, the color, hardness, weight, or other 
physical properties of an object can be perceived.  147 
Nonetheless, it is this legal meaning which must be observed, and that requires that it 
be allocated empirical identifiers, or, to put it more simply, that we must define what 
data we are looking at, when we seek (metaphorically) to observe the counter-factual 
146 Supra, note 142, p. 28. 
147 Ibid p. 2. 
60 realm of  nonns. The observation is metaphorical because it does not concern the 
actual actions of  the officials, but rather the effects of  certain actions - the defined 
empirical identifiers oflaw-creation or alteration - manifested as additions to reality; 
the "counterfactual or normative interpretation" of  those selected "factual occurrence" 
(the empirical identifiers oflaw).148 
However, this ontology is only tangentially relevant to Kelsen's enquiry, because the 
first real thrust of  hiss work is epistemologica1.149 The relevant question is not "what 
does it mean for a nonn to exist?" but rather, "how do we know which nonns exist?"'; 
the fonner being relevant only to the extent that it impacts upon the latter. The 
ultimate question of  which nonn is applicable or detenninate in y must await the 
exposition of, and an answer to, the epistemological enquiry: cognition (in the sense 
of  recognising and understanding what is perceived) presupposes epistemology. 
Law has to be empirically identified, and yet it is neither an empirical description, nor 
a moral claim: this is true of  all rules, though of  course moral rules are also moral 
claims. A nonn exists when it is valid, and this must be true of  all nonns (all rules), 
yet nonns differ, the concept "nonn" is, for Kelsen, heterogeneous. In order to 
systematise nonns,  Kelsen divides validity into two separate streams: static and 
dynamic validity.  150 Statically valid nonns exist by virtue of  their content, dynamic 
nonns by virtue of  their pedigree. In both cases validity remains the ontological 
148 Kletzer The Mutual Inclusion of  Law and Its Science: Reflections on Hans Kelsen 's Legal 
Positivism PhD University of Cambridge, p. 92. 
149 Supra, note 142 p. 1. 
150 Ibid pp. 194-5. 
61 status, and therefore also the epistemological presupposition. This is what allows 
Kelsen to claim that the Pure Theory is the precondition for all other legal theories.
1Sl 
Natural law, according to Kelsen, recognises validity according to the static model. 
This means that a norm's validity depends on its content, or more precisely, the 
validity of  a norm depends on a minimum congruence between the content of  the 
norm and the content of  the moral order to which law is subjugated. This procedure is 
scorned by Kelsen as begging abuse, and serving only as a disguise for the 
illegitimate insertion of  contested moral claims into the legal order. It is definitionally 
a form of  moral imperialism. Kelsen believed history supported him in this regard. 
Other theorists - notably Lauterpacht
lS2 directly, and Finnis
lS3 indirectly - dispute this 
assertion, and note that Kelsen rarely if  ever looked at the content as opposed to the 
form of  natural law  . The essence of  this claim is that while the structure of  natural law 
may well be open to abuse
lS4 there is a sufficient continuity in content to advert to the 
existence of  a "perennial philosophy" embodied in all 'true' natural law systems. 
However, Kelsen does not appear to respond to these claims. Instead, he focuses on 
the nature of  validity in an a-morally defined system oflaws. Again, it must be 
emphasised that Kelsen's aims are epistemic. He is not claiming that law should be a-
moral, nor even that law could be value free. Rather he is arguing that the validity, 
and so the existence of  norms (including laws) is not itself dependent on their 
151  Ibid pp. 217-221. 
152 Lauterpacht H., "Kelsen's Pure Science of Law" in Collected Papers Vo12 p. 404. 
153 See, e.g. Natural Law and Natural Rights, generally. 
154 Indeed, following Ingo Muller, one could go further, stating that not only is the structure susceptible 
to abuse, but that the most evil legal system in history, the Nazi regime, was a natural law system, and 
was so precisely to get around the restrictions inherent in the positivist model. See Muller 1. Hitler's 
Justice. 
62 morality. 155 We can, and should be able to, cognise laws - identify and apply the 
applicable rule - without reference to their moral content, nor to our own, nor the 
regulated society's, moral codes. This requires an a-moral source of  validity. Kelsen 
postulates pedigree, which he terms "dynamic validity" to fulfil this role. 
Dynamic validity is based on the proposition that the only thing which can validate a 
norm is another, higher order, norm. This draws, inter alia, on Hume's proposition 
that it is illicit to derive an ought from an is. I56 Kelsen completes the separation, 
noting that it is illogical to derive an is from an ought, sein and sollen are radically 
separated in Kelsenian ontology: 
Nobody can assert that from the statement that something is, follows a 
statement that something ought to be, or vice versa ... The behaviour as it 
actually takes place mayor may not be equal to the behaviour as it ought to 
be. But equality is not identity.I5? 
All validity for Kelsen is systemic in nature, and in a system operating on the basis of 
dynamic validity, each valid norm gains its validity from a higher norm which is 
authorised (or which authorises a system official) to validate lower order norms (and 
defines the actions, the empirical identifiers oflaw, by which he may signify this 
occurrence, or manifest this act of  will). This entails that a norm is only valid to the 
extent that the norm validating it was (at the material time) both valid and capable of 
validating the lower order norm. Thus systems take on a pyramidal structure. 
155  See, e.g. Supra note 142, chapter 28 (pp. 115-22, esp. at p. 116). 
156 Ibid, chapter 20. See also Hume D. A Treatise afHuman Nature III.i.1 (2
nd ed. Selby-Bigge L. ed. 
OUP 1978) p. 469. 
157 Supra, note 142, p. 6. 
63 The system is pyramidal because every new (valid) norm is part of  the same legal 
system, though it may only apply to a small number of  subjects, as few as two, or 
even one in some cases. That is, because dynamic validity authorises the creation of 
ever more precise norms, every contract, every (legally binding) promise, and every 
judicial decision is a (relatively) concrete norm of  the same system. Hence the 
pyramid structure is directly related to the sheer proliferation of  norms which gradual 
concretisation not only entails, but also unifies (systematises). 
However, this chain of  validity can only be taken so far, at one end it is terminated by 
norms not authorising (or not logically capable of  supporting) further concretisation, 
but at the other it must be artificially terminated, as infinite regression would 
otherwise occur.
158 This leads Kelsen to postulate the grundnorm. The grundnorm is a 
logical hypothesis, it is not itself validated, but rather assumed to be valid, it functions 
as the foundation and apex of  the normative order. Actually, Kelsen's view on the 
nature ofthe grundnorm evolved, but by the second edition of  the Pure Theory he had 
settled on the opinion that it was a "transcendental-logical presupposition".  159 In 
General Theory of  Norms, he notes "[i]t is a 'basic' norm, because nothing further can 
be asked about the reason for its validity. It is not a positive norm (i.e. posited by a 
real act of  will) but a norm presupposed in the thinking of [subjects of  the normative 
order] in other words it is a fictitious norm"  .160 
This raises two important points, one is that law is positive because it is posited, i.e. it 
is the product of  enactment. This enactment need not be intentional, it could come 
158 This is stated clearly in supra note 142, p. 254 
159 See pp. 198-205, esp. p. 201. 
64 about as a result of custom or by an act of  will. However, this dichotomy should not 
be overemphasised, especially in relation to public international law, where customary 
law, and especially opinio iuris can be best perceived as normative intent, and 
therefore ultimately as the product of  directed human endeavour.  161  The other point is 
that we are not free to simply choose a grundnorm but rather are logically constrained 
to selecting a norm which logically supports the hypothesis of  a system which 
intelligibly interprets the data of  reality. 162 
Dyzenhaus suggests163 that the grundnorm 's status as foundation and apex is logically 
incoherent, and reflects a deeper fracture in Kelsen's entire system, viewed from a 
logical perspective. However, this criticism is unfair, and takes spatial metaphors far 
too seriously. The legal system is a logical hypothesis; it is a means of  organising data 
(albeit a means with a specific purpose): it is not a real object. Only once reified 
would Kelsen's system need to obey the physical laws Dyzenhaus accuses it of 
breaching. Rather than pursue this criticism,164 it is easier to point out that there is no 
reason, if  we are adopting spatial metaphors at all, to assume that Kelsen's pyramidal 
normative structures are not supported by their apexes as each can easily be imagined 
to hang hypothetically from its grundnorm (which is then foundation and apex, with 
neither contradiction nor logical fallacy). 
160 Supra note 142, p. 254 
161  On the best available theory of  customary intemationallaw, see chapter 5, infra. 
162 See supra, note 142, pp. 201-5. 
163 Legality and Legitimacy p. 103, note 4. 
164 I do not wish to claim that none of  Dyzenhaus' critiques of  positivism, or even of  Kelsen, should be 
pursued, as many are extremely important and well thought out, and indeed provide important points of 
focus for much of  my thought and critique. Indeed, chapter 2 of  the present thesis is essentially 
structured around an engagement with Dyzenhaus' critique of  Hart; albeit with the aim of showing the 
capacity of  conceptual legal positivism to meet that critique. In my opinion, Dyzenhaus is, all in all, 
probably the pre-eminent critic of  positivism in contemporary legal theorising. 
65 However, even dynamic systems have a "static aspect,,165 which is the fixed structure 
which identifies them as specific systems of  norms. That is, the static aspect 
delineates the boundaries of  each normative order, and determines the differences 
between normative orders. From this perspective, it becomes clear that law is a 
particular type of  normative order and, for Kelsen, the distinguishing feature of  a 
legal order (its "static aspect") is the connection between norms and sanctions.166 
Kelsen perceives law in an imperative model where duty forms the exclusive deontic 
operator. Thus laws, for Kelsen, define "delicts", and a delict is defined as the 
"condition for a sanction". Thus, to be a law, a norm must both define a delict and 
provide for a sanction in the event that the conduct identified as delictual occurs. One 
peculiar effect of  this understanding is that law does not place obligations directly 
onto its subjects, but only on the system officials. This is because law only commands 
action in the event that a delict occurs, it does not prohibit the commission of  delicts 
per se, but only by implication.  167 This attempt to avoid para-psychological 
definitions of  obligation (which Kelsen views as a decisive advance on Austin168) 
serves to fundamentally alter the definition of  efficacy against which a legal system 
should be evaluated. Kelsen demands no obedience from those ultimately subject to 
the system, but only from those applying the system, the Austinian "habit of 
obedience" is replaced as the empirical precondition oflegality with the requirement 
that officials duly apply sanctions where delicts are discovered. 
165 See supra, note 142 pp. 108-92. 
166 See, e.g. ibid, p. 33; for the inverse point, that a norm without a sanction cannot be considered as 
law, see pp. 50-4. Kelsen makes it clear, p. 154, that he does not see the connection between law and 
sanction as an act of  choice, but rather as a logical necessity; he does not, however, justify this claim. 
167  See, e.g. supra note 142 pp. 111-4. 
168  General Theory of  Law and State pp. 130-7, esp. p. 135. 
66 An advantage of  Kelsen' s model is that it need not perceive or portray failure to make 
a law as a sanction. This was an important weakness in Austinian legal positivism, 
and thus provides an excellent example of  the advances Kelsen's system of  gradually 
concretising norms brings over the Austinian command based model. For one thing, 
Kelsen can recognise commands as a particular (albeit important) subset of 
imperatives, that is of  norms defined as ought statements (the definitions of  delicts). 
Thus not every norm in a Kelsenian structure presupposes a commander. This point is 
particularly useful in relation to international law, as it overcomes a large part of 
Austin's refusal to see international law as law; Kelsen's system does not require a 
sovereign as SUCh.
169 
However, it is in relation to contracts and other private rights that Kelsen makes his 
greatest advance beyond Austin. The doctrine of gradual concretisation denies any 
differences within laws, all law is understood on an imperative model. This is a direct 
rejection of  the neo-Hohfeldian drive to individuate laws. For Kelsen, there is no 
distinction between law and obligation, between public and private law, or between 
duty and subjective right. The only question ever to be asked is what (legal) norm 
applies here. To answer this question, one ought to work one's way down from the 
grundnorm, applying the doctrine of  "gradual concretisation". One looks for norms 
dynamically validated which apply to the case at hand. This is very similar to the 
169 We could go much further here, and state that Kelsen's theory is specifically designed as a refutation 
of  the claimed link between law and a Sovereign. Law, for Kelsen, existed to restrict and limit so-
called sovereign power. From this perspective, Kelsen's theory is a direct response first to the 
personalisation (and totalisation) of  the legal order as advocated by Schmitt; and second to the rise of 
Nazism itself an embodiment of  that very personalisation. See Dyzenhaus, supra note 123, pp. 108-23. 
However, Kelsen himself would probably deny this, claiming his theory to be specifically "pure", 
scientific, a-political. This is, clearly, a nonsense; Ke1sen's theory, like all other legal theories is 
normative in nature, it must be judged as one theory among many. Moreover, the very use of  (the 
power and authority of) natural science is itself a political manoeuvre, though not necessarily an illicit 
one. Finally, as Dyzenhaus notes (ibid p. 109) "the presupposition that there is a distinction between 
politics and a science oflaw is itself  political"; or, in my terms, it is an act of  choice. 
67 Razian notion of  systemic or structural location.  170 Is there a nonn on point? The 
answer to this question will always be "yes", but this is in a sense fonnal, as it is an 
entailment of  the necessary unity and universal coverage of  the legal system. 
For Kelsen, the real question is which nonn is on point, that is, how specific a nonn is 
there for the regulation of  this specific area? A contract (or, in public international 
law, a treaty) would be an example of  a specific nonn. The potential problem, and the 
benefits of  the Kelsenian over the Austinian model, become manifest when evaluating 
both the possibility and the effect of  the concretised nonn (treaty or contract) failing 
to provide a nonn on point, or indeed being themselves invalid. For Austin, invalidity 
had to be (unrealistically) portrayed as a sanction, because although a contract was 
clearly a "law" it did not otherwise fit within Austin's (dogmatic) definition oflaw as 
sovereign command. 
Kelsen's technique, gradual concretisation, simply states that an invalid contract fails 
to create legal norms. There is no question of a sanction; the law simply exists as it 
did before the attempt to create the contract. A sanction is only needed to identify a 
legal nonn, but an invalid contract is not a nonn at all, let alone a legal nonn, hence it 
is actually the absence of  a (connection to a) sanction which logically identifies an 
invalid contract as not being part of  the legal system. This applies to both the 
constitutional and the contractual level. At the fonner Kelsen is most explicit: 
Constitutional nonns authorise the legislator to create nonns - they do not 
command the creation of  nonns; and therefore the stipulation of  sanctions do 
170 Supra, note 121, p. 24-5. 
68 not come into the question at all. If  the provisions of  the constitution are not 
observed valid legal norms do not come into existence.l7l 
Thus, for Kelsen, contracts are in a sense mere fragments oflaw;172 they rearrange 
duties, but duties (given Kelsen's imperative model) remain the exclusive legal 
deontic operator. This also affects the nature oflegal analysis. For Kelsen, non liquet 
is a logical impossibility, and lacunae are merely undesirable freedoms from law 
(unwarranted privileges!?3 would be a suitable analogy). Thus, in the absence of  a 
(more) concrete norm on any given point, analysis re-focuses at a higher level. In 
essence, what legal analysis in Kelsen's cognitive theory does is to look for the most 
concrete norm on point, the last norm in the general area (i.e. the substantive portion 
of  the instant legal system which logically includes the more delimited substantive 
issue on which a norm was not found) to be validated. Ultimately, however, freedom 
to act is the default position in the absence of  any norm, and this is a simple 
entailment of  maintaining duty as the sole deontic operator; if  there are no norms 
there are no duties, and the absence of  duty is freedom. 
To take an example from public intemationallaw, a customary norm can only be 
valid if  it manifests a symbiosis of  state practice and opinio iuris. As Judge 
171 Supra, note 142, p. 51 
172 Kelsen describes these as "dependent norms", see e.g. ibid. p. 51. This compares very favourably 
with Hart's attack on a 'straw man' of Austin, and his understanding that the legal nature of 
authorisation precluded the view that law had to have a definite relation to sanctions, see Concept of 
Law pp. 38-41. Moreover, Hart's dismissal of  the idea that powers or contracts could be fragments of 
law is, at best, woefully unsupported and even irrelevant. To say simply "that is not how people think 
about them" is to avoid rather than engage argument; it is indeed tantamount to claiming that the Earth 
remained flat until people agreed otherwise. 
173 For the distinction between privileges and rights see Hohfeld W. N. Some Fundamental Legal 
Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning esp. pp. 50-64. 
69 Shahabudeen noted in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,174 this entails that an 
absence of  (or conflict in ) opinio iuris precludes the creation of  a customary  norm. 
The putative norm is not validated, so not valid, and so does not exist. However, this 
does not mean there is no law on point, but rather that the law remains identical with 
that "momentary system" which existed before the putative norm was argued. There 
is no sanction in invalidity, just a failure to change the operative, imperative, duties of 
the system. 
Thus disagreement does not prevent an area from being legally regulated, as the 
unconsidered use of  the claim that the absence of  prohibition equals permission might 
argue (which misplaced dogma Scobbie has termed an "unreconstructed Lotus 
position", and, in my opinion, quite successfully refuted  175). Instead, the effect of  this 
type of  disagreement is to prevent the legal regulation of  an area from changing. This 
is of  fundamental importance in regard to customary exceptions from generic legal 
prohibitions, as it explains why public international law cannot, and does not, endorse 
the simple proposition that the absence of a (direct) rule on point leads to a legal 
privilege. So, in the case of  the proposed doctrine of  Humanitarian Intervention, the 
split in opinio iuris precludes the crystallisation of  a rule, and this means that legal 
duties are unchanged. This in tum entails not freedom to act, but a prohibition on the 
threat or use of  force, as no exception to the prevailing norm (art. 2(4) UNC) has been 
validly created; i.e. no new norm exists. 
174 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case 1996 ICJ Reps. p. 225 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, 
p. 375, at pp. 379-80. 
175  Scobbie I. "The Theorist as Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht's Concept of  the International Judicial 
Function" 2 EJIL (1997) 164 at p. 196 
70 However, we do not generally actually work our way down from the grundnorm to 
the particular case, at least not in legal systems with which we are familiar. Rather, we 
start with the case, look for the nonns which appear to be on point, and then check 
that these are valid according to the legal system. That is, we trace each nonn back to 
the grundnorm, and then apply the most concrete nonn(s) on point, which are actually 
valid by systemic standards to the case at issue. In effect, this is little different to the 
process under the rule of  recognition, as understood by Hart. But what Kelsen's 
theory really emphasises is the systemic nature oflegal analysis, and the systemic 
nature ofthe requirement that the law ultimately provides an answer to any given 
question of  the legality of  proposed conduct. 
Moreover, Kelsen's theory makes clear the counter-factual nature oflaw, the fact that 
law is something which must be defined before being observed. This is the deep, 
divisive, methodological fracture running through legal positivism as a school. 
Despite apparent similarities, even equalities, in substantive conclusions this 
methodological divide serves to split legal positivism into two completely distinct 
schools. The schools may agree, in the end, on most things, but their reasons for 
coming to these conclusions diverge radically: and "equality is not identity"  .176 
CONCLUSION: SIMILARITY, DIFFERENCE, HOPE: 
Ultimately then, the debate between conceptual and empirical legal positivists 
remains as unresolved as that between hard and soft legal positivists. Empirical legal 
positivists offer no convincing support for their decision to classify certain things as 
176 Kelsen, supra note 142, p. 6. 
71 law, or certain people as legal officials. Instead they offer a circular definition of  both, 
reliant on a smuggled-in common sense definition (that law must impose order, which 
entails that law is that which is enforced). This position can do little to defend itself 
against, or undermine the Dworkinian challenge, which smuggles in different 
common sense assumptions of  the nature and purpose oflaw (that law is morally 
good, and politically coherent, etc.). 
Conceptual legal positivism, sadly, fairs little better here. At least conceptual legal 
positivists can defend their data choices and classification, but only by reference to a 
definition of  law which is itself  unsupported. What does appear clear, however, is that 
legal positivists of  each strain predicate law on its institutional setting, rather than its 
intrinsically legal nature. This is borne out by the fact that the two paradigm 
conceptual theorists, Austin and Kelsen agree on enforcement as the specific quality 
oflaw, and enforcement is, itself, an institutional concept, reliant on a centralised 
monopoly oflegitimate violence. Absent such an institutional setting - e.g. in the 
international political system - neither side can offer a convincing argument for 
identifying legal norms; nor, however, can either offer a convincing argument for 
declaring that international law is not law. 
The View From the Margins: International Law: 
Michel Foucault's work concerns the creation of  the normal from the marginal,l77 and 
perhaps this perspective can provide an intelligible context for the arguments above. 
Inherent in Foucault's claim is, I think, an acceptance of  Kierkegaard's point that "the 
177 See, e.g. Madness and Civilisation, or Discipline and Punish. 
72 exception ... thinks the general with intense passion",I78 and its converse; that the 
paradigm case does not. The paradigm is identified by its banality, its regularity and 
commonness; it is hum-drum, and so, opposed to thinking. The paradigm case can 
never cause us to think about the paradigm itself; only the exception, or marginal 
case, can facilitate this. 
The paradigm oflegal theory is the institutional centrality oflegitimate violence, the 
monopoly over legitimate violence which the municipal legal system claims, and by 
which the municipal legal system is identified. My claim is that this elision oflaw and 
the monopoly of  institutional violence (the elision we call the Rule of  Law
179
)  is the 
product of  human choice; and moreover, of  a problematic human choice at that; the 
agreed baseline, the orthodox elision of  law and centralised force is wrong. At the 
very least, this elision should be opened to critique, rather than transcendentally 
posited and shielded. Paradigmatic reasoning is necessarily blind to its own 
contingency, as "central cases" - which anchor reasoning - are defined by the 
presence of  the paradigmatic features of  which the paradigm is constructed, thus they 
can never expose the contingency of  those features. The effect is to move these 
features beyond critique. 
If  we accept the baseline of  institutionalised coercion then we say - with some 
variation of  mediation, e.g. between Hart, Dworkin, and the American Realists - that 
178  Quoted in Schmitt C. Political Theology p. 22. 
179 There are two ways of  understanding this elision, from a Hartian perspective, the important point is 
that law rules; the rule oflaw is a claim oflegal sovereignty. Consequently, law is taken for granted in 
the sense that the expression of  authority is law. From the opposite perspective, consider e.g. E. P. 
Thompson's claims about the rule oflaw (see Whigs and Hunters), it is 'rule' and not law which is 
taken for granted; law becomes the evaluative variable. The question refocuses entirely: is it rule by 
law, or rule by something else, something other than law? 
73 law is what is enforced; that central social institutions are legal institutions.
I8o But this 
would seem to entail, as the Realists accepted, that what is not enforced is not law. To 
take a recent example from international law, this would indicate that the absence of 
enforcement, of  Security Council condemnation, and of  an armed or coercive 
reaction, proved that the Anglo-American invasion of  Iraq was lawful. Yet this answer 
seems problematic, at the very least, when put so bluntly, it seems too glib. Perhaps 
then the simple absence of  coercion is not dispositive of  the claim to illegality. 
But, if  this is so, if  that nagging doubt remains, then what does that fact (the continued 
existence ofthe doubt) tell us about law, or about our own attitudes to law? It is at 
least possible that this doubt (or "anxiety" as Heidegger might have it) begins to 
expose the methodological presumptions to light, to illuminate a hidden truth from the 
margin: we expect more from law than the imposition of  order. I call this "more" the 
specifically legal. The specifically legal is that which the law has which other 
discourses and techniques do not; that which distinguishes, or specifies, the legal; that 
which makes it unique, and distinct from other concepts. 
And it is in ignoring this more, in ignoring the specifically legal, that orthodox 
theories oflegal positivism fail. But it is here, also, that the difference between the 
empirical and conceptual methodologies comes to light. The empirical methodology 
had to be wrong, whereas the conceptual methodology merely is wrong. 
In other words, both sets of  theories (the empirical as manifested in Raz, Hart, and 
possibly Gardner; and the conceptual as manifested in Austin and Kelsen) are wrong. 
180 See note 21  and accompanying text supra. 
74 Consequently, there is little point in analysing too closely what they have to say about 
international law as they have examined the topic back to front; anything these 
theories could have told us about international law is already tainted by the original 
error they transpose from municipal law. But only one methodology (Hart's) had to 
be wrong. Thus we can accept Kelsen's methodology - that there is a "static aspect" 
oflaw, which distinguishes it from other normative orders and social practices - but 
reject his theory that this "static aspect" should be the relation between norm and 
force. This is what allows, methodologically, the conceptual approach to facilitate 
examination of  the specifically legal. 
In other words, although only one side of  the debate (the empirical legal positivists) 
was methodologically precluded from focus on the specifically legal, the other 
(  conceptual legal positivists) defined this badly. Accepting and understanding this 
point allows us to re-discover Fuller;181 however, even Fuller expressly - though 
perhaps wrongly - acknowledged the link between law and sanction, defining the 
enterprise oflaw as that of  "subjecting human conduct to the governance of  rules".  182 
In doing so, Fuller implicitly acknowledged the baseline adopted by both streams of 
legal positivism; that law was, dejinitionally, enforced order. However, there is a 
critical difference, one which conceptual legal positivism is capable of  analysing, and 
may do well to adopt. 
From the Fullerian perspective, law is something to which power (force, or violence) 
is ascribed, the ideal must exist first,183  and then be reified, and only then can force be 
lSI This task is taken up in chapter 2. 
182 Fuller, supra note 95, p.  106, emphasis added. 
183 Consider for example Fuller's eighth principle oflaw "congruence" between enacted rule and 
official action, which implies that the rule, the law, precedes official action. 
75 ascribed to it. In other words, enforcement is an effect oflaw, and thus cannot be 
either a cause, nor a definition, oflaw. The mistake made by the conceptual legal 
positivists is to confuse law as such (the specifically legal, however this is defined) 
with its own effects (enforcement, obedience or sanction); however this mistake is 
identifiable, and rectifiable from within the methodological structures of conceptual 
legal positivism. 
Things are bleaker for empirical legal positivism. By understanding law as having a 
real existence, and being capable of  direct observation, empirical legal positivism 
limits itself to focus on the ascription of  power itself. The object (law) to which power 
must be ascribed, is perfectly shielded from the focus of  empirical legal positivism, 
which is so in thrall to centralised power that it is capable of  perceiving nothing else. 
For this reason, Hart was in fact correct to claim
184 that public international law was 
not a legal system; but this tells us more about the methodological weaknesses of  the 
Hartian model than it does about international law, or its status as law. That Hart's 
definition oflaw is anchored paradigmatically in municipal law is one, forgivable, 
thing; that it, while claiming to be a theory oflaw, overlooks even the possibility of 
the specifically legal is another matter altogether. 
184 Hart, supra note 10, chapter 10. 
76 CHAPTER 2: LEGAL THEORY, A "STAGNANT" DISCOURSE? 
Introduction: 
This chapter seeks to explore several intertwined themes relating to the existence, 
identification, and purpose oflaw. The central aim pursued here is to lay the 
foundations for the understanding oflaw - and especially PIL - as an independent 
normative discourse, a system of  rules with its own (fixed) criteria for entry. This is in 
effect a defence of a legal positivist ideal, oflaw as a body of  amorally identifiable 
and applicable norms. However, this defence also seeks to re-conceptualise the 
concept oflaw, and in particular to emancipate it from the demands of  social 
centrality and authority, that is both from the demand that law be authoritative, and 
the demands that this social centrality in return makes of  the law. The present thesis 
denies the classic legal positivist elision of  law and centralised authority, but refuses 
to replace it - or mediate, or mitigate it - with an elision of  law and morality. 
To this end, the traditional assumptions oflegal positivism, and the traditional 
critiques of  these, having been briefly considered, a new understanding of  the basic 
category "law" w'ill be devised, presented and defended. The utility of  this concept! of 
law is essentially implied here, but will be developed subsequently, as the instant aim 
is simply to show the feasibility of  this approach. 
I Concept is used here in a quite deliberate distinction to conception of  law, precisely because the core 
of  the present argument is that so much attention has been paid to particular (  domestic) conceptions of 
law, that these have become confused with the concept oflaw itself. However, this terminology will 
77 DISENGAGED ANALYSIS: LEGAL POSITIVISM'S BANAL ATTRACTION: 
In his critical engagements David Dyzenhaus presents legal positivism, unjustifiably, 
as a unitary school of  thought, while in reality emphasising the Hartian empirical 
perspective. From that perspective, Dyzenhaus has recently accused legal positivism 
of  offering a "stagnant research proposal"? This stagnancy is traced to legal 
positivism's being caught in oscillation between practical irrelevance and non-
evaluative description. Dyzenhaus' charge is sure to re-invigorate the interminable 
legal positivist against natural law debates on the essence and identification of  law. As 
I have already elaborated, I have my position within this debate. However, I hope now 
to begin the more radical, and indeed more urgent, task of  recasting the debate's very 
terms; that is of  analysing not only the differences between the camps, but also, and 
more importantly, their shared assumptions.
3 In doing so, I shall also lay the ground 
for demonstrating conceptual legal positivism's capacity to respond to Dyzenhaus' 
critique. 
The crux of  Dyzenhaus' charge is that legal positivism's "separability thesis" (the 
belief that law and morality do not necessarily coincide
4
)  cannot countenance the idea 
of a "prior moral obligation to obey the law", and yet legal positivism remains 
rarely be re-used, and preference will be give to a three level schema of  categorisation, drawn 
essentially from semantic analysis, on which see infra. 
2 Dyzenhaus D., 'Positivism's Stagnant research Proposal' 2000 OJLS 703. 
3 Shared assumptions can in fact be the most difficult obstacles in the path of 'truth', or the evolution of 
thought. This is because the effects they exercise on perception and so on 'reality' and 'possibilities' 
are generally unrecognised. Such assumptions form a part of  the very way in which we perceive the 
world and any part of  it. This effect of  background assumptions on perception gives rise to what Paul 
F  eyerabend terms our "observation language", and it is important to note that, while powerful, an 
observation language is contingent, and may therefore be wrong, inducing, in effect, delusions in the 
perception of  those deploying it. See F  eyerabend P. Against Method 66. 
4 According to Paulsen, in his "Introduction" to Kelsen's An Introduction to the Problems of  Legal 
Theory, the term '''separability thesis' is standard nomenclature" and can be traced, or at least is 
generally attributed, to Hart's seminal article "Positivism and the Separation of  Law and Morals" 71 
Harvard Law Review (1957-8) 593. 
78 predicated on an understanding of  law as authoritative; as providing answers 
(syllogistically derived from legal norms) which must be obeyed, or give rise to 
sanctions for disobedience. Thus other reasons or motivations for obedience are 
sought by legal positivists, or else obedience is defined into law, and thus simply 
regarded as a characteristic, an identifying feature, in no more need of explanation 
than the wetness ofliquids.
5 This, as noted in the previous chapter, can be seen clearly 
in the works of  Austin and Kelsen, and lies latent, but necessary, in the assumptions 
structuring the "observations" of  Hart, Raz, and Gardner. 
This stagnant research project, the emphasis on non-evaluative description, is traced 
to legal positivism's (Hart inspired) descriptive tum, its becoming an amalgam of 
"analytic jurisprudence" and "descriptive sociology". Moreover, the stagnancy is 
exacerbated by changes in the focus of  legal theory which have centralised the 
adjudicative process. The "data" for observation has been determined as adjudication, 
and legal positivist theories can be evaluated only by the correspondence of  their 
description to that data. From the previous chapter, it should be apparent that the 
resources to answer this challenge lie latent in the conceptual strand oflegal 
positivism, but also that Dyzenhaus' charge emphasises the weaknesses of  empirical 
legal positivism. In other words, we must choose sides within legal positivism before 
we can respond to Dyzenhaus' charge. 
Dyzenhaus claims that the Hartian changes of  technique and focus have left legal 
positivism trapped in a futile choice between a strained analysis of  a legal positivist 
stipulated 'law' or a descriptive report ofthe unconstrained exercise of  judicial 
5 Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, pp. 711-2. 
79 discretion.
6 Natural Law escapes such troubled waters by retaining a purposive 
understanding of  the practice oflaw, while legal positivism floats into them because it 
"has to some extent lost its substantive moorings,,7. In other words, the legal positivist 
"claim that understandings ofthe point oflaw, which inform theories of adjudication, 
operate in a different conceptual space from theories oflaw"s is wrong - law cannot 
be understood in non-purposive terms. 
This is an important criticism, but it is not an original one. In fact it is simply an 
eloquent recapitulation of  Dworkin's elision oflaw and adjudication, ofthe claim that 
legal philosophy is the "silent prologue" to adjudication. This entails that, iflaw in the 
adjudicative setting has a purpose, then law as such, the object oflegal philosophy, 
must share that purpose; after all, the two -law and adjudication - are the same: 
Jurisprudence is the general part of  adjudication, silent prologue to any 
decision at law.
9 
Thus, the role oflegal philosophy is to identify this "silent prologue", through 
adjudication, and therefore according to the purposes and values of  adjudication 
within the given legal system. Legal theory must then be substantively normative, 
because it, and the law with which it has now been elided, rely on an "understanding 
ofthe point oflaw". In fact, their role is to explicate and further that "point" or 
purpose. 
6 Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, p. 715. Ricouer eloquently denounces this strand of  positivism as "the 
complicity between the juridical rigidity attached to the idea of a univocal rule and the decisionism that 
ends up increasing a judges discretionary power" see, 'Interpretation and/or Argumentation' in Ricouer 
P., The Just 109 at p. 114. Positivism's potential to guide interpretation, using context to provide 
determinacy, will be considered in a later section. 
7 Dyzenhaus, ibid p. 709. 
80 Thus Dyzenhaus' charge can be more clearly presented in its relation to Dworkin, and 
the adjudicative focus of  legal theory. The irrelevance of  which legal positivism is in 
danger is the arbitrary imposition of  the criteria for the identification of  law, the 
arbitrary content of  any fonnulation ofthe Rule of  Recognition derived from pure 
observation of adjudicative practice. To whatever extent Dworkin is correct about 
endemic controversy, the Rule of  Recognition must take a stand and enunciate 
criteria. Absent a purposive understanding, this enunciation becomes arbitrary. 
However, the alternative (within Hartian theory) is a simple admission of  relatively 
widespread "strong" judicial discretion, which entails admitting both an absence of 
criteria for (usefully) identifying legal rules, and the absence of  a method for 
generating such criteria. 
The truth of  this charge can be perceived in Hart's paradigm legal system, the English 
legal system. Hart fonnulated the English rule of  recognition as: "Whatever the 
Queen in Parliament enacts [is Law]".l0 Increasing judicial activism, membership of 
the EC/EU, the advent of  "fundamental common law rights", and the domestic 
incorporation of  the ECHR have served - individually and collectively - radically to 
undennine that simple fonnulation. Of  course we could attempt a new fonnulation, 
but this is where the arbitrariness would come into relief. 
Firstly, any 'accurate' (re)fonnulation would require so many variables as to be 
practically without content; and secondly, several senior judges (notably Woolf, 
Laws, and Steyn) have commented extra-judicially that some rights may not be 
8 Ibid. 
9 Dworkin Law's Empire p. 90. 
81 removed by Parliament, no matter how candid they may be in doing so. The example, 
however, is illustrative only, but the point remains: the rule of  recognition as the 
product of  factual observation cannot give adequate criteria for the accurate 
identification of  law. 
Thus, for Dyzenhaus, legal positivism, in perceiving law simply as an inadequately 
differentiated social phenomenon (the actions of  legal officials) to be described, 
analysed, explained and critiqued, has lost its focus. It has indeed lost any basis from 
which to justify (or even structure) such analysis or critique, and in extreme cases, 
even to justify its identification of  the phenomena described.  11  Only are-engagement 
with the purposes oflaw - and presumably then with the justification or roots ofthe 
duty to obey the law - can remedy these shortcomings. This would involve 
(re)considering the relationship between substantive and methodological concerns 
generally, and between the separability and identification theses in particular. 
These theses - that law and morality do not necessarily coincide, and that law should 
be identifiable and interpretable without direct recourse to moral argumentation - are 
believed by legal positivists to be independent of  one another. However, Dyzenhaus 
claims that concessions in the identification thesis would lead inexorably to a slippage 
in the separability thesis, by re-introducing a moral compulsion to obey the law; i.e. 
the use of  moral criteria to expand and elucidate the effects oflegal rules inexorably 
re-introduces a moral compulsion to obey the law, the law's authority is bolstered by 
its moral force. Moreover, such re-introduction of  moral criteria is a necessary 
entailment of  legal positivist engagement with questions of  adjudication. 
10 Hart The Concept of  Law, p. 102. 
11  Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, pp. 714-7. 
82 This is an interesting, and superficially plausible argument. Nonetheless, it is both 
wrong on its terms, and often inapposite. The argument is irrelevant to the branch of 
soft positivism which declares (simply and solely) that the rule of  recognition of  any 
given legal system may refer to morality. This is because the reference must be 
understood as an allusion to a particular morality - be it an official religion, the 
judges' inclinations, or the rationality of  "the reasonable man" - rather than, as 
Dyzenhaus must imply, the morality ofthe person examining the law. From this, 
essentially external, perspective,12 the moral element in the rule of  recognition, has no 
(or possibly even a negative) bearing on the duty to obey the law. Only where the two 
moralities happen to coincide will the moral duty to obey the law be reinforced. 
This is closely related to the failure of  Dyzenhaus' argument for the foundation ofthe 
moral authority oflaw, on its own terms. The duty to obey the law cannot be founded 
on the particular moral structure of  a legal system in the way that Dyzenhaus, 
borrowing here from Dworkin, suggests. This becomes apparent when attention is 
focussed on the obligations of  the loser in any adjudicative setting, as analysed by 
Dworkin. The side which lost misunderstood or misidentified or misinterpreted the 
moral structure ofthe law. In other words, their moral duty to obey the law was, 
before the Courts' decision, founded on an error. 13 The key question then is why this 
12 That is, it is a perspective which recognises an extant internal perspective, but one to which the 
observer does not personally subscribe. 
13 This is similar to, but more extreme than, the problem Thoreau long ago recognised in democracy, 
that the loser is bound against his will to the acts of  the state, see The Duty of  Resistance to Civil 
Government. However, Thoreau at least honestly admitted that this could be overcome only by positing 
an abstract commitment to democracy which was manifested and concretised by the act of  voting, and 
so bound the voter - win or lose - to the final outcome. This does not hold for law. We do not 
necessarily choose to go to court, and only by means of  elaborate fiction could it be argued that in 
going to court the participants commit themselves to the final decision. The bindingness of  any 
decision in the abstract predates the parties presence in court. In other words, at the root of any fiction 
of  participation binding the participants must be presupposed an abstract moral commitment to obey 
83 error does not vitiate that duty. The answer in short is that the particular duty to obey 
the law was founded on a more abstract duty to obey the law as such. But this latter 
duty is simply presupposed: 
We share a general, unspecific opinion about the force of  law when ... special 
considerations of  justice are not present, when people disagree about the 
justice or wisdom oflegislation, for example, but no one really thinks the law 
wicked or its authors tyrants. Our different convictions about the force oflaw 
unite in such cases. 14 
In effect, this means that Dyzenhaus is caught by his own charge: the Dworkinian 
system can no better account for the authority of  law than can legal positivism, it is 
just that Dworkin is (arguably) better at hiding this fact. 
EFFECTS OF THE INSIGHTS TO BE DRAWN FROM DYZENHAUS' 
CHALLENGE, IN LIGHT OF ITS FAILURE: 
Although Dyzenhaus contends that the "malaise in legal theory"lS is a general one, he 
does not appear to acknowledge the radical implications of  his own challenge. These 
include the possibility that the purposes of  law do not justify its centrality as a social 
institution; that it is in fact a bad idea "to make ... the reach of  legal authority co-
extensive with the reach of  law" as Dyzenhaus suggests we should.
16 
the law. But this type of commitment was the very thing the theory set out to prove, it cannot therefore 
be a presupposition of that theory. 
14 Dworkin R., Law's Empire p. Ill. 
15 Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, p. 719. 
84 Much of  Dyzenhaus' charge is, however, apposite. Contemporary legal positivism is 
far from being beyond reproach, and its assumption of  self-evidence - supported only 
by its stipulative definitions of  its object of  analysis - is at best misguided. This is 
perfectly illustrated by Gardner's (persuasive) unifying thesis oflegal positivism 
(LP*): 
In any legal system, whether a given nonn is legally valid, and hence whether 
it fonns part of  the law of  that system, depends on its sources, not its merits 
(where its merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of  its sources  ).17 
While this thesis is clear, and could easily be subscribed to by most legal positivists 
(myself, unfortunately excluded by the contents of  the parenthetical ending) it 
displays two shortcomings, which from Dyzenhaus' perspective become key failings. 
First, (LP*) lacks a definition oflaw, legal system, or legally valid. Secondly, and 
related, (LP*) afortiori lacks any defence or justification of  its (non-existent) 
definition of  law. (LP*) is beyond challenge not because of  its empirical accuracy, but 
because of  its contentless, self-referential, and stipulative nature. 
Nonetheless, legal positivism as a method of  analysing and understanding law retains 
great value. This utility is increased (especially in PIL) by the absence of a quasi-
universally accepted articulation of an ethico-political programme, or of  the 
successful demonstration of  the type of  obj ective ethics presupposed by the 
16 Ibid p. 717. 
17 Gardner J. "Legal Positivism: 5 Y2 Myths" 46 American Journal of  Jurisprudence (2001) p. 199 at 
p.201. 
85 Dworkinite project.  18 We can therefore acknowledge the accuracy of  Dyzenhaus' 
observation that "the presupposition that there is a distinction between politics and a 
science oflaw is itself  political",  19  and consequently reject Kelsen's claims for the a-
political purity of  the decision to adopt the Pure Theory, without also acknowledging 
that Dyzenhaus (or Dworkin, Finnis, Fuller, etc.) provides a preferable theory. 
It does not matter that the adoption of  a legal positivist theory is an act of  choice, 
rather than an underlying natural or logical necessity, provided only that this choice 
can be justified. It  is in this sense that Dyzenhaus claims - and I agree - that all legal 
theory is necessarily normative: we must explain why our chosen theory is better than 
the alternatives. A mere claim to greater descriptive accuracy (the foundation of  the 
stagnant research proposal bequeathed by Hart) can never suffice, because the very 
data to be described must first be identified. But the move from the descriptive to the 
normative is not, in the least, inconsistent with the claim that positivism provides the 
best available theory oflaw. Indeed Dyzenhaus himself emphasises the normative 
ambitions of  both Bentham and Hobbes' theories oflegal positivism?O 
Legal positivism as method essentially claims that law is (or at least should be) 
identifiable, interpretable, and capable of  determinate application without recourse to 
direct moral evaluation. In other words, that law is best perceived as a body of  rules, 
membership of  which is independently ascertainable by reference to fixed criteriaY 
However, this form oflegal positivism is not inured from inquiries into the purpose of 
18  On the necessity of  such a demonstration to preclude an inexorable slip into infinitely regressive 
questions, see Simmonds N. 'Mundane Practices and Imperial Visions' 1987 eLJ 465, esp. atpp. 474-
7. 
19 Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy p.  109 
20 Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, pp. 718-9. 
86 law, and indeed legal positivism in its more sophisticated manifestations entails a 
dialectic between the purposes of  law on one hand and its very existence and form 
(the objects oflegal positivist analysis) on the other. In other words, Gardner's 
carefully preserved distinction between the source and the form oflaw
22 cannot 
obviate the need for a definition oflaw. A definition, as Fuller recognised, does entail 
formal merits, because only objects bearing certain characteristics, a certainform, can 
be accommodated within any given definition. 
The Nature of  Law 
Law is not a brute fact, it does not 'exist' to be described in the way a tree, or even a 
courtroom, does. It has, without doubt, physical consequences, and even physical 
manifestations, but these are ultimately constituted by belief  in the law, and this belief 
cannot, initially, have been shaped (let alone caused) by the law. In other words, only 
a peculiar form of  (now institutionalised) commitment to law differentiates the words 
of  a statute, treaty, or case report, from those of  a novel or a newspaper; and only this 
belief sustains law. 
This raises the question of  what this institutional commitment is, or rather of  what it 
means to say that there is an institutional commitment to law, and, moreover, a 
commitment which provides the very basis for law's existence. Once more this 
confusion is brought about by an apparent agreement which masks a deep-seated 
disagreement, but is itself manifested in ambivalence. MacCormick exemplifies this 
ambivalence by describing law as an "institutional fact": 
21  For an outline of  the relative advantages of  this understanding of  public intemationallaw, see 
Beckett J.  'Behind Relative Normativity' 2001 EJIL 627 
87 This idea, expounded at length by MacConnick and Weinberger as the Institutional 
Theory of  Law,23 is encapsulated by the fonner's insistence that law is a "thought 
object", and that these: 
Exist by being believed in, rather than being believed in by virtue of  their 
existence24 
This understanding oflaw has profound ontological implications, but it is not 
necessarily as radical as it first appears. Belief is a slightly ambiguous tenn, but is far 
closer to acceptance than to commitment, and the necessary bearers of  belief are not 
clearly specified. Nonetheless, one thing is clear: not everyone has to individually 
believe in law (or any given legal system) for it to exist. There is no individual veto 
over law - as law (once extant) has physical manifestations, and can act upon people, 
their beliefs notwithstanding. Nonetheless, both a belief and a commitment by system 
officials is necessary for law to exist, and this must (extreme cases of  violence and 
oppression notwithstanding) be complemented by a general commitment to the legal 
system amongst the general populace under its jurisdiction?5 
Already an ambivalence appears to be surfacing as, radical possibilities 
notwithstanding, the above analysis remains perfectly compatible with Hart's 
descriptive approach to legal theory. Indeed the definition of  belief  just offered could 
22 Gardner, supra note 17, at p. 208. 
23 MacCormickN. and Weinberger 0., The Institutional Theory of  Law. 
24 MacCormick N., 'The Ethics of  Legalism' 2 Ratio Iuris (1989) 184 at p.  191. 
25 See e.g. Hart H. L. A. The Concept of  Law ch. 6; MacCormick N. Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Theory Appendix: 'On the Internal Aspect of  Rules' esp. pp. 277-8; 'The Concept of  Law and the 
Concept of  Law' 1994 OJLS 1 at p. 17. 
88 come straight from the pages of  the Concept of  Law. The ambivalence is unresolved 
as we have not yet considered what is to be believed in: the law as such, or 
institutional behaviour as law. 
The central focus of  this work as a whole is on the question of  what law is, on how we 
identify the raw data for legal theory. This is a second order question, a prologue to 
legal practice as Dworkin has put it, but it should not be understood as a "silent 
prologue" as Dworkin suggests. Thus the concern is not with what the law says, nor 
with what legal rules, ideas, or norms mean. These are first order questions, but they 
depend for intelligibility on the second order question, what makes the law law (what 
counts as law),. From what data do we identify what the law says? How do we 
recognise legal rules, ideas, or norms? What is law? 
There are two distinct ways of  answering this question, the descriptive and the 
normative; and consequently two distinct ways of  understanding law as an 
institutional fact. We can accept a fixed, natural, existence for law in institutional 
practice, (law - or at least legal system - as brute fact) and then judge theories by 
their correspondence to this. Or, we can accept that law is an ideal, and thus outside 
of  institutional practice, an ideal which legitimates institutional practice, and therefore 
provides a point of  critique for institutional practice (law as thought object). Hart 
takes the former route, I am advocating the latter; MacCormick provides an 
ambivalent median, or perhaps is simply unwilling to take sides. 
My argument, adopted from Fuller, is that law is a particular form of  the exercise of 
power. What this entails is that not all authoritative or central exercises of  power are 
89 law, and so that not every society need be regulated by law. Moreover, not every 
society purporting to have and apply a body of  rules, or other form of  authoritative 
dispute settlement, has a legal system; yet all societies have regulative codes and 
techniques of  governance. Thus it is also entailed that not all such techniques and 
codes are law or legal systems. This is posited as an analytic, rather than an historic 
claim. 
In considering the "beginnings", or origin, oflaw Willem Witteveen has recently 
observed that: 
The question of  Law's beginning is a complicated one. Logically speaking, 
there must be some origin, some moment in time when the law came into 
being. After a certain date it must have started functioning, and then law was 
socially recognised for what it is. But for no established legal culture can we 
say in retrospect exactly when this origin occurred, at what time it must be 
dated?6 
Questions surrounding the beginnings, the coming into being oflaw, are questions 
beyond, and separate from, the discourses of  legal history. They are questions which 
can only be answered logically, analytically, hypothetically, and so contingently. 
They are questions of  theory, not of  fact, empirical reality, or history; and it is as 
questions of  theory that I propose to engage with them here. 
26 Witteveen W. J., "Law's Beginning" in Fe1dbrugge, F.J.M. (Ed.), The Law's Beginning. 221  at p. 
221. 
90 The tale could also be told historically, and a synopsis of  that perspective may make 
matters a little clearer. Historically it is likely that law grew out of  (and in tum 
gradually gave birth to) certain institutions and institutional practices. Therefore law 
does have a real tie to institutional behaviour, but this tie need not be unmediated, nor 
uni-directional. That is, law is not solely the product of  institutional behaviour, and 
cannot be discerned purely (or directly) from institutional behaviour; i.e. not all 
institutional behaviour is law. 
We could then hypothesise the law's original role as a legitimatory one, not (at least at 
first) to speak right to might, not to provide justice against power, but to legitimate 
power. Law could be perceived as a set of  practices through which the exercise of 
power is explained and legitimated. However, ifthis is the case, then it is also at least 
possible that over time this process of  justification through law (treating like cases 
alike, providing rules, etc.) could, itself, solidify. At that point, the law could begin to 
break free of  institutional constraint, to differentiate itself from other exercises of 
power, to become distinct, identifiable, and ultimately "socially recognised". 
It is at this point, when law has become an analytically identifiable phenomenon, that 
it can also become a point of  critique for institutions and institutional behaviour: that 
power is not being exercised lawfully. But for this to happen, law must provide its 
own standards, its own ideal type, separate from, and indeed opposable to institutional 
behaviour. This, I think, is why Dyzenhaus believes all legal theory must be 
normative, because it must be arguing toward that ideal type, seeking to articulate the 
ideal, not merely describe the actual. 
91 At first glance this is not necessarily so, as noted above there is an ambivalence here; 
law could be perceived free of  institutional behaviour, but it need not be. However, 
even at this point, Dyzenhaus remains correct. There is no external reason to elide law 
and institutional behaviour (there is no necessary nature oflaw) and thus the elision 
can only (ultimately) be an act of  choice; that being so, even descriptive legal theory 
is based on a decision, and so is normative (in seeking to further that decision). But 
the decision itself remains. It is this decision which I believe MacCormick both makes 
and effaces. 
The effacement is presented as an undeclared ambivalence, MacCormick notes that 
law is an "institutional fact" rather than a "brute fact", but the phrase "institutional 
fact" could easily be adopted by Hart. 
Nonetheless, the understanding of  law as an "institutional fact", rather than a "brute 
fact", represents a decisive advance made by MacCormick over Hart; it may also 
display a fundamental, methodological, rift between MacCormick and Hart. 
Alternatively, it may that MacCormick simply offers a "line of  flight",27 a way out of 
Hart, which he himself does not take, or certainly does not admit to taking. That is, 
MacCormick's analysis has a radical potential, but equally retains an infatuation with 
Hart's belief  in the necessarily institutionalised nature oflaw, or at least legal system. 
As noted, Hart also perceived law as an institutional fact; the existence of  law is 
manifested in the institutional recognition and enforcement oflaw. In a sense then, the 
27  See Deleuze G. and Guattari F. A Thousand Plateaus pp. 9-15. A line of flight is an opening in 
existing ideas, from which new ideas may grow or 'take flight'; but it is a radical opening, intended, at 
least in part, to eliminate or rupture path dependence, and thus (to some extent) to free the new ideas 
from their own genealogical baggage. See also: http://www.uta.edu/english/aptld&g/alinesofflight.html 
92 real existence oflaw (and for Hart the existence oflaw must remain real) is both 
institutional and based on belief; the belief of  the legal officials. Nonetheless, the/act 
of  institutional belief can be observed in institutional rhetoric and behaviour, and 
these can provide the data for legal theory, which can therefore remain descriptive. 
However, MacCormick, opens up another way of  conceiving oflaw's "institutional 
existence". By taking legal counter-factuality seriously - as MacCormick does - we 
can (contra the Hartian in MacCormick) 'de-institutionalise' law (and thus also de-
institutionalise the rule of  recognition as law's empirical identifier) and focus on 
pedigree and form to provide a duty to recognise norms based on law (however 
defined) and not on power (however imposed) as an institutionalised - oppressive, 
forceful, violent - form. 
That is, we must choose whether to privilege the conceptualisation of  law as a 
"thought object" opposable to institutional behaviour; or to privilege the institutional 
behaviour itself as identifying the institutional fact oflaw. This is the ambivalence: 
that an institutional fact could come from either the fact of  institutional behaviour, or 
the potential institutionalisation of  a "thought object". 
I think that Dworkin also maps neatly onto this debate. In perceiving legal philosophy 
as the prologue to adjudication, Dworkin suggests the latter route: that we privilege 
the thought object, and our understanding of  this determines our identification oflegal 
rules (definition preceding description). However, in reducing this prologue to silence, 
Dworkin then makes the opposite move, privileging the actual institutional behaviour. 
In both cases, the thought object still exists, but in the former it speaks for itself  while 
93 in the latter it can only be identified through the institutional behaviour, hence its 
"silence"  . 
However, the move from institutional fact to thought object seems more likely to 
represent a move from the factual to the counter-factual- a move from Hart to 
Kelsen. This allows a fundamental reconsideration of  the basic nature of  law: if 
existence effects belief, why did humanity choose to believe in law? More basically, 
what was this thing, law, in which they chose to believe. Definition must precede 
existence, and thus existence must become counter-factual. However, the idea oflaw 
as thought object, is also a decisive advance on Kelsen, as it brings into relief the fact 
that there is no necessary element in the definition of  law: the relationship between 
law and force is, conceptually, as contingent as that between law and morality. 
Understanding law as a "thought object" allows us free reign in deciding how to 
identify law, provided only that we can subsequently justify our definition. 
Another important consequence of adopting the claim that belief effects law, is that 
the beliefthat created the law must have pre-dated law. Therefore, the belief cannot 
have been inspired by law. This belief  must then have another source, and this 
(source) can be analytically reconstructed as follows: Law exists; therefore something 
must have inspired belief in it; this beliefled to the conceptualisation of  a legal 
system; the legal system must then have had a purpose; in turn this adverts to a 
perceived need, a reason to identify the absence of  such a system; this would seem to 
imply a gap, a conceptual space which such a system could inhabit. This rational 
reconstruction can be hypothesised and presented in chronological order as follows. 
94 First comes the awareness of  a 'gap' and the need to fill it (or at least the desirability 
of  filling it). This gap is the requirement for some form of  regulation, or the need for a 
purposive/functional equivalent.
28 Temporally, it must first manifest itself as the 
presence of  an unfulfilled purpose, and the absence of  a means of  fulfilling it. 
Once the necessity of  filling the gap thus identified has been brought into relief, a 
mechanism can be conceptualised to fulfil this purpose, one such mechanism is the 
concept of  a legal system. However, this, or any other mechanism, can (analytically) 
only be conceived by reference to the need which exposed the gap it is being designed 
to fill. Thus the belief is in fact focussed on a purpose, with the aim of  creating a 
means of  achieving this. Therefore, the conceptualisation of  a legal system (which is a 
prerequisite for that belief  which brings law into existence) is absurd and impossible 
in the absence of a purposive understanding of  the function of  law. Therefore, not 
only is the understanding of a legal system teleologically conditioned by the 
understanding of  a good legal system, but the understanding of  a good legal system is 
itself determined by the understanding of  the purpose(s) of  the system. 
It should probably be acknowledged at this point that the very idea of  any pre-legal 
conceptualisation of  a legal system is itself absurd, and that if  this idea, simpliciter, 
were the claim then the institutional theory itself would be absurd; belief and 
existence would be mutually interdependent, so that neither could effect the other. 
Thus, the "thought object" oflaw is, itself, the product rather than the premise of  an 
epistemological process. Although true, this serves simply to illustrate why the focus 
28 I assume the gap would be brought into relief by the apparent arbitrariness of extant decision making 
processes. Indeed Hart's Concept of  Law may be read as the history of  a gradual progression away 
from the defects of  pre-legal decision-making; see Finnis J. Natural Law and Natural Rights p. 7. 
95 of  the initial belief  must be displaced from the legal system to the gap it is to inhabit -
the unfulfilled need for regulation?9 Thus the system is envisaged at a remove: 
1.  Perceive gap 
2.  Identify need to be fulfilled (delimit gap) 
3.  Conceptualise a means of  fulfilling it 
4.  Persuade 'relevant' others of  efficacy of  chosen means 
5.  Effect 'existence' of  object o£icreated by belief (fill gap) 
However, the effect, and indeed the very existence of  this remove, becomes 
submerged and hidden from sight (and afortiori from analysis) as attention is instead 
turned to refining the system adopted. This means that, as the mechanism evolves it 
gains control over the conditions of  its own development and its central features 
become'  given', the parameters of  analysis become set.  30 Put differently, history once 
again takes over from analytic reconstruction and the (brute) fact of  "the law" as 
institutional behaviour (or coercively imposed order) resurfaces. Legal theory returns 
to the descriptive, and the concept oflaw stops being recognised as a product of  the 
theory oflaw: the nature oflaw is set as the imposition of  coercive order.
31 That is, 
point 5 in the analytic reconstruction is no longer recognised as the conclusion of  a 
rational reconstruction, but is instead considered as if  real- as if  it were a brute fact -
and, in the case of  the legal system, as the natural ontology oflaw. 
29 However, as Cover points out this is (in a sense) not really an absence of  regulation, but rather a 
super-abundance, what is actually missing is the regulation of  regulation - the "jurispathic" function of 
law. Arbitrariness comes from having too many factors to take into account, and no way of delimiting 
relevance. This is similar to a Hobbesian "State of  Nature", but is functionally equivalent to an absence 
of authoritative regulation. See Cover R. "Nomos and Narrative" 97 Harvard Law Review (1983)4 at p. 
53; Hobbes T. Leviathan pp. 88-91. 
30 Searle J., The Construction of  Social Reality 7-24 
96 This is what is meant by the critical charge of  reijication, as the purposive creation of 
law (the analytic ideal giving rise to the thought object oflaw) is forgotten, what 
remains (the mechanism of  the institutionalised legal system) is reified; it is 
epistemically reconstructed as the thing. This allows its (ultimately contingent) 
features to be understood as natural-i.e. innate - characteristics. It is in this sense 
that these 'natural characteristics' (the force and authority oflaw) are moved beyond 
critique, to an almost transcendental level, as they are taken as given. Not only is their 
status as assumptions - as the product of  human choice - forgotten; but this very 
forgetting is in tum forgotten. The ontology oflaw is effectively transferred from the 
contingent realm of  institutional fact, to the empirical realm of  brute fact. 
Thus, the law is no longer understood as a purposive creation, nor as a tool, but rather 
is perceived as a fixed element in social reality. Law is understood as coercive order 
(the common assumption of  municipal legal theorising) and the reasons for this are 
ignored. Analysis and critique move to the first order questions of  content and 
meaning, and the second order issues of  what makes law law are submerged, no 
longer to be engaged with. From here on, the only valid critique oflaw is that which 
seeks to expand, restrict, or refine the effects of  the system; analysis is completely 
displaced to the conditions for the validity (however defined) of  the norms of  the 
system - in Dyzenhaus' terms to make legal authority co-extensive with legal reach 
and justify this. The reach of  law itself is presupposed as total, as law is understood as 
coercive order; as if  this were a natural and necessary feature oflaw. 
31  I think this is similar to Marxist claims about the fetishisation oflaw. Once law and coercive order 
are elided, it becomes difficult to think of an ordered society without law, and the nature of  law 
97 This is where legal theories in general, and legal positivism in particular, find 
themselves today. Law is totalising (has an answer to all questions)32 and 
authoritative; this cannot be helped, and therefore attention must focus on making the 
law substantively 'better'. This, in effect, is the limit point of  the controversy between 
legal positivism and natural law. The question is reduced to a description in the case 
oflegal positivism, and to a set of  substantive claims in the case of  natural law. That 
is, both schools (and indeed the critical and realist movements) accept the fixed 
characteristics oflaw, and divide only over how to deal with them. Natural law asks, 
purposively, how to direct the authority oflaw, while legal positivism remains content 
merely to describe what is there; the data oflaw as organised (i.e. identified and 
classified) around these fixed characteristics.33 
The Reach of  Law: 
The real dispute between legal positivism and natural law is not over the ontology of 
law; it is not over what law is, as that has been loosely, but sufficiently agreed as 
some form of  centralised coercive order. Instead, the underlying disagreement is over 
how, and whether, to limit or regulate this socially central regulative order; over how 
to substantivise law. In both schools ofthought (natural law and legal positivism, 
which may, for these purposes be taken as unified entities, because the assumption of 
the necessary centrality oflaw, is adopted by all major proponents of  both schools), 
law is presented as a centralised, authoritative, rule-bound discourse. The focus of 
becomes not only set, but also necessary. 
32 This is essentially an epistemic claim, law is a method of (or grid for) perceiving the world, therefore 
its reach is 'total', it covers all eventualities and nothing escapes legal regulation (in its wide sense, 
which includes permission, and is therefore distinct from interference). 
98 disagreement is how we should form the rules; how to identify the rules; and whether 
to circumscribe the content of  any putative rules. 
The inevitable, and total, reach oflegal solutions to problems is inherent in any 
sources theory34 of  law, as is well illustrated by both Hohfeld and Raz. The 'closing 
principle' (to which I shall return) provides an answer to those questions unregulated 
by specific norms of  the system, and thus the law cannot help but have an answer. As 
Raz explains it, in any sources based system, one source will occur always (and only) 
in the absence of  all the others - generally, following Hohfeld, this will mean that the 
absence of  prohibition equals permission. In Raz's terms: 
Intuitively, the negation of  a legal reason is nothing more than the absence of  a 
legal reason. It does not make sense to look for the source of  an absence of  a 
reason, legal or otherwise.
35 
Thus the "sourceless reason" is entailed by the absence of  any other reason, and 
closure rules become "analytic truths" in sources based legal systems.
36 
However, this area can be re-opened, and Hohfeld and Raz's claims problematised 
(indeed their conclusions undermined), by a demonstration that law's totalising 
tendencies are epistemic in nature. The law perceives the world only in terms of  its 
own legal/illegal code, thus conduct can be only legal or illegal. However, the 
33 Of  course, the more precise point being made by Dyzenhaus is that legal positivism does not, and 
cannot accomplish even that task; this point is effectively conceded by MacCormick, see ch. 3, notes 9-
20 and accompanying text, infra. 
34 A sources theory is one that makes law identifiable by virtue of  its pedigree (source), it is therefore a 
necessary corollary of  the positivist identification thesis. 
35 Raz J., The Authority of  Law p. 67. 
99 connection between this epistemic claim, and the normative-pragmatic claim to 
obedience is not entailed by the former. That is, the conclusion reached by law need 
not be considered authoritative or compulsory. 
One way of  limiting this is to condition the translation of  the epistemic claim to the 
pragmatic claim by making a second epistemic claim that the legallillegal code is 
itself conditioned by law's rule-bound internal structure. This claim, which will be 
expanded subsequently, shows the limits ofthe effective use of  the legal worldview, 
and therefore gives indicators as to when law's claims to authority are valid, or even 
worthy of  consideration, and thus of  when they should be considered irrelevant. In 
other words, if  law is a standard against which conduct can be evaluated, the 
limitations inherent in the rule structure give an indication of  when a premium should 
be placed on conformity.  37 
It should, however, be noted that the distinction drawn here between normative and 
epistemic claims is not hard and fast. There are very few (if any) epistemic claims that 
do not have normative overtones, especially within the institutional theory oflaw, 
where belief, and thus understanding, create and condition existence. However, the 
claim that law is a rule bound discourse is staked as a factual
38 one, but is not 
36 Ibid p. 74. 
37 However, this type of evaluation is necessarily arbitrary at least in the ultimate point. Law is most 
likely to be good at the things it has traditionally done, but only because it has traditionally done these 
things. In other words, after a certain point, it becomes inevitable that the mere fact of  legal regulation 
becomes the evaluative standard against which successful regulation is evaluated. Law is good at what 
it is good at, because the law has defmed the good. 
38 However, the very idea of  factual is problematic here. The rule bound internal structure of  law is 
entailed by the purpose of  law postulated here. But this purpose, in tum determines what is to count as 
law; what can be perceived or observed as law, or as the functioning oflaw. The claim is thus factual in 
a counter-intuitive sense; it is by perceiving (inter alia) such a rule bound reasoning process that we 
can understand ourselves as perceiving law. Definition controls perception, and thus implicitly 
definition controls factuality. This is the "reality" of life within an institutional understanding of  a 
given phenomenon, in this case law. 
100 synonymous with the claim that individual (complexes of) norms determine any given 
decision. Rather the claim is that law's reasoning structure - its method of  applying 
the legal/illegal distinction to construct its reality - is rule-bound: law 'thinks' in 
terms of  rules; considerations are not ad hoc but are examples of  rules, exceptions to 
rules, or counter rules.
39 Law formulates - frames or constructs - disputes in terms of 
rules. Of  course the claim that legal theory should take this into account is normative, 
and may even have the normative effect of  emphasising or supporting law's rule-
orientation, but this does not make the factual 'observation' (of a rule structure) itself 
into a normative claim. 
The purpose of  this section of  the chapter is simply to demonstrate that law is not a 
brute fact (even when it appears to be so, this is only as a result of  an unarticulated 
consensus, that is, it is an act of  human choice; which still requires justification), and 
therefore that reconsideration of  law (and its purpose) can alter its very nature; 
structural limitations, restrictions, and effects can only be analysed and combated 
through consideration of  the structure, and the social-structural location, oflaw itself. 
The Authoritative Centrality of  Law Reconsidered, and Problematised. 
Dyzenhaus' charge can now be more fully developed, as challenging legal positivism 
(although it is really applicable to all oflegal theory) to re-engage with the question of 
the purpose oflaw, and then (by implication) with the notion of  an automatic and 
absolute (i.e. non-contingent, non-arguable) obligation to obey the law (or suffer the 
consequences) as an assumed constituent trait of  a legal system. Legal positivism, in 
39 This will be developed subsequently. 
101 this analysis, sees the authoritative nature of  law as a condition of  law's very 
existence rather than a contingent feature of  a given understanding of  its purpose. 
In perceiving law as an identifiable phenomenon, with authoritativeness as a defining 
characteristic, legal positivism also has the effect of  radically relocating the debates 
surrounding the legitimacy oflaw, as consideration of  the structural location or 
hierarchic superiority oflaw is precluded; law is authoritative by definition, by virtue 
merely of  being law. The corollary of  this is that, whichever order, whichever 
commands or "norms" are enforced is designated as the law (in that territory, area, 
etc.). Legitimacy then can only be considered in terms of  the efficacy, the content and 
the content forming procedures of  the substantive rules, and any limitations that can 
or should be placed upon these. There is no question of  illegitimacy through a 
structural or formal over-reach by the law. This is what conditions the terms ofthe 
legal positivist/natural law debate. The key point is that only through a re-
examination, or rather an evaluative analytic reconstruction, of  the origins and 
purposes of  law can the terms of  the debate itself be redefined, and circular insularity 
avoided. 
Shklar offers a similar challenge, albeit rhetorically and as part of  a different polemic, 
when she observes, and disputes: 
The ... belief  that law is not only separate from political life but that it is a 
mode of social action superior to mere politics.
4o 
40 Shklar J., Legalism p. 8; 
102 Shklar's strictures on legalism are not, however, restricted to legal positivism, but 
rather focus on the ethical attitude of  rule following; the endorsement of  the particular 
rationality that makes all traditional legal theory possible. Nonetheless, her charge is 
most damaging to legal positivism, as natural law does possess certain resources for 
response. While, of  course, natural law is no more a unitary school than legal 
positivism, and the different strands of  natural law will provide different resources for 
response, the important point here is simply the commonality: that each has resources 
of  some type with which to respond. In a slightly different setting, D'Entreves 
captures this idea perfectly: 
Weare no longer concerned with what divided their authors. Weare 
concerned with what they had in common.
41 
In Shklar's view an entailment of  legalism is the fact that law creates (and/or 
circumscribes) the conceptual space within which other discourses can function, and 
therefore law alone can determine transgression of  these conceptual spaces; i.e. law is 
always already hierarchically superior to all other discourses. The simple question 
then asked is why this is so. For natural law, this rule structure is authoritative by 
virtue of  its substantive value, which in tum is drawn from, and defended in terms of, 
its purpose and the necessity of  this for the human telos. For legal positivism on the 
other hand the situation is somewhat bleaker, and the possibilities for response 
impoverished; the rules are authoritative by simple virtue of  their being legal rules (or 
rather, they are designated as legal rules by simple virtue of  their being generally 
enforced): ifthey were not authoritative, they would not be legal; if  they were not 
41  D'Entreves A. P. Natural Law, p. 79. 
103 legal they would not be authoritative.
42 This circularity becomes obvious only when 
the question is so bluntly posed that it cannot be avoided. 
In other words, while natural law theory continues (at some level) to struggle with the 
question "why should law be obeyed?", legal positivism has become inured to this 
enquiry. However, both have adopted or inherited a focus which precludes 
consideration of  the equally vital question "should law be obeyed?". It may be this 
that explains the awkward (and individuating) approach each school takes to the 
corollary question "when should a law be (dis)obeyed?" 
The 'blind spots' of  normative analysis are systemic or structural, they are caused by 
the (temporally) belated focus of  analytic jurisprudence - both positivist legal theory 
and legal dogmatics.
43 The idea of  authoritativeness as a criterion of  positive law, 
explicitly formulated in the legal positivist requirement of  efficacy, must be 
predicated on one of  two assumptions: either the law is (always) good, or the law 
should be enforced anyway. Rules (individual norms) can be unjust in this analysis, 
but these are anomalies, which can, and should, be corrected by the system, within the 
system, for systemic ends; the system itself  remains beyond reproach.
44 These 
assumptions are meta-analytical in the sense that they form the preconditions for 
42 Legal here is used in a slightly broad sense of 'not illegal', thus a non-legal decision remains legal so 
long as it is not illegal; i.e. as long as it does not transgress the conceptual space which law has 
allocated to the discourse it inhabits. 
43 The focus is temporally belated because it concentrates on legal norms which are themselves 
conclusions, the products of  competing legal theories, but which are presented and analysed as 'fact', 
as the premises of  debate. This accusation initially appears unjustified in relation to positivism's 
dogmatic manifestation, but this appearance is illusory. Although the purpose of  this form of  positivism 
is simply to identify valid (individual) rules (and their inter-relations and effects) it does so by setting 
or acknowledging criteria of  validity predicated on membership of an extant legal system. This in turn 
presupposes a valid system to which rules can belong. System validity remains defined by efficacy, and 
therefore, although the relationship is mediated, valid rules are always determined by criteria of 
(systemic) efficacy. 
44 See, e.g. Schlag P. 'Normative and Nowhere To Go' 43 Stanford Law Review (1990) 167. 
104 analytic study, and therefore are not themselves open to analysis; hence the necessity 
of  the orthodox legal positivist blind spot inhabited by questions of  the purpose of 
law. 
Therefore the question "why should law be authoritative" is not so much irrelevant to 
legal positivism as perfectly hidden from its analysis. Laws can be good or bad, but to 
be laws at all they must be (indeed, are) authoritative. This does open the possibility -
especially in the terms of  Hartian theory - of  a disjunction between obedience and 
obligation, but even this potential space is always already filled by enforcement 
mechanisms. Thus, although only officials need accept obligations as obligations of 
the system (i.e. must have a commitment to the system such that a coincidence 
between legal and actual obligations is created and maintained, while the population 
need only display the 'fact' of  habitual obedience) subjects of  the legal system remain 
faced with the prospect of  obedience or sanction.
45 Thus the idea of  obligation is 
displaced, and efficacy is linked directly to enforcement; i.e. efficacy can now be 
measured in "breach = sanction" terms. In short, the subjects' choice of  obedience or 
enforcement (which Austin termed obligation) remains definitional to law.
46 
Purposive analysis is once more precluded, or at best displaced to the characterisation 
and differentiation of  "good" and "bad" legal systems, as that is determined by the 
degree of  the observer's sympathy towards the substantive rules or rule creation 
procedures. 
45 But, as observed earlier, this is inevitable given the origins of  the rule of  recognition in observation 
of  the practices of  these very legal officials. 
46 Indeed it is not even impossible that Hart does in fact relate legal obligation directly to the 
probability of  physical coercion (sanctions in Austin's terms) in the event of  transgression; see Concept 
p.84. 
105 Olivecrona, in his historical analysis oflegal positivist doctrine,47 presented the most 
direct engagement with this issue. In assessing legal positivism's implicit assumption 
of  a duty of  obedience for its subjects - or perhaps more accurately a right to, or 
expectation of, that obedience by the legal system - Olivecrona plots the history of 
legal positivism within the context of  its being an off-shoot of  natural law. His 
position is that the duty of  obedience to civil (positive) law flows from a natural law 
obligation to keep promises,48 an obligation sanctified by the construction of  social 
contract analysis. From this perspective, the difference between legal positivism 
(proper) and the 'positive' civil law of  natural law theory (human regulation of  areas 
untouched by the law of  nature) is radically reduced to one of  recognising and 
observing limitations on civil law maker's powers, or refusing to do so. There is no 
difference in kind between the two branches oflaw. 
The point here is that natural law theorists were not explaining the essence oflaw, but 
the basis of  its claim to authority; it is for this reason that Dyzenhaus can use this 
position - and emphasise Fuller - to attack legal positivism's failure to acknowledge 
and rationalise its radical break from its roots. In other words, where the purpose of 
law is to fulfil a divine or natural project, and law is defined as doing so, there is little 
need to defend either the purpose, or the obligatoriness oflaw. So, for Grotius, civil 
(positive) law was binding by virtue of  a natural law dictum of  pacta sund servanda 
and both positive and natural law were obligatory as a duty to God (or later human 
47 Olivecrona K. Law as Fact (2
nd Ed. 1971) pp. 50-62. 
48 However, an entirely converse argument is offered by Hume, who shows with some force the 
illogicality of  perceiving promise as a "natural virtue" as the idea simply does not seem to make sense 
outside a societal context, but rather is manifestly an "artificial virtue", but a good nonetheless. See 
Treatise on Human Nature Book III Part II Ch. V. In terms of  the positivist fallacy however, this does 
not seem to offer any support of  the idea that the obligation to obey is an inherent characteristic oflaw. 
106 nature) as a result of  our being given free wil1.49 Grotius buttressed this argument 
with an appeal to reason: short term gain through breach of  the law undermined the 
system through which gain could be measured, attained, and secured. Such breaches 
were, therefore, futile. For Hobbes it is a little different; law is no longer the fruition 
of  a natural or divine plan, and the purpose is therefore redefined as the preservation 
of  order. This is underpinned by the twin arguments that order is vital and only law 
can provide it. Therefore the law is entitled to demand obedience and presumptively 
obliged to sanction disobedience. 
However, legal positivism - from Bentham to Kramer - perceives obedience as a fact, 
a necessary characteristic oflaw, law's identifying mark. As obedience is linked to 
purpose, analysis of  the latter becomes unnecessary when the former is presumed. 
This leads to the analysis oflaw, of  the legal system as such (as opposed to the 
contents of  the legal system) as an a-contextual 'fact'  .50 But law cannot be identified 
without reference to its purpose (end) and techniques (means). In other words, legal 
positivism can give no defence ofthe phenomena it perceives as representing or 
reflecting law; rather it is reduced to the assertion "law is this which I describe". That 
is, any centrally enforced, ostensibly authoritative, rule or command is taken to be 
law. 
49 All of  the analyses given here are drawn from Olivecrona (supra note 47). However, of  more direct 
interest to PIL is Hersch Lauterpacht, whose attempts to add natural law content to Kelsen's positivist 
project also root the authoritativeness oflaw in free will sanctified by  pacta sund servanda; see e.g. 
The Function of  Law in the International Community. 
50 Hart was deeply concerned with context in his analysis of the meanings of  legal terms and legal 
concepts. However, this context was provided by the legal system itself (see "Definition and Rule in 
Legal Theory"). Thus, the legal system served as the objective domain of  analysis - it provided the 
standards by which truth or correspondence could be measured. But, that means that the system itself 
must be presupposed, or located in another objective domain of  analysis. As there is no evidence of 
Hart's having taken the latter course, it seems fair to assume he took the former. This would also 
resonate with his descriptive methodology, and with Raz'  s Hartian claim that the concept of law 
resides outside legal theory; see "Two Views of  the Nature of  the Theory of  Law: A Partial 
Comparison" in Coleman J. (ed.) Hart's Postscript 1 at p. 36. 
107 It is this - now forgotten - assumption, of  a purpose necessitating enforcement and 
obligation, which causes the disengagement oflegal positivism, and reduces it, in 
Laski's terms, to "an exercise in logic, not in life"; it is this, also, which leaves legal 
positivism open to Dyzenhaus' charges of  "stagnancy" and irrelevance. I have sought 
so far to lay the foundations for a refutation of  these charges through a 
reconceptualisation of  law predicated on a redefinition both of  its purpose, and of  its 
(necessary) relationship thereto. The contention implicit here, is that PIL as a 'naked 
legal system' (one unclothed by political privilege; indeed without a centralised 
political system at all) provides the natural focus for a re-examination of  the 
existence, functioning, and role oflegal phenomena.
51 
Re-considering Dyzenhaus, Again. 
However, the fact that "law" as much as the content of  any given "legal system" (i.e. 
any particular substantivised body of  norms understood as a system) must have a 
purpose - i.e. that each can only be properly or fully understood in terms of  a purpose 
- does not in any way imply that these two purposes must be identical. They are, 
however, intimately related. 
Dyzenhaus is correct that law as such must be understood purposively. Absent a 
purpose we have no way of  justifying our choice of  the phenomena we will observe 
under the name oflaw. Mere "empirical accuracy" cannot be a mark of  success if  the 
theory itself can define the relevant empirical data against which the accuracy of 
51  Moreover, PIL as a system lacking in centralised force and authoritative decision-making, is also 
most in need of  this form of  clear, almost self-applying, rule-bound legal system. 
108 description is to be evaluated. This would leave legal positivism in danger of 
irrelevance, pursuing a strained analysis of  its own stipulated (but unjustified) objects 
of  observation. Only by engagement with purpose - with the reason for having law at 
all- can we justify the choice of  phenomena to be observed, and justify unifying this 
observation under the name of  law or legal system. Law must be defined to be 
observed, and purpose is required to bring determinacy and justification to the 
definition offered. 
Moreover, Dyzenhaus may also be correct that any coherent theory of  adjudication 
must attribute an overall purpose to the legal system being theorised. That is, the 
application oflaw also presupposes that law have a purpose. Naturally, this is 
disputed by the hard positivists, for them judicial discretion alone structures the 
decision;52 such discretion performs the function Dworkin allocated to the overall 
purpose of  a legal system. This, as Dyzenhaus disparagingly notes, would leave legal 
theory with the task of  merely describing the exercise of  an unconstrained judicial 
discretion, rather than structuring or evaluating, or even predicting judicial application 
of  the law. Thus any theory of  adjudication seeking to constrain judges must posit an 
overall purpose for the legal system within which those judges operate. This is the 
concession soft positivists offer to the identification thesis, that the identification of 
(the content ot) norms in moments of  relative indeterminacy may be subject to moral 
criteria. 
Thus the understanding oflaw as such must be purposive, and the identification of 
legal norms (at least in hard cases) requires a purposive understanding of  the legal 
52 Gardner, supra note 17, p. 201. 
109 system. So, Dyzenhaus concludes, if  the identification of  law is a purposive practice 
and the definition oflaw is also a purposive practice, then the concession in the 
identification thesis must inexorably create a like concession in the separability thesis. 
This means that the separability thesis can no longer be maintained, and the moral 
nature of  law must be conceded. 
But this is simply not so. That both law (as such) and each legal system require 
recourse to their posited purpose to be fully understood does not in any way imply 
that each must share the same purpose. Law requires purpose at the ontological level, 
to identify the phenomena to be observed as law. A legal system requires purpose at 
the deontologicallevel, to give determinate content to the norms already assumed to 
exist at the ontological level. The two operate quite independently of  one another. 
In other words, the legal positivist "claim that understandings of  the point oflaw, 
which inform theories of  adjudication, operate in a different conceptual space from 
theories oflaw,,53 derided by Dyzenhaus,54 is in fact perfectly correct. What the law 
is, and what it is being deployed for in a particular setting, are two different things. 
That we need a purpose to determine the content of  some norms does not mean that 
this purpose also determines the form of  law as such. The form of  law as such may 
vary, but moreover and more importantly a single form for law (e.g. Fuller's 
definition, drawn from purpose, and encapsulated in the eight principles) can sustain a 
variety of  different purposes to be pursued by different legal systems. 
53 Dyzenhaus, supra note 3, p. 709. 
54 Ibid. 
110 This shows that the fact that each legal system may require a substantive purpose to 
determine the content of  (some of) its norms cannot lead to a requirement that these 
purposes each feed into (and moralise) the abstract purpose of  law as such. That the 
identification thesis may rely on "understandings of  the point oflaw", which 
constitute a substantive morality, does not entail that the separability thesis must give 
way to the same morality. Understandings of  the coherence ofthe content of 
particular legal systems which inform theories of  adjudication are deontological in 
effect. Understandings of  the purpose of  law which define the phenomena to be 
considered law are ontological in effect. Thus the two do, by definition, "operate in ... 
different conceptual space[  s]" 
However, Dyzenhaus is correct in so far as he can be interpreted as claiming simply 
that this fact does not obviate the need for a purposive understanding of  law as well as 
a purposive understanding of  any given system of  norms. This is because in 
understanding law non-purposively, but legal systems purposively, legal positivism 
effectively says to socio-political systems "Here is your (regulatory) tool. Now use it 
as you wish". 
In other words, the stipulated, and unjustified, legal positivist definition oflaw lacks 
utility. It completely overlooks the possibility that the tool (law as thus defined) is 
unfit for the purpose to which a given society wishes to put it (one of  many critiques 
oflegal positivism and oflaw generally, is that it fails to do what it claims it can). It 
also overlooks the point (made repeatedly by Fuller
55
)  that law is but one item in the 
regulatory toolbox, and the corollary point that to use the tool we must first examine 
55  See, e.g. "The Forms and Limits of  Adjudication" 92 Harvard Law Review (1978) 353. 
111 what it is, and what it is good at. Finally, the very definition ofthe tool is left 
indetenninate, as is the question of  the tool's utility (and any limits on this), and even 
its internal functioning. No reasons are given for the nature of  the tool, nor of  why it 
(and it alone) must be used, nor how it can be altered. When the definition oflaw is 
stipulated it cannot be altered, but where it is deduced from purpose the tool itself 
(law) can be examined, evaluated, corrected, disputed, and given space to evolve to 
fulfil its purpose (which can, in turn, also, always, be problematised itself). 
Thus Dyzenhaus, although correct to emphasise the necessarily purposive 
understanding of  both law and legal system, errs in eliding these purposes. The 
understanding that the point of  a legal order can be separated from the existence of 
law is correct. What law is, and what a particular legal order attempts to achieve (with 
law) are conceptually separate. The tool does not define the task, but nor does the task 
define the tool. What the tool is does not detennine what it may be used for, though it 
may indicate that the tool should be modified, or that another tool should be used, or 
another purpose pursued. The two purposes are related because only certain objectives 
can be efficaciously pursued through law. However, what these objectives are 
depends on how law is defined, and this in turn depends on the purpose law is 
understood to fulfil. 
The purpose of  "law" as such is very abstract, perhaps social-engineering of  some 
fonn, or the delimitation and evaluation of  society. But how this will be 
substantivised requires focus on a second (itself more substantive) purpose, namely 
the (political) purpose pursued through the legal system. Thus the purpose oflaw does 
not detennine how the law should be substantivised. It does not posit (deep enough) 
112 presumptions about the nature or good of  man, such as would be necessary to 
substantivise the purpose of  law as such. Yet this is exactly what Dyzenhaus is 
suggesting purpose does. The key is the necessity for two purposes, one to define law 
ontologically,56 and another to substantivise it deontologically. 
Dyzenhaus and Fuller, a Different Natural Law? 
Dyzenhaus suggests that Fuller offers a new direction for legal theory, and a new type 
of  natural law. 57 In positing an inner morality oflaw, Fuller is said to move away 
from the classic natural law position which subordinates law to a chosen moral order. 
Simultaneously, Dyzenhaus seeks to emphasise the difference between Fuller and 
Dworkin. As "antipositivists" each "must make an argument about moral choices 
which inhere in law, whatever the contingencies of  political choice.,,58 However, the 
arguments each offer are in entirely different registers. Due to his focus on 
adjudication, Dworkin contends that such constraints arise because "[j]udges ... find 
themselves compelled to offer a principled justification for their decisions in "hard 
cases"". However, "[t]hese principles are not freestanding" but must be located within 
the substantive content of  the legal order in question.  59 Nonetheless: 
Dworkin argues further that such a principled justification is intrinsically a 
moral one and that the core of  this morality is a liberal principle of  equal 
concern and respect for all individuals,,60 
56 However, this purpose is also based on a series of assumptions about the nature of  people, their 
amenability to regulation, and the 'parts' available from which the legal system in question can be 
constructed. 
57 See "Fuller's Novelty" in Witteveen and van der Burg (ed.s) Rediscovering Fuller, p. 78, 
58 Ibid. 88. 
113 Consequently: 
"[Dworkin] commits himself ... to the odd claim that every legal order must 
instantiate that particular political ideology".61 
In short, Dworkin offers a classic external morality, a version of  the very classic 
natural law which Fuller abandoned. By then turning to Fuller, Dyzenhaus implicitly 
admits the impossibility ofthis aspect of  Dworkin's project. Unlike Dworkin, Fuller 
offers a structural relationship between law and liberalism. This relationship is 
necessary and not contingent, as the relationship between law - and especially 
adjudication - and an external morality would be. Dyzenhaus then seeks to develop 
this aspect of  Fuller's thought, to 'flesh out' the internal morality, and more 
particularly its impact upon the substance oflaw. Dyzenhaus adopts, and seeks to 
extrapolate, Fuller's purposive understanding of  law. 
However, Fuller does not really provide a purpose, but rather a definition oflaw. The 
purpose he offers is so formal that it entails nothing outside the formal characteristics 
oflegal regulation, of  what it means to govern conduct according to rules. Rather, 
Fuller provides a technique for identifj;ing law in action, and distinguishing it from 
non-legal normative orders. This is why Fuller talks of  providing an inner morality of 
law. Fuller's theory is schematic; the purpose pursued - the subjection of  human 
conduct to the governance of  rules - is both formal and assumed. Fuller simply 
defines law; he stipulates the essence of  law as a concretisation of  a particular purpose 
which he attributes to law, but this is the purpose oflaw as such, not the purpose of 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
114 any particular legal system.
62 It is a definition oflaw as a tool, not a delimitation of 
the function that tool is to perform. 
Fuller's enquiry does not, in the first instance, concern good law and bad law, but law 
and not law. Thus, when Hart points out that carpentry is neither inherently good nor 
bad
63 
- that a carpenter could equally deploy his skills in creating a hospital bed or a 
torturer's rack - he fundamentally misses the point Fuller is making. The analogy 
does not concern good and bad uses of  carpentry, but the existence of  carpentry as an 
autonomous field of  human endeavour. A hospital bed or a torture rack could be made 
from wood; this has nothing whatever to do with any "morality" internal to carpentry. 
The key point is rather that a hospital bed or torture rack could equally well be 
constructed from metal, plastic, or stone. In these latter eventualities, the objects 
would remain a bed or a rack, but no carpentry would be involved. The internal 
morality is the bringing out ofthe "good" inherent in carpentry (the skilled 
manipulation of  wood) not of  the "good" to which carpentry can be turned. 
Fuller's theory is not merely one of  efficiency as the legal positivists suggested, but 
truly a morality because, for Fuller, any system displaying fidelity to the eight 
principles must pursue good ends. This is probably an overstatement; a legal order 
could pursue 'bad' ends, but it would have to do so openly, and in awareness of  the 
restrictions brought to bear on its subjects' loyalty by the candour demanded by 
Fuller's principles.
64 The question is not, as the legal positivists in an intuitively 
61  Ibid. 90-1. 
62 Ibid. 91-2 
63 Hart H. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy p. 347. 
64 This is very similar to Dyzenhaus' arguments about the South African apartheid system, and the role 
of  courts (ignoring the law, displaying no fidelity to the eight principles) in maintaining this. See "With 
115 Hobbesian fashion seem to assume, about the maintenance of  order or political 
control, but about the definition, and then the imposition, of  law as such. 
The nature of  this misunderstanding is brought clearly into relief in Gardner's 
adoption of  Hart's arguments against Fuller: 
To hold a norm legally valid according to its formal merits rather than 
according to the merits of  its content is still to hold it valid according to its 
merits, and this puts one on a collision course with (LP*) '"  Thus, as Hart had 
correctly explained in his earlier engagements with Fuller, a legal norm that is 
retroactive, radically uncertain, and devoid of  all generality, and hence 
dramatically deficient relative to the ideal of  the rule oflaw, is no less valid 
qua legal, than one which is prospective, admirably certain, and perfectly 
general.  65 
Fuller does not claim that such norms are not norms, nor does he necessarily claim 
that even an entire system constructed of  such norms would be inefficacious. What 
Fuller claims is that such norms are not laws, and so a system comprising such norms 
cannot be a legal system. The key is in Fuller's vital distinction between "fidelity to 
the law" and "deference to constituted authority". The claim is not that constituted 
authority could not (successfully) wield power in such a fashion. Rather, the claim is 
that in doing so it abandons law for other forms of  governance (or the imposition of 
'order'). The question is not one of  the merits, but ofthe definition oflegal norms: 
the Benefit of  Hindsight" in Lethe's Law Christodilidous E. and Veitch S. (Eds.). See also Craig P. 
'Ultra Vires and the Foundations of  Judicial Review' 1998 CLJ 63. 
116 One thing is, however, clear. A mere respect for constituted authority must not be 
confused with fidelity to law. Rex's subjects, for example, remained faithful to him 
as king throughout his long and inept reign. They were not faithful to his law, for 
he never made any. 66 
Fuller merely defined what law is and then assumed that its content, or content 
fonning procedures, or perhaps its origin, but never (merely) its enforcement or 
efficacy, brought the duty to obey law into relief. Despite this, Fuller instinctively, 
and spuriously, distinguished those regimes he disliked (apartheid South Africa and 
Nazi Gennany) and denied them the label oflegal systems. From these denials he 
universalised a theory that the internal morality of  law did provide certain substantive 
restrictions on the content oflaw. That is, Fuller believed he had discovered 
substantive limitations within his fonnal definition oflaw. 
These limitations were either contingent - e.g. the Nazi non-publication of  many rules 
- or falsely universalised - e.g. flawed Nazi and apartheid efforts to define race 
satisfactorily. From this latter observation, Fuller deduced that certain so-called evils 
could not be accurately defined, and therefore could not fonn the object of  regulation 
within a system showing fidelity to the eight principles oflegality.67 This is simply 
untrue. Fuller's error was to assume that law must be rational in some kind of 
absolute, as opposed to merely internal, sense. An absolute rationality of  this type 
would be required only when the purposes of  law and legal order, as the manifestation 
of  a socio-political project, are conflated. The possibility that race cannot be rationally 
65  Gardner, supra note 17, pp. 208-9 Paragraph breaks suppressed, footnotes omitted. 
66  The Morality of  Law p. 41. 
67 Ibid 159-62. 
117 defined with a satisfactory degree of  determinacy, does not preclude the fact that it 
can be arbitrarily defined with great precision. Moreover, that a legal system could 
not subjugate an ethnic group easily scarcely excuses the fact that it could subjugate 
women with impunity.  68 
Fuller's theory that the internal morality provides substantive constraints through its 
emphasis on the determinate exposition of  rules is in reality unfounded. There is no 
reason for law to be accurate, rational, or true to the nuances of  any given political 
project; rather the content oflaw can be arbitrary, and - in inter alia the Fullerian 
model-in order simply to be law need be only determinate, unambiguous, and 
impartially applied. That said, the idea that certain 'real world' projects could not be 
(successfully and truthfully) pursued through law - i.e. that law is not good for all 
purposes - is true, both of  the Fullerian approach and generally in any approach that 
perceives law as a system of  impartially applied (or at least impartially applicable) 
rules. 
Nonetheless, Dyzenhaus relies upon, and seeks to extrapolate, this implicit prohibition 
on certain norms. He attempts to substantivise and expand the internal morality of 
law; in doing so, he unwittingly develops an external morality, and destroys any 
"novelty" Fuller's theories may have had. Dyzenhaus reveals the 'classic' natural 
lawyer in Fuller. Fuller assumes law to be good,69 hence the use of  morality, however, 
he does not provide a mechanism to ensure this. Fuller does not provide a purpose 
68 The feminist critique of  the substance ofPIL (and of  both the fonn and substance of law generally) is 
very important, and - along with the critical claim that "laws hunt in contradictory pairs" - deserves far 
more attention than can be allotted to it in the present project. However, the critique of  substance also 
presupposes agreement on the definition of law and the identification of  substantive nonns and so in a 
sense conceptually follows the present work. 
118 capable of  determining the content of  the legal rules, in the way that Dyzenhaus 
suggests it should. This, in fact, is Dyzenhaus' advance on Fuller; he substantivises 
the purpose oflaw. In doing so, he alters both the role played by purpose, and the time 
(the temporal location) at which purpose performs this role. However, purpose as 
understood (or at least portrayed) by Fuller did not - or at least was not acknowledged 
to - play this role. 
It may be that the key variable in Fuller's purposive understanding of  law is not the 
limitations inherent in the rule form as such,70 but rather their application to "human" 
conduct. One could argue that Fuller uses "human" as an evaluative rather than a 
merely descriptive term. The assumption which Fuller makes, and Dyzenhaus 
emphasises, is the natural correctness of  liberal individualism. This assumption is so 
fundamental, so constitutive of  his own world view, that Fuller fails to recognise it as 
an assumption. But it is this very assumption which provides, for Fuller, the guarantee 
of  the goodness oflaw; in the sense, both, ofthe good end toward which the good 
means oflaw must be directed, and therefore ofthe duty to obey law.7! 
69 See, e.g. his response to the idea of a "morality of  poisoning"; The Morality of  Law (2
nd ed.) ch. 5 "A 
Reply to Critics" esp. pp. 201-8 
70 Though this does of  course playa role in determining the scope, the coverage, oflegal regulation. 
71  However, as Dyzenhaus attempts to explain, and perhaps also prove, there may be a truly immanent 
link between liberalism and certain understandings of  the form, the structure, and the formal purpose of 
law, namely law understood as a determinate and coherent system of  rules. This becomes particularly 
clear in relation to the morality of aspiration, the desire to make law ever clearer. After all, what is a 
merely determinate law (as opposed to a morally correct one) but a manifestation of  the liberal 
individualist denial of absolute truth. Furthermore, the desire for a clear, determinate, and neutrally 
applied law, does appear to assume a rational and free legal subject to be regulated. Perhaps then, the 
restrictions on the manifestation of  the collective intentionality of  law speak to a deeper issue of 
embeddedness within the liberal world view. However, even if  all this is so, it need not tie law to as 
substantive a vision ofliberalism as Dyzenhaus suggests. See, e.g. "Baker: The Unity of  Public Law?" 
in Dyzenhaus (ed.) The Unity of  Public Law, 1. 
119 Fuller must, dogmatically, see all humans as equal, and all law as impartially 
applied.
72 Although he cannot guarantee impartial rules (no-one can), nor even 
impartial or just rule creating procedures, the impartial recognition and application of 
rules is inherent in Fuller's description oflaw. Because he perceives law as universal, 
as governing human conduct as such, all humans within the jurisdiction of any given 
legal system are subject to the same rules.
73  It is, therefore, apparent that the demand 
of  congruence entails a value free technique for the identification and application of 
legal rules, that is until one realises what Dyzenhaus has brought into relief: Fuller 
actually depends on elements of  an undisclosed external morality of  law. This 
external morality is surreptitiously defined into the purpose oflaw, and thence into the 
very definition oflaw itself; this is why Dyzenhaus describes Fuller's theory as 
"morally partisan".74 The external morality determines the definition (elaboration) of 
the internal morality, and it is therefore unsurprising that faithfully following the 
internal morality leads to a legal system which manifests the limitations of  the 
external morality (liberal individualism). 
In deploying the "internal morality" to create substantive limitations on the content 
and coverage oflaw, Fuller unintentionally adverts to its true status as an external 
morality. However, it is important to realise that these two restrictions are not 
intertwined, let alone synonymous. To the extent that it limits only the coverage of 
law,75 the morality remains internal. It is only when used to restrict or determine the 
content oflegal norms that the purpose becomes an external morality. Consequently, 
this latter move can be either purged or developed. Dyzenhaus seeks to develop it. 
72 Ibid, e.g. p. 39, pp. 162-8. 
73  Once Fuller is transposed into the international sphere, it becomes clear that the key is subject rather 
than human. All subjects of  a legal order must be treated equally by that order. 
74 Supra note 57, p. 92. 
120 It is arguable that Fuller did not necessarily assume a duty to obey law as such, and he 
most certainly did not endorse a duty of  obedience to anything which superficially 
appears like law.
76 Instead, Fuller offers a means to identify and evaluate legal 
systems; a technique for identifying the legal system and its rules as a prerequisite to 
the assessment ofthe content ofthose legal rules, the duties imposed by law. He does 
not necessarily identify, or require a means to identify, any duty to obey the law as 
such, although congruence presumably has a coercive element; after all the purpose of 
law is the "subjection of  human conduct to the governance of  rules", and the rules are 
to be applied as stated. He does assume, however, that whatever this duty (to obey law 
as such) is, it recedes as the system in question displays less and less fidelity to the 
eight principles of  legality. 
This means that at some point the duty can disappear at the formal or definitional 
level if  deviance from the eight principles (the definition oflaw) becomes too great. 
There is no longer a legal system, and so can be no duty to obey the law. But Fuller 
also hints at the possibility that the duty could also lapse as a result of  the substantive 
content of  the legal system. Dyzenhaus seeks to expand this possibility, to develop the 
kind of  substantive purpose which could determine rule content and identification, by 
eliding the identification and separability theses. 
Purpose, in Dyzenhaus' extension of  Fullerian theory determines the content of  rules. 
The collapse of  the two legal positivist theses, entailed by Dyzenhaus' elision of  the 
two purposes, oflaw and oflegal system, works both ways. The abstract purpose of 
75  See, "The Forms and Limits of  Adjudication", 92 Harvard Law Review (1978) 353 
76 Fuller L. The Morality of  Law, pp. 38-41 
121 law restricts (and even determines) the content of  norms which can (  and must) appear 
in all legal systems in order that those normative orders be legal systems at all. The 
substantivised purpose underwrites both the content of  the law and the duty of 
obedience to the law. Dyzenhaus substantivises the purpose oflaw as such by eliding 
it with the substantive purpose (purportedly) pursued by legal systems of  which he 
approves. This is almost inevitable, as Dyzenhaus is not merely defining the law as 
such, but justifying the Rule of  Law.
77 
In substantivising the purpose of  law in this manner Dyzenhaus has done two things: 
first, he has moved purpose beyond the role allocated to it by Fuller; and second, he 
has vastly reduced the difference between Fuller and Dworkin in legal theoretical 
terms. Dyzenhaus has undermined the special-structural-role Fuller allocated to 
purpose, and thus revealed the contingency of  this particular purpose. This may 
simply reveal flaws inherent in Fuller's project, or it may attribute new flaws to it. In 
either event, Dyzenhaus' 'extrapolation' destroys Fuller's "novelty". 
Dyzenhaus does not simply extrapolate, but actually reverses, Fuller's theory. For 
Fuller, the relationship between form and purpose delimited the coverage oflaw: law 
could only be used to regulate conduct where that conduct could be subjected to the 
demands of  determinate rules. Dyzenhaus, effectively attempting to blend Fuller and 
Dworkin, allows for 'legal regulation' even in the absence of  a reduction to 
determinate rules. Dyzenhaus assumes the authority oflaw. Consequently, instead of 
the authority oflaw being made contingent on its substance, the substance oflaw 
becomes contingent upon the need to justify its assumed authority. 
77 See, e.g. Dyzenhaus D., "Form and Substance in the Rule of  Law" in Forsyth C. (ed) Judicial Review 
and the Constitution 141. 
122 This is permissible only to the extent that the rules can be made 'clear' by reference to 
the 'purpose' (the external morality) oflaw as such, and not by reference to judicial 
discretion. Such a move is necessary to preserve the "reach of  law", but it entails a 
collapse into neo-Dworkinianism. This collapse was implicit in Fuller's own theory, 
and Dyzenhaus simply brought it into relief. Alternatively, Fuller's true 'novelty' lay 
in his claim that law could regulate only a limited domain; that law was not 
necessarily authoritative; and that the Rule of  Law as a claim of  legal sovereignty was 
misguided. This is a claim Dyzenhaus abandons. 
This is important, because the indiscriminate destructiveness of  Dyzenhaus' critique 
ofthe authority oflaw - perceived as a dialectical corollary to the purpose oflaw, 
namely the (natural) promotion of  liberal individualism within (procedural) 
democracy - was entailed by his choice of  Fuller as his theoretical foundation. 
Having, in effect, conceded the Dworkinian argument,78 Dyzenhaus had to make 
explicit what Fuller had left implicit, namely the neo-Dworkinian basis ofthe duty to 
obey the law,79 which lies in the contingency of  the duty to obey law upon the 
substantive content of  law (the collapse of  the identification and separability theses). 
Moreover, and more important, is the existence and effect ofthe entailed corollary; 
that the abstract purpose oflaw determines (or at least conditions) the purpose (and so 
content) of  each (true) legal system. 
Consequently, this substantive content (oflaw) had to be shielded and entrenched, but 
this is the role of  an external morality. Thus Dyzenhaus had to find in Fuller that 
78  See note 61  supra. 
123 which he had conceded in Dworkin, a viable external morality on which the very 
definition of  law could be founded. Dyzenhaus implicitly set himself the task of 
formalising this external morality, in order to locate it in the purpose, and so the 
definition, oflaw.so In order for the defence to work, the purpose had to be formal, the 
duty internal to law as such. But, in order for the defence to have any meaning, any 
role or effect, the purpose required substance. This is patently paradoxical. 
The means employed by Dyzenhaus subvert the end to which they were aimed. His 
critique became a critique of  all legal theories, including his own and Fuller's. Once 
the authority of  law is brought into question, the stagnant, self-referential, 
contingency of  all contemporary legal theory comes clearly into relief. Dyzenhaus 
overlooks this because he simply assumes the goodness of  the ends on which he bases 
his purposive critique; yet the critique must also constitute a critique of  those ends, 
even if  this is a merely defensive sympathetic critique designed to elucidate and 
defend those ends.
sl This, of  course, does imply that Dyzenhaus' theory may still be 
the best available theory, but this is true only for those who endorse his substantive 
purpose, which possesses a merely contingent relationship to law (as such). 
Dyzenhaus cannot concede the contingency of  all bar one external moralities without 
breaching the methodological commitment to universality. It is the fact that his theory 
is founded on this unrecognised contradiction which entails that his critique oflegal 
79 Another recent attempt at substantivising Fuller, but one more explicitly indebted to Dworkin, is 
Allen T. R. S. Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of  the Rule of  Law, esp. at pp. 52-6. 
80 In fact Dyzenhaus begins this task in the postscript to his paper in Lethe's Law, supra note 60, and 
more fully develops his substantivised purpose oflaw (the institutional embodiment ofliberal 
democracy); see note 77 supra. 
81  On the socially reinforcing role of  sympathetic critique see Deleuze G. Nietzsche and Philosophy pp. 
1-3. Deleuze accuses Kant of  privileging the values inherent in particular systems. As a result, critique 
is limited to perfecting the system in terms of  those values. It cannot then offer any avenue for radical 
124 positivism has an equal, albeit slightly different, effect on natural law theories as well. 
Purpose, without more, does not sanction the collapse of  the identification and 
separability theses, nor does it alter the content of  rules or the identification and role 
oflaw. Because each level is based on a different, albeit related, purpose, the legal 
positivist distinction - between the separability thesis (law) and the identification 
thesis (adjudication) - remains valid. This does not alter the fact that the stipulative 
legal positivist definition, which allows only one understanding oflaw, is wrong. 
Finally, while Fuller is correct to draw attention to the necessarily purposive 
understanding oflaw, he offers no reason that his purpose should be perceived as the 
correct (let alone the only possible) one for law. Fuller is correct to maintain that law 
must be defined before it can be observed, and that the definition itself  must draw on 
the idea of  purpose and essence as a concretisation of  the features necessary to fulfil 
purpose. It is surely too much to leap from this methodological point to the 
substantive claim that his purpose and essence are the only available options for the 
understanding oflaw. 
Law could well be about subjecting human conduct to the governance of  rules, but 
equally it could be merely about evaluating human conduct in light of  rules, or 
legitimating human conduct in accordance with rules, or even simply observing 
human conduct from the perspective of  a certain form of  rules. Moreover, law (at least 
at the formal methodological level) could equally well be about the imposition of  a 
morality, or even the Fuhrer Prinzip to which Fuller himself was so opposed. Law 
re-evaluation. On a similar note, see Goodrich p", "The Critics Love of  the Law: Intimate Observations 
on an Insular Jurisdiction" 10 Law and Critique (1999) 343 at p. 344. 
125 could be about the realisation of  reason, or of  principle and particularity over the 
generality of  rules.  82 Law could be about process rather than about rules at all. 
There is no more reason to perceive law as definitionally being about the subjection of 
conduct to rules than there is to see it as being, definitionally, a recognition of  all 
enforced order. Fuller's task is uncompleted. He tells us how to perceive law based on 
his purposive definition. He gives a large indication as to why we must perceive law 
purposively. He does not, however, tell us why we should (let alone must) accept his 
definition of  the purpose oflaw. He does not look at other possible candidates for this 
purpose. He does not engage with the possibility of  other purposive understandings of 
law, let alone with the options of  other purposively understood definitions oflaw. 
Nor, finally and most vitally, can he engage with the possibility of  multiple, 
incommensurable, purposes, essences, and definitions oflaw. Fuller makes huge 
strides in the correct direction, but cannot, ultimately, break free of  either central 
dogma of  legal theory: the necessarily unitary ontology oflaw (that there can be only 
one form of, and therefore only one purpose for, law); or the necessarily authoritative 
nature oflaw (that law must subject human conduct to the governance of  rules). 
Purpose is important, both to law as such and to (meta) legal theory, but not in the 
way in which Dyzenhaus assumes. 
The Purpose of  Law and the Evaluation of  Legal Theory: 
82 As, I think, is suggested by Detmold, c.f. Detmold M. J. "Law as Practical Reason" 48 CLJ (1989) 
436 atp. 457 
126 The five stage conceptualisation of  a legal system developed above
83 is a logical 
hypothesis, a reconstruction designed to explain, rather than to describe the genesis of 
law as both an ideal and a regulative system. It serves a function similar to that of  the 
social contract in Kantian theory. It cannot be devalued by "proof' that it did not 
actually occur, as the claim is conceptual not historical. Moreover, the system is not to 
be fixed by reference to a postulated original purpose, any more than a political 
system should be frozen by reference to the detailed contents of  a mythical original 
contract. 
Rather, the purposive reconstruction oflaw, like the social contract and indeed like 
Rawls' "original position", is a thought experiment, an evaluative technique or 
strategy. It may serve to legitimate the legal system, but only by first problematising 
that very system. The social contract does not tell us what the law must (historically) 
be, it tells us how to evaluate particular laws in light of  reason. Similarly, the 
purposive reconstruction oflaw recentres purpose as such, but it does not privilege 
any particular purpose as that to be pursued by law as such (i.e. by all legal systems at 
all times). It simply provides a perspective from which different theories oflaw, and 
their particular manifestations in existing legal systems can be evaluated. The link to 
legitimacy is thus attenuated at best. Ifwe consider law purposively, then we must 
consider the purposes to which we direct particular legal theories (or systems), and 
only those which can successfully implement acceptable purposes can be understood 
as legitimate theories or systems. But what amounts to the successful realisation of 
acceptable purposes is a matter of  interpersonal debate and decision. 
83  See notes 28-31, and accompanying text, supra. 
127 Purpose and empirical assumptions fonn the two key variables in the analysis of  the 
working and preferability oflegal theories (or systems) in their socio-political 
environment. They also, therefore, provide the key evaluative criteria (purpose), and 
objects of  evaluation (assumptions) which facilitate internal critique. External critique 
is, however, more complex, more important, more uncertain, and indeed, ultimately, 
not susceptible to objective analysis. However, the same key variables (purpose and 
empirical assumptions) appear at this level. The difference is that both are now 
reduced solely to the objects of  analysis and evaluation. 
The evaluative perspective must be located externally, perhaps in (some 
substantivised vision of) reason or morality, epistemology or socio-political theory. 
These in tum may be evaluated in many ways. The perception of  particularity is 
always already mediated (ideologised) by our categories of  thought,  84 our 
observational language,  85  and our constitutive pre-judgements,86 and this leads all 
chains of  reasoning into infinite regress. Such chains must therefore be tenninated 
artificially and arbitrarily. At its most profound level, this implies, inter alia, that no 
epistemology is necessarily better than any other, let alone best. Truth is self-
referential, and therefore both contingent and necessarily blind to its own 
contingency. Value, and preference (the value of  values) become the key evaluative 
criteria of  legal meta-theory.  87 
84 Damton R., "Pruning the Tree of  Knowledge: The Epistemological Strategy of  the Encyclopedie" in 
The Great Cat Massacre, and Other Episodes in French Cultural History 191  at 192. 
85  Supra, note 3. 
86 c.f. MacIntyre A.  'Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of  Science' 60 
The Monist (1977) 453, at pp. 462-3. 
87 This is at least in part drawn from the insights of  Giles Deleuze and Friedrich Neitzsche, see esp. 
Neitzsche on Philosophy; my understanding, construction, and deployment of  such an evaluative 
system forms the focus of  much of  the remaining chapters. It is, however, fundamentally distinct from 
the Dworkinian methodological tenet of  seeing the law (only) "in its best light". While Dworkin uses 
this to determine what the law 'really' is or says, I seek only to provide grounds on which we may base 
128 The purpose oflaw need not underwrite the duty to obey law, and even where it does 
so this is contingent on our particular and continued commitment to that purpose. The 
only necessary relationship is that between the purpose, the definition, and the 
identification oflaw. The relationship between purpose and law - which is, as 
Dyzenhaus recognised, a fundamental one - is ontological in nature, rather than 
deontological as Dyzenhaus assumes. 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY: 
Contemporary legal theory is a deeply fractured discourse. As well as the classic 
dichotomy between "legal positivists" and "natural lawyers", there are dichotomies 
between normative and descriptive theories and between conceptual and empirical 
theorists. These last dichotomies permeate both sides of  the classic dichotomy, 
making even an accurate mapping of  the discipline a prodigious task. Nonetheless, the 
discipline must be mapped, schema for the identification, elucidation, and, perhaps, 
resolution, of  the ongoing debates must be formulated. 
From the perspective of  this requirement, Lon Fuller is perhaps the most novel, and 
the most important legal theorist. Nonetheless, Fuller's theory is incomplete, and 
inattentive to its own radical potential. The strengths and the weaknesses - the novelty 
and limitations - of  Fuller's project can best be understood through the lens of 
MacCormick and Weinberger's Institutional Theory of  Law. 
the identification, analysis, and evaluation oflaw as such, and then of  the norms of  particular legal 
orders. 
129 The principal strength of  Fuller's work is his realisation, and insistence, that law be 
viewed as a "purposive enterprise" and not as a "manifested fact of  social power". 
This methodological advance entailed, as Dyzenhaus emphasised, the necessarily 
normative nature oflegal theory, and the ontological link between the purpose and the 
form oflaw. Legal positivism could respond to this advance, but only by 
differentiating itself from empiricism. In other words, legal positivism had to return to 
its normative roots. Legal positivism too had to postulate a purpose for law and a 
mechanism for fulfilling that purpose. It is only once this ideal is in place that the 
actual practice of  law can be identified as such. 
Fuller's model was incomplete. Having demonstrated the necessarily purposive nature 
oflaw (and legal theory), Fuller dogmatically pursued a single purpose, as that true of 
law as such; a purpose "good for all times and places". Moreover, he did not justify 
that choice of  purpose, but in effect, posited it as a transcendental hypothesis; a value 
against which all theories oflaw would be evaluated. There is, consequently, a 
groundlessness and circularity to Fuller's work. That law is necessarily purposive 
does not entail that any specific purpose should be pursued, but only that a purpose 
must be pursued. 
There is another important absence in Fuller's work. Fuller, understood 
methodologically, and rescued from the dogma of  a unitary purpose, postulates two 
variables in legal theory: the purpose oflaw and the form oflaw as a mechanism for 
the realisation of  that purpose. However, a third variable is both required and 
presupposed by Fuller's work, viz the empirical reality in which the legal system is to 
operate. Fuller assumes a stable political structure with centralised institutions. The 
130 question he pursues is not how to maintain -let alone establish - this order, but rather 
how to exercise its powers through the medium of  law. 
A single fact, I believe, both links and disguises these weaknesses in Fuller's theory -
his commitment to liberal democracy as a normative ideal. This commitment is both a 
fact in the sense of  an empirical presupposition that law must treat people as agents by 
respecting the reciprocal relationship between obedience and protection, and a 
normative ideal or purpose oflaw. Thus the commitment links the two deficiencies in 
Fullerian theory. However, the commitment also serves to disguise these deficiencies 
simply through the fact that it represents contemporary political orthodoxy. The 
"truth" ofliberal democracy is understood, as Fukayama triumphantly proclaims, as 
the "End of  History",  88 the final stage of  man's quest for self-understanding and self-
realisation. This is no more objectively "true" than was the existence of  God and the 
truth of  Roman Catholicism in the middle ages. 
Moreover, despite rejecting the crude (Hartian) claim of  authority as law, Fuller and 
Dyzenhaus remain committed to the dogma ofthe necessary authority a/law. Again, 
this commitment is ungrounded, and again it is validated and disguised through the 
commitment to liberal democracy. The "truth" of  the authority of  law is mitigated and 
legitimated through the necessary liberalism oflaw. The engagement with purpose, 
therefore, is incomplete in several distinct ways: the purpose oflaw is presupposed; 
but that is because the form oflaw is (in part) also presupposed (law as authoritative). 
Consequently, the purpose of  law must concretise the remainder of  the form of  law 
88 Fukayama F., The End a/History and the Last Man; see also Marks S., "The End of  History? 
Reflections on Some International Legal Theses", 8 EJIL (1997) 449 
l31 (law as rules) in a manner capable of  justifying the fixed characteristic of  authority, 
within an orthodox political commitment to liberalism 
Thus Fuller's theory, although a significant step in the right direction, is posited in 
furtherance of  a particular political agenda. In itself, this is not necessarily a bad 
thing, but it does undermine the utility of  the Fullerian project as an elucidatory or 
evaluative schema for the discourse oflegal theory as a whole. Ultimately, Fuller's 
theory, like its contemporaries, is a specific truth claim; a normative proposition to be 
evaluated alongside other normative stances. 
This leaves open the critical question of  how such normative stances are to be 
evaluated. !fit is true that legal theory is necessarily normative (or, at least, is best 
understood as normative), then empirical accuracy cannot be an adequate ground for 
the evaluation of  competing theories. Instead, a topography must be formulated within 
which competing theories could be elucidated and comparatively evaluated. Fuller 
opens a path to the formulation of  such an evaluative schema, but neither he nor 
Dyzenhaus deign to travel down it. 
However, as noted, when Fuller's theory is analysed methodologically, the outlines of 
such an evaluative schema do come into relief. If  law is to be understood as a 
purposive enterprise, at least three separate, but related, criteria must be postulated; 
criteria according to which legal theories (and the legal systems they create) can be 
both elucidated and evaluated. However, this schema can only clarify - or, as I shall 
insist, disaggregate - theoretical presuppositions and disagreements; it cannot resolve 
them. Ultimately, the issues posed by normative legal theory can only be solved 
132 nonnatively. Rationality being limited to the exposition ofthe underlying 
disagreements, these can only be resolved by political choice or epistemological 
commitments. 
Nonnative legal theory, by denying that law is a "brute fact", must conclude that law 
is an "institutional fact", but must also conclude that law is a tool or mechanism for 
the achievement of  specific societal ends in specific ways. From this nonnative 
perspective, the three variables of  elucidation and evaluation become apparent: 
1.  The empirical reality in which the legal system is presupposed to 
operate. 
2.  The purpose to be pursued by the legal system. Contra Fuller, this 
purpose must be pluralized not unitary. The'  correct' purpose for law is 
a matter for debate and dispute, not definitional fiat. 
3.  The ontology of  the legal system itself, as a mechanism for linking 1. 
and 2 above. That is, law as a tool for the realisation of  the chosen 
purpose from the empirical reality of  the given society. 
The elaboration of  this schema, first as a grid for elucidating legal theories, and then 
as a perspective for evaluating competing theories, shall be the task of  the next 
chapter. In the meantime, a final caveat must be introduced: the limited coverage of 
this evaluative schema. Although, at least to some degree, the understanding of  legal 
theory as necessarily nonnative can be imposed on "empirical legal positivists", 
133 because their categorisation of  certain 'facts' as "the true" of  law can be challenged 
and problematised, the same is not true of  what we might term "empirical natural 
lawyers". 
By that term, I have in mind specifically the neo-Thomists,89 but possibly also neo-
Platonists,90 Hegelians, and perhaps Dworkinians. For these theorists, the law is a 
"brute fact" in a quite different manner. From a neo-Thomist perspective in particular 
the (ideal) law does actually exist. Law is analogous to a badly charted area ofland, 
the charts may be the subject of  dispute, but the existence and geography of  the land 
itself is not. 
Here we have a genuinely ontological disagreement, a difJerend which cannot be 
converted to litage. In attempting to transform arguments not susceptible to resolution 
by reference to a common standard (what Lyotard would term "difJerend',91) into 
litage (arguments which may be resolved by reference to a common standard
92
)  it 
may instead simply obliterate the difJerend by privileging one side over the other, 
under the guise of  offering a neutral evaluative grid. For the sake of  clarity, the 
problem here is not necessarily the privileging of  one side over the other, but rather 
the pretence of  neutrality behind which this can be (and often is) hidden. 
To argue that the purpose oflaw effects its ontology makes no sense from a neo-
Thomist perspective; it is tantamount to arguing that God does not exist. For this 
89 John Finnis would fonn the most obvious example, see e.g. Natural Law and Natural Rights 389-
403. 
90 Perhaps St Thomas Aquinas himself would be the most important of  the neo-Platonists, see e.g. 
Summa Theologica I-II Questions 90-7; see also Finnis, ibid, 398-403. 
91  See J-F Lyotard, The Differend at p. 12; see also Teubner G, "Regulatory Law: Chronicle of  a Death 
Foretold" 1 Social & Legal Studies (1992) 451 at 456. 
134 argument to succeed, we must abandon religious faith and we must put reason at the 
pinnacle of  human understanding. Ifthat were the case, then even those who chose to 
believe in God, would not really believe in God, but only in reason. To truly believe is 
not an act of  choice, it is a way of  being. 
This is also true of  belief in God's law. To argue that we would be better to 
understand law differently would be analogous to arguing that the world would be 
more fun without gravity. The argument may prove true, but it is also utterly 
pointless. We have no choice over the existence of  gravity, we cannot legislate it out 
of  existence, nor can we otherwise 'solve' the 'problem' of  gravity. Gravity, the badly 
charted landmass, and God's law are allfacts. As such, our desires have no influence 
over, or relevance to them. 
These theories can be accommodated within the elucidatory schema to be expanded 
subsequently, however, they cannot be made amenable to the evaluative schema 
which follows. A choice between "empirical natural law" theories and any form of 
normative legal theory is not, under any circumstances, a choice which can be made 
rationally. It is, rather, a fundamental disagreement as to the nature of  existence, an 
irreconcilable clash of  dogmas or worldviews. 
The Normative Claim: 
The purpose of  the present chapter was essentially to demonstrate the feasibility of  a 
non-authoritative definition oflaw. This leaves open major issues revolving around 
92 Ibid. 
135 the identification, role, and utility oflaw so defined. The question of  a non-
authoritative understanding of  law derives essentially from a belief  that PIL, although 
not ostensibly authoritative or centralised, is nonetheless law. This led to a feeling that 
there is more to law than authoritative command, that law must have somehow 
'earned' its position of  superiority - or at least convinced itself of  having done so-
and so must have been identifiable before this characteristic was claimed. 
Pursuit and clarification of  these intuitions was made more urgent by a belief that not 
only is there a demand for the social centrality oflaw (the rule oflaw), but that the 
claim of  social centrality makes further demands of  its own, and these can undermine 
the very nature oflaw, and thus, paradoxically, of  its claim to social centrality. 
Moreover, this claim of  centrality has been factually challenged - even at the 
domestic level - on a number of  grounds by both social and political theorists, and 
their concerns and observations ought to be considered important data for legal 
theory. 
As Shklar implies, there are many ways to perceive, and thus to regulate, social 
phenomena; law provides one of  these, a good one, but not the only one. We should 
not pretend that any answer labelled 'law' (or backed by 'legitimate' force) is a legal 
solution. The law has a role to play, and a method of  doing so and these should be 
examined and critiqued in their own right, rather than amended and changed ad hoc. 
Concluding Thoughts: A Recapitulation: 
136 My purpose so far has been to demonstrate the superiority oflegal positivism as a 
theory and as a "description" of  law, but also to acknowledge its weakness regarding 
adjudication, and therefore its inability (perhaps) to live up to its own ideological 
justification. From this it becomes apparent that legal positivism must become 
normative and engage with purpose to structure legal reasoning and decision-making. 
Ultimately, the theory must be made normative; legal positivism must re-engage with 
the why rather than the what oflaw. Purpose is needed both to identify law (the what 
to be observed) and to structure adjudication
93  (the why ofthe what observed). 
This is because legal positivism is mediated; it is legal, and obeys specific category 
matrices and pursues specific tasks. It is not a sociological positivism of  self-deluding 
empirical observation. Legal positivism provides answers on the basis of  norms 
posited, not on the basis of  (Comtean) positivist observation; there is after all no brute 
fact to be observed. The legal answers are merely determinate, not necessarily right. 
"Wrong decisions" are unfavourable conclusions not anomalies. The system is 
Kelsenian, not Poundian.
94 This is why focus on norm-creation and the diffusion of 
power becomes so important; this is the only counterpoint I have to the personalism 
and capture predicted by Schmitt. 
However, engagement with purpose undermines notions of  centrality, authority, and 
enforcement. This is problematic because all theories agree on a disembodied 
"essence" oflaw based on enforcement. Therefore, their (and notably Dyzenhaus') 
engagement with purpose is predetermined in structure; it is circumscribed to an 
93 Understood in a wide sense, as the identification of  the relevant 'rules' for the legal evaluation of a 
postulated course of  conduct. 
l37 enquiry into how (why) law as a (definitionally) coercive order is to be justified. 
There cannot be a disembodied essence oflaw; essence is a concretisation of  purpose, 
and therefore is symbiotically linked to purpose. 
This is why the'  critical' engagement with purpose proposed by Dyzenhaus is 
insufficient, the engagement is not even close to total. While it is good that 
Dyzenhaus so forcefully reminds us that not all coercive orders are legal orders, he 
fails to follow this insight through to contemplate the possibility that not all legal 
orders are coercive orders. Although he rejects authority as law, he continues to 
assume the authority of  law, and the absolute necessity for a unitary understanding of 
the form (and so for him some ofthe content) oflaw, "good for all times and all 
places". 
However, in Dyzenhaus' defence, this disembodied essence is common ground; it is 
law's identifying feature in observational language; it is legal common-sense. Hence 
the (pluralist) "politics of  definition" is given prominence over a normativist "politics 
of  decision". This (preferred focus) manifests itself awkwardly in PIL, as the authority 
of  law is less apparent, therefore theorists struggle to redefine "law" (away from clear 
rules) to preserve its "essence" (enforcement) and its definitional (paradigmatic) 
centrality. Despite all of  this, the "essence" imputed to law by common agreement is 
itself ungrounded, and that is why PIL theorising runs so frequently into trouble, or is 
dispersed as the fractured remnants of  a discourse rendered fatally indeterminate by 
its own lack oftheoretical cohesion: it is the singular point of  (definitional) agreement 
which is itself  inaccurate and misguided. 
94 This is important because much of  the danger threatened to any normative order by the exception is 
confined to situations where the order pursues absolute correctness as a defence against its own 
138 CHAPTER 3: PICKING UP THE PIECES, A FIXED POINT IN A FLUID 
DISCOURSE: 
The debates analysed in the preceding chapters are not purely academic. They have a 
determining effect on the practice oflaw, and ofPIL especially. The power ofthe 
CLSINAIL attack resides in the non-disclosure and non-resolution of  these debates. 
Our theoretical commitments determine what we perceive as law; they determine how 
we recognise legal rules or norms. A refusal to engage with this fact leaves legal 
discourse wide open to charges of  indeterminacy and political manipulation. It is only 
when these debates have been resolved that we can even identify legal rules as such. 
That, surely, is a prerequisite for either the application or the critique of  those legal 
rules. 
This returns us to the central concern; the need to re-engage fully and openly, without 
prejudice or dogmatic definition with the purpose ofPIL, and the role or function that 
PIL must perform - within an international society however defined - in order to 
fulfil this purpose. It is only once this has been achieved that one can engage 
meaningfully with Koskenniemi and show that (ideal) PIL is capable of  neutral rule 
formation (legal norms as agreed manifestations of  commonality). This provides a 
perspective from which both PIL itself (the substantive body of  norms actually 
accepted or argued as PIL) can be identified, and the actions of  states vis-a.-vis PIL 
can be consistently evaluated. As this ideal is also the justification for PIL (for the 
contingency; the exception is precisely the manifestation of that contingency. 
139 imposition ofPIL as a coercive, or authoritative, order) it carries a normative force 
within itself. 
PIL must strive to live up to its ideal in order to be justified, and it is legitimate to the 
extent - and only to the extent - that it achieves this task. Consequently, the ideal 
must provide a critical perspective from which to evaluate the potential and (more 
importantly) the actual functioning ofPIL and the actions of  states. 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: 
Once it is realised that law is necessarily! an institutional, rather than a brute, fact, it 
becomes apparent that there cannot be a (descriptively or empirically) 'correct' theory 
oflaw. Instead argument must centre on the best available theory oflaw. 
Consequently, the overarching purpose of  this chapter is to identify the best available 
theory. In order to do so, we must first identify and acknowledge the co-existence of 
competing legal theories, and develop a schema of  understanding within which these 
are rendered commensurate; it is only under these circumstances that a 'best' theory 
can be selected. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that law has neither necessary features, nor a 
necessary purpose. Law is formed, and continues to exist only as an act of  "collective 
intentionality".2 This remains true even when it is argued that law is a social practice, 
because the data which constitutes that social practice must, itself, ultimately be 
I Of  course, this ignores the neo-Thomist perspective, on which see ch. 2, notes 89-90 and 
accompanying text, supra. 
2 Searle 1. The Construction of  Social Reality, pp. 23-6. 
140 determined by reference to purpose; by reference to the purpose that law is postulated 
as fulfilling. 
Consequently, analysis must focus, in the first instance, on the purpose of  law, on the 
function law is to fulfil. However, that purpose is itself undetermined. Purposive 
analysis has been 'out of  fashion' for some time and, as a result, little has been written 
about the purpose of  law, per se. Moreover, as I have argued already - and shall 
demonstrate conceptually - the one 'necessary feature' commonly attributed to law, 
its authority, has in fact pathologised legal theory. Consequently, that characteristic 
must be modified or abandoned, or the discourse oflaw and legal theory itself 
radically re-imagined. The authority oflaw cannot be presumed, and so must instead 
be evaluated and justified or abandoned. 
However, iflaw has neither a fixed form, nor even a fixed purpose, the very idea of  a 
functioning discourse oflegal theory itself comes under threat. Consequently, an 
alternative foundation for legal theory must be 'identified'. As I have shown in the 
previous chapter, although neither the form nor the function oflaw can be 
determinately proven, the relationship between these two variables is itself a fixed 
point. Consequently, this relationship can be deployed to provide the foundation for a 
new understanding of  the project oflegal theory. 
Because the form oflaw is contingent on the postulated function oflaw, there is a 
necessary relationship between these variables. This relationship always exists, and 
always functions, even if  it is not always, or often, acknowledged. Accordingly, the 
relationship itself can function as the basis of  a schema of  understanding, a 
141 perspective from which all legal theories can be elucidated, ultimately evaluated, and 
chosen between. This fixed point of  cognition serves the purpose of  the inevitably 
absent Archimedean point in the identification and evaluation of  competing theories 
oflaw. It forms an 'artificial outside', a recursively stabilised 'somewhere' or a 
defined vantage point. As opposed to a "view from nowhere", this perspective 
manifests a very stipulated and exposed somewhere, a fixed point; I call it the 'form-
purpose dialectic'. 
THE FORM-PURPOSE DIALECTIC: 
Each legal theory, and thus each and every legal norm, is a manifestation of  the form-
purpose dialectic. Consequently, any understanding ofthe 'legal system' or the 'social 
practice' oflaw is also a manifestation ofthe form-purpose dialectic. The cognition of 
law is only possible as a mediated cognition of  the manifestations of  this dialectic. 
This is an entailment of  the necessarily normative nature oflegal theory: the act of 
'cognition' constitutes the data cognised (the law). 
The dialectic operates by postulating a purpose oflaw, by formulating a set of 
empirical assumptions about the society to be regulated, and then by postulating a 
mechanism (law) to realise that purpose under those conditions. Only once this has 
occurred can that mechanism be deployed to identify the 'rules' of  the legal system. 
This means that neither 'legal norms' nor 'legal systems' can be considered as the 
atomic units oflegal theory; rather each must be understood as a composite: the 
conclusion rather than the premise of  debate. The purpose of  the dialectic then is to 
142 elucidate the manner in which competing commitments to the purpose of  law and the 
'nature' of  the society to be regulated interact to form competing commitments as to 
the form law takes (or should take). Moreover, the dialectic also explains how these 
competing commitments give rise to competing understandings of  what constitutes a 
legal norm, and which legal norms exist in any given legal system. 
The purpose of  the dialectic is to disaggregate each of  these complexes of  competing 
commitments. In this way, the commitments themselves can be identified and 
debated, and the scene can be set for choosing between these commitments, based on 
something more consistent than the substantive preferability of  the norms they 
produce in any given case, or at least on the acknowledged adoption of 'substantive 
preferability' as the identifying feature of  legal norms. 
The dialectic operates by bringing to light the necessary commitments shared by each 
legal theory, and thus by presenting each theory within the same schema of 
intelligibility. In this way, it makes the theories commensurate, though acknowledges 
that they will remain incompatible. The dialectic makes the choice between theories 
more rational. 
In short, the dialectic serves four purposes simultaneously: 
l.  Facilitating the cognition oflaw 
2.  The elucidation of  legal theories 
143 3.  The identification of  competing legal theories within each normative order or 
'legal system' 
4.  Structuring the choice between these competing theories 
THE FUNCTION OF THE DIALECTIC IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 'THE 
PRESENT' OF LAW: 
The first, the most important, and yet the least visible function of  the form-purpose 
dialectic is to construct an intelligible understanding oflaw; to 'identify' 'the present' 
("the true") oflaw. This is simply a corollary of  the claim that law is not a brute fact, 
but rather an institutional fact, a product of  belief or "collective intentionality". Legal 
theories do not function merely to 'describe' or to 'evaluate' the law; rather they 
function to constitute 'the law' as an intelligible object of  observation. Even theories 
which are presented as empirical, or descriptive, must in fact first constitute the data 
they will go on to 'describe'. There is no empirical fact oflaw, but only law as 
constituted and understood by legal theory. 
Both Hartian and Dworkinian theories perceive and portray law as a social practice. In 
that sense, both are empirical theories of  legal phenomena. In each case, the empirical 
phenomena claimed to underpin and structure the theories do actually exist. There are 
- in most municipal legal orders at least - centralised adjudicative bodies (Courts) 
hearing cases and reaching decisions. There is dispute - indeed this is the primary 
dispute between Hartians and Dworkinians - over the extent to which these cases are 
144 consistently resolved; that is, over the extent to which consistent criteria for case 
resolution (and/or nonn recognition) can be fonnulated.
3 But this dispute cannot serve 
to disguise the underlying consensus: law's existence (and ontology) is a matter of 
empirical fact. Legal theory is presented as a descriptive discourse,4 but that is simply 
an inaccurate presentation. Legal theory remains nonnative because the consensus is 
itself  a product of  nonnative agreement; it is not an empirical, or brute, fact. 
5 
Although the existence of  the phenomena under discussion (between Hartians and 
Dworkinians) is itself a matter of  empirical fact, the decision to classify these 
phenomena (as law at all, and indeed as the totality - the necessary and sufficient 
condition - oflaw) is not a matter of  empirical fact, but of  nonnative choice. 
It is by this move that they disguise the nonnative nature oftheir theories behind the 
existence of  empirical facts they have chosen to classify as law. Their theories are no 
more necessary (or neutral, observational, or true) than anyone else's. All legal theory 
is necessarily nonnative; because even an 'empirical' theory in claiming to identify, 
must in fact define, the data it will describe, and against which it shall be measured. In 
other words, Hart and Dworkin displace definition from legal theory to the 
methodology of  legal theory; but they do not thereby evade the need for definition. 
Even the claim that law 'must be' authoritative, or enforced, presupposes a purpose; it 
presupposes that it is only through these characteristics that law can serve its function 
properly. The point oflaw is to impose order. This claim is legal common-sense, but 
3 See ch.  1, supra, esp. footnotes 119-131 and accompanying text. 
4 At first glance, this may seem untrue for Dworkin, but first glances can be deceptive. Dworkin's 
theory relies onfit as much as substance, indeed the role of  substance is largely to identify the data an 
interpretation must "fit"; that data then forms the descriptive justification of  Dworkinian analysis. 
5 While Dyzenhaus' and Fuller's theories also, at one level, perceive law as a social practice, they also 
contain an idealising element. Nonetheless, this ideal is necessarily compromised by their commitment 
145 it remains contingent; and in all probability grew from the initial function oflaw, to 
legitimate power's imposition of  order. What the form-purpose dialectic brings into 
relief is the non-necessity of  the link between law and enforcement; however, the 
dialectic in no way precludes this link, but only exposes it as an act of  choice. This 
opens the primary question: was this a 'good' choice? 
Hart, Dyzenhaus, and Dworkin, in 'acknowledging' the authority oflaw - i.e. in 
treating the contingent relationship between law and enforcement as necessary -
commit themselves to some form of  social practice theorising. This is an entailment of 
the commitment to law as enforced: the law can be found in the decisions of  the 
courts. Consequently, their 'decision' to understand law in this way, is manifested in 
their focus on adjudication. Law becomes what the courts declare law to be, because it 
is only the courts which can make such authoritative decisions. Understanding law as 
authoritative necessarily leads to social practice theorising. 
THE PATHOLOGY OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AUTHORITATIVE LAW; 
FROM SOCIAL PRACTICE TO RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: 
Social practice theorising simply does not work. This is the crux ofDyzenhaus' 
charge against contemporary, or "descriptive" legal positivism. The impossibility of 
social practice theorising is equally true for both positivist and natural law approaches 
to this practice. The key difference is that natural law retains the resources to deal 
with this failure, while positivism has abandoned these along with its normative 
project. 
to the necessity of  the presence of  certain features. Even to recognise that these features must be 
mitigated or utilised, is also to recognise that they must exist. 
146 Very briefly, social practice methodology cannot identify coherent chains of  legal 
decisions, nor determinate legal norms or rules. As a result, social practice 
methodology cannot constitute an intelligible, determinate, and internally coherent, 
legal order. Instead this order must be imposed onto the 'social practice'. The key 
point, at least according to Dyzenhaus' critique, is that natural law has the capacity to 
do this in a coherent (and, perhaps, justifiable) manner, while (  descriptive) legal 
positivism does not. Before we can respond to this critique, the nature ofthe problem 
itself  must be more fully elaborated. 
Law Understood as a Social practice Does Not Adequately Reduce Complexity: 
To understand law as necessarily enforced is an attempt to reduce the complexity of 
reality so that legal norms might be identified. This identification is to be validated 
not by its utility, but by its empirical accuracy. It will allow us to accurately identify 
the legal norm applicable to a given case; and to justify that choice by reference to its 
empirical accuracy, not its substantive appeal. The law is presented as an empirical 
fact (enforced decision) which may be empirically observed. This technique allows 
theorists to identify law by reference to the actions of  those institutions, courts, whose 
decisions are enforced: the enforced decision becomes law, an extant legal norm. 
Social practice methodology, to remain 'pure' or consistent, must treat all such 
decisions as equally valid extant legal norms. 
From this perspective, the ontology of  the norm is almost empirical. The norm is, in 
effect, a speech act, it comes into being at the point of  its articulation; it can then be 
147 treated as a fact. The legal system is the composite of  these facts, these legal norms 
manifested as legal decisions. The legal decision does not merely reflect, or even 
embody, the legal norm; it becomes the legal norm. Moreover, the arguments which 
led to the 'recognition' ofthis legal norm, having been recognised by the judge,6 
become (or are confirmed as) licit legal arguments, valid argumentative techniques, 
constituent parts ofthe "grammar" of  (that) legal practice. 
7 
Subsequent legal arguments are then constructed by applying a choice ofthese legal 
argumentative techniques to a choice of  extant legal norms; to produce a logically 
entailed 'chain' of  decisions pointing to the applicability of  a particular 'norm' to the 
instant case. The judge then chooses from amongst these norms, based I would argue 
(alongside Legal Realism and CLS) upon nothing more than personal preference, 
even ifthe judges themselves remain ignorant of  that fact. This is analogous to 
MacIntyre's refinement ofthe emotivist claim, whereby emotivism is transposed from 
a theory of  meaning into a theory of  use, and where: 
Meaning and use would be at odds in such a way that meaning would tend to 
conceal use  .... Moreover the agent himself  might well be among those for 
whom use was concealed by meaning. He might well, precisely because he 
was self-conscious about the meaning of  the words that he used, be assured 
6 This refers, specifically, to the judge in the institutional sense (and location) of  the word: the 
authorised decision-maker cum law cognisor; the institutional privileged locus of decision. It does not 
refer to the abstract paradigm of  the judge, as the embodiment of  the legal ought. Nonetheless, the 
implicit and underlying argument of  this thesis, is that the decisions of  the 'actual' judge, are legally 
legitimate only to the extent that they correspond with those of  the abstract paradigm. But that, of 
course, presupposes a full articulation of  the relevant abstract paradigm. On the two available 
understandings of 'the judge' - as institutional figure and as abstract paradigm - see, pp. 13-4, infra. 
7 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, "Epilogue", at p. 2; and see ch. 5 of  the present work, infra. 
148 that he was appealing to independent impersonal criteria, when all that he was 
in fact doing was expressing his feelings to others in a manipulative way. 
8 
In effect, this leaves judges with an almost unlimited discretion to choose the norm 
which will 'control' or 'determine' their decision. Hart assumed that this discretion 
would be controlled by the judges as a collegiate body, that their decisions would be 
consistent, and thus produce an obviously visible set of  rules by which norms were 
consistently recognised (the rule of  recognition as empirical fact). Hart was wrong. 
There is no self-evident core of  reason unifying and systematising legal systems 
understood as brute facts. Judicial discretion is not limited by previous judicial 
decisions, but is rather a result of  the multiplicity of  previous judgments. This can be 
demonstrated by a comparing Unger's call for a process of  "mapping and critique" of 
the legal order, with MacCormick's claim that legal theory is (or should be) engaged 
in a process of  "rational reconstruction": 
Give the name mapping to the suitably revised version of  the low-level, 
spiritless analogical activity, the form of  legal analysis that leaves the law an 
untransformed heap ... a requirement for the accomplishment of  this task is 
that we resist the impulse to rationalise or idealise the institutions and the laws 
we actually have.
9 
This would appear to be the logical conclusion, or perhaps the reductio ad absurdum, 
ofthe Hartian project of  descriptive legal theory: a non-evaluative description oflegal 
8 MacIntyre A., After Virtue, p. 14. 
9 Unger R.  What Should Legal Analysis Become? pp. 130-1. 
149 practice. However, such a process would illustrate confusion and contradiction, not 
rational order: 
Legal doctrine produced in this way degenerates into mere casuistry where it 
purports to reconcile and work in every single case and statute in some grand 
scheme; there has to be some discrimination between the parts that belong in 
the coherent whole and the mistakes or anomalies that do not fit and ought to 
be discarded. 10 
Instead of  this, the work of  rational reconstruction: 
Calls for the exercise of  creative intelligence and disciplined imagination to 
master the large and always changing bodies of  material involved, to grasp 
them all together [presumably with the 'necessary' excisions already having 
taken place], and to reconstruct them altogether [except the excised pieces] 
into systematized and coherent wholes.  11 
In short: 
Normative order as order is not a natural datum of  human society but a hard 
won production of  organizing intelligence ... the raw materials don't bear any 
one clear scheme on their face. Of  course they don't. The juristic task has 
always been to establish intelligibility, not merely to discover it.
12 
10 MacCormick N. "Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS" 1990 OJLS 539 at p. 
556. 
II Ibid p. 557. 
12 Ibid pp. 557-8. 
150 In other words, MacConnick, contra Unger, recommends that we indulge "the 
impulse to rationalise or idealise the institutions and the laws we actually have". 
However, the empirical theorists are then confronted with the limit point of  their own 
theorising. Absent its infonning values, the empirical evidence does not support a 
consistent set of  criteria for the identification of  legal nonns. Instead this must be 
imposed according to the desires of  the theorist's "creative intelligence and 
disciplined imagination". Nonetheless, MacConnick can conclude: 
In a modem state, the continuing intelligibility and operability of  law depends 
crucially on its continuing servicing by academic commentators as well as by 
practitioners and judges.  13 
Yet, by MacConnick's own admission, such a process must be arbitrary: it cannot 
take all available data into account, and yet can admit of  no infonning values by 
which the choice of  which material to excise could possibly be justified. This is 
precisely the charge Dyzenhaus levels against contemporary legal positivism.
14 
MacConnick has in effect conceded the impossibility of  the Hartian descriptive 
proj ect. The rationalising process is indeed "mere casuistry", and ex post  facto 
casuistry at that. But that fact is disguised and denied "by academic commentators as 
well as by practitioners and judges"; and that denial constitutes the "continuing 
intelligibility and operability o  flaw"  . 
13 Ibid p. 558. 
14 Dyzenhaus D., 'Positivism's Stagnant research Proposal' 2000 OJLS 703, at p. 711-2; see also, ch. 2 
supra. esp. note 1 and accompanying text. 
151 Consequently, the dynamics of  perception must be resolutely reductivist in function. 
The first reduction is that from the overwhelming data of  pure existence to the 
isolation of  institutional behaviour. This may be presented as a mere identification of 
the relevant data, but is, in fact, the construction of  the practice 'identified'. However, 
even once that is accomplished, the 'fact' ofthe social practice constituted by this 
structured and reductive observation, will remain too complex to facilitate rational 
exposition, ordered presentation, and predictable responses. 
Instead, we require three consecutive processes of  data reduction, identification, and 
ordering, which operate cumulatively to make the rational ordering, the rational 
reconstruction, oflaw as a social practice appear possible. First cognition is limited to 
the actions ofthose who constitute "authoritative decision-makers"; this delimits the 
social practice. Second a distinction is drawn between winning and losing arguments; 
this purifies the data (in a manner analogous to what Cover has termed the 
"jurispathic" function
15
). Third a final set of  exclusions are enacted amongst the 
winning arguments, in order to create the impression that these can be understood as a 
coherent whole. Only then can we 'identify' 'chains' of  cases giving rise to 
'recognised rules'. 
In Koskenniemi's terms, the overwhelmingly complex 'social practice' can justify 
any decision, and so becomes apologetic; the rational reconstruction must be founded 
on a political project, and so becomes utopian; and finally, because the utopia is 
constructed within the apology, the data of  the apology can overwhelm the utopia, and 
that leads to the inexorability of  oscillation between the two poles.
16 The 'social 
15  Cover R., "Nomos and Narrative" 97 Harvard Law Review (1983) 4 at p. 40. 
16 Koskenniemi M., "The Politics ofIntemational Law" 1 EJIL (1990) 4 at p. 8. 
152 practice' of  law is a creation of  the imagination; it is brought into being by the 
imposition of  a particular reason upon 'reality'  .17 This can be captured schematically 
in the following four movements: 
1.  Assume existence of  Legal System as a Fact (social practice) 
2.  Acknowledge overbearing complexity ofthat fact. 
3.  Reduce that complexity by imposing order and excluding 'contradictory' (i.e. 
minority, aberrational, cases) data. Reconstruct another, simplified and 
rational, version of  the system. 
4.  Describe product 3. as the "rational reconstruction" or "best available 
understanding" of  product 1. 
Consequently, the 'social practice' ofthe legal system as such is never actually 
engaged, and therefore cannot provide an empirical justification for the theory 
presented. There is no social practice theorising, because there is no accessible and 
intelligible social practice to theorise. However, this fact is not acknowledged, 
because the function of  stage 2 is to disguise the denial/abandonment of  stage 1, and 
to allow us to believe we are still operating within the empirical realm of 'social 
practice' . 
17 This is where the distinction between the two forms of  "institutional fact" (see ch. 2 notes 23-8 and 
accompanying text, supra) becomes vital. Where the institutional fact relies on the existence and 
practice of  real institutions it cannot adequately limit complexity. However, when the institutional fact 
153 Unger captures this move, and its disguise behind banality, when he recognises legal 
analysis as a "spiritless analogical activity".18 He then seeks to expose its true nature 
to light. The radical banality of  Unger's ideal of  "mapping" is to directly link tasks 1 
and 4, and thus to highlight the process oftask evasion inherent in rational 
reconstruction or paradigm case methodology. The banal radicality of  the process is to 
bring to light the full impact of  a task normally considered banal, the doctrinal 
analysis oflegal systems, the imposition of  order through exclusion, the nature of 
"reconstruction" as creation. That is the utter impossibility of  empirical analysis, and 
the delusion which disguises value imposition behind a claim to describe what "is". 
A Problem Denied is a Problem Perpetuated: 
This process of  reduction is not acknowledged, and indeed the very existence of  the 
indeterminacy it causes, is hidden behind two other empirical facts: 
1.  The authority of  the judicial decision 
2.  Academic, judicial, and practitioner efforts to reconcile conflicting judgments 
behind ever more complex syntheses and rationalisations 
Following MacCormick's imprimatur, we attempt to impose consistency, ex post 
facto, on inconsistent legal demands. This disguises, but it does not eliminate the 
existence, and causes, of  indeterminacy. This ongoing process of  ex post  facto 
is understood as a thought object, analysis of  the underlying thought object itself, can facilitate a 
justifiable and consistent reduction of  complexity. 
18 Supra, note 9. 
154 rationalisation  19 is itself hidden behind a deployment (or perversion) of  the Socratic 
ideal of  reasoned logic, whereby ad hoc and untenable distinctions are presented as 
natural, inevitable, and as mechanically explaining and syllogistically determining the 
necessarily correct decision. In reality, we choose our 'preferred' norms and then 
pretend (often even to ourselves) that these are the logical product ofthe consistent 
implementation of  the specific theory which structures and explains the legal system. 
But, as Mark Kelman has observed, this simply doesn't work: 
Most of  the arguments that law professors make are not only nonsensical 
according to some obscure and unreachable criteria of  Universal Validity but 
they are also patently unstable babble.  The shakiness ofthe argumentative 
structure is, quite remarkably, readily elucidated.  All the fundamental, 
rhetorically necessary distinctions collapse at a feather's touch-distinctions 
between substance and process, voluntary and involuntary action, public and 
private, legislative and adjudicative. Those who routinely use these 
distinctions "know" of  their vulnerability, at least in the limited sense of  being 
able to recognize it without being forced to look at the world in radically 
different ways.20 
The decisions cannot be reconciled. Law, understood as a social practice does not 
deliver determinate legal judgments. Yet surely it is the promise of  such determinate 
legal judgments which justifies law's social centrality - its existence as a social 
practice - in the first place. The promise is false, but the promise must be maintained: 
19 A similar process, albeit at a more avowedly theoretical level, is taking place in the domain of CIL, 
and has been mapped, and condemned, by Tony Carty. See The Decay of  International Law. 
155 Nevertheless ... the law's apologists present these outcomes as ifthey issued 
from a procedure that was as determinate as it was impersona1.21 
Consequently, from a CLS perspective, but also from the perspective ofthe 
legitimatory promise of  orthodox legal analysis: 
The inability oflegal doctrine to generate logically consistent outcomes from 
rules and distinctions that have a clear formal basis means that the entire 
process is at once empty and insidious. The process is empty because its 
results are entirely ad hoc -lacking firm definitions or borders, the concepts of 
doctrine can be manipulated at will and in any direction one pleases - and the 
process is insidious because these wholly ad hoc determinations are presented 
to us as if  they had been produced by an abstract and godly machine?2 
The limitations of  this form of  critique are well documented by Fish: 
By stigmatizing the law's rhetorical content, [CLS] makes [itself] 
indistinguishable from [its] opponents for, like them, [it] measures the law by 
a standard of  rational determinacy; it is just that while they give the law high 
marks, [CLS] finds it everywhere failing.
23 
However, as noted above, when the two aspects of  the Rule of  Law (as claim to 
sovereignty and as recognisory technique) diverge, empirical theorists privilege the 
20 Kelman M., "Trashing" 1984 Stanford Law Review  293 at p. 322. 
21  Fish S "The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence" in There's No Such Thing as Free Speech 141 
atp.169. 
22 Ibid, at p. 168. 
156 fonner. Authority is privileged, and the reasons for that authority are deferred to the 
realm of  Utopian ideal: 
a legal nonn that is retroactive, radically uncertain, and devoid of  all 
generality, and hence dramatically deficient relative to the ideal of  the rule of 
law [the recognisory technique], is no less valid qua legal [i.e. it will still be 
enforced], than one that is prospective, admirably certain, and perfectly 
genera1.
24 
The law remains whatever the particular judge decides it to be in the particular case; 
but we have no way of  telling in advance what this will be. This is because there is no 
orthodox or dominant theory, by reference to which the judge is compelled to 
recognise, or deny the existence of, the legal nonn. Gardner, following faithfully in 
the Hartian tradition, adopts "what the judge will decide" as his definition of  "qua 
legal"; that choice is inevitable in empirical legal theorising, because it is constitutive 
of  the social practice to be observed. Nonetheless, it is a choice which fails to reduce 
complexity to an adequate degree. 
In short the Hartian response to this inherent indetenninacy is denial; but that denial 
serves simply to perpetuate the problem. 
Another Response: Moralisation 
23 Ibid p.  169. 
24 Gardner "Legal Positivism 5'iS Myths" p. 209. 
157 Dyzenhaus offers an alternative response: he suggests that we accept the 
indetenninacy oflaw as a social practice (the impossibility of  adequately reducing 
complexity at this level), and focus instead on how the judge ought to choose the 
'correct' answer in each case. Dyzenhaus' retains the focus on previous adjudication 
(as data), but acknowledges that this, alone, cannot detennine the outcome of  future 
adjudication: there is no empirically cognisable rule of  recognition. 
This is where natural law's 'retention' of  its "substantive moorings" comes into play. 
It is this substantive commitment which will structure, and  justify, the further 
reduction in data necessary to the functioning of  the social practice method; the final 
reduction in complexity, manifested in the choice between (and exclusion of  certain) 
winning arguments. In short, Dyzenhaus accepts legal indetenninacy, but seeks to 
negate its importance, by deferring to another system (substantive morality) to 
produce detenninacy, and to justify an authority law is simply assumed to possess. 
This approach may work - assuming that the substantive morality is, itself, 
sufficiently detenninate - but it can no longer be empirically justified. Consequently, 
its legitimacy is dependent on a demonstration of  the legitimacy of  imposing the 
particular external moral order. 
Interim Conclusion: 
From the Hartian perspective, MacConnick in effect concedes the failure of  the social 
practice understanding oflaw. That is the burden borne by the theory of  rational 
reconstruction.  Dyzenhaus' does not make a like concession, however, his defence of 
158 the project is, at best, contingent and incomplete; it remains reliant on afurther 
defence, a defence of  the particular morality lending determinacy to his theory. 
The key point of  this section is that both responses to the deficiencies of  the social 
practice method are, themselves, pathological. The legal positivist response does not 
engage the real problems, but functions in denial. Consequently, it serves merely to 
perpetuate the problems. The natural law response retains the hubris of  moral 
imperialism. Neither response should be adopted; despite being presented as 
exhaustive of  the field of  possibilities, these theories do not, in fact, constitute our 
only available options. Instead, we could abandon social practice methodology. 
It may be that MacCormick offers a way out of  this dilemma; albeit one he does not 
take, nor even adequately develop. MacCormick is, undoubtedly, correct that the key 
is to further reduce the data; it stands to reason that this should be done rationally 
rather than irrationally. However, this merely poses the key question, it does not 
resolve it. That question is: how ought we to substantivise the rationality structuring 
the rational reconstruction? What I am developing is a specific technique to 
accomplish this legitimately; a technique to 'operationalise' MacCormick's theory. 
In doing so, I am merely drawing the disparate strands of  MacCormick's own 
arguments together. The structure of an operative rational reconstruction is best 
developed from the choice between competing legal theories, themselves understood 
as (manifestations of) thought objects. This amounts to an immanent completion of 
MacCormick's own project. 
159 THE PROBLEM RE-PRESENTED: PRE-ADJUDICATIVE EXISTENCE OF 
LEGAL NORMS 
There is an necessary relationship between accepting law's authority, in either sense, 
and understanding law as a social practice. The social practice is the manifestation of 
the collection of  authoritative (i.e. legal) decisions. To understand law as authority 
entails understanding the legal system as the mass of  these authoritative decisions. To 
accept, merely, the authority of  law likewise entails understanding the social practice 
as the mass of  decisions, but additionally entails attempting to justify law's authority 
in each individual case. This is why attention is refocused onto the substantive 
outcome; that outcome must justify law's authority. This does allow for a structured 
reduction in the complexity of  the practice, but only to the extent that the substantive 
choice itself  is adequately determined by the chosen morality. Even then, the question 
of justifying the imposition of  that (  specific) morality remains open. 
Neither variant ofthe social practice methodology can be justified, the first leads to 
judicial decisionism. The second leads to either moral imperialism (if  the imposed 
morality structuring substantive choice is sufficiently determinate, and consistently 
deployed); or itself degenerates into judicial decisionism (if either of  these criteria are 
not met). To avoid both judicial decisionism and moral imperialism, the data which is 
currently understood as constituting the social practice must itself be reconstructed, 
reduced, re-imagined. 
The assumption that law is authoritative command, and even the weaker natural law 
corollary that the command of  law is authoritative, must be abandoned or at least 
160 suspended ("bracketed"). This is because these commitments 'artificially' arrest the 
form-purpose dialectic; they disguise alternative ways of  understanding (and so, of 
constituting) the law (as an intelligible object of  cognition). Moreover, their analytic 
focus is temporally belated. 
Because the social practice methodology focuses on judicial decisions, it accepts 
conclusions as premises. Instead, the question must tum to the data which constitutes 
the options for judicial choice. The judicial task is to choose one norm over the 
alternatives. At present, this is done in an unstructured manner, based on the 
substantive preferability of  each norm in the instant case. 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming complexity ofthe 'social practice' oflaw must be 
further reduced, and this can only be done either: 
1.  Randomly25 (oscillation between apology and utopia); or 
2.  By reference to morality (modem natural law theories); or 
3.  By substantivising rational reconstruction (by reference to the 
competing theories between which the judge must choose.) 
25 This does not mean that each individual choice will be random, as if  based on the throw of  a die. 
Instead, the claim is that, when viewed as a totality the decisions will be random. Each individual act of 
judicial discretion will be constrained (by the skill of  the advocates, and the judge's 'biography'), but 
overall, there will be no guiding principles through which this discretion is constrained. Each judge will 
retain a strong discretion in each case, and the 'system' as a whole will lack coherence. 
161 The fonn-purpose dialectic offers a different perspective from which the law may be 
viewed. This brings into reliefthe reason for the incoherence ofthe 'legal system'. 
Understood as a 'social practice', the legal system is in reality a melange of  different 
nonns, each manifesting a different theory oflaw. This opens up the possibility of  a 
different kind of  solution: a choice between the competing theories, based on 
something other than substantive preference as to outcome. This is a choice which 
focuses on the theories themselves, rather than their substantive outcomes in any 
given case. This is a choice which had been hidden from sight by social practice 
methodology. 
The Nature of  Judicial Choice; Competing Theories, Competing Nonns: 
Legal decision making is inherently indetenninate, and this is, primarily, because 
there is no agreement on what constitutes a legal nonn, nor a fortiori, on how legal 
nonns should be identified. The law is a specific way of  viewing the world, a 
technique whereby events are reconstructed and evaluated from a particular 
perspective, the legal perspective. Consequently, law operates by highlighting certain 
features of  reality as 'legally relevant'; the rest being discarded or excised from 
analysis as not 'legally relevant'. In theory (or at least according to the dominant 
ideology oflaw) this distinction between the relevant and the irrelevant can be made 
by reference to legal 'nonns' - rules, standards, and legal argumentative techniques. 
This brings to light an important point of  focus, and indeed a methodological 
commitment, of  my legal theory: I adopt the judge as the abstract paradigm of  legal 
theory. In other words, I take 'the judge' to be more than a mere institutional figure; 
162 the judge is also an idea, or a perspective. Legal theory should be focussed, in my 
opinion, on what the judge ought to decide; the purpose oflegal analysis, or legal 
theory, is to identify the correct legal outcome. This contrasts with an alternative 
function on the advocate as the abstract paradigm of  legal theory. From that 
perspective, there would be no correct legal answer, but only acceptable and 
unacceptable, plausible, and implausible legal arguments: arguments likely to 
succeed, and arguments likely to fail. 
It must be emphasised that focus on the judge as abstract paradigm - focus on legal 
analysis as the provision of  the correct answer, not merely of  a persuasive argument-
becomes, paradoxically, more important in the absence ofthe institutional figure of 
the judge. The more the institutional role of  the judge is limited (the more access to 
court is reduced), the more important it becomes that legal analysis focus on the 
judicial perspective; the perspective of  the law itself. 
However, it is vital to recognise and emphasise that law is also a product of 
complexity reduction. Kletzer, from an avowedly Kelsenian perspective, describes the 
issue thus: "laws are ... themselves merely the legal meanings of  factual 
occurrences". "Positive norms descriptively select facts for which they offer a 
counterfactual or normative interpretation,,?6 The critical question then is which 
"factual occurrences", which "descriptively select[  ed] facts" should count as legal 
occurrences? How do we know - how do we tell or perceive - that laws exist, or what 
their content is. We can 'know' this only by reference to a postulated privileging of 
26 Kletzer The Mutual Inclusion of  Law and Its Science: Reflections on Hans Kelsen 's Legal Positivism 
PhD University of  Cambridge, p. 92. 
163 certain factual occurrences as legally relevant. The question then is: which factual 
occurrences are relevant to the cognition oflaw? 
The two views of  the judge are also closely linked, at least ideologically. The 
heteronomy of  the law is justified by its capacity to provide determinate answers. This 
justifies the authority of  the judicial decision: the law must decide; and that is its 
unique specificity or function?7 However, this ideological function is not realised, the 
link between the two views is broken: the nature of  the judicial choice (abstract 
paradigm) is hidden by the fact of  judicial choice (institutional figure). Consequently, 
because the fact of  indeterminacy, contradiction, and ad hoc decision-making is often 
hidden behind the 'fact' of  an authoritative decision, it becomes more noticeable in a 
'legal' arena absent authoritative legal institutions. Public, and more particularly 
customary, intemationallaw offer precisely such an arena. 
For example, take this question: Was the recent invasion of  Iraq illegal? There have 
been many and varied responses to this, my favourite was the potentially 
contradictory Yes, the invasion was illegal, but the doctrine of  precautionary self-
defence is part of  PIL. But, of  course, it is the status of  that doctrine as valid law 
which would frame the whole question oflegality; especially at the point when it was 
(at least tenuously) arguable that Iraq did possess "Weapons of  Mass Destruction". It 
is the existence, or not, of  a norm permitting "precautionary self defence" (or another 
permitting "humanitarian intervention" for that matter) which is at the crux of  the 
question oflegality. 
27 See, MacCormick N., 'The Concept of  Law and "The Concept of  Law"', 14 Oxford Journal of  Legal 
Studies (1994) 1 at p. 6 
164 But, are these doctrines part of  customary international law (elL)? That is the 
question which I contend cannot be answered, until we can sort out the theoretical 
arguments over the nature of  elL. In other words, because the form we ascribe to elL 
dictates the empirical identifiers we seek in the identification, or recognition, of  the 
individual norms of  elL, we need a theory to determine what constitutes a norm of 
elL in the first place. 
The question of  what it means for a norm to exist is generally disguised behind a 
barrage of  apparently technical legal analysis. However, this merely begs the question 
of  what counts as technical legal analysis, and of  what technical legal analysis truly is, 
does, or amounts to. That, in turn, depends on our understanding of  the legal system 
which must facilitate this analysis. 
Two Views of  the Legal System: 
As noted already, there is no necessary reason to understand law as enforced, nor as 
socially central, nor indeed as a social practice or a social institution; the choice of 
definition of  "qua legal" which Gardner endorses above can be rejected. These 
commitments may well combine to form the orthodox perspective within legal 
theorising, but that in itself grants them no virtue, as it offers them no support beyond 
the "staying power" of  orthodoxy. Social practice theorising precludes law from 
meeting the standard of  rational determinacy. There may be good reasons for 
accepting that outcome, but definitional fiat does not rank among their number. 
165 Law can be understood differently, as an ideal ide;8 structuring, justifying, but 
imperfectly reflected within, a social practice: law as the reason for judicial decisions, 
not merely the fact of  judicial decisions. Consequently, there are (at least) two 
possible understandings oflaw, and these give rise to two quite different views of 
(what constitutes) 'the legal system'. 
1.  Law as a social practice. 
2.  Law as an Ideal Idea. 
From the first perspective, law is what judges say the law is. Consequently, all extant 
judgments must be understood as brute facts; and these brute facts (the texts of  the 
judgments, the arguments accepted by the Court as legal arguments, the techniques 
acknowledged by the Court as constitutive oflegal norms) in total constitute the 'legal 
system'. The task of  the 'lawyer' is to select from amongst these facts, seeking those 
most suitable to constructing the argument their'  client' desires. But, of  course, these 
'facts' do not form a coherent system; consequently the task of  the judge is to make a 
free choice between the competing arguments (and then deny that this has occurred), 
and the task ofthe 'orthodox' academic is to aid and abet this disguising and denial of 
the fact of  judicial decisionism. 
28 The ideal idea is a concept which I have adopted from Jorg Kammerhofer (see Kammerhofer J., 
"Uncertainty in the Formal Sources oflnternational Law: Customary International Law and Some of 
Its Problems 15 EJIL (2004) 523 at 544) however, we deploy this term in slightly different senses. His 
is more Platonic, relying on an abstract realm of the ideal, and in particular on the ideal ontology of 
norms; whereas my use of  the term refers to the human construction of  ideals, which can then form 
essences, or categories in the semantic sense. 
166 From the second perspective, the law is not a brute fact. Consequently, the texts and 
'facts' and decisions which constitute the legal system in the first analysis are, at 
most, evidence ofthe underlying ideal oflaw. Instead, each legal argument is 
understood as the manifestation of  a particular theory oflaw. From this perspective, 
the law is an ideal idea, a direct product - an actualisation or realisation - of  the 
underlying theory of  law. The legal system is understood as a manifestation of  the 
dominant theory oflaw. The legal system too is an ideal idea, the idea which ought to 
structure, or even determine, the judicial decision; and define the actions which may 
be acknowledged as law constitutive, and the argumentative techniques which may be 
acknowledged as legal arguments. The critical question is how to decide which theory 
to adopt as dominant. 
However, when law is understood as a social practice, this question regarding the 
ideal idea cannot be brought into focus. This is because it precedes the legal 
judgments, and the judgments themselves are understood as 'the law'. Consequently, 
the 'problem' of  indeterminacy, whose existence seems incontestable within the arena 
of  social practice, cannot be resolved within that arena. The solution, therefore, must 
lie, at least initially, with the full articulation ofthe decision the judge must actually 
make. The decision as to which ideal idea to endorse, which definition oflaw to 
concretise into the legal norm. 
As there are no "agreed criteria" for legal decision-making, it is delusional to assume 
that judges apply such criteria. Instead they must, implicitly, choose between 
different, contesting, and irreconcilable visions, or theories, of  law in order to reach 
their decisions. However, such theories are merely implicit in the legal arguments 
167 actually offered; hence the silence of  the "prologue", the unarticulated nature of  the 
theoretical assumptions driving the argument. 
Even within the arena of 'social practice' these inarticulate theories are being 
deployed and decided amongst. They ought to be brought to light. This will entail 
only an apparent widening of  legal argument, to encompass legal theory. In practice, 
legal argument and legal decision-making already encompass legal theory. That this 
fact is denied does not make it untrue. Consequently, the fact should be 
acknowledged, and its implications contended with. 
This allows us to understand the true nature of 'technical legal analysis' - of  the 
masquerade ofthe empirical-which is, in reality, no more than a random selection of 
'extant' norms; understood as the brute facts of  articulated legal judgements, which 
MacCormick terms "the large and always changing bodies of  material involved". The 
collections presented as identifying the applicable norm owe nothing to internal logic, 
but gain their force from the substantive appeal ofthe norm itself. Ifwe reject (or at 
least bracket) Dyzenhaus' thesis on structuring this substantive preference through the 
imposition of  a substantive morality, the question ought to tum to the 'criteria for 
collection' themselves. Focus should be directed to the reasons for inclusion within 
the rational reconstruction, and not on the 'data' from which that material is to be 
selected, especially as that 'data' is itself constituted by the legal theory adopted, 
which is in tum a manifestation of  those'  criteria for collection' . 
Constructing the Data of  Law: Structuring Technical Legal Analysis and the 
"Grammar" of  Legal Practice: 
168 It must once more be emphasised that the primary role oflegal theories is in the 
construction ofthe practice oflaw. Legal theories tell us what is to count as law, or as 
a legal norm; they define the empirical identifiers oflaw. In this way even 
'descriptive' theories construct the data they claim merely to describe, and against 
which the accuracy of  their 'descriptions' should be evaluated. Consequently, the role 
of  the theory is to construct the reality of  law, and then to explain that construction. 
MacCormick, for example, does not 'observe' the data of  the (social practice of) law 
as a whole. Instead, he 'observes' that part of  the social practice, the rational 
reconstruction, which has been defined and deemed as relevant. The theory constructs 
reality as an intelligible entity. Similarly, Kelsen attempted to impose order onto 
international life using his model oflaw. This could be envisaged only because of 
perceived similarities between his ideal idea and the 'reality' of  international life; 
there were enough similar phenomena to construct the idea of  an international legal 
system intelligibly. In fact the resemblance did not suffice, and that left Kelsen 
desperately scrambling around seeking phenomena which sufficiently resembled 
sanctions. 
To make the data of  international life 'sufficiently' proximate to the ideal oflaw, 
Kelsen required sanctions. His ideal determined his construction and interpretation of 
reality. D'  Amato exemplifies this process in his article "Is International Law Really 
"Law,,?,,29 There are two independent movements in his argument: first he seeks to 
demonstrate the extent of 'permissible' distance from the ideal. This is accomplished 
29 "Is International Law Really "Law"?" 79 NwLR 1293 (1985), available at: 
b11p://anthonydamato.law.northwesternc?du/Adobefiles/A853.pdf 
169 by a demonstration ofthe limited role of  enforcement in municipal law. The second 
movement demonstrates the existence of  this minimum in the actuality ofPIL; the 
sufficiency of  congruence between reality and ideal (category). The conclusion then is 
that PIL is sufficiently proximate to the ideal oflaw (as enforced order) to be 
understood as law. 
It is only then that legal critique may take place, but even that critique is limited to 
seeking greater congruence with the postulated ideal. This critique is implied in the 
works of  both Ke1sen and D'  Amato. However, it is vital to recognise that in the 
specific ordering of  the tasks, the observational has lexical priority. It is only once the 
'social practice', law, has been established as an intelligible object of  observation that 
critique may commence. Consequently, the primary role of  the ideal is to construct 
reality, and that is why analysis must focus primarily on the ideal itself: on why the 
ideal is postulated as it is, and why proximity to that ideal should signify the 
'existence' of  a legal system. 
Only when we have constructed ideals, or categories, can we begin to make sense of 
(to impose order upon) the complexity of  reality. Thus 'all descriptions leave an 
infinite amount unsaid' simply because of  the infinite routes that can be taken through 
categories.
30 The structure and content of  the observer's conceptual matrix determines 
both what can be perceived and how it will be recognised or identified: 
30 Social systems, as epistemic grids, are precisely socially constructed chains of categories, which 
make (particular) sense of  the world through (particular) constructions of  reality. They are designed to 
replace personal chains of  categories to allow consistency and collective understanding (and therefore 
predictability and regulation). That law is merely one among many such social systems is the central 
theme which (I hope) unifies the present work. 
170 Where Stendhal describes, in one phrase, Lucien Leuwen's entrance into a 
room, the realistic artist ought, logically, to fill several volumes with 
descriptions of  characters and settings, still without succeeding in exhausting 
every detail. Realism is indefinite enumeration ... Realistic novels select their 
material, despite themselves, from reality, because the choice and the conquest 
of  reality are absolute conditions of  thought and expression. To write is 
already to choose.
31 
In the end, "[realism] is born of  a mutilation and of  a voluntary mutilation performed 
on reality." 32 
Paradoxically, these obstructions are also necessary to facilitate the very possibility of 
cognition in the first place: 
We, at one glance, can perceive three glasses on a table; Funes, all the leaves 
and tendrils and fruit that make up a grape vine ... A circle drawn on a 
blackboard, a right triangle, lozenge - all these forms we can fully and 
intuitively grasp; Ireneo could do the same with the stormy mane of  a pony, 
with a herd of  cattle on a hill, with the changing fire and its innumerable ashes 
.... [This] permit[s] us to glimpse or infer the nature of  Funes vertiginous 
world. He was, let us not forget, almost incapable of  ideas of  a general, 
Platonic sort. Not only was it difficult for him to comprehend that the generic 
symbol dog embraces so many unlike individuals of  diverse size and form; it 
bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side) should have 
31  Camus A., The Rebel p. 235. see also, pp. 230-1. 
32 Ibid. p. 230. 
171 the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front) .... He was the 
solitary and lucid spectator of  a multiform, instantaneous and almost 
intolerably precise world  .... I suspect, however, that he was not very capable 
ofthought. To think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions. In 
the teeming world of  Funes, there were only details, almost immediate in their 
presence.  33 
In response to this overwhelming complexity, to aid us in de-differentiating, in 
generalising, we tum to categories: 
We order the World according to categories that we take for granted just 
because they are given. They occupy an epistemological space that is prior to 
thought, and so they have extraordinary staying power.  34 
Law is a category in this sense. However, different theories manifest different 
categories, and so will construct the reality oflaw differently. The role of  the form-
purpose dialectic is to identify these differences. It is only in this way that we can 
identify the endemic disagreements disguised behind the 'authority' of  law. 
Finally, the dialectic provides the grounds on which we can choose between 
competing theories, it reduces each set of  theories to responses to the same generic 
questions. In doing so, it allows us to evaluate competing techniques for reducing and 
ordering the data identified (stipulated as relevant) by each competing theory. 
33 J. L. Borges "Funes the Memorious", in Borges Labyrinths 87, at pp. 92-4 (paragraph breaks 
suppressed). 
34 Damton R., "Pruning the Tree of  Knowledge: The Epistemological Strategy of  the Encyclopedie" in 
The Great Cat Massacre, and Other Episodes in French Cultural History 191 at p. 192. 
172 There continues to exist a multiplicity oflegal theories, producing an incoherent 
multiplicity oflegal norms. Taken together, as the social practice oflaw, this data is 
too vast, too overwhelming to be made intelligible. Consequently, the data requires 
further reduction. As noted, this can be done randomly (whether acknowledged or 
not), as advocated by the Hartian tradition. Alternatively, the final reduction can be 
grounded in the adoption of  an external morality, as advocated by, inter alia, 
Dyzenhaus and Dworkin. Finally, we could attempt to develop a matrix within which 
the competing theories themselves could be evaluated; i.e. the thought objects 
constituting (and constituted as) legal norms, the data oftechnicallegal analysis, 
could be identified and elucidated. In this way, we could structure the reduction of 
complexity by reference to the desirability of  the legal theories themselves, and not 
merely the norms they produce in any given case. 
This would amount to a 'rational reconstruction' ofthe legal system, but not, perhaps, 
as MacCormick might have imagined or desired. To understand law as a thought 
object, we must abandon the understanding oflaw as a social practice; the judicial 
decision merely reflects, it does not embody, the law. An 'empirically supported' 
rational reconstruction would have to accommodate the majority ofthe 'actual data' 
of  the social practice, the inclusions would have to vastly outweigh the exclusions; 
this appears to be the tenor of  MacCormick's suggestions, that a rational 
reconstruction cannot accommodate "every single case",35 which does suggest that the 
vast majority of  cases will be accommodated. 
35 See note 10 and accompanying text, supra. 
173 This becomes more important in relation to PIL as the institutional figure of  the judge 
is replaced by the 'authoritative decision-maker'. The idea ofthe authoritative 
decision-maker, which is vital to all empirically validated (realist) theories ofPIL, 
incorporates any policy-maker, or executive or other governmental figure, whose 
decisions are, or are likely to be, implemented in practice. This would include Heads 
of  State, Foreign Office officials, ministers, the UN, the Security Council, but also 
any others with a decisive input into the process of  'law application'.  36 Given this 
diffusion of  authoritative decision-making, any attempt to incorporate the majority of 
the 'data' produced would prove impossible within even a minimally coherent 
system.
37 
Understanding law as a thought object is quite different, as it posits an entirely 
different relationship between law, legal norm, judicial decision, and legal system. 
We must alter our understanding of  "the large and always changing bodies of  material 
involved"; and reconsider which data should be included, and why. The masquerade 
of  the empirical must be abandoned, and the project reconceptualised so that it is no 
longer a task of 'describing' (i.e. reducing) an 'empirical fact'. It is the legal system 
itself  which is being constructed, the rational reconstruction is simply the description 
of  that coherent legal system. Thus the focus on the law as thought object  attenuates 
the empirical, and displaces the requirement to accommodate the majority ofthe data 
previously understood as constituting the social practice. What counts instead is the 
utility and desirability of  the competing theories themselves; not the happenstance of 
an empirical development. 
36 See Higgins R Problems and Process: International Law and How We  Use It pp. 1-16, esp. pp. 9-11 
37 See chapter 5, infra. 
174 DIALECTIC AS METHODOLOGY: ARTICULATING THEORIES 
Indetenninacy would be greatly reduced, if  not eradicated completely, if  each legal 
system were to 'authoritatively adopt' a single legal theory as orthodox. In this way, 
we would be able to identify what counts as a legal demand according to that system, 
and so we would be able, impartially, to identify the legal demands ofthat system. 
In order to choose the 'correct' or 'applicable' legal nonn, we must first detennine the 
correct or applicable legal theory. It is only in this way that we can adequately reduce 
the complexity of  the social practice oflaw, in order to detenninately identify legal 
nonns. At present, this process occurs randomly. I contend that it can be structured by 
identifying the competing visions oflaw underlying the nonns which currently 
constitute the social practice oflaw, and then choosing one amongst these as 
orthodox. 
The inherently nonnative nature oflegal theory - the move away from the empirical 
toward the ideal or counter-factual, the claim that law is an institutional rather than a 
brute fact - raises an obvious apparent paradox: if  law is not real, how can we observe 
it? How can we perceive what is not there, what is not tangible to our senses? 
In Kelsen's tenns, and within the peculiarity of  his theory, the problem is presented 
thus: 
175 The legal meaning of  an act, as an external fact, is not immediately perceptible 
to the senses - such as, for instance, the colour, hardness, weight, or other 
physical properties of  an object can be perceived.
38 
This problem of  perception must be understood as opening an enquiry into legal 
epistemology. Not in the sense ofthe epistemology deployed by law - after all, that 
can only be determined from within the protocols of  a specific theory oflaw - but 
rather the epistemological structures within which law itself can be recognised as a 
specific, differentiated, phenomenon. 
Thus, the critical question can be stated simply: 
How do we cognise "the law"? 
What is the epistemology oflaw? How and why do we separate out specific 
phenomena (specific empirical, moral, political, normative, etc. phenomena) as the 
identifying features oflaw? Under what conditions can we think law at all? 
This is, as should be apparent, a critical issue for both legal theory and the practice of 
law: there is no agreement on what constitutes law! There is no agreement on what 
law is, does, or strives toward. Consequently, there is no agreement on which 
phenomena count, or should count, as legal phenomena. 
38 Pure Theory p. 2. 
176 It must be emphasised that these questions have to be resolved before we can identify, 
interpret, and apply 'legal norms' (or 'rules', 'standards', 'principles', etc.). These 
problems are analytically and lexically prior to the problems, questions, issues of 
legal reasoning or legal practice. 
In other words, iflaw is understood 'empirically' as that which is enforced, namely 
those arguments and norms recognised and endorsed by courts or "authoritative 
decision-makers", then the underlying lack of  analysis and agreement as to what 
counts as law, or as a legal argument, leads to too many different types of  argument, 
too many different sources of  legal norms, being accepted. These different norms and 
'licit arguments' are then allowed to co-exist as the basic resources ofthe legal 
system. Consequently, the system becomes radically indeterminate as there is no 
formal technique by which the arguments can be hierarchised, and between them the 
norms, principles, and argumentative techniques can justify any outcome. 
Instead, we need to accept the existence ofthis co-existence of  a plurality oflegal 
norms and licit argumentative techniques. Only once this is accepted can it be 
elucidated, analysed, evaluated, and if  necessary counteracted. We must acknowledge 
the manifestation before we can look to the cause, and we must elucidate the cause 
before we can tum to any postulated 'solution'. But that, of  course, presupposes that 
this indeterminacy is itself a problem, that it is a bad thing. 
Consequently, the vital question is how judges ought to make their choices between 
competing legal arguments and 'norms'. These choices, these decision-making 
techniques, can only be elucidated by reference to the causes of  indeterminacy. 
177 Attention must focus on the processes by which putative norms are formed, and then 
on the products of  these processes, the putative norms themselves. These are the 
candidates for judicial 'recognition' as legal norms and arguments, and it is only by 
focussing on the procedures by which they were formed that we can rationally choose 
amongst them.
39 
To facilitate this choice, the theories must be articulated in such a way that they 
become subject to rational comparison. We must avoid the dangers of  ineffability and 
irrationalism; the aim is to make a 'rational' (or at least structured and consistent) 
choice between competing theories. We must neither fear, nor uncritically embrace, 
'postmodernism'; as Rasulov has noted, the dichotomy between 'modernism' and 
'postmodernism' is largely a figment ofthe Rationalist imagination: 
Orthodox theory ... is essentially grounded in an ethical rejection of 
postmodernity ... [which] derives from a mistaken conception of  the 
postmodern condition. The essence of  the postmodern experience, as the 
anxious Modems perceive it, is all about destruction. Postmodernism 
disbelieves everything that Modernism cherishes. It questions ... the great 
projects of  progress and conquest ... In the Postmodernist view, the Modems 
declare, reality is absurd. It is fragmented and can never be fully explained or 
verified. The few random glimpses of  it that can be captured here and there 
unfailingly imply that it is either totally devoid of  meaning or that it constantly 
overflows with it. ... Reason thus gets deposed from the divine throne .... The 
39 However, it is also important to stress the limited ambition of  the present project. I am not engaging 
intra-norm indeterminacy, except to the extent of  emphasising its (perhaps necessary) connection to an 
omnipotent and omnipresent (i.e. a sovereign) legal system. Intra-norm indeterminacy can be avoided, 
178 [orthodoxists] are right insofar as they recognise that the idea of  a totally fluid 
discourse is a contradiction in tenns. Without meaning fixation there can be no 
discursive experience: any sustained transfer of  knowledge presupposes the 
common grasp of  the exchanged tenns. But they are also wrong insofar as they 
assume that meaning can be fixed in only one way ... The[y are] right in 
establishing the link between postmodernisation and the undoing of  all eternal 
verities. [But] wrong in assuming that the latter is nihilism.4o 
Although methodology cannot replace 'natural reason', it must nonetheless strive to 
function as if  it did so. Methodology must strive to become the self-aware, self-
critical, constitution of  an artificial outside; a functional equivalent of  the inevitably, 
and irretrievably, absent Archimedean point. The key here is to make the competing 
theories commensurate: to tum them into answers to the same generic set of  questions 
and, consequently, to build them from the same atomic units. The fonn-purpose 
dialectic provides both these questions, and those units. 
Articulating Complete Visions of  Law: 
As Dyzenhaus observed, "the presupposition that there is a distinction between 
politics and a science oflaw is itselfpolitical".41 This means that any theory oflaw is 
a political theory, a political claim. The role of  the concept here is not to classify 
reality, but rather to create an aspect of  reality. A concept is more than a claim of 
difference (or indeed similarity); a concept is also a claim about the value or utility of 
but only if  we are willing to make the choices which must be evaded or compromised in the pursuit of 
legal sovereignty. 
40 Rasulov A., "The Double Impossibility ofInternational Law: Navigating the Practical Philosophy of 
the International Legal Project" [unpublished manuscript, on file with author] p.  18. 
179 'recognising' or imposing that difference. For present purposes a simple thesis may be 
stated: 
The concept oflaw is no more (or less) than a claim that law is different to 
other discourses (e.g. politics, morality, economics), supplemented with a 
claim that recognising this difference increases human utility. 
In other words, the concept of  law is a manifestation of, and a shorthand expression 
for, the claim that it is to our advantage to perceive law as something unique and 
differentiated. It is no more than this, because it makes no claims as to the nature of 
that difference, nor the nature of  the utility it produces. It is no less, because it is 
irreducibly a claim of  difference, a claim that law cannot be reduced to, or elided 
completely with, any other discourse. Even the slogan "law is politics" posits -
paradoxically and despite itself  - an essential separation of  law and politics. 
To summarise, perceiving law as authoritative proved pathological, it deprived law of 
content; consequently, if  we want to justify a role for law at all, we must return anew 
to the foundational question: what is law. We must examine the competing theories of 
law and select an orthodox theory. The alternative is to perpetuate the decisionism of 
Dworkinian Juris-Proconsuls, hidden behind a wavering illusion ofthe Rule of  Law. 
To some extent this relies on an old dichotomy, much cherished by thinkers from 
Aristotle to Dicey, that is, the dichotomy between the Rule of  Law and the Rule of 
Man. 
41  Dyzenhaus D., Legality and Legitimacy p. 109. 
180 Very simply, the Rule of  Man (pejorative connotations of  naked power and usurpation 
notwithstanding) is functionally equivalent to Weber's notion of  "Khadi Justice", 
decision without reference to rules. This is contrasted to the rule (or logo) centrism of 
regulation under the rule of  law. However, this dichotomy must quickly unravel, if  not 
collapse completely, when it is recognised that legal judgments are based on 
fundamentally indeterminate normative structures. The rules do not determine 
decisions, but are referred to only ex post  facto as sources of  justification for decisions 
already made.
42 
The CLS slogan "law is politics" is true at the most fundamental level possible. 
Consequently, the claim that law should be something distinguishable from 'pure' or 
'unrestricted' politics must be accepted as the basis of  all law and legal theory. 
Subsequently this claim, which must be made for legal analysis to begin, must be 
justified. This justification should not take the form of  necessity (an empirical claim 
of  difference) but of  utility (a normative claim as to the advantages of  difference). As 
law is a tool, it must be presupposed to have utility. 
However, this immediately opens the critical question: utility for what? Or, in a guise 
by now more familiar: what is law for?  Why should law be separated from politics? 
What is it that law provides which politics does not? There are many and varied 
answers to these questions, but it is crucial to realise that each will tend toward a 
different manifestation, orform oflaw. Consequently, the first stage in the process of 
articulation comes into relief: 
42 This charge is identical to that motivating American Legal Realism, and particularly Hutcheson's 
idea ofthe "Judicial hunch"; Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of  the 
181 1.  Postulate and defend a specific purpose oflaw: e.g. to impose order; to 
provide determinate answers; to impose a morality, or a political vision; to 
reflect the wishes of  its subjects. 
The subsequent questions concern two issues; first, maximising the utility of  law, 
maximising its ability to deliver the proposed purpose. Second, refining that purpose 
in relation to the specific political community under consideration. Logically then, the 
second stage of  the process must be: 
2.  Propose a mechanism for pursuing this purpose: e.g. law as judicial decision; 
law as determinate rules. 
At this stage, we have established the essence of  law most appropriate to (our 
understanding of) the legal regulation ofthe community in question. Now that essence 
must be further concretised into a conception oflaw, into the ideal template for a 
specific legal system. Thus, stage 3: 
3.  Concretise mechanism: e.g. define 'judges'; identify the processes by which 
legal rules may be recognised. 
At this point, we have articulated a theory of  law. We have developed the ideal 
against which the legal demands of  the legal system in question can be identified. 
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision" 14 Cornell L.Q. 274,274 (1929) 
182 Step four, then, also marks the move from second to first order questions. This is the 
point at which legal demands can finally be 'objectively' recognised or identified: 
4.  Apply mechanism to determine 'legal demands'. 
Only now can we actually engage in what is generally perceived as the task oflegal 
reasonmg: 
5.  Implement mechanism: interpret and apply legal demands. 
It is important to realise that all five steps must always take place, or be presupposed 
to have taken place; even to 'select' (to identify, discover, pick up, stumble across) a 
'legal norm', is to select (to pick up, or appropriate) the manifestation of  a theory, the 
conclusion of  the operation of  stages 1-3. The aim of  this methodology is not to 
expand the nature oflegal argumentation, but to acknowledge the extent it already 
bears. It is not, in one sense, to ask legal decision-makers to do more than they 
already do. Instead it is a plea to recognise what they already do (they choose between 
the products of  competing legal theories, rather than empirically identifying 'the law', 
as they believe, or pretend, they do), and then to do it, more consciously, tentatively, 
and openly. Of  course it is, however, a plea for legal decision-makers to work harder, 
and, hopefully, to do better. 
A complete theory must articulate what it takes to be the current salient features of 
empirical reality; what it proposes law should aspire to; and why its particular vision 
183 (mechanism) oflaw will best achieve that purpose.
43  Only once these points have 
been demonstrated (or at least argued for) can attention tum to the legal demands 
produced by that particular theory. However, and more importantly, debate is 
rendered complete and transparent. The various contenders for the essence of  law can 
each be heard. It is likely, if  not inevitable, that different essences (whether singular 
or composites) will be chosen for different places. As a result, law will be able to take 
on different forms in different places (and times) without being any the less law for 
that fact. 
DIALECTIC AS CRITIQUE: CHOOSING BETWEEN THEORIES: 
Once the theoretical options have been identified, and made commensurate, one can 
be chosen as the best ideal idea for the regulation of  the society in question. If  that 
theory were then adopted (implemented) consistently, the complexity ofthe social 
practice oflaw would be reduced sufficiently to facilitate the determinate recognition 
oflegal norms without recourse to morality. In this way, law could both be made 
determinate, and avoid any (necessary) moral imperialism. 
Two points must be emphasised here: first, that this technique of  disaggregation and 
choice does not lead to a 'correct' theory oflaw, good for all times and places. 
Instead, it merely allows for structured (rational) choice between competing theories 
in a specific social setting. Second, that although this debate must ultimately resolve 
around the purpose oflaw (and so the question of  why we value law), it does not 
43 There is another complexity here. It  may be that a version oflaw is favoured not (solely) because of 
what it will achieve, but also because others, which could do more are also liable to abuse, and thus the 
danger of  doing considerably less, or even of doing more harm than good. 
184 therefore degenerate into a 'post-modernist' acknowledgement ofthe ineffability of 
the 'otherness' of  each legal theory seen from the perspective of  any other theory. 
Choosing Theories, or Toward a Topography of  Critique: 
There are several ways in which disagreement with, and critique of, extant theories 
can be structured, and several sources from which it can flow. Therefore, it is 
advisable to clarify the nature of  one's disagreement with any given theory, rather 
than confusing (mistaking the target of) or conflating (eliding) dislikes. To do so, 
however, some form of  topography, or typology, of  critique must be assumed or 
stated. This should contain, at least, the following: 
Pure political opposition to the ends ofthe theory, e.g. opposition to the political 
desire for world homogenisation under the 'liberal alliance' of 'free trade' and 
'democracy', or ghettoisation of  "them and us" camps (societies), which drives and 
characterises the classic New Haven perspectives on PIL. 
Moral or political opposition to the means deployed. Even if  one were to accept that 
their aims were good, any theory which elevates the powerful above the law entirely, 
or worse still redefines the law as a description of  the activities of  the powerful, as 
purely facilitative oftheir desires, ought to be opposed. This is the crux of  the apology 
aspect of  Koskenniemi's critique ofPIL.
44 
44 There is no contradiction in my rejecting Koskenniemi's specific deployment of  his critique as 
inaccurate, as misunderstanding the PIL it sought to destroy, while at the same time endorsing his 
analytic schema per se. Indeed I fully endorse his basic claim that (public international) law should be 
185 These theories, however, tend to be more carefully presented, and to over emphasise 
their difference from the New Haven approach. The argument for a non-universally 
available right to deploy values is disguised behind the claim that "we can easily tell 
good from abusive claims,,45; i.e. we recognise claims which meet our moral 
evaluative standards; but that assumes that we, the People, know who we are, even as 
we judge one of  our own number. 
However, that is precisely the moral imperialism denounced by the Utopian pole of 
Koskenniemi's critique. It is precisely the solipsism and narcissism of  moral 
imperialism, and it is acted out as political imperialism. This is the reality of  neo-
colonialism: 
But how can a particular tradition speak in the name of  humanity? What 
possible reason might the Turks, the Serbians and the rest of  the world have to 
believe that? Surely this is the stuff of  colonialism .... The danger is that of 
mistaking one's preferences and interests for one's tradition - and then 
thinking of  these as universal, a mistake we Europeans have often made.46 
Consequently these theories must be met at the normative level. The efficacy with 
which such moralities could be imposed is not relevant, because it could not assuage 
the basic wrong of  the imposition itself. 
neither Apologetic nor Utopian in his senses of  those words. I maintain however, that a positivist 
theory ofPIL avoids both poles and any eternal oscillation between them. 
45 Higgins R., Problems and Process p. 14. 
46 Koskenniemi, "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" 16 EJIL (2005) 113 at 
p. 115 paragraph breaks suppressed and footnotes omitted. 
186 The analytic critiques would tend to focus on either the possibility of  attaining the 
ends by the declared means, or the likelihood of  abuse of  the means, or on the 
measures of  success adopted to determine the realisation of  the ends by the means. 
Thus, for example, Tasioulas' transposition of  Dworkinite methodology to PIL should 
be opposed not because it cannot be used to attain good ends, nor even because 
positivism is more likely to attain good ends, but because Tasioulas' methodology 
begs abuse in the international context. Absent the structural constraints of  the 
domestic legal order, the system cannot be shielded against hijack and misuse. 
Tasioulas' system is in a lose-lose position. Ifit concretises its values for all times and 
places, it entrenches the (effects of  the) originary violence of  its own creation (its own 
"table of  values"). Ifit does not concretise these values, then it must raise the 
powerful, those entitled or enabled to deploy their values, above the law.47 
The question of  realisation is a more vexed and more vexing, one. What does it mean 
for a system to have fulfilled, or to be fulfilling, its purpose? This is well illustrated in 
Van der Walt's notion of  deconstruction,48 and immanent critique, the working 
through of  an idea to its logical conclusion, or its legitimating promise.49 Ifhuman 
rights promise equality, they should be made to deliver equality, otherwise their 
legitimacy is based on an untruth; they then become illegitimate. This form of  critique 
- which I believe is synonymous with Marks' "ideology critique" - works to consider 
the unnoticed effects of  (unnoticed) ideologies in our perceptions ofthe world, and 
the (social) systems operating within it. In Marks' hands, this involves unmasking the 
ideologies, and tracing their effects; Van der Walt shows more commitment to the 
47 This will be expanded in the analysis of  Tasioulas, in ch. 4 infra. 
48 Van der Walt J., "Law as Sacrifice" 2002 Journal for South African Law 710-728. 
49 Ibid. 
187 legitimatory promise which the (human rights) system he analyses makes, and seeks 
instead to unearth the reasons for its failure to fulfil that promise. 
Finally, there are the empirical critiques, aimed at the accuracy of  the empirical 
claims and assumptions underlying (and perhaps justifying and legitimating) 
particular theories. The central location of  empirical conditions in moral philosophy 
has been obscured by the rise and dominance of  rationality and legitimacy through 
universalisability, but it has simply been overlooked, it has not actually receded.  50 
This is why the critical methods based on challenges to the empirical accuracy of  the 
justificatory claims of  certain legal theories remain important. 
Summary: 
At its very simplest and starkest, a legal theory is the exposition and justification of  a 
technique (or method) for identifying, interpreting, and applying the demands and 
permissions of  a given legal system, or oflaw generally. Different theories make 
more or less grand claims beyond this, but ultimately, all must fulfil this basic 
function in order to operate; and to maintain any relevance whatsoever to the practice 
oflaw. A direct, but often overlooked - ignored, disguised, or even denied - corollary 
ofthis is that all law, even the blackest of  black letter law, is always already the 
application of  a theory oflaw: law does not and cannot have (nor maintain) an a-
theoretical existence. Therefore, because the theory we adopt will determine how we 
perceive law, what is then required is a technique for choosing a preferred theory. 
50 Pogge T., World Poverty and Human Rights pp. 202-3 . Emphasis on the possibility of  rationality 
and legitimacy, at the expense of  historical enquiry and the possibility of  necessary illegitimacy, also 
seems to be at the heart of  Foucault's warning that we must "beware the lustre of  Power"; see Society 
Must be Defended, esp. at pp. 43-62. 
188 In order to elaborate, or fully articulate, a preferred theory we must go through several 
steps, which will also serve as our means of  justifying and defending that theory. First 
we must postulate the precise (formal) purpose of  the given legal system. Then we 
must expound and clarify our assumptions about the present nature of  society (in this 
case international society), and any other empirical presuppositions necessitated by 
our preferred theory. Then we must offer an exposition of  the theory itself, the 
ontology oflaw it embodies, and how this operates. Finally, we must demonstrate the 
effectiveness of  our chosen means (theory oflaw/legal system) in linking the 
empirical presuppositions with the desired ends (purpose). A topography of  critique 
simply focuses on each of  these steps in the negative. 
It is important to realise that the steps must be disaggregated; it is this which gives 
rise to the varying levels of  critique. Composite critique of  whole theories is simply 
impossible, because no objective, nor even a consistent intersubjective, frame of 
reference can be created. Therefore any critique of  alternative theories must focus on 
their component parts in isolation. Consequently, as noted above, the evaluation of 
law, or rather of  any given legal theory, must focus on: the empirical conditions; the 
means; the ends; and the inter-relations of  the three. A good theory must be defensible 
at each level independently of  its desirability in other regards. This is because it is 
only by separating the debates that we can formulate them in a manner conducive to 
rational argumentation. Until the ends (purposes) oflaw have been established, it is 
simply pointless to debate over which theories will best advance the purpose oflaw; 
the very question makes no sense, especially as different theories pursue conflicting 
purposes. 
189 MAKING THE CHOICE - PURPOSE IN A SPECIFIC SOCIAL SETTING: 
The basic contention of  the present work is that all extant theories ofPIL are flawed 
according to one or more of  the critiques outlined above, and that the resources for 
rectifying this are not to be found in the classic theories of  domestic law, either 
because the contexts of  the two types of  system are too radically dissimilar, or 
because the idea that PIL must aspire to be like domestic law is fundamentally 
inaccurate. 
By accepting this, the ground can be set for a new theory. In fact the theory I endorse 
is as much reactionary as it is novel; it is a theory of  positivism, but one set out 
normatively, which constitutes the best theory to fulfil the roles demanded by the 
purpose of  law best suited to the international social environment. It is not as such a 
description of  what happens, but an analysis of  the ideal underlying our cognition of 
actuality. It is a normative plea to restrict and refine PIL, to make it the best system it 
can be, but also to realise that this cannot be done until after we have agreed on a 
definition of  best, a definition ofthe purposes that should be aspired to by PIL. 
Identifying and Ordering the Questions: the Role of  the Revised Schema: 
Any proposition offering a specifically legal answer to a given question begins from 
the presupposition of  the differentiation of  the legal sphere, but that, formal, 
assumption alone cannot provide the specifically legal answer. Instead, the nature of 
the specifically legal must be defined. That is, we must begin with a claim as to what 
190 differentiates the legal from the non-legal. This claim will form the basis ofthe 
essence oflaw. It is a concretisation of  the chosen purpose oflaw. 
Consequently, from a strictly analytical perspective, we must go through several 
processes of  concretisation before we can get from the concept to the conception of 
law, and more again to move from the conception to the implementation of  the 
specifically legal demand. To further complicate matters, the necessary pluralism of 
this approach precludes the possibility that there is a single purpose oflaw, good for 
all times and places. As a result, these processes of  concretisation are, themselves, 
contingent. We do not seek legal rules in the abstract, but rather the demands of  a 
specific legal system. This means that the 'best available' purpose, will be that which 
best suits the location and needs of  a specific community. The entire process can only 
be concretised in relation to a particular concrete situation. Even then, it is unlikely 
that anyone purpose will be rationally superior to all others. The issue will remain, 
ultimately, subjective. 
There is no more an objective answer to the question "what is the law for here?", than 
there is to the general question "what is the law for?". However, views on the former 
question will at least be more focussed. I do not claim that such questions are 
susceptible to rational resolution, I merely observe that they are implicit in questions 
of  what the law demands. As such, they form part of  the stakes in the resolution of 
that question. As this is a fact, it ought to be acknowledged. Once their existence is 
acknowledged, such questions must be formulated and answered. 
191 To repeat, the composite question "what does the law say about x?" cannot be 
answered unless it is first dis-aggregated. The question contains at least the following 
component parts: 
1.  What purpose should law pursue, so as to be justified here? 
2.  How does that purpose manifest itself; what is the mechanism by 
which that purpose is best pursued? [And: is that mechanism 
available? What is the best available mechanism?] 
3.  How does that mechanism define/identify legal 'norms'? 
4.  Which legal 'norms' are on point? 
5.  What do those legal norms say about the proposed action (x)? 
However, it is vital to realise that these questions, although consecutive, are also 
operating at different levels of  understanding. Engaging with that fact is the peculiar 
strength of  the multi-level system of  analysis. The first two questions concern the 
choice of an appropriate essence of  law; the third concerns the transformation of  that 
essence into a conception oflaw, a legal system. The final two questions - the two 
most often asked by legal analysis and legal theory - presuppose that the others have 
been resolved. These questions deal with the implementation of  the norms of  a 
spec[jic legal system (or conception oflaw). 
192 What this entails is that the first three questions must be resolved in order to identify 
the orthodox legal theory for a given area. These tell us which legal system is 
operative. If  the law is to fulfil any postulated role, it must be manifested as a specific 
legal system. Failure to recognise this means that the first three questions - the vital, 
if  second order, questions - are rarely articulated. And yet, they must be resolved, as 
such a resolution is implicit in answering the final two questions. They are, therefore, 
resolved without thought, or even recognition. That is what creates the primary 
indeterminacy in legal reasoning. 
The Method Illustrated: 
I have not offered a theory of  law or justice, certainly not one good for all times and 
places. There is no Rawlsian Original Position, no Kantian Social Contract, nor even a 
Categorical Imperative. These thought experiments capture only the hubris of  their 
authors: when in doubt, do as I would do. My thought experiment is, I believe, more 
formal, more neutral, or minimalist. 
Imagine two (or more) protagonists in a court - or court like - environment. Each 
pursuing their'  case'. Each protagonist argues for a specific effect (application) of  the 
law. One says that the law is a, the other (or another) that the law is z. 
The judge asks them why? Why does the law state a or z? The answer, schematically, 
must be that the relevant 'norm' states a or z. But why; why is that the relevant norm? 
Why does that norm exist? The answer to this question ought to begin "because ...  " 
and go on to offer an exposition and defence of  a specific theory of  law: the ontology 
193 oflaw, and then the identification and application oflegal 'nonns'. This does not 
occur, instead the process degenerates into the masquerade of  the empirical. 
Precedents and interpretative principles are bandied about. 
The law, despite being a product of  theory (and a disputed product of  disputed theory 
at that) is presented as a series of  empirical truths: these are legal nonns, this is their 
logical chain, these are their interpretative and identificatory necessities. Furthennore, 
law must be pragmatic, reasonable, good, liberal; law must be these conflicting things 
because of  its empirical centrality. The true debate, "what is justifying this 
centrality?" and, indeed, "is the law really central, or just the judicial decision?", is 
ignored. The debate is foreclosed, and yet must be authoritatively settled. The judge 
must decide what he understands law to be, and must then apply that law. 
The methodology presented here seeks only to expose the true nature of  this decision, 
to bring to light the questions the judge is actually facing. Even if  these questions are 
ignored, they must nonetheless be engaged, they must be answered, or have their 
answers presupposed. This motivates and justifies the drive for transparency. Why is 
the law like that? Why should a legal nonn be constituted in that manner? What 
function does law, postulated as you postulate it, pursue? Is that a good function for 
law to serve? Why will your mechanism deliver that purpose? At what price?5! Will 
the law be too rigid? Or unfair? Will it be too flexible? Or indetenninate? Should 
judges be encumbered and entrusted with so much discretion? Are these prices worth 
paying? What other ways could law serve these functions? What other functions could 
it serve? What other nonns would then be created? 
51  I.e. will the mechanism proposed also do damage to the pursuit of  that, or other, functions? 
194 In short: why should I [the judge] believe in, or agree with, your particular vision of 
the law? 
This is the question around which legal practice - or any other reality of  the legal -
must revolve. It is only by engaging this question, either alone, or at least with lexical 
priority over all others, that the stability of  a legal system can be maintained. The 
judge should adopt a formal understanding oftheir role - alternatively, the judge as 
abstract paradigm should embody a formal understanding - not because this is 
conceptually necessary, but because it is beneficial. Stability is maintained because 
value selection is restricted; the only truly value-centric question engaged is "what is 
law for?". Once this is answered, the other answers (what is law? what is the legal 
norm? how should it be interpreted?) follow (at least in theory) from the operation of 
logic. 
Moreover, as the value question is posed formally, and at the systemic level, its 
answer ought to remain relatively stable over time. Thus focus on these questions, 
rather than on substantive preference in the outcome of  the instant case, produces 
stability. The answers are far less likely to vary from case to case, and thus (more) 
determinate answers can be produced without reliance on substantive institutional 
bias: the law itself can provide determinate answers. This is the legitimating promise 
(or ideology) oflaw; moreover, it is a good purpose for law. The current taste for 
substantive choice in the instant case militates against determinacy; this can only be 
countered by engaging the formal question. 
195 Nonetheless, it is a question which is generally overlooked, hidden behind unstable 
claims of  synthesis, technical legal argument, and wafer thin dichotomies of 
explanatory reason. It is a question denied engagement. 
A similar point has been raised, at a more obviously theoretical level, and in relation 
to CIL, by Tony Carty. Speaking at the Critical Legal Conference in 2004, Carty 
described the thesis of  his book The Decay of  International Law thus: 
Theorists keep coming up with new ideas about what CIL is. These are used to 
explain - or argue for - new decisions, or novel courses of  action. Then other 
theorists come along, and synthesise these new theories into existing 
understandings of  CIL. The result is confusion and hidden contradiction: the 
Decay of  International Law. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
So far, I have attempted to bring into relief, and elucidate, the crisis in which law 
currently finds itself: the crisis of  radical indeterminacy. I have shown how this crisis 
arose, and why any attempts at empirical theorising will necessarily prove inadequate 
responses to this crisis. Furthermore, I have explained the methodological fallacies of 
the empiricist project, and suggested are-orientation of  legal theory: as a necessarily 
normative discourse. In doing so, I have opened, and attempted to resolve, a central 
question in the theory oflaw: how are we able to cognise law at all? 
196 However, this resolution has led only to an apparent widening of  the problem. It has 
exposed the multiplicity of  normative orders competing for the signifier "Law", and 
the analytic impossibility of  making a rational choice between these. There can be no 
correct theory oflaw, at least not within the confines of  normative legal theory. 
Instead, the focus of  analysis had to be altered: from the correct theory oflaw, to the 
best available theory oflaw. However, I also acknowledged that - in addition to this 
question having no objective, ultimate, or correct answer - this issue could not be 
solved 'absolutely'; could not be solved for all times and places. 
Instead of  this, I have contended that the question can only be framed in such a 
manner that it may be susceptible to inter-subjective resolution, and even then only by 
reference to a specific legal system; a specific legal order postulated in relation to a 
specific society. The question of  which legal theory is 'best' reduces, at least in large 
part, to the question of  which purpose(s) that legal system should pursue. That 
question can only be engaged in relation to a specific and defined societal context. It 
is not a question of  which purpose(s) law should pursue per se, but which purposes it 
should pursue here. 
The move from a schema of  intelligibility to a topography of  critique and/or choice 
can only be made within such narrowly specified confines. The time to make this 
move is now upon us, and the topography will be developed in relation to a specific 
society: the international society. I have chosen this particular focus for a number of 
reasons: it was within Public International Law (PIL) that the inadequacy oflegal 
discourse first became apparent to me. As a 'naked' legal system, PIL displays the 
symptoms of  crisis at their most obvious; moreover, as a 'legal system' without 
197 authoritative institutions, PIL stands in most urgent need of  resolving this crisis; 
finally, the subject ofPIL is, and always has been, my first love. This project was 
inspired by PIL, and must now return to its roots, by elucidating the problems within 
PIL (chapter 4), and then by seeking to articulate the best available response to those 
problems (chapter 5). 
Having established the minimal nature of  the concept of  law, as claim of  difference 
and justification for the existence (and recognition and perpetuation) of  that 
difference, attention must now tum to some of  the rival candidates for substantiating 
that claim. 
198 CHAPTER 4: INDETERMINACY ILLUSTRATED: THE 'CANDIDATES' FOR A 
THEORY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
There is not a person who, except in the field of  his own specialization, is not 
credulous - Jorge Luis Borges. 
TWO VIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
Thirlway has noted, in a stinging, but perhaps unwarranted, attack on the thesis 
presented by D'  Amato,  1 that: 
The distinguishing character of  a legal claim, in the sense of  a claim that a 
certain conduct is required or justified by law, is surely an implied assertion 
that an impartial third-party, called upon to consider the matter from the 
standpoint oflaw, would decide that the claim is justified? 
He continues: 
Looking at the matter from the point of  view of States, of  what Professor 
D'  Amato calls national "decision-makers" and their legal advisers, it would 
seem reasonable to suppose that in a "claim-conflict situation" where both 
sides could point to "rules oflaw" in Professor D'  Amato's sense, a question 
which the national decisionmaker would be bound to put to his legal adviser 
would be: Which view is right? - and this would mean, Which alleged rule 
1 I have my own thoughts on D'  Amato's thesis, its failure and its necessary pathology, and these are 
expanded infra, see footnotes 49-81 and accompanying text. 
199 represents the correct rule of  international law? This in turn means, in the 
present writer's view, Which rule would be upheld by an impartial tribunal on 
the basis of  internationallaw?3 
Two points must be noted: firstly Thirlway appears to adopt at least a neo-Hartian 
methodology, as how can we tell what a tribunal might do without relying on its 
previous conduct; secondly, Thirlway simply assumes the natural correctness of  what 
could be called the 'English' or 'European' understanding oflaw, viz.  that the law 
must and can reach impartial decisions. 
The first point, while important, is not fundamental, because Thirlway's claim is 
ambiguous on this issue. He simply does not tell us how we ascertain the likely 
actions of  a tribunal. Consequently, this claim remains compatible with the neo-
Kelsenian claim, developed in the previous chapter, that the 'norm' precedes and 
determines the (correct) legal judgment. That is, the claim can be understood in either 
'social fact' or 'ideal idea' terms. However, the likelihood is that Thirlway's 
methodology tends toward the social practice paradigm, as he implies that what the 
Tribunal would decide constitutes the law; and that in turn implies that 'the law' can 
be identified from the observation of  the consistent behaviour of  the relevant 
tribunals, which it cannot. 
The second point suggests one possible root cause of  the confusion of  international 
law: American (or perhaps more accurately United Statesean
4
) legal thought is 'post-
2 Customary Law and Codification pp. 51-2. 
3 Ibid p. 52. 
4 Kennedy D. "The Disciplines ofIntemational Law and Policy" 12 Leiden Journal of  International 
Law (1999) p. 9. 
200 Realist' thought. What this means is that US legal thought, in abandoning Langdellian 
Formalism has also abandoned the idea oflaw as a neutral discourse, capable of 
producing determinate answers solely by reference to rules. Consequently, the idea of 
'judge' (or "impartial tribunal") as the abstract paradigm of  legal thinking has also 
been abandoned. The judge has been reduced to just another advocate, a site for 
persuasion, not a purveyor of  correct answers. From an American perspective, 
Slaughter notes that: 
The paradox is that the American conception oflaw, at least from a European 
perspective, is composed of  equal parts cynicism and idealism ... American 
lawyers have long had difficulty thinking oflaw as an autonomous body of 
rules.
5 
As Hart noted, the response to this acceptance has fractured American legal thinking, 
causing a bifurcation between "the Nightmare and the Noble Dream".6 
The details of  these responses are, for present purposes, not relevant. The important 
point is that US legal thinking is fundamentally different to European legal thinking. 
Intemationallaw must consider both perspectives. Ultimately, one must be privileged 
over the other - that much is true - but this should be the outcome of  a process of 
rational engagement, not the arbitrary imposition of  dogma as it appears in Thirlway's 
analysis. 
5 Slaughter A. "An American Vision of  International Law?" 97 American Society of  International Law 
Proceedings (2003) p. 125. 
6 Hart H. L. A., "American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream" 
reproduced in Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy p. 123. 
201 There is another, perhaps deeper and more serious, flaw in Thirlway's analysis: the 
assumption of  a (single) legally correct answer. In line with Hart, Kelsen, Fuller and 
positivist thinking generally, Thirlway assumes that law not only can, but does 
produce determinate answers, or at least, determinate legal norms: that the norms can 
be identified by reference to a fixed test, or set of  criteria. In direct opposition to this 
assumption, Carty has argued that: 
The task of  the jurist cannot simply be to identify phenomena as legally 
significant by applying an agreed legal criterion of  identification. Legal 
controversy goes to the very nature ofthe criterion itselr.? 
There are no agreed criteria; Thirlway's second thesis must be abandoned, and 
consequently his claim for the specificity of  the legal must fall. However, this is 'true' 
only within the confines of  empirical theorising. 
From the fact that law has no shape of  its own, but always comes to us in the 
shape of  particular traditions or preferences, it does not follow that we cannot 
choose between better or worse preferences, traditions we have more or less 
reason to hope we universalise.
8 
The question for normative theorising is whether Thirlway's ideal oflaw is desirable, 
and if  so, whether it can be realised. I shall argue that both of  these questions can be 
answered in the affirmative, but first, the nature of  the problem must be more fully 
elucidated. 
7 Carty A. The Decay of  International Law p. 25. 
202 Locating Koskenniemi's Critique Within the Topography: 
Koskenniemi offers the most devastating contemporary critique of  the very possibility 
ofClL.
9 He claims that ClL must reduce either to a description of  what states do 
(which Koskenniemi terms Apology) or to the arbitrary imposition of  an ethical or 
political theory onto a heterogeneous world (which he terms Utopia). Worse still, 
these two options stand in bivalent contradiction; they cannot be blended or 
synthesised, yet neither can serve to justify ClL. Consequently, Koskenniemi claims 
two related points and a dialectic conclusion: PlL can admit to being neither 
apologetic nor utopian, yet PlL cannot help but be one or the other. Therefore PlL 
exists in a permanent and manipulable oscillation between the two. 
What Koskenniemi's critique brings into reliefis the analytic failure of contemporary 
theories of  ClL. This failure is encapsulated in their tendency toward oscillation 
between Apology and Utopia. Consequently, Koskenniemi demonstrates the fact that 
ClL is fundamentally indeterminate; he also explains why this is the case. However, it 
is also vital to realise that the force ofKoskenniemi's critique lies in an unarticulated 
postulate that this analytic failure, although an empirical reality, is normatively 
undesirable. Radical indeterminacy may be a 'fact' of  contemporary ClL, but it is 
undesirable; it is a fact which should be contested, combated, and eliminated. 
8 Koskenniemi "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" 2005 ETIL 113 at p. 
119. 
9 See From Apology to  Utopia. For an excellent synopsis of  this thesis, see Koskenniemi M., "The 
Politics ofInternational Law" 1 ETIL (1990) 4. 
203 Accordingly, Koskenniemi's critique becomes the analytic litmus test within the 
topography of  critique as outlined above. Passing this test is a necessary, but never a 
sufficient, condition for the acceptability of  a theory of  CIL. This is because, as noted, 
Koskenniemi's critique can be 'side-stepped' by those willing to endorse either 
Apology or Utopia, and thus substantivise their imposed morality, or leave law as a 
descriptive justification of  the actions of, e.g., the 'alliance' ofliberal states, the 
"coalition ofthe willing", or NATO. Either of  these responses must be met at the 
normative, rather than the analytical, level. A successful theory must be defensible at 
all levels; the best theory must be preferable at all levels. 
Koskenniemi's critique only works against those who assume certain purposes or 
characteristics to be innate to the law: consistency, impartiality, objectivity. 
Koskenniemi's critique gains its critical purchase by playing on its readers' hopes and 
fears.  We (the readers) ascribe force to his critique because it relies upon, echoes, and 
re-inscribes our beliefs in what law should be like. The critique brings a version of 
law's abstract promise, and our commitment to that promise into relief. Consequently 
the critique builds on the hopes of  its readers, by illustrating to us that CIL fails to 
meet that promise, and why this is so. 
In elucidating the nature of  the problem, Koskenniemi also begins to unearth the 
outlines of  its solution. This is an important critique, but one which can be met; and in 
meeting it, we shall discover an understanding of CIL which is neither Apologetic nor 
Utopian. 
FALSE AGREEMENT AND THE THEORETICAL OPTIONS: 
204 The critical issue is to 'unpack' Carty's claim that there are no agreed criteria for the 
recognition of  valid international law. This critique is of  especial importance to - and 
was raised by Carty in relation to - CIL. This is because there are several different 
theories competing to explain CIL, but also because of  academic attempts to 
synthesise these competing theories, and by the tendency - prevalent amongst both 
academics and practitioners - to jump lightly between competing theories, simply in 
order to justify their personal desires regarding the content of  CIL. 
Consequently, the first movement in Carty's critique must be to denounce the 
tendency to jump between competing theories, and second to denounce attempts, ex 
post  facto, to justify these jumps in terms of  grand synthesised theories. This assumes 
a purpose oflaw not in the least dissimilar to Thirlway. International law ought to be 
normative, it ought to evaluate (and perhaps regulate) and not merely describe State 
behaviour. This ideal oflaw also appears to underlie Koskenniemi's devastating 
nihilist critique of  CIL. The emotive purchase of  this critique lies in its premise: that 
good law, and especially good international law, should be neither Apologetic nor 
Utopian, much less oscillate between the two. 
In chapter 5, I propose to engage directly with Koskenniemi's critique, and to 
demonstrate the conceptual viability of  its immanent inversion; the bringing into relief 
the possibility of  realising its inarticulate premise of  good law. We can create a 
justifiable ideal idea, which can function to allow the cognition, elucidation, 
understanding, analysis, evaluation, and critique of  CIL. However, for now I wish to 
adopt the premises ofKoskenniemi's critique, and also to deploy the critique 
205 (amongst other techniques) to demonstrate the causes of  indeterminacy in CIL; but 
also to argue that this indeterminacy is detrimental - that the primary purpose of  CIL 
ought to be the provision of  'neutral' and (more importantly) determinate legal rules. 
As Koskenniemi himself  puts it: 
If  the universal has no representative of  its own, then particularity itself is no 
scandal. The question would be: Under what conditions might a particular be 
able to transcend itself? What particular politics might we have good reason to 
imagine as a politics ofuniversallaw?lo 
At present this idea of  determinate law, which we might call the rule oflaw ideal, is 
not being realised in CIL. Instead, a multiplicity of  theories compete for our attention, 
and each defines the law differently, and so recognises different laws. To exacerbate 
this descent into the 'rule of  man', academics, practitioners, and judges routinely 
move between these theories
ll without conscious thought, simply to 'discover' the 
rules which best suit their particular desires. 
In order to alleviate this problem, two stages are required: first the movement between 
theories must be declared illicit (or licit only under certain carefully defined 
circumstances); and second, the competing theories themselves must be elucidated 
and fully articulated, in order that one ofthem may be chosen as the best available, 
and consequently recognised as the dominant, or orthodox, theory of  CIL. In 
conformity with Carty's plea, we must abandon the attempt to synthesise a 'correct' 
10 Koskenniemi, supra note 8, p. 115. 
II This is the cause of  what CLS have termed "Up/Down arguments", see Koskenniemi From Apology 
to Utopia: The Structure of  International Legal Argument pp. 40-1. 
206 theory of  ClL, and tum our attentions instead to the decision, the choice, of  a 'best' 
theory: 
The fact that international law is a European language does not even slightly 
stand in the way of  its being capable of  expressing something universal.  12 
The key is precisely to find a law legitimately capable of  speaking the universal, even 
ifthis must take place within a European dialect (Law). To recapitulate, briefly, we 
cannot objectively identify the content oflegal rules in any given area of  regulation 
unless and until we have established the orthodox legal theory through which the rules 
themselves are to be defined, and so by which the rules are to be identified. It is by 
adopting this methodology that we are able to separate arguments over what the law 
says from arguments over what the law is. Only after the latter arguments have been 
resolved can the former be rationally formulated. 
Obviously, I cannot begin to synopsise all of  the variant theories proposed as 
candidates for a theory of ClL, but shall instead subject exemplar theories to a test 
implicit in the claim Pound made many years ago, a claim picked up and amplified by 
Fuller. Pound said "ideas of  what law is for are ... largely implicit in ideas of  what 
law is,,.13 Fuller premised his entire theory on this claim that law necessarily had a 
purpose, and thus law must be restricted to forms and techniques appropriate to the 
realisation of  this purpose; he called this essentialism. Fuller claimed that any object 
which had a purpose also had an essence,14 a minimum concentration of  properties 
allowing it to serve its function and be recognised as an object of  its type. Fuller's 
12 Koskenniemi, supra note 8, at p. 115. 
13 Pound R. An Introduction to the Philosophy of  Law p. 46. 
207 argument is that this essentialism has been lost in regard to law - primarily because 
we no longer think about what law is for. Yet we all have views on this, whether we 
articulate them or not. 
By disguising these divergences, these disagreements, behind the word "law" (and/or 
the phrase Customary International Law) we court confusion. This apparent 
agreement serves to disguise deep divergences in the techniques for 'identifying' the 
norms of  CIL. Nonetheless, a 'debate' ensues over the meaning and application of 
these 'norms. The underlying debate - the debate over which norms exist, and why 
this is so - has, tragically, never so much as been framed, let alone initiated, and much 
less resolved. Schematically, theorists, black letter academics, and practitioners of 
international law, transpose - or probably more accurately transplant
15 
- assumptions 
about the "nature of  law", from the theory and practice of  municipal law to the alien 
environment of  international society. Koskenniemi is correct to draw attention to: 
The domestic analogy that persuades us - contrary to all evidence - that the 
international world is like the national so that legal institutions may work there 
as they do in our European societies.  16 
Two problems arise as a result: first municipal law is not, itself, a coherent, nor an 
unproblematic, concept;  17 and second PIL is not municipal law. 
14 Fuller L. The Morality of  Law pp. 145-151 
15 The, very useful, distinction between transplanting and transposition was developed, and is 
elucidated, by Esin Orucu; see "Law as Transposition" 51  ICLQ (2002) 205. 
16 Supra, note 8, at p. 122. 
208 The disaggregation of  debates may prove of  great utility here. I believe that the 
'concept of  municipal law' can itself  be subdivided into the necessary presence of 
four (or possibly five) key components, or central features. Municipal law - and thus, 
for the unreflective, law as such - is: 
1.  Socially central (law has an answer to all questions) 
2.  Enforced (law must be enforced, and thus law is what is enforced) 
3.  Impartial (the same laws apply, in the same way, to all subjects
18
) 
4.  Determinate (we can identify the laws quasi-objectively) 
5.  (Possibly) In some form congruent with a posited moral demand 
The most interesting questions are which, if  any, of  these characteristics is truly 
necessary, definitional, or paradigmatic? Alternatively, which syntheses of  the 
available elements can be created; how does privileging or concretising some (groups 
of) features, while excluding or marginalizing others, affect, or even effect, our 
understanding of  law? There seems to be an undeclared, but generally observed, 
17  See Kammerhofer J., "Uncertainty in the Formal Sources ofInternational Law: Customary 
International Law and Some ofIts Problems 15 EJIL (2004) 523 at p. 550; see also Kletzer c., 
"Kelsen's Development of  the Fehlerkalkul-Theory"  18 Ratio Juris (2005) 46; and ch. 3 supra. 
18  Or, more precisely, to all subjects within a given (specified) class; however, within PIL (if we take 
Sovereign equality seriously, even at the formal level) then there is only one primary class of  subjects; 
the Sovereign States. 
209 convention that enforcement and centrality are the paradigmatic features oflaw,19 
with the corollary that the others can be marginalized as needs be. 
Following the elision oflaw and Rule of  Law, institutional enforcement, and the 
description of  institutional techniques, has become the principal focus of  a largely 
descriptive legal theory. Within an institutionalised municipal legal order this may 
make sense, though even here it must be open to normative or political challenge, 
simply because it implicitly posits a brutally Hobbesian purpose (the imposition and 
maintenance of  order) to law as such. Certainly Fuller openly objected to this 
privileging of  power over the specifically lega1.
2o Moreover, as Dyzenhaus and 
Dworkin have shown, and as MacCormick appears to have conceded, this project is 
also analytically indefensible due to the sheer scale, complexity, and contradiction of 
the data oflaw understood as a "social practice". 
However, given our immediate focus, the most important questions reside in the 
transposition of  law from the municipal to the international sphere. We must 
determine which features, or syntheses of  features, could be most fruitfully developed 
to create, define, and identify PlL or ClL. My argument is that, ultimately, the debate 
revolves - and must be resolved - around the purpose oflaw. It is only once we have 
agreed on a purpose for law (or more precisely, for the specific legal system under 
consideration) that we can identify and articulate law's ontology; and only then can 
we 'objectively determine' the content (the norms) of  the given legal system. 
19 Even Fuller, despite railing against the confusion of  "deference to constituted authority with fidelity 
to law", acknowledged the need to enforce law, and indeed even incorporated that need, implicitly, into 
his (wrongly) fixed enunciation of  the purpose of law: "to subject human conduct to the governance of 
rules" (see The Morality of  Law p. 106). Thus, enforcement - while generally considered insufficient 
for a definition oflaw, is nonetheless an agreed element in almost every theoretical analysis oflaw. 
The necessity for an enforced order is legal common-sense. 
210 Moreover, at least in relation to PlL, only a well articulated, and carefully delimited, 
positivist theory can provide a satisfactory mechanism for the implementation of  a 
coherent and acceptable purpose. 
But before that can be demonstrated or proven, attention must tum to the issue of 
choice itself, and the important preliminary question: just what options do we have to 
choose between? 
A Schematic Overview (Or Typology) Of  The Theoretical Possibilities: 
Roughly speaking, the options for the relationship between practice and opinio iuris 
are that they could create elL as either an aggregate or a synthesis. But this shifts the 
question immediately onto the definition of  each part. To provide a synthesis, the two 
parts would have to be part ofthe same thing, reflections of  each other; inexorably 
bound and inseparable. To be an aggregate, the opposite must be assumed, that the 
two elements are radically separate from one another, each enjoying an atomistic 
existence. These options reflect, summarise, and encapsulate the classic and the 
modem theories of  custom respectively. As should be apparent, they cannot be 
reconciled.
21 
There are two central options for State Practice, either it is everything that States do, 
or it is some o/what States do. After this choice is made - or perhaps before this 
choice is made - we must decide how to decide which ofthe things which States do 
20 Fuller, supra note 12, p. 4l. 
21  This course of  action has been suggested, and attempted, by Roberts, see Roberts A. E. "Traditional 
and Modem Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation" 2001 AJIL 757. My 
criticisms of  this idea are developed at notes 85-102 and accompanying text, infra. 
211 should count as State Practice. This question has been answered in different ways: for 
a classic natural lawyer, like Teson,22 it is the congruence of  the action with a posited 
ethical order (deemed self-evidently timeless and correct) which separates Practice 
from mere Conduct; for a classic positivist it is opinio which differentiates Practice 
from Conduct.23 Those following D'  Arnato,24 New Haven, or a Dworkinian 
approach25 must, I believe, assume all state actions to be State Practice. 
Opinio iuris too is a term of  many meanings: it could be about the nature of  the claim 
to act, or about the reception of  this claim. Alternatively, it could be wider, covering 
all that states say (normative opinio); or, again, it could be some of  what states say-
e.g. that sufficiently congruent with "World Order Values". Then again opinio may be 
a "state of  mind" imputed onto states. Within this latter perspective, opinio could be 
understood as a belief  in legality, a consent to be bound, or a simple normative claim 
for legality. 
It is already almost impossible to track the potential permutations available between 
State Practice and opinio iuris, the "agreed elements" of  CIL. However, all that must 
be stressed for now, is that each permutation will focus on different data; each 
perceives rule formation differently, and so each will return different rules. Moreover, 
these differences are largely masked by the apparent agreements over the structure 
and elements of  CIL; and by their elision or confusion with those disputes over the 
content and meaning of  rules; disputes which are endemic to the practice oflaw. It is 
the combination of  all of  this which leaves CIL wide open to the nihilist critiques of 
22 Teson F. Humanitarian Intervention pp. 11-15. 
23 The classic exposition is from the North Sea Continental Shelf  Cases 1969 ICJ Reports 3 at p. 43. 
24 The Concept of  Custom in International Law pp. 87-98. 
212 NAIL. Law is not an application of  rules, it is an act of  choice; justified ex post  facto 
by reference to rules. 
However, it is also important to realise that arguments over the ontology oflaw are 
disguised by apparent agreements, particularly in the sphere of  elL. Disputes over 
which rules exist, are thus completely elided with disputes over the content, meaning, 
and applicability of  rules (already presumed to exist). This confusion occurs because 
the external dispute over the nature of  law has been transposed into an internal 
plurality of  articulated and unarticulated theories of  elL. These issues must be 
separated. elL must be accurately defined, before it can be observed, or have its rules 
evaluated for content, meaning, and applicability. 
Theories of elL can be roughly divided into the following categories: 
1.  Single Element Theories: 
a.  Based solely on practice 
b.  Based solely on opinio iuris 
2.  Twin Element Theories: 
a.  Which consider the two elements in synthesis 
b.  Which consider the two elements in aggregate 
25  See, e.g. Tasioulas 1., "In Defence of  Relative Nonnativity: Communitarian Values and the 
Nicaragua Case" 16 Oxford JLS (1996) p. 84. 
213 3.  Avowedly Moral Theories: 
a.  Based on an Evolving Morality 
b.  Based on a fixed Morality 
c.  Realist Theories 
A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE THEORETICAL 
OPTIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN CIL: 
The development of  a determinate theory of  CIL must commence by singling out a 
single theory, which will be considered orthodox and will be privileged over all 
others. This can best be done by demonstrating the normative and analytic 
preferability of  one theory, but can also be achieved negatively, by demonstrating 
analytic -failings and normative failures within alternative theoretical options. That is 
the function of  the topography of  critique developed above. However, that topography 
then requires data to which it may be applied; that is, we must consider the varying 
theories of  CIL in an attempt to isolate one as preferable to the others. 
What I shall demonstrate in this section is the fact that, for structural reasons, all 
available theories ofPIL are either analytically vulnerable or normatively 
objectionable. That is, all fall foul of  Koskenniemi's devastating critique, in one way 
or another. These failings are not to be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of  each 
individual theory, but to the very structures ofthe theories themselves. As a result, I 
shall show how each type (category or genus) oftheory in the typology above is 
214 doomed to failure, and to producing either apologetic or utopian 'norms' or, worse 
still, yet more likely, to oscillate between the production of  each. 
1.  Single Element Theories: 
There have been two important and, in their time, influential attempts to develop 
single element theories of  elL. One focussed exclusively on State Practice, driven by 
a methodological commitment to the empirically observable. The other, focussing 
exclusively on opinio iuris, comes across more as a lament for the absence of  an 
intemationallegislature, and an attempt to create its functional equivalent in the UN 
General Assembly. 
State Practice Only (Early Kelsen): 
Kelsen did, at one point, offer the view that state practice was the only necessary 
element in the formation of  customary law?6 However, he did not maintain this 
position?7 This was perhaps inevitable. Firstly, it is obvious that such a position 
would breach Kelsen's fundamental commitment to the is/ought distinction. It would 
allow a mere fact to become constitutive of  a legal norm, consequently, deriving an 
ought from an is. This is well captured by Kammerhofer: 
26 Hans Kelsen, "Tbeorie du droit international coutumier" 1 Revue Internationale de la Theorie du 
Droit (1939) 253-274. See esp. p. 264: 'D'ailleurs la theorie selon laquelle l'element psychique, l' 
"opinio juris sive necessitatis" est essential a  la formation de la coutume, est fort contestable ....  '; at 
266: 'Etant donne qu'une prevue objective de l'existence de l' element psychique dit "opinio juris sive 
necessitatis" n'est pas possible, et que, par consequent, l'existance de cet element, de meme que la 
qualite morale de la coutume, sa concordance avec lajustice, depend totalement de l'arbitraire de 
l'  organe competent a  applicquer de regIe consideree comme une norme du droit coutumier ....  '. 
27 The Pure Theory of  Law (2nd ed. 1960) Ch. 35.b. 
215 such a view of customary law overlooks that practice alone is not a subjective 
attitude  and  practice  alone  cannot  create  law,  a  collection  of facts  has 
descriptive,  not prescriptive value.  A  non-factual  (subjective)  law-belief is 
seen as necessary to make what 'is' into law. Without that opinio custom is a 
mere factuality, not a norm.
28 
This was a particularly strange error for Kelsen to make, because: 
[the] breach of  the duality ofIs and Ought [is] a legal theoretical 'crime' [and, 
moreover,] it was Kelsen's work which made this violation a theoretical 
,  .  ,  29  cnme. 
Moreover, as Kammerhofer again notes, such a theory would be unworkable. It would 
simply fail to reduce the complexity of  international life in such a way as to 
discriminate between normatively relevant, and normatively irrelevant conduct: 
The reason why the subjective element, formulated as opinio iuris, is 
considered necessary is first to determine between 'mere' usage and 
customary norms, and second to delimit between customary law and other 
normative orders.
3o 
28 This important observation appears in an early draft of  Kammerhofer's paper "Uncertainty in the 
Formal Sources of  Intemational Law" [on file with author] but did not survive the final editing ofthe 
paper. Kammerhofer assures me that this argument was culled for reasons of  space only, and that he 
stands by its content. 
29 Kammerhofer J, supra note 16, at p. 546. 
30 Ibid, p. 535. 
216 In short, an approach based solely on state practice must become merely descriptive 
ofthe actions carried out by states. In Koskenniemi's terms, this theory is resolutely 
apologetic in nature. 
Opinio Iuris Only (Cheng): 
A precise mirror image ofKelsen's single element theory was developed by Bin 
Cheng.
3
!  In an influential article, Cheng developed, and radically extended, the 
voluntarist thesis of  CIL. That is, he started from the voluntarist assumption that all 
PIL derives from the consent of  States and worked logically to the conclusion that 
such consent was, alone, constitutive of  obligation in PIL, and therefore also, 
necessarily, in CIL. This eradicated the normative role of  state practice; instead: 
the role of  usage in the establishment of  rules of  international customary law is 
purely evidentiary: it provides evidence on the one hand of  the contents of  the 
rule in question and on the other hand ofthe opinio juris of  the States 
concerned.  32 
However, this is simply not a theory of  customary international law, as Danilenko has 
pointed out: 
It is important that according to Art. 38 opinio iuris must be based on practice. 
The view that the expression of  opinio iuris without accompanying usage or 
31  Bin Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" international customary law?", 5 
Indian Journal of  International Law (1965) 23-48 
32 Ibid, p. 36. 
217 practice can lead to the creation of  custom disregards the specifics of  custom 
as a source oflaw.
33 
Moreover, Cheng's theory gives very little guidance as to how to delimit the content 
of customary norms, nor even how to differentiate between norm creative and 'other' 
statements, unless his thesis is restricted purely to unanimous resolutions of  the 
UNGA, in which case it is reduced to being a disguised plea for an international 
legislator. Outwith that institutional setting, only moral preference could perform this 
necessary discriminatory function. 
Conclusion: The Impossibility of  Single Element Theories: 
Put simply, single element theories cannot sufficiently reduce the complexity of  CIL. 
Kelsen's theory becomes purely descriptive, as not only does it fail to adequately 
reduce the complexity of  international life, it also reduces law to Apology: the 
description of  state actions. Cheng's theory suffers the opposite fate; absent practice it 
cannot really be considered a theory of  customary law, but more importantly, neither 
can it be grounded, except in a Utopian vision which isolates statements on certain 
topics as normatively relevant and consequently as opposable to state will and action. 
2.  Twin-Element Theories: 
33  Gennady M. Danilenko, "The Theory of  International Customary Law" 31 Gennan Yearbook of 
International Law (1988) 9-47 at 31 
218 As a result of  the necessary failings of  single element theories, the contemporary 
consensus privileges twin-element theories. However, between the varying twin-
element theories there is no agreement on either: 
1.  The definition of  opinio and state practice; or 
2.  The relationship between the two elements. 
This creates a complicated topography of  theories which must be articulated, 
elucidated, analysed, critiqued and, I shall suggest, ultimately rejected. As a result, 
isolating an 'orthodox' or 'best' two-element theory is not an easy task. In fact, even 
if  we acknowledge the consensus and assume a two element theory of  custom 
formation and even ifwe assume the two elements to be opinio iuris and State 
Practice,34 we have still not reached any real agreement. More must be done: we must 
agree on the relationship between State Practice and opinio, and then we must agree 
on a definition of  each concept. 
The Classic Twin Element (Synthesis) Theories: 
Classic two element theories understood state practice and opinio iuris as combining 
in synthesis to constitute new rules ofPIL, understanding opinio as: 
34 D'  Amato, at least, has rejected this claim. See D'  Amato A. The Concept of  Custom in International 
Law pp. 73-86. Moreover, Mendelson appears to agree with D'  Amato; see, Mendelson M "The 
Subjective Element in Customary International Law" BYBIL (1995), an article which Thirlway has 
characterised as "an eloquent plea for the abandonment of  the concept of  opinio juris", see "The 
Sources ofInternational Law" in Evans (Ed.) International Law, 117 at p. 143. 
219 The psychological element in the fonnation of  custom, the philosophers' stone 
which transmutes the inert mass of  accumulated usage into the gold of  binding 
legal rules.
35 
However, although unanimous about its function, classic theorists did not agree on a 
definition of  opinio. Instead two distinct propositions were put forward: opinio as 
belief  that a practice confonns with (or is required by) law, and; opinio as consent to 
be bound by the proposed legal rule. However, it was agreed that the presence of 
opinio iuris transfonned mere state conduct into nonnatively relevant state practice. 
In other words, the role of  opinio was to reduce the complexity of  international 
interaction into a manageable sequence of  nonnatively relevant activities. In essence 
this is the same role as that perfonned by "rational reconstruction" in MacConnick's 
'development' of  Hartian theory.36 
It is vital that opinio be accorded this function. Law is a simplifying discourse, and 
consequently relies on having a tool to facilitate this process of  simplification in a 
manageable and controlled manner. However, neither definition of  opinio proposed 
by the classic understanding of  CIL is actually capable of  perfonning this function. 
The two classic candidates for the definition of  opinio - belief  in legality and consent 
to legality - are both flawed. 
Consent theory seems to be the product of  a simple error in logical reasoning. This is 
well explained by Mendelson.
37 In essence these theories take the orthodox belief that 
PIL is a consensual legal system to entail that each part of  that system must also be 
35 Thir1way H., Customary Law and Codification at p. 47. 
36 MacConnick N., "Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS" 1990 OJLS 
220 consensual. So, if  States (as a whole) can generate the sources ofPIL by consent, then 
each source must also be subject to the consent of  each state. This is simply not so; it 
betrays a genetic error in reasoning. States could agree that CIL should no longer be a 
source oflaw, but rather the Papal Bull should be recognised as law once more. That 
would be a consensual decision; the Papal Bull would become a source of  PIL, but it 
(the content of  each individual Papal Bull) would not therefore become subject to the 
consent of  individual states. And no more need CIL.  38 
Consequently, the consent theory although falsely presented as a logical entailment of 
the consensual nature of  PIL, is in fact adopted as an act of  choice.
39 As a direct 
consequence, the desirability of  the theory must be evaluated. The critical question 
becomes: is this a good theory of  CIL? Consent is not a good theory of  CIL, because 
it risks depriving the law of  its normativity. 
If  opinio is reduced to the consent of  individual states to be bound by the law, then 
that consent may (conceptually) be withdrawn with the same ease with which it was 
given.40 Taken to extremes, this simply robs CIL ofnormativity. A state wishing to 
act contrary to the rules of  the (momentary41) legal system, withdraws consent, acts 
(this cannot be a breach, as the rule no longer binds that State) and moves on. Consent 
theory privileges change over stability. In Koskenniemi' s terms, consent theory is 
necessarily apologetic. 
37 See supra, note 34, at pp. 189-90. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid pp. 189-94. 
40 Ibid, pp. 184-94. 
41  Raz J. The Concept of  a Legal System pp. 34-5. 
221 Alternatively, if  opinio is defined as a belief in legality then change, normative 
evolution, the move from one momentary system to another, becomes impossible.
42 
Thirlway captured this perfectly when he noted that defining opinio as belief: 
Necessarily implies a vicious circle in the logical analysis of  the creation of 
custom. As a usage appears and develops, States may come to consider the 
practice to be required by law before this is in fact the case; but if  the practice 
cannot become law until States follow it in the correct belief  that it is required 
by law, no practice can ever become law, because this is an impossible 
condition.
43 
Belief  theory privileges stability over change. In Koskenniemi' s terms, belief  theory 
becomes necessarily utopian. More importantly, however, because neither theory can 
actually function, and neither theory can be acknowledged as not functioning, elL 
can only evolve by privileging one claim over the other in an ad hoc situation specific 
decision. 
The content of  customary international law has always been vague and, all of 
us know, had really to be constructed every time it was "discovered" by the 
truth  -declarers.  44 
That is precisely the oscillation between Apology and Utopia against which 
Koskenniemi's strictures are directed. 
42 Pace, Kammerhofer, supra note 16, at p. 536. 
43 Thirlway, supra note 35, at p. 47. 
44 Rasulov A, "The Double Impossibility ofInternational Law: Navigating the Practical Philosophy of 
the International Legal Project" [unpublished manuscript, on file with author] p. 23. 
222 Thus, neither consent nor belief  theories can adequately explain the psychological 
element of  CIL, because neither is acceptable as a definition of  opinio iuris. This 
necessitates either abandoning the idea of  opinio, or the articulation of  an alternative 
definition of  opinio. Both strategies have been attempted, but neither has been wholly 
successful. It should be stressed that most theories of  CIL have arisen as a result of 
the impossibility (and indeed implausibility) of  the classic approach. Some have, 
however, arisen out of  a more realist concern with the content, and 'necessary' 
pragmatism, or 'realism', of  CIL. They have arisen from the legalist belief that law, 
because it is socially central and authoritative, must also be reasonable and pragmatic. 
Legal solutions ought, above all, to be correct. This is an impossible, and pathological 
demand. It involves the imposition of  a singular definition of  the "correct", and must 
be opposed at the strictly normative level. As MacCormick has noted, the need for 
law is greatest precisely when moral agreement is absent.
45 These two 'branches' of 
modem theorising shall be analysed separately. 
The Modem Twin-Element (Aggregationist) Theories: 
The defining feature of  modem theories is the abandonment of  the idea of  CIL as a 
synthetic product. Modem theories consequently posit, and build from, a total 
separation of  state practice and opinio iuris. This is designed to evade the stasis, or 
metaphysical puzzles, of  the classic theory; however it simply leads to another 
degeneration into the oscillation between apology and utopia. This is for one simple 
reason: once separated, state practice and opinio iuris each manifest one of  the poles 
45 MacCormick N., 'The Concept of  Law and "The Concept of  Law"', 14 Oxford Journal of  Legal 
Studies (1994) 1 at p. 5. 
223 ofthe apology/utopia dialectic. As a direct consequence, theories built on this 
separation must either privilege one pole over the other or oscillate between the two 
poles. 
Article 1.  Custom in Mendelson and D'  Amato: 
Both Mendelson and D'  Amato attempt to restructure and reinvigorate customary 
international law - to rescue it from its perceived ambiguities, inconsistencies, 
paradoxes and illogicalities - by downplaying the subjective element, opinio iuris. 
D'  Amato is more consistent in his destruction of  opinio, which he replaces with a 
concept he terms "articulation".46 Mendelson on the other hand perceives opinio iuris 
(still conceived as a truly subjective element, a state ofmind, or a consent to a given 
rule) as a sufficient, but not a necessary, criterion of  customary international law. 
The individual State's consent is not a necessary condition [to bring a rule into 
being], though it may be a sufficient one.47 
This reversal of  the usual ordering of  sufficiency and necessity is probably the most 
novel and profound aspect of  Mendelson's treatment of  customary law.48 
Both writers accept and advocate a bifurcation between general and specific custom, 
and both seem to agree that the psychological element is more important in the latter. 
46 See D'  Amato A., The Concept of  Custom in International Law; available at: 
http://anthonvdarnato.Jaw.northwestern.edu/8ooks-2.htm#conceptofcustorn 
Chapter 4. p.  1. [note, in citations from D'  Amato, the page numbers refer to those given in the .pdffile 
cited above; and not to the original text of  the book] 
47 1998 Mendelson M., 'The Formation of  Customary International Law', 272 Recueil de Cours (1999) 
155, at p. 249 
224 In the fonner, general customary law, the psychological element is neither a necessary 
nor a useful tool
49
, while in the latter it does retain utility and so importance. 
D'  Amato's most fundamental insight is that States do not have minds, and thus opinio 
conceived as a truly subjective element would be a logical impossibility.  50 From this 
he postulates the necessity of  replacing opinio with articulation. This has the effect of 
splitting customary international law into "physicalist state practice" and "nonnative 
opinio iuris".51 A customary rule is still to be fonned by the coincidence ofthe two 
elements, but the very nature of  the elements themselves has altered. 
Articulation is the oral or written statement of  a rule; practice is action in confonnity 
with that rule. Both are required to constitute customary law, but they need neither 
(temporally or spatially) coincide (nor need they even be attributable to the same 
state, let alone individual actor
52
)  nor recur. A single articulation can be solidified by 
a single confonning action into a rule of  general customary international law. but, this 
can only happen if  the area in question is currently legally unregulated. 
This raises the first problem with D'  Amato's concept of  custom. According to many 
legal theories, legal non-regulation is a conceptual (logical) impossibility. Closure is, 
48 Or, as Mendelson himself puts it "I appreciate that this is a somewhat unusual way of  using the 
distinction", ibid footnote 249. 
49 Both authors are very proud of  the logical consistency and efficiency of  their theories, and 
Mendelson in particular is vocal in his philosophical support of Occam's razor. As Mendelson states 
"The only tools we can use here are an understanding of  the practice of international decision-makers, 
common sense, and, perhaps, Occam's razor - "entities [in this case legal concepts and fictions] are not 
to be multiplied unnecessarily"" (supra note 46, at p. 250). 
50 Thirlway also draws attention to this fact, but notes that this is no reason not to adopt a subjective 
approach as a useful shorthand; supra, note 2, p. 49. 
51  Roberts, supra note 21,  p.757. 
52 However, the actor must have actual or constructive notice of  the articulation before they can be said 
to act in compliance with it; supra note 46, p. 2 
225 in Raz's tenns "an analytic truth,,53. Thus D'  Amato's concept has utility only at the 
foundation of  a legal order. This is not an insunnountable problem, as D'  Amato's 
notion oflegally unregulated really seems to mean that a given act is neither legally 
compulsory nor legally prohibited. Thus customary rules can fonn in any area which 
is legally subject only to what Raz tenns "conclusive privileges".54 In D'  Amato's own 
tenns: 
A single writer or a single state may effectively articulate a new rule of 
intemationallaw in an area that ... is not established as clearly based on 
.  55  comIty. 
The repetition of  an act constituting the quantitative element of  custom serves 
to enhance the rule significantly. Two acts are significantly more persuasive 
than one; since in the third situation [dissent] there would be no effective way 
of  cancelling the rule by acting differently.56 
Moreover, D'  Amato prides his theory in its accommodation oflegal change, but does 
not really explain how this happens. The unfolding ofthe theory outside of  the realm 
of  pennitted behaviour or legal novelties is not given extended exposition in 
D'  Amato's text. 
53 Raz J., The Authority of  Law p. 77 
54 Ibid p. 67. A "conclusive privilege" arises from an absence of  prohibition, and manifests the closing 
rule, that all which is not prohibited is, therefore, permitted. It is "conclusive" in the sense that it is the 
conclusion of an analysis which reveals no extant prohibition. This is contrasted to an "express 
privilege" which is an explicit legal permission to act; though one which falls short of  forming a 
(claim) right. 
55 Ibid. The clear establishment of an area as one of  comity seems to be analogous to the Razian idea of 
an "express privilege". 
56 Ibid p. 10. 
226 D'  Amato does note "the possibility, and actuality, of  change in customary law,,57 and 
asserts that traditional theories of  custom are unable to account for this, as they appear 
to "lay down a rule that the first case or first few similar cases generates a customary 
rule, and that later cases would simply be violations of  the customary rule and should 
be given no effect". This would lock PIL in stasis, which in D'  Amato's view is 
"logically absurd". D'  Amato believes that his theory can accommodate change, "by 
giving legal effect to departures from preceding customary norms".  58 This is an 
important issue, but D'  Amato in practice offers little to aid in its resolution. 
For D'  Amato, repetition of  actions increases their normative weight, "two acts are 
significantly more persuasive than one", but "a single contrary case can cancel a 
previous one".59 Therefore a single articulation followed by a single action could not 
displace a rule founded on two articulations and two actions, but the latter could be 
superseded by a rule based on a single articulation and many acts. Yet elsewhere he 
castigated as metaphysical enquiries
60 earlier attempts to calculate the number of 
repetitions necessary to make an act general or widespread. This seems to undercut 
his reliance on numerical equivalence. Moreover, as Thirlway notes, linguistically 
custom implies ideas of  repetition and generality, and thus whatever the other merits 
ofD'  Amato's position it cannot be considered as a concept of  customary law.
61 
57 Ibid.  (emphasis in original) 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid p. 9. 
61  In ch. 5, infra, I shall also attempt to demonstrate a conceptual and not just semantic link between 
elL and repetition of  practice. 
227 Nonetheless, D'  Amato does note that "[  e  ]ven a rule of  custom based on two or more 
situations can be changed".62 This possibility is attributed to the fact that "resort to the 
World Court or to any other international tribunal is ... a highly a-typical event,,63 and 
so disputes are norm  all y resolved by reference to states' "view[  s] of  international 
law" and these will be influenced by non-legal factors. D'  Amato seems to argue that 
the IC] would treat a single articulation and action as constitutive of  a custom -
though this seems to contradict, inter alia, the orthodox reading of  the North Sea 
Continental Shelf  Cases - and would preclude a state from offering its own counter 
practice (i.e. that practice now being adjudicated) to negate this rule.64 However, 
according to D'  Amato this is not so problematic for his own theory as it is for (his 
interpretation of) orthodox theory. This is because the vicious circle adverted to by 
Thirlway - that opinio precludes legal change as the actor must know it is breaching 
the law and so cannot possess the opinio requisite for legal change65 - is circumvented 
by D'  Amato's substitution of  articulation for opinio.
66 
Outside of  the judicial environment (which D'  Amato in US-style seems to postulate 
as the paradigm oflegality - "what actual courts will in actual fact decide") the 
refusal by the 'breaching' state to make amends would have normative effect. It 
would negate a nascent (single articulation and event) rule and weaken or undermine 
62 D'  Amato, supra note 51, chapter 4, p.  11 
63 Ibid, p.  10. 
64 Ibid, p. 10. D'  Amato does not appear to consider the possibility that the respondent state would 
simply argue that no prohibitive rule existed, and that the Court, following NSCS would probably 
agree. This would leave the area as one of  conclusive legal permission, rather than a lacunae, or non 
liquet as such. In effect, this would be equivalent to arguing that an actively permissive rule governed 
the area of  conduct in question. 
65 Thirlway, supra note 35, at p. 46. 
66 It should, however, be noted that the abandonment of  opinio was unnecessary to achieve this result. 
D'  Amato is forced to abandon opinio because of  the a-systemic nature of  his interpretative techniques. 
Interpretation can evolve within the system as claims of  the form "x is a better understanding of  rule y 
because it takes account of  principles or other rules, or because it takes account of  other developments 
in the systemic context" are perfectly valid forms of  legal argument. In other words, rules themselves 
228 an established one. This effect would be increased ifthe 'victim' state accepted this 
refusal, or failed to protest adequately. The next state would then be in a position to 
negate or alter the rule: 
E would argue that its own refusal to pay would constitute the second 
disconfirmatory instance which would then serve to negate the two affirmative 
precedents67 
This does not, unfortunately, explain the exact status or necessity of  numerical 
equivalence of  examples and counter-examples in the function of  altering rules. 
D'  Amato is unclear in the extreme: 
The number of  disconfirmatory acts required to replace the original rule is a 
function partly of  the number of  acts that established the original rules in the 
first place, the remoteness in time of  the establishing acts, the legal 
authoritativeness of  the participating states,68 and other factors. 69 
The important point for D'  Amato is that "an 'illegal' act by a state contains the seeds 
of  a new legality" and that his theory "allows for the smooth working of  change in 
customary intemationallaw".  70 This does not actually seem to be true at all; although 
D'  Amato explains why change can happen (because it does), it is still unclear in the 
can evolve, and so the system need not only evolve by extinguishing and replacing existing rules, but 
rather can modify the demands of  the (same) continuously existing rules over time. 
67 D'  Amato, supra note 51, ch. 4 p. II. 
68 D'  Amato has a sub-theory that more "sophisticated" states have (and should have) a greater impact 
on the normative process (ibid p. 11). This seems to be an acknowledgement of  reality which is being 
theoretically grounded, and yet it radically underplays the effects of  realpolitik; quite simply the actions 
of  the powerful are far less likely to be protested, and probably more likely to be emulated. 
69 Ibid p. 12. 
70 Ibid. 
229 extreme how change is to be identified as having occurred in his model. Though one 
must assume that "articulation" plays a role, the precise nature of  this role remains 
unclear. 
D'  Amato seems to assume that the state seeking (or inadvertently prompting) change 
will articulate a rule. That is the state will seek to justify its actions through 
universalisation, or perhaps will (explicitly or implicitly) rely on a previously 
articulated rule which contradicts the current legal position. However, this assumption 
is neither declared, nor necessarily well founded. More importantly, D'  Amato does 
not appear to perceive the necessary tension between change and stability. If  law is to 
be more than a descriptive discourse it must privilege stability even while allowing 
for change. What is required is a means of  differentiation withinprimajacie 
transgressive behaviour: separating (merely) deviant conduct from conduct leading to 
(or crystallising) normative evolution. 
D'  Amato seems to miss this point primarily because his understanding of  action, and 
its variable interpretations, is overly simplistic. He states that while there may be 
many articulations of  varied rules, practice determines which will become law, and so 
concretises the articulation into a rule (oflaw). This is because actions are susceptible 
of  only one interpretation. As D'  Amato puts it: 
Many contradictory rules may be articulated, but a state can only act in one 
way at one time. The act is concrete and usually unambiguous ... The state's 
act is visible, real, and significant; it crystallises policy and demonstrates 
230 which of  the many possible rules of  law the acting state has decided to 
manifest.7
! 
This latter claim, due to its inaccuracy,72 undermines his conceptual architectonic. 
Mendelson also focuses almost exclusively on state practice. However, he does 
concede to opinio a role in discriminating between relevant and irrelevant actions, but 
he does not expand on this role: 
I suggest that it is useful to think of  the subjective element as a means of 
distinguishing not so much (or only) one class of  rules from another, but those 
instances of  State practice which count towards the formation of  law from 
those which do not.
73 
Thus, for Mendelson opinio is not (merely) relevant to the distinction between social 
and legal rules (the role ultimately accorded to it by Kelsen
74
), but actually plays its 
most important role in facilitating a distinction between the evolution and stability of 
norms within the legal order; opinio differentiates between normatively relevant and 
normatively irrelevant acts of  state(s). 
Mendelson excludes opinio from general customary law, not because it is 
conceptually incoherent but, because it is unnecessary, and therefore falls under 
Occam's razor: 
71  D'Amato, supra note 51, ch. 4 p. 7. 
72  See notes 75-6 and accompanying text, infra. 
73 Supra, note 46, at p. 272. 
74 See note 27, supra. 
231 Although recourse to the subjective element helps us understand why, in 
particular circumstances, a constant and uniform practice does not give rise to 
a customary rule, these are somewhat exceptional cases and, in the run-of-the-
mill case, the subjective element is oflimited value.
75 
This is the wrong way to assess the problem, if  for no other reason than it creates an 
unnecessary and unwieldy distinction between ordinary and special cases. If  opinio 
does no harm then it need not be eliminated from our understanding of  ordinary cases, 
and so this distinction can be avoided. Moreover, Mendelson confuses limited 
visibility with limited value, and yet the most important parts of  many machines are 
precisely those we rarely view. 
Mendelson's theory could be easily rescued ifhe realised that his focus on practice is 
not so much the dismissal of  opinio iuris as the presumption of  opinio iuris. Acts are 
presumed to have normative force, but this may be rebutted by displaying an absence 
of  opinio iuris, which Mendelson terms opinio non iuris. Mendelson's logical mistake 
is to misunderstand Occam's razor. He has not eliminated the concept of  opinio iuris 
but has merely restricted its role, but he has on the other hand invented the concept of 
opinio non iuris. Now three concepts are at work in customary law, opinio iuris, state 
practice, and opinio non iuris. This is one more than is necessary; the operation of 
elL can be explained solely by reference to the first two concepts, and therefore the 
latter concept falls under Occam's razor. 
75 Supra, note 46, at p. 246. 
232 Theoretical approaches to law can be roughly divided into micro- and macro-theories. 
That is, theories about specific areas of  law and theories about law or legal systems as 
such. Mendelson's mistake is to incorporate a theorem of  macro-theory (Occam's 
razor) into his own micro-theory on customary international law in run-of-the-mill 
cases. This error causes him to confuse concepts "in play" with concepts "in 
existence". Concepts in play in the analysis of  any part of  the system (described and 
unified by macro-theory) are extant concepts, even when they are not at play in 
(descriptions of) other parts of  the system, and Occam's Razor deals with extant 
concepts, and not only concepts in play. Thus even if  Mendelson is correct in his 
observation that customary law can (generally) be explained without reference to 
opinio iuris, opinio continues to exist for those parts of  the system where it does come 
into play. It never ceases to exist, and cannot fall under Occam's razor sometimes, but 
not others. Things either exist or they do not. 
This takes us back to Mendelson's more important point, albeit one made in passing 
and more as a concession than a contribution, that opinio plays a role in data 
discrimination. Not all state actions are of  equal normative importance - nor indeed is 
each susceptible of  a single uniquely correct interpretation. This can be well 
illustrated by a simple example from the law of  war (International Humanitarian Law 
or IHL). There is a general prohibition in IHL on weapons which are indiscriminate, 
or which cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. Use of  such a weapon 
could be understood in any ofthree ways (at least): as a simple breach ofIHL; as a 
statement that the specific weapon does not actually breach IHL (or that the specific 
weapon should be entitled to a specific exemption
76
); or that the rule prohibiting 
76 Given the structure ofIHL, and the definitions given to indiscriminate, unnecessary, and superfluous, 
these two interpretations are really different ways of  saying the same thing. 
233 indiscriminacy etc. should itself  be revoked.
77 Three interpretations, but only one 
single action, and prior articulation of  rules helps us not at all. Neither for that matter 
does opinio non iuris, except perhaps in regard to interpretation 2. These 
interpretations can only be separated by seeking or implying (distilling) some sort of 
subjective element accompanying the acts. 
Mendelson is more interested in the definition and utility -rather than the outright 
rejection - of  opinio iuris. He points out weaknesses in both the belief  and consent 
definitions (understandings) of  opinio, and seems to feel that this suffices in 
undermining the role of  opinio itself.
78 He does not consider an understanding of 
opinio as merely normative intent. In reality, his own common law training and 
epistemology seem to lie at the basis ofthis theory. Here, again, we can observe the 
impact of  'theory' on the identification and interpretation of  the data putatively 
'forming' (being the content of) the practice (law). Mendelson attempts to relocate 
customary law in the conceptual matrices of  English common law thinking, and most 
especially (explicitly) in "legitimate expectations,,79 and (implicitly) in the doctrine of 
estoppel. 
This allows for the sufficiency but non-necessity of  opinio to hold a state bound by a 
customary rule. In effect opinio for Mendelson formalises an informal rule. That is, 
once state A accepts a rule, it creates a legitimate expectation on which state B may 
rely, and this expectation is normatively relevant, in fact binding, even if  the rule has 
not completed the necessary formalities to become part of  the general customary 
77 This example is deployed, in a slightly different context, and for a different end in the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion 1996. 
78 Supra, note 46, at p. 253. Mendelson implies that, "having discovered deficiencies in both schools", 
he has exhausted the field. 
234 international law. Thus opinio (now become acceptance or consent) is sufficient but 
not necessary. Had the rule been properly formalised, it would bind regardless of 
opinio. This is exactly the process by which estoppel formalises a flawed contract in 
English Common law. 
However, this limited understanding of  the role of  opinio iuris undermines 
Mendelson's analysis of  the general part of  customary international law, and in 
particular the stability of customary law even in the face of  inconsistent conduct by 
states. This is perhaps best illustrated by consideration of  the possibility of  a 
customary rule facilitating torture. Torture undoubtedly goes on throughout the world, 
in fact it is probable that more states resort to torture than do not. In both Mendelson 
and D'Amato's theories this amounts to a significant accumulation of  state practice, 
and should therefore tend toward normative change, namely the evolution of  the 
prohibition on torture into a qualified permission to torture. This can only be avoided 
by discounting the state practice in question. 
Mendelson can discount this practice only by reference to opinio iuris, or to his own 
concept of  opinio non iuris, the admission of  illegality in effect. However, he can only 
rely on this distinction ifhe first demonstrates that this is an exceptional, rather than a 
run-of-the-mill case. This brings a dilemma to light, what is to count as exceptional? 
Torture is an endemic feature of  international life; the action itself therefore cannot be 
considered exceptional. This drives Mendelson's theory into the position that it is the 
nature of  torture (as an especially heinous activity) that renders this an exceptional 
area. But, the crux and purpose of  Mendelson's theory was to remain within the 
79 Ibid p. 249. 
235 positivist tradition, and this in itself would appear to exclude such morality based 
reasoning. Rescuing his theory here would therefore entail transforming it into its 
opposite, a natural law based explanation of  international law. 
If  the issue is put in Koskenniemi's terms, the pathology of  Mendelson's theory is 
most clearly visible: Mendelson's generally Apologetic (i.e. descriptive) theory 
(which is empiricist, rather than positivist, in nature) has an unstable Utopian 
movement. This movement becomes active when the user wishes to maintain a rule of 
elL in the face of  challenge, or even endemic breach. There is no reason to assume 
that the Utopian movement cannot come into play to facilitate the creation of  a rule 
not otherwise mandated by Mendelson's theory. The theory necessarily oscillates 
between apology and utopia. 
Here D'  Amato may be in a slightly stronger position, but probably by accident or luck 
rather than design. State practice only counts in D'  Amato's theory if  it follows an 
articulation of  a rule. So for acts of  torture to count as (normatively relevant) state 
practice, there must have been (at least one) public articulation of  the right to torture, 
of  which torturing states have actual or constructive knowledge. This leaves D'  Amato 
in an almost positivistic position of  having to trust an unbounded humanity not to 
publicly articulate such a claim as a general norm. It also leaves him in the 
uncomfortable position that if  some major journal were to publish the articulation of 
such a claim, even once, we would be well on the way to establishing just such a 
permissory rule. Unless, of  course, in a Utopian moment, articulations (or values) 
more conducive to liberal morality were privileged. 
236 This Utopian moment comes into relief when we consider D'  Amato's analyses of  US 
armed interventions abroad. Generally, according to D'  Amato these are "justified 
responses to tyranny,,;80 at this moment, values swamp the system, and D'  Amato slips 
from apology to utopia. Liberal or democratic (i.e. pseudo-Kantian) theory functions 
as the utopia (the manipulable political theory) to be imposed at will. Alternatively, 
D'  Amato's work remains apologetic insofar as his theory merely describes US armed 
adventures abroad. 
There is thus, from the perspective of  Koskenniemi's critique, an inexorable 
pathology about aggregationist theories of  custom; they are a crisis in disguise, 
always requiring the sovereign act of  choice to substantiate them. In every given 
application ofthe law, a concrete decision (which will determine the outcome of  the 
case) must be made at the point of  law application. Which should prevail, practice or 
opinio? Which moral theory should apply? What does that theory demand in 
concreto? Complexity has not been reduced in a structured and consistent manner, 
therefore none of  this can be determined in advance. In effect, the rules must be 
created at the point of  application - the sovereign decision (the creation oflaw) is 
displaced to the judicial act, and removed from its institutional constraints.81 
Truly traditional natural law theories do avoid this criticism; for them God, Human 
Nature, or Reason play the role of  sovereign, and thus (at least in theory) lend 
determinate character to law. Modem theories can be insulated from the descriptive 
and oscillatory charges in Koskenniemi's critique in the very same way; by imposing 
upon them a fixed, determinate (though not necessarily timeless) moral order. 
80 See e.g. "The Invasion of  Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny", 84 AJIL (1990) 516. 
81  See Rasulov, supra note 44 at p. 23. 
237 However, both sets of  theories then become Utopian, and therefore are open to attack 
at the normative levels of  presuppositions (that such a universal, objective, and 
determinate ethics exists) and purposes (that the World should be homogenised into a 
Pax-Americana, or Holy Roman Empire, or 'democratic' free-market economy).82 
This brings to the surface a very interesting tension in D'  Amato's text, between the 
neo-Fullerian naturalism of  his general (legal) theoretical commitments (the internal 
morality mandating the moral legitimacy of  law as such), and the non-evaluative 
nature of  articulation and practice as the source of  legal rules. This implicit tension 
surfaces as outright ambiguity when D'  Amato's empirical architectonic is redeployed 
in a Rawlsian theoretical schema by Roberts.  83 
Classic and Modern Theories, and the Impossibility of  a Reconciliation: 
The central distinction between modern and traditional theories of  custom lies in the 
relationship they posit as existing between (and thus defining) State Practice and 
opinio iuris. Modern theories are aggregationist in the sense that they perceive the two 
elements as radically separate, and as combining in aggregate (where one element 
may be given preferential treatment, or each may receive identical weighting) at a 
certain (generally unannounced) threshold level to create CIL. Classic theories do not 
see the elements as separable at all; it is the existence of  opinio which transforms 
82 It should also be noted that the theories would actually remain open to Koskenniemi's primary 
analytic claim of  necessary indeterminacy; because the formulation of  objective morality (in whatever 
guise) must, in order to gain consensus, be constructed at such a high level of  abstraction, that its 
potential concretisation into specific demands is open to multiple interpretations and the legitimation of 
conflicting norms. 
83 Roberts, supra, note 21. Tasioulas avoids this outcome by ignoring the tension, and reading 
D'  Amato's concept of  opinio iuris (articulation) in a wholly moralised manner; see, supra, note 25, p. 
85. 
238 mere action into State Practice.84 However, classic theories do not agree upon, nor 
consistently -let alone persuasively - articulate the nature of  opinio, nor its effects on 
State Practice. 
One understandable, though pathological, response is to attempt to engineer a 
reconciliation. This has been attempted by Roberts. Adopting the simplified dialectics 
which Rawls christened "reflexive equilibrium", Roberts (who had already explicitly 
adopted aggregationist presumptions)85 set out to reconcile the impact ofthe always 
already separated State Practice and opinio - to move between, and gradually reduce 
the distance separating Apology and Utopia, and to temper each with the demands of 
the other. This may help to reconcile the theories ofD'  Amato and Kirgis, maybe even 
Tasioulas86 too. It does not reconcile traditional and modem: it does, however, prove 
Koskenniemi's secondary (Schmittian) claim that PIL will degenerate into 
manipulable oscillation, simply in order to avoid the unpalatable choice of  choice 
itself. 
Article II.  Robert's Reconciliation: Thoughts on a Misunderstanding Illustrating 
the Impossibility of  Reconciliation: 
Roberts has proposed the deployment of  a Rawlsian "reflective equilibrium" as the 
only effective technique of  reconciliation between the "old" and "new" strands of 
theory regarding customary intemationallaw.87 This version of  rational liberalism is 
portrayed as more apt than that put forward by Dworkin for transposition into the 
84 See, e.g., Thirlway, supra note 35. 
85  See supra, note 21, p. 757. 
86 On Tasioulas' arguments, see notes 94-113, and accompanying text, infra. 
87 Roberts, supra, note 21. 
239 international arena. Unfortunately, far from reconciling the two epochal theories of 
customary international law, Roberts has simply misunderstood both the classic 
theory and (because of  this) the nature of  the disagreement. 
The debate central to Roberts' thesis is that between Weil88  and Tasioulas,89 however 
her misunderstanding of  Weil's position is manifest from the moment that she states 
that the analysis and proposed reconciliation will take place within an understanding 
ofCIL as comprising "physicalist" state practice and "normative" opinio iuris.
90 Thus 
the key question for Roberts is whether opinio iuris or state practice should 
predominate in the formation of  customary law.91  All state actions are deemed state 
practice and the font of  opinio iuris is sought outside observable activity. At this 
point, from the traditional perspective, the debate is already lost. 
Classic theories of  custom do not and cannot accept this separation. For a liberal 
positivist like Weil it is anathema. Following the exposition in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf  Cases, state practice and opinio iuris are mutually constitutive. 
They are not discreet entities to be weighed one against the other, nor cumulative; 
neither can exist without the other. The key question, the key difference between the 
traditional and modem perspectives, is not "what role does opinio iuris play?" but 
"what is opinio iuris and where does come from?" This is mirrored in the question of 
88 Weil P. "Towards Relative Normativity?" 77 AJIL (1983) p. 413. 
89 Supra, note 25, 
90 This is also the position expressly adopted by Tasioulas, see supra note 25, at p. 86. However, it is 
acknowledged by him to be quite distinct from Weil's classic liberal positivism; see ibid p. 96. 
Moreover, it should also be emphasised that while Tasioulas does appear to interpret all state activities 
as state practice in the normatively significant sense, he explicitly rejects the idea that all statements, or 
even all UNGA resolutions, are automatically examples of  opinio iuris. This status is reserved only to 
those displaying sufficient congruence to Tasioulas' unenumerated list of  World Order Values. See 
Tasioulas supra note 25, at p. 10l. 
91  Compare, e.g. Kirgis F "Custom on a Sliding Scale" AJIL 146, and D'  Amato A. "Trashing 
Customary Law" AJIL 101. 
240 what constitutes state practice. The central argument between traditional and modem 
understandings of elL is not primarily what opinio does, but what constitutes opinio, 
and mutatis mutandis state practice, in the first place. Reference to Rawls' equilibrium 
seems to be an attempt to bridge or suppress this gap. Roberts' 'reconciliation' fails at 
a methodological, or pre-theoretical, level, because it adopts D'  Amato's "physicalist" 
understanding of  state practice, rather than - indeed in preference to - the classic, 
symbiotic, and evaluative understanding of  state practice and opinio iuris as mutually 
constitutive. 
The classic position's absolute commitment to factuality is its central dogma, and this 
commitment is misunderstood and so mis-portrayed in Roberts' attempted 
reconciliation. In the classic understanding, state practice and opinio iuris cannot be 
separated, as any separation has to postulate the creation and recognition of  opinio 
iuris solely by reference to correspondence with arbitrarily chosen external standards. 
It does not matter what role these external standards are given; simply granting them a 
role in the creation or validation oflaw is in itself incoherent with the understandings 
of  classical legal positivism. 
Adopting the "physicalist understanding", as Roberts (at least initially) explicitly 
does, presupposes the answers to these questions, and so relocates - or rather 
comprehensively misunderstands - the nature ofthe disagreement. It is only when the 
argument is thus mis-represented that the stage can be set for the triumphant Rawlsian 
reconciliation. As all (physical) State activity is now deemed "state practice" the only 
relevant questions are the source and effect of  opinio iuris. Paradoxically, this 
understanding both expands and contracts the class of  action to be understood as state 
241 practice (in the nonnative sense). On the one hand, classic examples of  state practice, 
e.g. protest, are now excluded; on the other, state activities in clear breach ofPIL are 
now to be awarded the nonnative significance of  practice.  92 
This is all at odds with the classic position. Roberts' attempt at reconciliation opens 
by conceding the debate to the progressive forces of  the new order (the relative 
nonnativists), albeit with the pronounced caveat that the "nonnativity threshold" is 
reintroduced, though in a manifestation unrecognisable to the classic understanding. 
Thus the key question, which underlies the debate, how to separate actions in breach 
of  the law from those pertaining to its evolution, is misrepresented in Roberts' 
(re)construction and replaced with that of  which extra-systemic sources should 
detennine the moral validity of  the distinction. For classic PIL, as a liberal positivist 
theory, there is no outside, no extra-systemic value, against which the validity of 
system decisions can or should be measured.93 
In fairness, Roberts appears to notice this implicitly, and an undeclared ambiguity in 
her notions of  both state practice and opinio iuris, slips into the later (explicitly 
Rawlsian) sections of  her paper. For example, "state practice must be accompanied by 
some articulation oflegality so as to distinguish between legal and social 
obligations,,;94 "inconsistent state practice can be interpreted as a breach of  an existing 
92 This seems to be a feature of  modem approaches to custom, and also seems to contradict the IC} case 
from which they draw their central support, the Nicaragua case. In para. 184, the Court very clearly 
drew a line between state practice (proper), and the things states just happen to do. 
93  At least none which the system should recognise, nor which should have direct ingress to system 
decision-making. Of  course, as Weil (supra, note 90) (and Kelsen before him; see Pure Theory of  Law, 
pp. 66-7) notes the system can and should be evaluated and critiqued by external standards, but only at 
the political level, and only to tend toward such political change as is recognised by, and therefore 
influences, the legal system. Critique is a reason to initiate the process of  norm creation; but it is not 
part of  that process, and nor should it become that process. 
94 Roberts, supra note 21, p. 776. 
242 custom or a seed for a new custom,,;95 which would tend to suggest a symbiosis of 
state practice and opinio iuris. She, however, also suggests, "State practice is 
ambiguous because some states torture their citizens with minimal protest by other 
states, while others do not engage in torture. Further, most states have accepted 
declarations against torture (opinio juris)",96 which adverts to the return of  a 
separation between the two. This is rapidly followed by the utterly ambiguous claim 
that "practice can only form a custom ifthere are statements that [it] is a legal 
obligation, not just a social practice (opinio iuris).97 The two are then categorically 
divorced: "Statements of  opinio juris ... are mainly relevant to the dimension of 
substance because they represent what the practice should be, not necessarily what it 
has been".98 Then reunited in synthesis: "a state's resort to factual or legal exceptions 
to justify a prima facie breach of  a rule has the effect of  confirming the general rule, 
rather than undermining it or creating an exception to it"  .99 This fusion of  opinio iuris 
and state practice is drawn from the leJ's judgement in the Nicaragua case, and 
seems to meet the classic criteria of  symbiosis, a point which Roberts apparently 
confirms.  100 
In short, Roberts simply fails to reconcile the two epochal theories of  elL, moreover, 
she does not even fail consistently. Having initially adopted 'modem' aggregationist 
premises, she then moves toward a classic understanding of elL as a synthesis, but 
also fails to adopt this approach consistently. Ultimately, unable to blend the two 
theories, she fails (or refuses) to privilege one over the other, and instead oscillates 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid p. 781. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid p. 782. 
99 Ibid p. 783. 
100 Ibid p. 785. 
243 between the two. The attempt at reconciliation was doomed to failure from the start; 
given their presuppositions, the two sets of  theories are irreconcilable. One approach 
had to be privileged over the other, but recourse to a Rawlsian reflexive equilibrium 
simply could not provide the resources for this act of  choice. Absent such a choice, 
Roberts inevitably remained trapped within the oscillation between apology and 
utopia. Only by adopting an avowedly utopian model could this have been avoided 
while aggregationist assumptions were maintained. 
Tasioulas' "Dialectical Route" To Reconciliation: 
Tasioulas develops precisely such a moralised, such an openly utopian, model. 
Although it is, briefly, worth considering the extent to which Tasioulas does in fact 
attempt to synthesise classic and modem approaches, it is ultimately more important 
to understand that the model he in fact offers is utopian in nature. Moreover, that 
model does not work, and so it is also important to elucidate how the failings of 
Dworkin's social practice methodology manifest themselves in the international 
environment. 
Despite Tasioulas' claims to "sketch a dialectical route" between traditional and 
value centric approaches to customary law,  101  he is not interested in reconciliation or 
synthesis, but in proof of  the anti-thesis, a neo-Dworkinite natural law as a reliable 
foundation for relative normativity.102 Such an approach involves endorsing a radical 
separation of  state practice and opinio, and an understanding of elL as an aggregate 
of  the two. The question is how to formulate or define that aggregate. 
101  See Tasioulas, supra note 25, at p. 85. 
102 Ibid. p. 96. 
244 Tasioulas adopts and expands Frederic Kirgis' rationalisation of  the Nicaragua case
I03 
suggesting, in its defence, that it cannot be considered an "ad hoc and arbitrary 
manipulation of  the traditional understanding of  custom"  I 04 but should rather be seen 
to have "a deeper rationale in Dworkin's re-statement of  natural law theory".  105 
Thus Dworkin's interpretative concept oflaw is deployed to provide parameters 
within which the World Order Values (WOVs) necessary to the relativist approach 
can be contained. In this way, it is intended, indeterminacy would be reduced, and 
radical indeterminacy, a "spectre ... conjured up by positivists like W eil", would be 
"exorcised".  106 The obvious implication is that Dworkin provides a theory which can 
mediate between radical indeterminacy and value imposition. 
Dworkin's theory is predicated on 'constructive interpretation', a "matter of  imposing 
purpose on an object or practice". For analytical purposes, this is accomplished in 
three distinct stages. First, the 'raw data' to be interpreted is identified. Second, that 
data is interpreted to discern the rule to which it gives rise. Finally, at the post-
interpretative stage, the interpreter "adjusts his sense" of  what the data really requires, 
so as to better suit the rule he has distilled from it. 107 
This interpretative process takes place within a matrix created by the "relationship 
between the dimensions of  fit and substance which condition the acceptability of  an 
interpretation". Fit is the extent to which the rule discerned coheres, or 'fits', with the 
103 Kirgis F., "Custom on a Sliding Scale" 81  AJIL (1987)  p.146. 
104 As suggested by Alston and Simma, see Tasiou1as supra note 25, at p. 110. 
105 Ibid,pp.llO-l. 
106 Ibid, p. 115. 
245 data from which it is drawn. Substance is, essentially, the desirability of  the rule. 108 In 
customary international law, the raw data to be examined, and with which a proposed 
rule must 'fit', would be state practice and opinio juris while the'  substance' of  the 
putative rule would be measured in tenns of  its appeal to WOV  s. 
However, the two dimensions of  fit and substance are not "discrete hurdles that 
competing interpretations must negotiate",  109 nor are they 'fixed' by reference to any 
set external standard.  1  10 Rather, "they must be balanced against each other in order to 
ascertain the best interpretation"  .111 This happens in several ways: fit influences 
substance, as any interpretation which best fits is prima facie to be preferred; 
substance affects fit, allowing deficiencies to be compensated by reference to the 
desirability ofthe proposed rule from a WOV perspective. Moreover, and more 
radically, however: 
The 'minimum level' of  fit is not an 'external', invariant standard 
unconditioned by substantive considerations. 
1 
12 
The constraint imposed by fit rather relies for its efficacy on the good faith of  the 
interpreter. Only by refusal to subordinate fit entirely to substance can the decision 
maker be seen to interpret, rather than invent, the law. There is no hierarchy between 
fit and substance, and therefore neither can overrule or eliminate the other: 
107 Ibid, p. 111. 
108 Ibid, p. 112. 
109 Ibid, p.  113. 
llO Ibid, This is certainly true of  fit, but is substance not decided in reference to fixed, albeit 
indeterminate, Ways? 
246 Thus, the determinacy of  interpretation is emergent upon the tension among, and the 
process of  mutual adjustment between, the different convictions of  fit and substance 
the interpreter accepts: 'Whether any interpreter's convictions actually check one 
another, as they must ifhe is genuinely interpreting at all, depends on the complexity 
and the structure of  his pertinent opinions as a whole'  .113 
Drawing on Kirgis' suggestion that state practice and opinio juris  could be 
separated;  114 that an abundance of  either could be used to compensate a deficiency of 
the other; and that the aggregate needed to 'create' a norm could be varied by 
reference to WOV  s, 115 Tasioulas defends the sliding scale: 
III Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
as a sketch of  that part of  a working theory of  the interpretation of  customary 
law which elaborates the relationship between fit and substance [which] 
permits the adoption of  an interpretation as best even though it fares poorly on 
the dimension of  fit (e.g. because, despite considerable support in normative 
words (opinio juris), little state practice supports the putative norm and much 
practice conflicts with it) provided the putative norm possesses very strong 
appeal on the substantive dimension (i.e. it expresses an essential part ofthe 
good which the institution of  customary intemationallaw is supposed to 
achieve, such as peaceful co-existence).  116 
113 Ibid, p. 115. 
114 This idea had already been implicitly mooted by, inter alia, Cheng and KeIsen. 
115 Kirgis, supra note 4, at p. 149. 
116 TasiouIas, supra note 25, at p. 113. 
247 Thus, the sliding scale, or rather Dworkin's idea of  fit and substance, provides a 
technique by which legal norms can be identified from amidst the chaos of 
intemationallife. We can construct and interpret the social practice of  law using fit 
and substance as an epistemic grid; that is, we can identify the relevant data, and 
explain the imputation of  a specific result, the creation of  a legal norm. This approach 
claims that an abundance of  either element can be used to compensate a deficiency of 
the other; and that the aggregate needed to 'create' a norm could be varied by 
reference to WOVs. In other words, the more 'important', 'reasonable', or 'necessary' 
the rule was deemed to be, the lower the aggregate necessary for its establishment as a 
rule ofCIL. 
However, there is a complication here, as "substance" appears to be playing two roles 
at once. First, substance as congruence with WOVs identifies a statement as 
normatively relevant,117 as an instance of  opinio. Second, substance as desirability 
functions to lower the 'threshold level' at which a normative claim is recognised as a 
norm of  CIL. Tasioulas has misunderstood the data from which his theory derives 
legal norms; he has misunderstood the relationship between fit and substance, and the 
absolute dependency of  fit upon substance. As the raw data which an interpretation 
must fit is the aggregate of  state practice and opinio juris, there is no reason to 
understand the example of  limited state practice but abundant opinio as one of  poor 
fit. It should instead be recognised as one in which a high degree of  fit is achieved 
through the malleability ofthe raw data itself. 
117 Ibid.  101. 
248 This brings a major complication to light; if  opinio juris is separated - as opposed to 
more traditionally abstracted - from state practice, it must have its own source. The 
spring from which it flows would appear to be sustained by WOV  S.118 
It is not then the form, the forum, or the popularity of any given "articulation" - be it 
a resolution, a treaty, or whatever - which allows it to be considered as opinio juris, 
as the 'raw data of  constructive customary interpretation' . Rather it is its substantive 
content, and the concurrence ofthis with WOVs.  There is no logical reason, given or 
extant, not to reduce this simply to WOV =  opinio juris =  raw data. 
Because substantive desirability defines the raw data, the system cannot adequately 
reduce complexity to provide determinate legal norms. As a result, this theory offers 
no way to prevent the 'interpreter's' values (which identify, in part construct, and 
interpret the data) from becoming the law. This is particularly problematic if  we 
maintain an assumption of  formal equality in the identification and application of 
legal rules. Having failed to define the values relevant to law creation, Tasioulas' 
system must mandate each particular interpreter to bring their particular values into 
the process of  norm 'identification'. Consequently, for each interpreter, the legal 
system will produce a norm consonant with their values. But, of  course, these values 
are unlikely to be the same for different interpreters; consequently, the law becomes 
an indeterminate description of  the desires of  each interpreter, or actor. 
Despite all ofthis, Tasioulas simply asserts his position: 
118 Ibid. 
249 The interplay between convictions of  fit and substance notwithstanding, a 
genuine distinction between interpretation and invention will result provided 
that they are sufficiently independent of  each other to enable the former to 
impose a normative'  drag' on the latter.  119 
This independence is both conceptually impossible, and empirically precluded by 
Tasioulas' particular adaptation of  the Dworkinite schema. Nonetheless, Tasioulas 
attempts to tum the question into one of  onus, when he suggests that: 
Opponents of  relative normativity such as Weil thus have the harder task of 
showing that the sliding scale conception of  custom does not articulate a 
sufficiently complex relation between fit and substance to produce the 
requisite tension in any particular case. 120 
By doing so, Tasioulas clearly implies that this is the only way to portray relative 
normativity as precluding a genuine distinction between interpreting and creating the 
law. This is an interesting, but ultimately disingenuous approach. Tasioulas' 
challenge, even if  it were appropriate, presupposes an external, quasi-objective, 
category of  raw data, rather than one whose very existence is defined by reference to 
the criteria of  substance.  While fit and substance may be able to temper one another, 
this can only have a genuine effect where the data an interpretation must 'fit' has an 
existence external to the 'substance' by which that 'fit' may be modified. Yet in 
Tasioulas' scheme the 'fit' and the 'substance' of  data are evaluated from the same 
119 Tasioulas, supra note 25, at p.  115 
120 Ibid. 
250 source, ways. These are then effectively asserted to exercise a "nonnative drag" on 
themselves, a clearly impossible suggestion. 
Moreover, the transposition of  Dworkin to PIL is problematic, and produces 
pathological consequences. Dworkin's theory has two central assumptions neither of 
which is sustainable in PIL. These are the existence of  a "thick", or value-
homogenised, community (whose values may, indeed often must, be imposed on 
dissenters) and the centrality of  adjudication in the understanding and functioning of 
law. 
Although the question of  the role of  adjudication, and the use of  a theory of 
adjudication to answer a pre-adjudicative question ofthe existence (and identification) 
oflaw (the rules to be adjudicated on), is itself problematic, it is demotion of  the 
courts from the "Capitals of  Law's Empire,,121 in Dworkin's thesis, to little more than 
interesting villages in PILls theoretical topography which is of  most concern. Due to 
the voluntaristic nature of  adjudication in PIL, the courts move from a central to a 
contingent role, with a consequent diminution in involvement and prestige. The 
centrality of  adjudication in the Anglo-American domestic legal systems is 
manifest;  122 its peripheral status in PIL equally so. 
The data from which Dworkin constructs the social practice of  law - the opinions of 
authoritative courts - is absent in PIL. Consequently, Tasioulas must identify a 
different set of  actions which can be categorised as the relevant data for the 
121  Dworkin R., Law's Empire, p. 407. 
122 It is probably also worth noting that the centralised position of, and general infatuation with, courts 
is, itself, a peculiarly, Anglo-American, or perhaps Commonwealth, phenomenon. This enthralling 
251 elucidation of  the rules ofPIL. But this new data, which can only be the actions of 
"authoritative decision-makers",123 will be even vaster, and even less coherent than 
that relied upon by Dworkin in the municipal setting. Even in its original setting, the 
data could not provide the determinacy required. 124 The new setting merely 
exacerbates this problem, and therefore, the interpreters' values play an even larger 
role. 
This is a centrally important point, because any tendency toward stability, the role of 
law, and the avoidance of  radical indeterminacy in the Dworkinian analysis are all 
predicated on the centrality of  the courts, or at least of  the possibility of  unilateral 
recourse to the courts. Dworkin relies on the courts to stabilise the law (and thus 
authoritatively determine which values are in the system), but in PIL they simply 
cannot play this role. Stability, which is a prerequisite for the independence ofthe 
law, can only be protected by the law itself. 
If  the law is understood as a social practice, then that practice must be identified from 
the rhetoric and actions ofthe authoritative decision-makers, but these are too many in 
number, and their actions are too disparate. Consequently, to provide stability at all, 
the law must exert a greater control over these decisions; the decision-makers' 
discretion must be limited by clear legal rules, and clear processes by which new rules 
can be identified. This necessitates a process to determine which values may enter the 
system, and necessitates that this process is not open to change based on substantive 
importance is not allocated to courts in all municipal legal orders, and thus cannot be necessarily 
imposed upon PIL. 
123 For a sympathetic, but nonetheless useful, account of  this notion, see Higgins R Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It pp. 1-16, esp. pp. 9-11. 
252 preference. If  this approach is not adopted, the data becomes too vast and 
indeterminate to be ordered into a coherent whole. Instead ofthat, the 'law' is 
'identified' (created) according to the substantive preference of  the 'interpreter' at the 
point of  application. The law becomes an apology for its subjects' political interests. 
The positivist process may be slower, less responsive, than that offered by Dworkin, 
but given the absence of  centralised adjudication, and the consequent fragmentation of 
"authoritative decision making", value-centricism, and thus the diffusion of  the right 
to embody values in the law, effectively denies the law content. To preserve a role for 
law, it must be focussed on certainty and the prevention of  subjective alteration. 
Indeed Tasioulas appears to accept this when he acknowledges the need for 
determinate WOV  s: 
It is only to be expected that relativistic doctrines will be indeterminate if  there 
are no universally accepted criteria in terms of  which the value judgements 
they require may be assessed. From this it is evident that the anti-pluralism 
charge is the more fundamental ofWeil's two objections, since it explains 
why in the last resort any appeal to values in intemationallaw process is 
.  .  bl  .  d  .  125  mevlta  y m  etermmate. 
This is a strange, but accurate, concession; any response to the anti-pluralism charge 
opens itselfto the charge of  indeterminacy, and vice-versa. In Koskenniemi's terms 
the potential answers, for reasons immanent to themselves, cancel each other out. 
124 Barring the fortuitous or deliberate assembly oflike-minded judges, judges sharing (in some detail) 
the same values and beliefs, Dworkin's system does not produce determinacy in municipal law either, 
it simply better disguises that absence. See ch. 1, supra. 
253 It can therefore be seen that Tasioulas' arguments against indeterminacy are little 
more than a framework, and perhaps even an unnecessary framework at that. They do 
not provide, or even tend toward, determinacy themselves; rather they show how a 
value imposition, already presupposed to be legitimate, can be controlled.  126 Yet even 
this control relies for its efficacy on the determinacy of  the values to be imposed. 
Therefore, ifWOVs cannot be established, the anti-indeterminacy argument 
collapses; the framework for limiting their role is irrelevant if  their existence and 
content are indeterminate. Moreover, if 'legitimate' WOVs can be identified, the 
controls offered by Tasioulas are ineffective, and the only bulwark against radical 
indeterminacy is the determinacy ofthe WOVs themselves, which renders any 
attempt to control the parameters of  their content redundant. 
This does not render Tasioulas' argument wrong, but merely incomplete and 
inconclusive. It does, however, illustrate a central problem with the policy science or 
relative normativity approach to PIL, which is the school's inability to prove the 
existence of, let alone define, control, orjustify WOVs. 
Tasioulas does not return to a direct attempt to prove WOVs. Having apparently 
succeeded in his task - the internal critique of  Prosper Weil' s positivism - he left his 
abstract purpose to be completed by others.  He does, however, warn of  the 
difficulties of: 
125 Ibid, p. 116. 
126 Interestingly, as well as doubts which may be harboured as to the applicability of  Dworkin's 
analysis to PIL as a whole, it would appear that Tasioulas actually inverts its logic: where Dworkin 
says 'value imposition is legitimate, here is how to control it', Tasioulas interprets 'here is how value 
imposition may be controlled, therefore it is legitimate'. In strict logic this reversal of  antecedent and 
consequent, the affirmation of  the consequence, is illicit. 
254 provid[ing] an account of  the substantive values that detennine the fonnation 
and application of  universal intemationallaws which is not vulnerable to 
general accusations of  radical indetenninacy, ethnocentrism, and patriarchy.  127 
It is a strange theory, which ends in a plea to others, someone, anyone, else to provide 
the central mechanism required for the theory to operate. Tasioulas provides a vehicle, 
but asks someone else to design the engine when they have time. This is not, at 
present, a usable theory, even on its own tenns. 
However, to say that this theory cannot do what it claims to be able to do is not 
synonymous with claiming that it cannot function at all. There are (at least) two ways 
to rescue Tasioulas' theory. One would be to create (and impose) a moral code, that is 
to provide WOVs; the other technique would be to read the theory as a nonnative plea 
for institutional refonn. As Tasioulas himself notes: 
As Weil concedes, the problem would be alleviated if  the World Court 
asserted an activist role in detennining customary nonns on the basis of 
considerations of  world public order. 128 
This can be read in either of  two ways; first, as a plea for enhanced use of  value 
oriented legal reasoning, in which case I maintain my original critique that the IC] 
127 Tasioulas, supra note 25, at p. 128. 
128 Tasioulas, supra note 25, p.  104. 
255 cannot and should not perform such in role in contemporary PIL.  129 However, the 
quotation could also be understood as a political plea for institutional reform, an 
attempt to recentre law in international life. This would be a major institutional 
reform, turning the international (un)society130 into a rule oflaw community of  some 
kind. However, all of  these alternatives seem anti-pluralistic, either directly or 
indirectly, and it is worth bearing in mind that the accrual of  institutional power by 
value driven courts need not be synonymous with a victory for law. In short, 
Tasioulas' theory can be rescued. But can this be achieved at an acceptable price? 
The central question, obfuscated by Tasioulas, goes unrecognised by Roberts, but 
nonetheless remains: if  opinio iuris is separated from state practice, how is it to be 
independently identified? Obviously, it must have moral identifiers, but those offered 
by Roberts, "commonly held subjective values about actions that are right and wrong, 
which a representative majority of  states has recognised in treaties and 
declarations,,131 are not merely circular, but devoid of  content, and can offer no more 
practical aid in the identification of  opinio iuris, than could Tasioulas' plea for 
someone (anyone) else to enumerate the list ofWOVsY2 Moreover, Roberts more 
conspicuously fails to explain why such commonly held values, shared by a 
representative majority of  states, are not reflected in practice; nor why they might 
need help to get in to a consensually made body of  norms (as the classic theory 
understands PIL to be). 
129 See Beckett J., "Behind Relative Nonnativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of  Law" 12 EJIL 
(2001) 627. 
130 On the idea of  the International Unsociety, see Allot P., Eunomia p. xlix, and s 13.102.6. 
131  Supra, note 20, at p. 762. 
132 Tasioulas, supra note 25, at p. 128. 
256 In other words, the "fit and substance" schema of  understanding can only adequately 
reduce complexity if  "substance" is authoritatively defined. This is not simply a result 
ofTasioulas' peculiar reading of  Dworkin. Even if  we were to refuse to separate fit 
and substance as Tasioulas does, and were instead to accept the alternative reading of 
Dworkin that suggests substance helps us to identify and interpret the data of  fit, the 
same problems would arise. What Tasioulas' separation of  the two highlights is a fact 
inherent in, but denied by, Dworkinian methodology: viz. that fit is always determined 
by substance, because the data is always identified because of  its substantive appeal. 
In other words, both attempts at 'reconciliation', Roberts' and Tasioulas', collapse 
into utopian theories, or exist in perpetual oscillation between apology and utopia. 
This is so because somewhere between half  and all of  the'  data' against which "fit" is 
to be measured is itself identified and made 'relevant' by its substantive appeal. 
The purpose of  fit and substance is to allow the simplification of  reality, the reduction 
of  complexity, but to attempt to do so while also maintaining a claim to empirical 
justification. However, this claim is simply meaningless, because the data against 
which the putative norms are to be empirically justified is itself a product of  moral 
preference. Even where an attempt is made to deny this, and state practice is radically 
separated from opinio iuris, and from substantive appeal-i.e. when all state action is 
considered as state practice - things do not improve. Instead the theory moves from 
the Utopian to the oscillatory: state practice becomes apology, opinio iuris (and 
'substance' per se) manifest utopia. The content of  any given legal norm can be 
identified only by privileging one over the other. The system can only be stabilised by 
becoming avowedly Utopian, and having the courage of  its convictions in declaring 
that utopia. 
257 Indeed, from this perspective it becomes (more) apparent that the central bone of 
contention between the traditional and modern approaches to custom is purposive, 
rather than descriptive. The modern approach seeks to impose a moral code on PIL, 
while the traditional approach adheres to a belief that (near) universally agreed moral 
claims will emerge within the body of  laws. The problem faced by the modem 
approach is the separation of  good from bad moral claims. The traditional approach 
takes no stance on this issue. The modern approach can only function by becoming 
avowedly utopian; the classic approach simply cannot work at all. In short, despite 
their heterogeneity, the theories accommodated in the preceding typology do have one 
important feature in common: none of  them works! 
The Failure Of  Neutrality: Avowedly Apologetic Or Utopian Theories: 
One final response to the apparent impossibility of  a structured reduction in the 
complexity of  international life is to tum to an avowedly moralised separation 
between the relevant and the irrelevant. This can be accomplished in either of  two 
ways: firstly the legal system as a whole can be made subservient to specific, 
identified, moral values; secondly, certain states could be moved 'above' the system 
of  legal regulation, either explicitly, or by reference to their (  exclusive) ability to 
import the values 'necessary' to the determinate identification of  elL. In many ways 
these theories, prominent in the USA, operate interdependently to justify, ab initio, 
the actions of  the so-called alliance of  liberal states. 
258 However, for analytic purposes the two strands of  theorising can be separated. 
Although each purports, fundamentally, to advance the cause of  a 'liberal' 
international law, the works ofTeson and Slaughter tend toward the first and second 
techniques respectively. A non-United Statesean (and in many ways non-liberal) 
version of  the first technique is also evident in the work of  Hall. 
Fernando Teson, elL as the Manifestation of a Fixed Morality: 
Teson offers us a morally driven vision of  international interaction, where the "unity 
between law and ethics operates most strongly in the field of  international law"  .133 
From this perspective: 
When a court or impartial observer (such as a scholar) is surveying history in 
order to find patterns of  international conduct, the search is not unprejudiced 
... Rather, the selection of  instances of  state practice, of  those pieces of  past 
history that count as custom, is informed by a theoretical framework within 
which ethical considerations play an important role. In this sense, finding 
customary law is not an objective or value-neutral process, nor should it be so 
... Accordingly, a primary reason why [specified actions] count as custom is 
that the process and the outcome of  those cases are justified by a moral theory 
that ... is preferable to the ... alternative.134 
This creates two problems; one apparent, the other less so. The apparent problem is 
the need to justify the application ofthat particular moral theory in a heterogeneous 
133 Teson F., Humanitarian Intervention p. 11. 
134 Ibid pp. 11-2. 
259 world. The less apparent problem is the role of  that theory which, in effect, constitutes 
the data of  elL. On the first point, Teson is less than convincing: 
If  we are equipped with a moral theory which on reflection seems to us 
correct, our process of  selecting those precedents that shape a customary rule 
shall be naturally guided by such theory. 135 
The suggestion that a theory "which seems to us ... correct" could provide 
determinacy in elL is, quite simply, ludicrous. It possesses no content whatsoever, 
and reduces elL to the whim ofthe (admittedly not) 'impartial observer'. Moreover, 
Teson also alludes to the impact ofthis utter indeterminacy on the identification of 
elL: the theory defines the data. Nonetheless, Teson denies that this is the logical 
conclusion of  his approach: 
This value choice, however, is not exercised from nowhere,136 in a vacuum. 
International legal discourse is not co-extensive with moral philosophy. 
Rather, international legal propositions are the children both of  institutional 
history (diplomatic history, treaty texts) and political philosophy, in the sense 
of  a background political theory. 137 Thus, state practice (that is, institutional 
history) is interpreted in the ascertainment of  international law. State practice 
thus remains a central touchstone of  international legal reasoning. 138 
135 Ibid p.  12. 
136 I would suggest that this claim is simply untrue, Teson seeks, precisely, to offer the view from 
nowhere; the objective truth. Moreover, all that he demonstrates, on his own terms, is that this is not a 
view of  nowhere; the view is exercised on certain data, but that data is not constitutive of  the location 
of  the viewpoint itself. 
137 Teson attributes this observation to Dworkin. 
260 For the reasons demonstrated with regard to Roberts and Tasioulas, this is simply not 
true. At best, this statement is meaningless, or a denial of  the true claims made by 
Teson's thesis, because the data which constitutes state practice is, itself, constituted 
by reference to substantive preference. At worst it signals another descent into 
inexorable oscillation between Apology and Utopia; if  state practice can, somehow, 
be given an existence separate from its moral desirability, then the relationship 
between practice and opinio becomes one of  oscillation. 
Consequently, this claim should be treated as false, and attention should be displaced 
to Teson's underlying claim: that he has discovered a legitimate universal ethics. This 
claim is made most prominently in his book A Philosophy of  International Law, 
where he sets out to develop and "offer ... a modem reconstruction of  Kant's thesis  . 
. .. accurate ... against the backdrop provided by Kant's general moral theory". l39 I do 
not propose to go into the substance ofTeson's moral philosophy, but only to point 
out two important defects. Firstly, Teson fundamentally misunderstands the Kantian 
thesis, and in particular the power of  reason over will which that thesis implies. 
Secondly, Teson does not offer any proof of  the legitimacy, let alone the universal 
legitimacy, of  Kantian theory. 
The first point can be made succinctly by considering the following claims by Teson: 
Kant includes freedom (respect for individual autonomy under the rule oflaw) 
h  fi  f ·  .  I  h·  140  as t  e  lrst tenet 0  mtematlOna  et  lCS. 
138Teson, supra note 114, p. 15. 
139 Teson F., A Philosophy of  International Law p. 2. 
261 This is simply not Kant's understanding, let alone definition of  freedom. For Kant, 
freedom is subjugation of  will (desire) to Reason.141 It is not some democratic pipe 
dream. As Reiss states: 
[Kant] assumes that a plan of  nature must intend the elucidation of  mankind 
into a state of  freedom. Or (to put it differently) since nature has endowed man 
with reason, and since the purpose of  nature is to realise man's essence, nature 
has made man in order that he become rationa1.142 
This misunderstanding re-occurs when Teson attempts to co-opt the ideal of  the 
Social Contract to the democratic cause. For Teson, the social contract is the 
relationship between governed and government, whereby the former select and 
control the latter. 143 However, for Kant, the social contract is an artificial device of 
Reason, against which the deciSions, the laws, of  a government or State may be 
assessed. 144 It does guarantee freedom to the citizens, but only in Kant's sense, 
subjugation to reason. As Reiss puts it: 
The social contract must therefore be seen as a practical Idea of  reason.  145 
What Teson refuses to see is the potentially totalitarian element to Kant's thinking. 146 
Consequently, the first strand ofTeson's justification for a moralised vision ofPIL, 
his support in the works of  Kant, cannot be justified. 
140 Ibid p. 3 
141  Groundworkfor the Metaphysics of  Morals ch. 2, s. 3S. (2002 OUP ed. pp. 240-2); see also ch. 3. 
142 Reiss H. Kant's Political Writings (2
nd ed.) "Introduction" p. 36. 
143 Supra, note 141, pp. 57-S. 
144 See, e.g. Foundations of  the Metaphysics of  Morals s. 47. See further, Rawls J. A Theory of  Justice 
pp. 11-2. 
262 This leads to the second, and deeper charge: that Kant's theory, even properly 
understood, is neither self-evidently correct, nor is it timeless. Kant's reliance on 
Reason cannot escape Hume's observation that: 
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of  the passions, and can never 
pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. 147 
The contingency of  Reason has since been conceded by the most famous (and 
globally influential) neo-Kantian of  present times, John Rawls.  148 The genius of  Kant 
simply cannot legitimate a world wide system of  moral imperialism. Nor, it should be 
noted, was it ever designed to do so. Kant spoke out, in Teson's central Kantian tract, 
"Perpetual Peace,,149 against aggression or intervention,150 even by the members of  a 
"Federation of  Free States".  151 lfthe doctrine of  Universal Reason were true (and I 
contend that it is not) it would win out by persuasion. 
Teson's theory simply attempts to disguise and justify an apology for an alliance of 
'liberal' states, specifically as manifested in NATO.152 At a more structural level, 
Teson, having offered no proof of  the universal nature of  the Kantian thesis, can 
145 Supra, note 144, p. 28. 
146 This is not a new charge to lay against Kant, it has been made by, inter alia, Nietzsche (Beyond 
Good and Evil, p. 211), Foucault ("What is Enlightenment" in Michel Foucault: Essential Works, vol. 
1 Ethics, (Faubion J. ed.) 303) Deleuze (Nietzsche on Philosophy p. 2), and Hardt and Negri (Empire 
pp. 183-4). 
147 Hume D., A Treatise of  Human Nature  s. II:iii:3 (1978 OUP Selby-Bigge L. ed., p. 415) 
148  See "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980", 77 The Journal of 
Philosophy (1980); see also Political Liberalism. 
149 "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" in Kant's Political Writings Reiss H. (ed) 93. 
150 Ibid, p. 96 "Fifth Preliminary Article" 
151  Ibid. p. 102 Second and Third "Definitive Articles" 
152 See, e.g. Teson "Collective Humanitarian Intervention" 17 Michigan Journal of  International Law 
(1996) 323. 
263 surely offer no coherent argument against the claim that another morality, "which on 
reflection seems correct" to its advocates could not similarly become the substantive 
content of  CIL. In short, Teson's thesis is likely to become entangled in the Apology 
to Utopia dialectic, and to the extent which it avoids this by adopting a non-universal 
ethic as universal, it is illegitimate, and must be normatively opposed. 
Stephen Hall and the Persistent Spectre of  Natural Law: 
Hall offers a complex, and in places convincing, argument for "positivism's" inability 
to justify the authority of  PIL. I do not wish to deal with this here, because, in my 
opinion, the authority oflaw is epiphenomenal. For what it is worth, I agree to some 
extent with Hall, that classical positivism does have problems, on its own terms, in 
justifying, or even demonstrating the authority ofPIL, but that is an irrelevant, and 
parasitical, concern. 
Nonetheless, it does bear mentioning, because Hall seeks to ground the authority, and 
consequently the content, of  CIL in a higher source altogether: God. Hall locates 
himself completely within Finnis' vision of  natural law and natural rights: 
Our natural rights ... are fundamental components of  the common good. They 
may be conveniently mediated by treaties and custom, but they are not 
conferred by positive international law. Natural rights form part of  the broad 
limits within which we are free to fashion positive laws.
IS3 
153 Hall S., "The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order and the Limits of  Legal 
Positivism" 12 EJIL (2001) 269 at p. 301. 
264 This thesis is open to all the usual criticisms: reason is not universal; there are no self-
evident natural rights; it is moral imperialism; the Roman Catholic Church lost this 
battle many years ago; Finnis was wrong; etc. Stated in such bare fashion it is, quite 
simply indefensible. 
In essence, Hall asks that we take his avowedly moral theory on trust. He knows what 
the self-evident goods are, he knows how to identify the rights to which they gave 
rise, at least according to "the common good under the natura11aw". Perhaps the blind 
moral imperialism of  this thesis is best represented in the following short quote: 
In particular states are not free to transform moral wrongs into human rights 
with complete juridical effect  . ... The establishment of  a human or 
fundamental right to abortion under the positive law would be an example of 
an attempt to transform a moral wrong into a human right. Laws authorizing 
abortions, and buttressing access to abortions, are radically unjust (and 
radically immoral).  154 
Hall gives us no reason to accept this Universalist moral judgement, let alone to 
subject ourselves to it; a fortiori he can give no reason why we should (be allowed to) 
subject others to it. He does, however, remind us that: 
The temptation to tum moral wrongs into human rights arises when, 
unmindful ofthe richness of  the common good under the natural law, every 
154 Ibid p. 302. 
265 person's desire or preference is a potential candidate for promotion to the 
ever-expanding pantheon of  positive human rights.  155 
What we are not offered, and what we should be sceptical about accepting, is a reason 
to privilege Hall's (or even Finnis') understanding of  the "common good under the 
natural law". We are not offered a reason to distinguish this from their "desire[s] or 
preference", but we are warned not to give unnecessary weight to such desires and 
preferences. Perhaps PIL should become a more ethical discourse, but this cannot be 
legitimately pursued in a heterogeneous world by returning to disputes over the "One 
True God", and imposing one moral truth on others. How badly could things tum out, 
if  we choose the wrong God? 
Realist Theories From Yale to Harvard, New Haven and Slaughter: 
The idea of  blending law with other discourses, from propaganda analysis and 
political science, to ethics, psychology, etc. is not a new one. It is, amongst other 
things, one of  several responses to the project of  American Legal Realism. PIL, 
naturally, has not been immune to this process, nor to the desire for a 'better law' 
which drives it. The law, in these theories, is to be made substantively better, more 
useful, more responsive, more pragmatic. In this sense then, these theories deny the 
duality of  is and ought, and in both directions too: sometimes deriving an ought from 
what is, and invariably understanding what law is in light of  what a given writer 
thinks it ought to be. 
155 Ibid. 
266 Two exemplars of  this tradition are New Haven Policy Science and Anne-Marie 
Slaughter's "Liberal" synthesis ofPIL and international relations. These particular 
theories are significant. They are not only exemplars, but also (currently) the 'book-
ends' of  this type oftheorising in PIL. But regardless of  their other strengths and 
weaknesses, no theory of  this type is capable of  adequately reducing the complexity 
of  international life, to facilitate the provision of  determinate, let alone neutral, 
answers. 
The Original and the Best? New Haven Policy Science: 
As Duxbury notes, New Haven was both a response to, and a refinement of, American 
Legal Realism.  156 New Haven scholars adopted the basic rule-sceptical premise of 
ALR, but sought to rationalise and structure ALR's eclectic borrowings from the 
social sciences. From one perspective, New Haven aimed to 'positivise' ALR.157 
However New Haven was also a normatively driven theory, a theory with a specific 
purpose: 
The genesis of  New Haven lay in the Second World War and the emergence of 
communism as an international political force ... For MacDougal and 
Lasswell [the founders of  New Haven] the choice was one between nuclear 
annihilation and the global promotion of  US democratic values. 158 
156 Duxbury N., Patterns of  American Jurisprudence ch. 3. 
157 Ibid pp. 164-76; See also Morrison J. L., John Austin ch. 6. 
158 Scobbie I. "Some Common Heresies about International Law" in Evans M (ed.) International Law 
at pp. 68-9. 
267 This mixture of  motivations falls readily into Koskenniemi' s ApologylUtopia 
dialectic: 
By trying to achieve a more empirical [i.e. Apologetic] account ofthe 
operation oflaw in society, and by postulating the instrumental [i.e. Utopian] 
aim of  achieving human dignity.159 
However, although from Koskenniemi's perspective this might undermine the theory, 
from a strictly New Haven perspective, such a critique is simply inapt. New Haven 
did not aim to produce 'lawyers' understood as neutral rule appliers, but rather to 
"provide systematic training for policy makers";  160 i.e. 'lawyers' who would act as 
advocates, not neutral advisers, nor litigants. 
Nonetheless, it has been claimed that: 
The realisation of  preferred values is not ... the sole factor in decision making, 
law does constrain. Recourse must be made to trends of  past decisions, and 
how these relate to the goals the decision-maker wishes to achieve.161 
However, this is simply not so. Under the New Haven approach, trends of  past 
decisions can only be identified and interpreted by reference to values: after all, the 
trends themselves are merely embodiments of  those underlying values. Consequently, 
at its descriptive pole, the theory tends absolutely toward Apology, as the object of 
159 Ibid p. 70. 
160 Ibid p. 68. 
161  Ibid p. 71. 
268 description (the trend interpreted) is constituted by the very value it then seeks to 
justify. 
This necessitates a move toward utopianism to rescue the theory from descriptive 
indeterminacy. If  the theory is to work at all, it must postulate fixed values. It does so, 
and calls these "W  orId Order Values". There are nine in total, and these values are set 
for all times and places by McDougal and Lasswell as: 
Health; Well-being; Affection; Respect; Skill; Enlightenment; Rectitude; 
Wealth' Power162  , 
Two aspects ofthese values are immediately apparent; one is their bland 
indeterminacy,163 the other their remarkable correspondence with the liberal 
individualist underpinnings of  the US Constitution. As with Finnis' seven basic 
goods,164 they are simply postulated as self-evident.165 
These values are meant to constrain decision-makers. However, as MacDougal and 
Lasswell had themselves observed: "normative statements of  high-level abstraction 
can be manipulated to support any specific social goal".166 Contrary to Higgins' claim 
that such an articulation of  relevant policy factors has a conditioning influence on 
162 MacDougal M., and Lasswell R., "The Identification and Appraisal of  Diverse Systems of  Public 
Order" in MacDougal and Reisman W., (eds.) International Law Essays 15, at p. 20. 
163 Ibid.; see also Lasswell and MacDougal "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training 
in the Public Interest" 52 Yale Law Journal (1943) 203, at p. 213. 
164 Finnis J., Natural Law and Natural Rights 73, and 85-90. 
165 Supra, note 162. 
166 Lasswell and MacDougal, supra, note 164. 
269 decision-makers,  167 by MacDougal and Lowell's own admission, they possess no such 
force. 
There is aparadox in the functioning ofthe New Haven approach: if  the rule is a 
"shorthand" and consequently an inadequate method of  communicating desired 
action, it is also an inadequate (or more precisely indeterminate) vehicle for the 
transmission of  values. This is brought most starkly into reliefby Rex Zedalis' 
deployment and inadvertent reductio ad absurdum of  New Haven method in his 
defence of  the 'pre-emptive' Israeli strike on the Iraqi Osirak Nuclear Power Station. 
Zedalis locates the relevant trend of  decision-making as having culminated in the 
rules stated in the Caroline incident. 168 He offers no particularly convincing argument 
for the Caroline rule's capacity to over-ride the apparent textual clarity ofthe UN 
Charter (UNC)169 (but then he need not, what value textual clarity iflaw is not about 
rules anyway?), but proceeds directly to an application of  Caroline to the legality of 
the Israeli destruction of  an Iraqi nuclear power station. 170 
Caroline set out three criteria for anticipatory self-defence, as follows: an attack must 
be imminent; leaving no moment for deliberation; and no choice over means. Zedalis 
167 Higgins R., Problems and Process: International Law and How We  Use It p. 5 
168 This incident occurred in 1837 and led to a heated exchange ofletters between the UK and the USA 
in 1842. The outcome of  this exchange was to recognise a right to "pre-emptive self defence" under 
carefully deflned conditions; the 'defending' state must demonstrate the "necessity of  self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of  means, and no moment for deliberation". This statement 
was to decisively structure customary PIL, at least until the advent of  the UN Charter (UNC). For a 
brief overview, See Brownlie I. Principles of  Public International Law (6
th ed) 701-2. 
169 Art. 51  UNC states that States retain their right of self-defence "if  an armed attack occurs". This is 
generally understood to mean that self-defence can only be legitimately resorted to once an attack has 
commenced. Consequently, anticipatory self-defence is not permissible within the UNC system. 
170 Zedalis R., "Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of 
Anticipatory Self-Defense", 19 Case Western Reserve Journal of  International Law (1987) 129. 
270 identifies the unifying factor underlying this trend as the need for certainty,  171 
arguing, in effect, that as long as the decision-maker 'knows' that the attack will 
happen at some point - it does not matter when the attack will happen, only that we 
know it will-then his pre-emptive action (which on another reading will be a use of 
force, contrary to art. 2(4) UNC) will be lawful. 
The latent ambiguity with this interpretation is the rules' emphasis on the temporal 
element; surely the value, if  a value is to be sought or privileged at all, underlying this 
trend is temporal imminence. On the most natural reading of  the Caroline restrictions, 
the vital factor is the absence of  time, and so of  alternative courses of  action, rather 
than certainty as postulated by Zedalis.l72 Yet Zedalis is acutely sure that he has 
identified the correct value, and this, and this alone legitimises his account: the strike 
was lawful because it accorded with Zedalis' choice of  "underlying" value, but 
Zedalis cannot claim this privilege to himself. Rather any decision, by any 
authoritative decision-maker is valid to the extent that it accords with that decision-
maker's choice both of applicable trend, and of  underlying value. 173 
17l Ibid pp. 133-4, and 144-53. 
172 This is especially so as the certainty must itself be undermined by the potential for recourse to 
peaceful means of  dissuasion. 
J73 I have focussed on Zedalis quite deliberately, even though some may claim this to be unfair. Zedalis 
is extreme, he takes New Haven toward the limits of  plausibility, he uses surprising values where 
others may see or deploy only (culturally) orthodox ones, he (accidentally) makes the method 
ludicrous. Zedalis does not make New Haven ludicrous, but rather illustrates that it already is so. New 
Haven relies on a consensus of  values which does not exist. Values orthodox and important in one 
culture, milieu, or social-setting may be strikingly incongruous in another. New Haven can overlook 
this by only preaching to the converted, the orthodox, the West. What Zedalis provides is a glimpse, 
perceptible to Western eyes, of  the outsider's view of  New Haven, the startling arbitrariness of  its value 
impositions, the utter indeterminacy of  its directions, and the apologetic nature of its analysis - at least 
vis-a-vis the major Western powers and their friends (in the particular case Israel). New Haven, from 
this perspective, exists in the absence of  compulsory adjudication to legitimise international actions to 
domestic audiences. See also Falk R., "Casting the Spell: the New Haven School of  International Law" 
104 Yale Law Journal (1995) 1991. 
271 It  is at this point - when the disutility of  New Haven as method becomes manifest-
that New Haven as a theory must be reconsidered. As theory, New Haven can and 
does guide the identification of  trends, and the choice of  underlying values, as these 
must be commensurate with, and aid the realisation of, the permanent and universal 
values of  World Public Order. Only from this fixed point can the "tension" and 
"normative drag", which Tasioulas postulates as saving the New Haven system,174 be 
anchored. However, if, as suggested above, the values are either meaninglessly vague 
and ambivalent, or simply examples of  wrong-headed moral imperialism, then the 
theory cannot play this role. In this case, the theory can only defend or legitimise the 
chosen trends and values by reference to previously chosen trends and values, and this 
form of  emotivist escape is manifestly pointless. The New Haven method cannot be 
rescued from the theory, and the theory (for good or for ill) does not work. Ifit can be 
defended at all, New Haven is a normative choice; it is not a reflection ofthe neutral 
rules of  discourse and international intercourse. It is as a choice to promote the United 
Stateseanisation ofthe World (which must be considered as one option amongst 
many), and not as the necessary precondition of  understanding, that New Haven must 
be evaluated, and should be rejected. 
Even Better Than the Real Thing? Slaughter's Liberal Alliance: 
According to my methodology, I am precluded from claiming that the mixture of 
international law and international relations theory as proposed by Slaughter just isn't 
law. However, my basic charge does not differ far from that: Slaughter'S approach 
174 Supra, note 25, p. 115. 
272 cannot adequately reduce the complexity of  international life to allow for the 
production of  determinate norms. As she herself  puts it: 
International relations (IR) theory does not provide determinate legal answers; 
it is ... a tool to situate doctrines in the context of  international politics and 
sort out the underlying policy arguments. 175 
These different arguments can be translated into legal justifications and 
mapped onto existing legal rules and principles '"  but that is once again the 
job ofthe international lawyer. The international relations/internationallaw 
method is a means rather than an end, aiding international lawyers to 
accomplish their own ends  176 
There appear to be two quite distinct movements here; the first is the synthesis of  PIL 
and IR, but the second is an essentialisation ofPIL. Between them, these 
contradictory movements bring a degree of  opacity to Slaughter's thesis: what exactly 
is the synthetic method? 
Slaughter is clear that her method is "liberal". She does not delve randomly into IR 
theory, but adopts a particular variant thereof: liberal IR theory. Slaughter is also clear 
that the process is "positive not normative" (by which she means descriptive not 
prescriptive); it is an empirical theory: 
175  Slaughter A. "An International Relations Approach" 95 ASIL Proceedings (2001) p. 25. 
176 Ibid p. 26. it is worth noting that, in Koskenniemi's terms, this looks like a process for structuring 
"instrumentalism", that is, for elucidating and evaluating what is actually desired (by the instant actor, 
presumptively a Liberal State for Slaughter) and thus facilitating the 'recognition' of  the legal rules 
most likely to facilitate that outcome. On instrumentalism, see Koskenniemi, supra note 8, p. 124. On 
the move from instrumentalism to formalism, see ch. 5 infra. 
273 These codes and norms may not seem like law at all. Yet scholars and 
practitioners seeking to predict actual behavior must take them into account as 
empirical facts that guide action
l77 
The theory is prescriptive in so far as it calls for the production and analysis of  law 
exclusively from the liberal perspective. It takes as its foundational assumption, which 
Slaughter terms "hypothesis", the existence, and the moral good of  an alliance of 
Liberal States. PIL should be their law, and should seek to make others emulate them. 
Alternatively, PIL should be a non-universal form oflaw, applying only to liberal 
states, and to the conduct ofliberal states in intervening in non-liberal states: 
The most distinctive aspect of  Liberal international relations theory is that it 
permits, indeed mandates, a distinction among different types of  States based 
on their domestic political structure and ideology.  178 
However: 
We may find that in some instances it will be more attractive to use the model 
to generate a\iniversal set of  concepts and norms, applicable to liberal and 
non-liberal States alike.179 
These are normatively objectionable assumptions; they necessarily involve a moral 
imperialism. Nor are they defended by Slaughter. However, they are contingent. 
177 Slaughter A. "A Liberal Theory ofInternational Law" 94 ASIL Proceedings (2000) 240 at p. 244. 
178  Slaughter A. "International Law in a World of  Liberal States" 6 EJIL (1995) 503 at p. 504. 
274 Slaughter appears to concede that ifher hypotheses about the existence and goodness 
ofliberal states are false, then her theory fails: 
The project ... is a thought experiment ... designed to generate a hypothetical 
model of  international law based on a set of  assumptions about the 
composition and behaviour of  specific States. Its ultimate value must await 
empirical confirmation of  specific hypotheses distilled from this model. 180 
The 'concept' of  a Liberal State is defined by reference to six hypotheses: 
1.  Peace 
2.  Liberal Democracy 
3.  Market Economics 
4.  A Dense Network of  Transnational Transactions 
5.  Transgovernmental Communication 
6.  Collapse ofthe Foreign/Domestic Distinction 
States, or rather groupings of  States, bearing these characteristics will be compliant 
with liberal law. Essentially, Slaughter's theory is motivational in nature: it is not 
about law creation, nor even about recognising legal norms. It is about motivating 
compliance with legal norms presupposed to exist, but also legal norms substantively 
generated and constrained by liberal individualist moral assumptions: 
179 Ibid at p. 515. 
180 Ibid.  at p. 505. 
275 The methods used to imagine or conceptualize legal relations in a world of 
liberal States ... follow logically from the various assumptions and attributes 
already discussed. 181 
There are two obvious problems with this conceptualisation of  legal relations. First 
and most obviously, Slaughter simply does not tell us how legal rules (norms, 
principles, etc.) are to be identified at all; secondly, her descriptive vision ofliberal 
democracy seems wildly optimistic, to say the least: 
Liberal States are States with governments oflimited powers, powers limited 
by law enforced by courts. Such governments are thus accustomed to the 
application of  a legal instrument to curtail asserted political power ... liberal 
States guarantee a host of  individual rights against the government, to be 
enforced through legal action. Thus it is possible to imagine individuals as 
monitors of  government compliance with agreed rules ... arrived at through ... 
an international legislative process. Fourth is a commitment to transparency as 
a key cog in the mechanism of  liberal government  .... Fifth, liberal States are 
more likely to be monist than dualist.
182 
The key here appears to be democratic responsibility; that liberal States will be 
controlled by their citizens, and that this reinforces, but also obviates the need for, 
international regulation. Anyone familiar with both the recent USIUK adventure in 
Iraq, and the attempts made in both countries to prevent this flagrant illegality, may be 
less optimistic than Slaughter on these matters. As Alvarez notes: 
181  Ibid p. 518. 
182 Ibid p. 533. 
276 The widespread support for the Gulf  war among the US public indicates [that] 
the 'openness' of  American society leaves it open to ... media-induced 
nationalist fervour.
183 
This, as he implies, may not be the most robust safeguard imaginable. The problem 
with Slaughter's thesis is that it takes place in the imagination. The founding 
hypotheses cannot be empirically validated, but are nonetheless treated as if  they 
justify the thesis. Of  course "it is possible to imagine individuals as monitors of 
government compliance with agreed rules"; it is also possible to imagine a Unicorn, 
but that does not bring the mythical creature into existence. The dangers of 
Slaughter's thesis are manifest, as Alvarez again notes: 
All that we may be doing is giving the US and other liberal policy-makers a 
legal license to wage war against those that they choose to define as outside 
the 'zone of  law  , . This is all the more dangerous to the extent that ... liberals 
appear ready to discount the alternative: that pluralist institutions and their 
rules may exert a constraining influence on states, liberals and non-liberals 
alike.
184 
In short, Slaughter does not really offer a theory oflaw, but instead offers a partisan 
theory of  motivation for compliance with legal rules already assumed to bear some 
essentialised existence as 'facts' outwith the scope of  her theory. This is an unhelpful, 
and imperialistic theory, developed on the foundations of  unverified (and in all 
183 Alvarez J "Do Liberal States Behave Better?" 12 EJIL (2001) 183 at p. 237. 
184 Ibid. 
277 likelihood false
185
)  empirical assumptions. The fate of  the theory has perhaps been 
best summarised by Slaughter herself: 
The very idea of  a division between liberal and non-liberal States may prove 
distasteful to many. It is likely to recall 19
th century distinctions between 
'civilized' and 'uncivilized' States, rewrapped in the rhetoric of  Western 
political values and institutions.  186 
I would happily place myself amongst that "many". 
THE END OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
I have attempted to demonstrate schematically why all theories of  CIL presented so 
far fail, and indeed, were bound, ab initio, to failure. The fact that unacknowledged, 
and logically illicit, moves between these theories exacerbate this problem should be 
instantly apparent. However, it is also important to realise that the different categories 
oftheories 'fail' for different reasons. 
Classic theories of  CIL fail analytically, they simply cannot accomplish the tasks they 
set themselves. This is also true of  modem aggregationist theories, notably those 
drawing on D'  Amato or Mendelson. This is why Tasioulas, Roberts, Mendelson, and 
D'  Amato are challenged primarily at the analytic level: they claim, but/ail, to deliver 
185 See e.g. ibid generally, but especially at pp. 194-224; see also Pogge T. World Poverty and Human 
Rights, generally on the behaviour of 'liberal' states in the maintenance of  an economic order which 
tolerates 50,000 avoidable human deaths daily. 
186 Slaughter (EJIL) p. 506. 
278 neutral and determinate legal rules. This is a purpose I find normatively appealing; it 
is not a purpose these theories are capable of  fulfilling. 
As they make their theories Utopian to overcome this analytic failure, Tasioulas and 
Roberts open themselves up to both normative and empirical challenges. At the 
empirical level, neither can demonstrate the existence of  the type of  objective ethics 
their theories demand. At the normative level, neither can give sufficiently strong 
reasons for ignoring charges of  anti-pluralism inherent in imposing a morality which 
cannot be demonstrated to be objectively correct. Teson is subject to a similar mixture 
of  normative and empirical criticism. His timeless ethics proves little more than an 
idiosyncratic misreading of  Kant; even were this not so, he does not offer adequate 
support for his foundational thesis of  the neutrality and objective correctness of 
Kantian moral or political theory. 
New Haven, Slaughter, and any other attempt to synthesise PIL and IR can be 
problematised analytically, but are mainly met at the normative level. Analytically, it 
can be demonstrated that these theories are incapable of  reducing complexity 
sufficiently to allow for the provision of  determinate, legally correct, answers. 
However, normatively, it could also be argued that this was never intended or 
promised by these theories. They privilege the 'correct', the 'prudent', the 'optimal' 
course of action above the merely 'lawful'. Consequently they have no desire to 
reduce complexity to the levels required for the provision of  determinate answers. 
This is to ignore law's primary strength and promise, which is precisely the provision 
of such determinate answers. Consequently these theories are normatively 
objectionable. 
279 The synthetic PILlIR theories are also empirically vulnerable. New Haven relies on 
'self-evident' World Order Values which are neither self-evident, nor sufficiently 
determinate to prove meaningful. Slaughter relies on an idealised image of  an alliance 
ofliberal states, which simply cannot be supported by the data of  international 
interaction. These theories manage, interestingly, to fail on every level of  the 
topography of  critique. 
To summarise: all of  the theories presented so far fail. Either they fail to adequately 
reduce complexity at all, or else they fail to do so in a normatively acceptable manner. 
CIL remains trapped within the Apology-Utopia dialectic. We cannot transcend 
kitsch
187 and move from an Instrumentalist to a Formalist understanding of  CIL. 
This would appear to prove both the Realist and the CLS claim that law is necessarily 
indeterminate, but, and here is a curious point, none of  these theorists wanted to be 
right.188 Goodrich, following Teubner, terms this 'desire to be incorrect' "the Crits 
secret love of  the law",189  which he characterises as an "epistemically hidden ... 
desire for a return to legal idealism".  190 We could almost see Crits as frustrated 
formalists (this is certainly how Higgins portrays KoskenniemiI91), throwing a 
tantrum because the legal system doesn't live up to its promise. This, of  course, 
187 The idea of  htsch, a manufactured niceness, a sugary-sweet alternative to thought, is developed by 
Milan Kundera (see The Unbearable Lightness of  Being) and transposed to the analysis ofPIL by 
Koskenniemi. On the function ofPIL as kitsch, see Koskenniemi, supra, note 8 at pp. 121-3. 
188  See e.g. MacCormick N., "Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS" 1990 OJLS 
539 atpp. 541-7, esp. note l3. 
189 Goodrich P., "The Critics Love of  the Law: Intimate Observations on an Insular Jurisdiction" 10 
Law and Critique (1999) 343 at p. 344. 
190 Ibid 
191  Higgins R. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It pp. 14-16. 
280 assumes the system has a promise; moreover, it also assumes that we all agree on that 
promise - on the purpose of  the system; on what law is for. 
Koskenniemi's Plea: 
We should take much more seriously those critiques of  international law that 
point to its role as a hegemonic technique. Once that critique has been 
internalised however, I want to point to its limits. If  the universal has no 
representative of  its own, then particularity itself is no scandal. The question 
would then be: Under what conditions ... might we have good reason to 
imagine ... a politics of  universal law?  192 
It is to answering that question, which Koskenniemi repeated poses but does not 
resolve, that attention can now tum. For this surely is the question: under which 
circumstances can the norms ofPIL be neutrally created and impartially observed? 
Put differently, which politics should a universal law "congeal" into legal norms? 
Which actions, under which conditions, ought to be recognised as law constitutive, so 
as to produce a legal system which avoids both indeterminacy and moral imperialism? 
192 Koskenniemi, supra note 8, p. 115 
281 CHAPTER 5 : INVERTING KOSKENNIEMI, AN IDEAL SOLUTION? 
INTRODUCTION: 
Having considered the advances and the limits of  legal theorising so far, and having 
constructed a technique for the full articulation, differentiation, and evaluation of 
legal theories - with an aim to disaggregating complex arguments so as to allow for 
the determinate identification of  legal demands in the ideal case - attention must now 
tum to the construction of  the best available theory ofPIL as I understand it. This is a 
theory of  a rule structured, determinate, system of  law, adopting the classic positivist 
separability and identification theses. It is also a system limited, and rendered 
contingent, by these very characteristics. It is a theory of  law as a specific tool, and 
the point of  departure for an analysis ofthe role this law should play, the types of 
situations it should regulate. 
Far from amalgamating international law with international relations,
l  I seek a radical 
separation between the two, in order to facilitate analysis of  their actual and/or ideal 
interaction. It must also be emphasised that, while my project manifests a political 
claim - the value of  formalism
2 in international law - it is primarily epistemic in 
nature, and is so at two distinct levels. First, the project is epistemic in attempting to 
describe the way in which the cognition oflaw is possible at all. It is an epistemic 
1 As, e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter has attempted; Slaughter A., "International Law in a World of  Liberal 
States" 6 EJIL (1995) 503 
2 Formalism is different to legal positivism in two regards: first, where legal positivism aims for 
determinate norm identification, formalism goes further, arguing that the norms themselves ought to 
determine the outcome of  the dispute; second, formalism need not be associated with rules as such, but 
rather with the determinate resolution of  disputes, from this perspective, Dworkin is a formalist 
282 theory of  what it means to cognise phenomena as legal phenomena: as legal nonns 
and a legal system. It attempts to elucidate how we can group the co-occurrence of 
certain phenomenon as signifying the existence of  a legal demand. This is the 
recognition of  the fact that law itself is a product of  complexity reduction. 
Second, it advocates an inherently epistemic role for law. Law in this analysis 
becomes an epistemic grid, an "observational language"  , a way of  looking at the 
World. Law is a technique for reducing the complexity ofthe reality of  human 
conduct outside oflaw. This is the only necessary function oflaw; all other functions 
or attributes are epiphenomenal in nature. Even ifwe assume (and I do not) that law 
ought to be obeyed or enforced, that law ought to regulate, condition, or direct human 
behaviour, that can only be done after law has served its initial epistemic function. In 
order to function as a nonnative discourse, law must give a baseline against which 
actions can be evaluated; only after this has occurred can 'remedial' action be 
undertaken to ameliorate, or atone for, any divergence between legal expectation and 
actual conduct. The first task has lexical priority, and, moreover, is, in my opinion, the 
only task truly gennane to law. 
KOSKENNIEMI'S CRITIQUE: 
The Oscillation Between Apology and Utopia and the Consequent Necessity of 
Radical Indetenninacy: 
theorist. However, my own commitment is to the first variant of  formalism. A commitment to what 
Franck has termed "idiot rules", see The Power of  Legitimacy Among Nations 67-83. 
283 Koskenniemi claims that, no extant theory of  CIL has escaped the apology-utopia 
dialectic, and also that no theory can escape this dialectic; the collapse of  theories of 
CIL into apology, utopia, or oscillation is a conceptual necessity. CIL (indeed PIL as 
a whole) is inherently indeterminate, and as a result can always be made to defend its 
subjects' political choices. 
The combined effect of  the elements of  necessary indeterminacy is that PIL must 
remain trapped in destructive oscillation between apology and utopia. Each ofthe 
competing value-commitments is manifested in one pole or the other. Consequently, a 
neutral, objective, PIL is conceptually impossible, as it would simultaneously require 
the law to be concrete and normative, but: 
The two requirements cancel each other. An argument about concreteness is 
an argument about the closeness of  a particular rule, principle or doctrine to 
state practice. But the closer to state practice an argument is, the less 
normative and the more political it seems. The more it seems just another 
apology for existing power. An argument about normativity, on the other 
hand, is an argument which intends to demonstrate the rule's distance from 
state will and practice. The more normative a rule, the more political it seems 
because the less it is possible to argue it by reference to social context. It 
seems utopian and - like theories of  natural justice - manipulable at will.
3 
Hence PIL conducts its illusory existence in the dialectic between Apology and 
Utopia, in a perpetual and manipulable oscillation between these poles. As a process 
3 Koskenniemi M., "The Politics ofIntemational Law" 1 EJIL (1990) 4, at p. 8 
284 law cannot be differentiated from description, it has no normative value. At its 
normative pole law has no objective support, it is a disguised (and illegitimate) 
political manoeuvre. 
As the force of  Koskenniemi's critique has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, 
the focus of  the present chapter is on the inversion of  the critique; the elucidation of  a 
theory of elL which is neither apologetic nor utopian. The articulation of  the very 
theory Koskenniemi claims to be impossible. 
My Initial Misreading: 
When I first with engaged Koskenniemi' s critique, I thought that his charge of  the 
necessary indeterminacy of  PIL was, to say the least, overstated. I even thought it 
contradictory: 
Koskenniemi, however, argues that, because the application of  any formal test can 
have relatively indeterminate results and a margin of 'political' discretion - i.e. a 
choice of  justice theory - is involved in the distillation and application oflegal 
rules, objectivity becomes a myth. This argument, while superficially persuasive, 
is ultimately unfair. Language, and therefore the articulation of  rules, will always 
permit of  a degree of  uncertainty, but any suggestion that this precludes objective, 
or at least consistent intersubjective, understanding is ultimately self-defeating. If 
this were not so, what would save the written claim of  radical indeterminacy from 
its own charge; why would it alone be intelligible?4 
4 See Beckett J., "Behind Relative Nonnativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of Law" 12 EJIL 
(2001) 627, at p. 644. 
285 This was an inaccurate reading, and thus an unfair critique. My one redeeming claim 
in this regard is that at least I was not alone: 
The articulation of  the experience of  fluidity in From Apology to  Utopia has 
sometimes been misunderstood as a point about the semantic open-endedness or 
ambiguity of  international legal words .... But the claim of indeterminacy here is 
not at all that international legal words are semantically ambivalent. It is much 
stronger (and in a philosophical sense, more "fundamental") and states that even 
where there is no semantic ambivalence whatsoever, international law remains 
indeterminate because it is based on contradictory premises and seeks to regulate a 
future in regard to which even single actors' preferences remain unsettled. 5 
In other words, Koskenniemi' s assertion of  the necessary indeterminacy of  PIL is 
deeper and more sophisticated than the caricatured thesis I and others thought we had 
refuted. 
The Real Cause of  the Problem, Competing Value Commitments: 
Indeterminacy is not semantic in nature, but flows from the fact that rule-makers, and 
rule-appliers, are simultaneously committed to an array of  conflicting values and 
desires, and that these are manifested in rules simultaneously pursuing different and 
conflicting purposes: 
286 To say this is not to say much more than that international law emerges from a 
political process whose participants have contradictory priorities and rarely know 
with clarity how such priorities should be turned into directives to deal with an 
uncertain future ... Even where there is little or no semantic ambiguity about an 
expression in a rule ... that expression cannot quite have the normative force we 
would like it to have .... because no rule is more important than the reason for 
which it is enacted, even the most unambiguous rule is infected by the 
disagreements that concern how that reason should be understood and how it 
ranks with competing ones .... It follows that it is possible to defend any course of 
action - including deviation from a clear rule - by professionally impeccable legal 
arguments that look from rules to their underlying reasons, make choices between 
several rules as well as rules and exceptions and interpret rules in the context of 
evaluative standards. 
6 
Moreover, it should be noted that, from Koskenniemi's perspective, this 'problem' 
(indeterminacy) is not, in fact, a problem at all: 
The important point I wish to make in From Apology to  Utopia is not that all of 
this should be thought of  as a scandal or (even less) a structural "deficiency" but 
that indeterminacy is an absolutely central  aspect of  international law'  s 
acceptability. It does not emerge out of  the carelessness or bad faith oflegal actors 
(States, diplomats, lawyers) but from their deliberate and justified wish to ensure 
that legal rules will fulfil the purposes for which they were adopted. Because those 
5 Koskenniemi M., From Apology to  Utopia (2
nd ed.) "Epilogue" p. 27. Note, this edition has not yet 
been published, all page references are to the unpublished manuscript (on file with author) as printed as 
a free-standing word document. 
6 Ibid. pp. 27-8, paragraph break suppressed and footnotes omitted. 
287 purposes, however, are both conflicting as between different legal actors and 
unstable in time even in regard to single actors, there is always the risk that rules -
above all "absolute rules" - will tum out to be over-inclusive and under-inclusive  . 
... This fundamentally - and not just marginally - undermines their force. It 
compels the move to "discretion" which it was the very purpose to avoid by 
adopting the rule-format in the first place.
7 
Nonetheless, I contend that such indeterminacy is a problem; that it precludes PIL 
from working as it ought to, from fulfilling its (best available) purpose. I also contend 
that this issue of  indeterminacy can be resolved, that a functioning, neutral, and 
determinate PIL (and CIL) is conceptually possible. 
Koskenniemi's Confused Resolution: Deny, But Work With, Indeterminacy: 
Koskenniemi himself appears trapped within something resembling the apology-
utopia dialectic. At times he claims this indeterminacy 'just is'; at times that it is 
conceptually inescapable; and at yet other times that it is normatively desirable. These 
positions would seem to map quite nicely onto: apology, necessary oscillation, and 
utopia, respectively. Nonetheless, this indeterminacy should not be acknowledged: 
7 Ibid. 
Little seemed to be gained from thinking about international legal argument as 
being "in fact" about something else than law. Had I responded to my 
superiors at the Ministry when they wished to hear what the law was that this 
was a stupid question and instead given them my view of  where the Finnish 
288 interests lay, or what type of  State behaviour was desirable, they would have 
been both baffled and disappointed  and would certainly not have consulted 
me again.
8 
Yet, without admitting to doing so, that is exactly what the competent international 
lawyer must do. Law is radically indeterminate, and can support any argument. It is 
deployed to promote someone's view of  "where the [State's] interests [lie]". 
Consequently, at the descriptive level, there is a danger of  Koskenniemi's analysis, 
precisely by accepting and legitimating these contradictions, degenerating into a self-
fulfilling prophecy: 
It only shows the inevitability of  political choice, thus seeking to induce a 
sense that there are more alternatives than practitioners usually realise, that 
impeccable arguments may be made to support preferences that are not 
normally heard; that ifthis seems difficult through the more formal 
techniques, then less formal techniques are always available - and the other 
way around. 
9 
Ultimately, however, what I wish - and thus what I choose - to focus upon is 
Koskenniemi's plea, made in his keynote address to the European Society of 
International Law.lo This, as I understood it, was a plea for a neutral and determinate 
PIL, a project encapsulated in the move from instrumentalism to formalism. I I That is, 
8 Ibidp. 3 
9 Ibid p. 38 
10 This has subsequently been published as "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Renewal" 2005 EIIL 113. 
II Ibid p. 124. 
289 in the move from rules used "instrumentally" to justify pre-formed policy choices, to 
"formalist" rules which can be counterpoised to policy choices (desires). 
METHODOLOGICAL CONFLICTS: KOSKENNIEMI'S EMPIRICISM AND MY 
IDEAL POSITIVISM: 
This appears to be the critical issue, the crux ofthe problem: Koskenniemi and I adopt 
incommensurable methodologies. It is, I suspect, for this reason that Koskenniemi 
does not consider idealising the rules ofPIL as a potential resolution of  the 
indeterminacy issue: no social practice methodology can cognise an ideal idea. This 
distinction manifests itself in Koskenniemi'  s claim that, "the closer to state practice 
an argument is, the less normative and the more political it seems." Because it is in 
this statement that Koskenniemi implicitly rules out the possibility of  idealising state 
practice. The critical question from a positivist (or ideal) perspective is: which state 
actions ought to count as state practice? That is, what is state practice? 
It is precisely by understanding state practice as an ideal idea - that is, as a structured 
and justified selection of  specific actions from amongst the mass of  state conduct -
that a distinction can be drawn between those state activities which are pertinent to the 
norm creation process and those which are not. It is that distinction which allows the 
establishment ofthe conditions within which CIL can generate rules which can be 
simultaneously normative and concrete. 
The Purpose of  Methodology Reprised (the structured reduction of  complexity): 
290 Methodology is, at its most functionally basic level, a technique whereby the 
complexity of  reality is reduced to manageable levels. This is accomplished by 
privileging certain aspects of  reality. Thus, from the overwhelming array of  "space-
time-events" the privileged few are abstracted, isolated and deemed to be relevant. 
Consequently, methodology is simply a signifier denoting the technique through 
which certain data is included in our (momentary) focus, and by which all other data 
is implicitly excluded. Methodology is the construction of  the epistemic grids 
whereby reality is rendered intelligible. In our specific context, methodology is the set 
of  techniques whereby the data which will function to constitute the phenomenon 
"Law" is identified. 
Methodology is the construction, and ideally the evaluation, of  the categories through 
which we can make sense of  the world. Once this is realised, it becomes obvious that 
the categories themselves represent the conclusion (and in a sense the compression) of 
their host theories, and that these theories must be chosen between. The role of 
methodology then is to provide structure to this act of  choosing between theories and 
categories. 
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF EMPIRICISM: DATA MUST BE CLASSIFIED: 
Despite its methodological weakness, Koskenniemi adopts a variant of  the 'social 
practice' model oflaw, whereby: 
"competence" in intemationallaw is not an ability to reproduce out of  memory 
some number of  rules, but a complex  argumentative practice ... We develop 
291 an ability to distinguish between competent arguments and points [  which] 
somehow fail as legal arguments. The descriptive thesis in From Apology to 
Utopia is about such intuitions. It seeks to articulate the competence of  native 
language-speakers of  international law. It starts from the uncontroversial 
assumption that international law is not just some haphazard collection of 
rules and principles. Instead, it is about their use in the context of  legal work. 
... even in the midst of  political conflict, international lawyers are able to 
engage in professional conversation in which none of  the participants' 
competence is put to question by the fact that they support opposite positions  . 
. .. [W]hatever else international law might be, at least it is how international 
lawyers argue,  ... But ... [w  ]hy not speak directly to the legal rules and 
principles, the behaviour of  States, the stuff of  law as a part of  the 
international social or political order? From Apology to Utopia assumes that 
there is no access to legal rules or the legal meaning of  international behaviour 
that would be independent from the way competent lawyers see those things. 12 
This "competence" can be articulated as a "grammar" of  international law: 
The grammar that emerges from the analyses in From Apology to  Utopia takes 
its starting-point from the tension between concreteness and normativity that 
structures all (competent) international legal speech. Any doctrine or position 
must show itself as concrete - that is, based not on abstract theories about the 
good or the just but on what it is that States do or will, have done or have 
willed. A professionally competent argument is rooted in a social concept of 
12 Supra, note 5, p. 7. 
292 law - it claims to emerge from the way international society is, and not from 
some wishful construction of  it. On the other hand, any such doctrine or 
position must also show that it is not just a reflection of  power - that it does 
not only tell what States do or will but what they should do or will. It must 
enable making a distinction between power and authority and, in other words, 
be normative. The more concrete an argument is, the less normative it appears, 
and vice-versa. This tension structures international law at various levels of 
abstraction.  13 
Criticism 1, Failure to Reduce Complexity Adequately: 
By understanding law, and thus PIL, as a social concept, Koskenniemi must focus on 
the empirically identifiable. However, Koskenniemi's methodology does differ from 
the Hartian or Dworkinian understanding; it is not, quite, a social practice 
methodology, because Koskenniemi does not presuppose that law possesses the 
coherence necessary to understand it as a practice. In other words, Koskenniemi 
adopts a variant of  Unger's idea of  "mapping" the legal order (ofPIL). There is, 
however, one crucial difference: the absence of  centralised institutions. 
Thus, where Unger advocated mapping the decisions of  centralised legal institutions 
(  courts), Koskenniemi must focus on legal arguments. However, being bereft of 
institutional vetting - by which'  good' legal arguments could be separated from 'bad' 
ones - Koskenniemi must accord the label 'legal argument' to arguments emanating 
from 'lawyers'. This creates a very wide category of  raw data, as there is no 
13 Ibid, p. 12. 
293 distinction between 'winning' and 'losing', 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' 
arguments. There are only arguments which are adopted, and those which were not. 
However, as Koskenniemi himself  has noted, adoption oflegal arguments owes more 
to the desirability oftheir conclusions than to their intrinsic merits. In short, 'legal 
arguments' is a category in which contradiction is endemic. 
Criticism 2, Circularity in Data Identification: 
Koskenniemi effectively dismisses the idea of  understanding law as an ideal idea 
when he locates its existence in the practice oflawyers. However, as noted in chapters 
1 and 2, such an escape is not actually available, it presupposes the 'objective 
existence' of 'lawyers' as some essentialised (or at least essentialisable) reality. But, 
what constitutes a lawyer is a product of  agreement, and thus of  definition. Moreover, 
Koskenniemi's particular methodology is - on this issue - patently circular. 
"Competence" is the capacity to engage the practice, but the practice itself  is 
identified by reference to "competent lawyers" (i.e. practitioners). In short, 
competence distinguishes lawyers from laymen, but the distinction between the 
arguments oflawyers and laymen is the definition of  competence. This can be 
avoided only by treating legal argument - implicitly or explicitly - as an ideal idea. 
Criticism 3, Random Reduction in Complexity Nonetheless Occurs: 
A similar difficulty arises in regard to the "tension between concreteness and 
normativity", and more particularly the (implicit) definition of  concreteness. "A 
professionally competent argument ... claims to emerge from the way international 
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to emerge from the way the whole of  a society - international or not - is; it comes 
from the way certain aspects of  that society are. Rooted in reality does not mean 
reflective of  the whole of  that reality, but reflective of  certain parts of  it. 
This opens a simple question: which aspects of  international society ought to be 
reflected in PIL? This leads to another, simpler yet more profound question: why? 
Why those aspects and not others? It is impossible to root anything in the totality of 
reality, because that totality is incapable of  being cognised intelligibly. Consequently, 
a good theorist bears the burden ofjustifoing her or his particular reductions, of 
justifying the decision to privilege (to abstract) the particular aspects of  reality their 
theory demands. 14 Koskenniemi does not appear to recognise, nor rise to, this 
challenge. 
Miscellaneous Additional Critical Observations on Koskenniemi's Methodology: 
Koskenniemi's critique also displays what we might term the pathologies of 
'pragmatism'. He claims that PIL must be capable of  producing 'reasonable' answers, 
and that that necessitates flexibility: 
This may require lowering the expectations of  technical certainty and 
increasing sensitivity to the ways in which law gets spoken.ls 
14 See chapter 3, notes 9-20, and accompanying text, supra .. 
15 Supra, note 10, p.  119. 
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"over" and "under" inclusive. This, he claims, makes them bad rules or, more 
precisely, bad legal rules. This criticism manifests a collapse of  the is/ought, and the 
descriptive/censorial, divides in legal theorising. It seems premised on the assumption 
that legal rules have, also, to be pragmatically or morally 'good' rules. More 
importantly, Koskenniemi does not identify the standards by which (acceptable) 
inclusiveness is to be judged. Consequently, this desire for law descends into 
Koskenniemi's own apology-utopia dialectic. The turn to "grammar" merely disguises 
and  perpetuates these pathologies. Koskenniemi's thesis becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
Perhaps the preceding criticisms will seem unfair, after all, Koskenniemi was simply 
describing a social practice as it is, but that is the very heart ofthe problem: there can 
be no such thing as a 'social practice as it is'. A social practice is a social construct; it 
is not a thing in itself. To 'observe' a social practice one must first identify that 
practice, and to do so, one must, implicitly or explicitly, define that practice. 
It is only by reference to our categories of  thought that we can impose intelligibility 
onto 'reality'. It is the proximity of  certain aspects of  reality to a pre-fonned ideal 
which allows us to group those aspects of  reality together, to assemble them into a 
distinct phenomenon, in this case the law or legal practice. The social practice of  law 
relies on the understanding of  law as a category (enforced or authoritative command) 
to structure and understand a 'reality' oflaw as a social practice. This cognition of 
reality is only possible because the data privileged for abstraction from reality is 
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category, or as an instance of  that concept. 
Consequently, the category itself must be articulated and explicated; or at the very 
least assumed. It is the act of  creating and imposing a category, and that act alone, 
which can constitute the 'practice' as an object capable of  being subjected to analysis. 
Koskenniemi has fallen into the trap of  orthodoxy: to constitute the social practice of 
law as an observable object, he has constituted that practice by implicit reference to 
the necessary centrality ofthe legal. He has assumed the authority oflaw. 
This is an orthodox assumption, but it cannot be defended solely on the grounds of 
that orthodoxy; nor can it be defended on the ground of  empirical accuracy, as it has 
no data outside of  itself against which it may be evaluated or validated. Instead, the 
assumption must be analysed purposively. What is the purpose of  socially central 
law? At first glance, the answer is obvious: its purpose is to regulate human 
behaviour. However, it cannot achieve this by reference to rules, as Koskenniemi 
himself has shown. Socially central (definitionally authoritative) law is necessarily 
indeterminate, because this is the price for its political acceptability. In a centralised 
legal system, e.g. a municipal system, this indeterminacy can be disguised, because 
law can bring momentary determinacy by authoritatively allocating final decision-
making power to named institutions (usually courts). Moreover, practitioners and 
academics can then "service" the system, disguising and denying its indeterminacy by 
unconsciously idealising it as a rational reconstruction. 
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decentralised system, authority is decentralised, and consequently the allocation of 
decision-making authority is also decentralised; it is spread amongst "authoritative 
decision-makers". An inherently indetenninate law has no role to play in a 
decentralised system. Nonetheless, Koskenniemi has made it abundantly clear that his 
was not a proposal for the development of authoritative, or centralised, institutions: 
The fact that there is no alternative institutional blueprint in this book is not an 
incidental oversight. ... Indeed, ... institution-building seem[s], as David 
Kennedy would say, "part of  the problem" .... Today, it often seems that 
academic work in the field is justifiable only if  its ends up in a proposal for 
institutional refonn. From the perspective of  From Apology to Utopia, 
however, the offer of  policy-relevance by engaging in institution-building was 
.  d  h  1·  16  a pOlsone  c  a Ice. 
In short, to maintain its'  centrality' Koskenniemi robs law of  its nonnativity, and in 
doing so denies law any role outside the legitimation of  state conduct. PIL becomes 
necessarily apologetic, and that is its "instrumentalism". The law (i.e. the rule chosen 
because of  the desirability of  its content) becomes the instrument by which pre-
selected state conduct is legitimated. 
The law 'controls' all decisions, but it conditions very few, and detennines none. The 
law is permitted to remain'  central', but only because it always and only'  demands' or 
'mandates' what the state in question wished to do anyway. Only power is left as a 
16 Supra, note 5, p. 39. 
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necessarily says what the powerful wish it to say. This necessitates the move from 
instrumentalism to formalism, but the details of  that move are not provided by 
Koskenniemi; because they cannot be understood from within the methodological 
structures he has adopted. 
We can identify the possibility of  a theory of  CIL which adopts the premises, but 
denies the conclusions, ofKoskenniemi's critique. But only by understanding (or 
theorising) law as an ideal idea. To understand why ideal idea theorising can do this, 
attention must be turned to the structure of  Koskenniemi's critique, which must itself 
be explicated from the perspective of  the ideal idea. Put differently, it is from the 
perspective of  the ideal idea that I am best able to constitute the intelligibility of 
Koskenniemi's critique, and consequently, it is from that perspective that I see the 
possibility of  refuting - or inverting - that critique. 
DISAGGREGATING KOSKENNIEMI'S CRITIQUE: 
The Meanings of  Apology and Utopia: 
There is an unnecessary complexity in Koskenniemi's critique induced by his failure 
to separate three questions dealing, respectively, with the ontology oflaw, the content 
of  particular norms, and the obligation to obey the law. Koskenniemi struggles 
heroically, but ultimately unsuccessfully, to mount a parallel critique at all three 
levels. The unfortunate outcome is an opacity in the meaning of  his central terms 
299 (apology and utopia) as each bears the burden of  three separate but related contents 
corresponding to the three levels of  critique. 
Before responding to this, we must understand the poles themselves. Koskenniemi's 
critique can be read in either of  two ways: we can understand the critique as truly 
deconstructionist in as much as its own polar dichotomy has always already been 
deconstructed: the poles are so reliant on one another that they meet conceptually. 
Perceived in this way, apology relies on and contains utopia, and vice-versa. 
Alternatively, we can adopt a more rigorously analytic model and examine the 
elemental components of  each pole in isolation. 
This latter perspective offers greater clarity, and elucidates certain confusions and 
elisions within Koskenniemi's analysis; it shall be adopted for the remainder of  this 
thesis. This perspective brings into reliefthe multiple definitions of  each pole as it 
operates in Koskenniemi' s critique. 
Apology has three distinct meanings: 
1.  ClL is descriptive of  what States do: 
The critical purchase of  this claim lies in the assumption that law must be normative. 
This is the most important of  the three meanings of  Apology: the law is necessarily 
created at the point of 'application'. Consequently, the law can only describe, but can 
never regulate state conduct, or at least the conduct of  the most powerful states. Any 
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reference to "impeccable legal arguments". 
This version of  the critique presupposes the temporal collapse manifested in social 
practice methodology. It presupposes that everything which has previously been 
accepted as a "competent" legal argument will be accepted again. It assumes that law 
creation necessarily takes place at the point oflaw application, and consequently 
draws no distinction between those manifestations of  state action and will which 
ought to be considered law-constitutive, and those which ought not to be so 
considered. It is for that reason that the reintroduction of  the temporal axis to the 
analysis oflaw is so vital, as it is on that axis alone that this aspect of  Koskenniemi's 
critique can be withstood. 
2.  CIL reflects the wishes of  its subjects: 
Higgins presents a different analysis ofKoskenniemi, one which roots apology in the 
consensual nature ofPIL per se; in effect Higgins argues that Koskenniemi perceives 
law as the vindication of  authority over power, and that, as a result, no consensually 
agreed code could amount to law. Consent itself, in Higgins' reading of  Koskenniemi, 
precludes law, because no consensually agreed code could be normative.  17 This top 
down definition of  the necessity of  imposing law seems both irrelevant and politically 
reactionary, it goes against what we could call the democratic spirit of  our times. If 
the apologetic pole of  Koskenniemi's critique is to have force, it must be a critique of 
the form and function, not merely the substance, oflaw. 
17 See Higgins R. Problems and process, International Law and How we Use It, at pp. 15-6. 
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of  somebody 's values or the outcome of  some political struggles,18 it scarcely seems a 
criticism at all that the particular values embodied were consensually chosen. It is 
only the alteration of  the rules to meet putative new values at the point of  application 
which would deprive law of  its normativity. The normativity of  law is not a disguised 
claim to the impartiality oflaw, let alone oflegal rules. Rules are not, and cannot be, 
impartial- as embodiments of  value they are definitionally partial-but the function 
oflaw is not to be objectively impartial, but to provide common standards against 
which diffuse conduct can be (quasi-)impartially evaluated. 
3.  elL reflects only the wishes of  States: 
Although, methodologically and theoretically, simply a variant of  meaning 2 above, 
the third version of  the apology critique does possess a far greater political impact. In 
effect, it rails against international society as a political system, built on the primacy 
of  the State form. States are portrayed as evil, or at least selfish. Why then should it be 
the congruence of  their interests, and not the interests of  their peoples, which dictate 
the content of  the law? This criticism, and its force, can be well illustrated by 
reference to the manner in which the Laws of  War - particularly before the advent of 
Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions - privileged States and their armies. 
Taken in isolation, the requirement, encapsulated in art. 13 of  the First Geneva 
Convention of 1949, that "members of  organised resistance movements ... fulfil the 
18  See, e.g. Asmal K, 'Truth Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Perspective', 63 MLR 
(2000) 1, at 15, n. 72. 
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unproblematic. This serves to distinguish combatants from civilians, and thus to 
protect the latter. However, and this I believe is Koskenniemi's point, it also serves to 
make 'lawful' rebellion or insurrection (revolution according to the rules ofIHL) 
tantamount to collective suicide on the part of  the rebels. This rule was agreed 
between states, and it is in the common interests of  states (though not, necessarily of 
their peoples) to hinder any possibility of  revolution. 
We can also see this form of  apology rear its head in relations between states, 
particularly in relations between victors and vanquished. Commenting on the 
Nuremberg trials, historian Sven Lindqvist has noted: 
[R]ather than establishing that the Allies too - in fact, especially the Allies-
had committed this kind of  War Crime, the American prosecutor declared that 
the law had been rendered invalid by the actions ofthe Allies?O 
However, from a strictly methodological perspective, this is not a critique of  the 
possibility, nor even of  the desirability ofPILper se. It does provide an excellent 
perspective from which a critique ofthe substantive content of  contemporary PIL 
could, and should, be mounted, but ultimately confuses the 'how' and the 'why' of 
law-making. 
Two Meanings of  Utopia: 
19 Art 13 (2) (b). 
20 Lindqvist S. A History of  Bombing para. 239. 
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meamngs: 
1. CIL reflects a consistently imposed political theory: 
The crux of  both meanings of  apology is an attack on the illicit imposition of  a 
political theory onto an international society, which is assumed to be heterogenous. 
To impose a fixed political theory - in the assumed absence of  its 'objective truth' - is 
anti-pluralistic; it is an act of  moral imperialism. As there is neither an objectively 
correct political or moral theory, the law should be (made, or understood, to be) 
identifiable without recourse to political or moral theory. 
2. CIL reflects an indeterminate political theory: 
This is probably the most forceful of  all the critiques of  apology or utopia. It blends 
the failings of  the first manifestations of  both apology and utopia. An indeterminate 
utopian CIL would be both morally imperialistic, and open to manipulation at the 
point of  application. This remains true even if  the indeterminacy is a price paid for 
moral or political consensus. In particular, any attempt to 'identify' a 'universal 
ethics' would have to be formulated at such a high level of  generality as to support 
multiple and conflicting concrete applications. As a result, any law requiring 
concretisation against such ethics would also be open to multiple conflicting 
interpretations. 
Interim Conclusions: 
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which require refutation. The second and third manifestations of  apology are 
different. The second 'critique' in particular merits respect and not derision. It 
acknowledges the necessarily value-laden nature oflaw, and seeks to ensure that the 
law reflects the values and desires of  its subjects. This should be understood as its 
great strength, not its weakness, at least by anyone who believes in the idea of 
democracy. The third version of  apology is a political (not a legal) critique; the 
question of  the goodness or badness of  States is radically separate from the question 
of  the conceptual validity or practicability of  CIL. So, the real question is, can we 
construct a theory of  CIL which encapsulates these but is not susceptible to the other 
critiques? The answer, of  course, is yes. 
TOWARDS A SOLUTION: 
A solution, a viable response, to Koskenniemi's critique can only be 'discovered' or 
constructed by accepting the necessity of, and understanding a move to, ideal idea 
methodology. It  is only by structuring the reduction of  complexity that this process 
can be made to yield manageable and determinate results. Consequently, we must 
construct the ideal of  CIL. 
The Functions of  the Ideal of  CIL: 
The ideal idea of  CIL, the image of  CIL, allows us to make sense of 'reality', to 
abstract parts of  that reality to constitute something recognisable as law or a legal 
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be critiqued. Analogously, the ideal allows us to identify the extant norms of  ClL, but 
that in tum facilitates critique ofthose norms. Consequently, the ideal image serves 
four separate (though related) functions: 
1.  Data identification, the construction of 'the present' of  ClL. We can 
understand extant actions, events, processes, etc. as legally relevant or law-
constitutive, or as legal arguments etc., only because of  their proximity, or 
similarity, to our ideal image oflaw, or in this case of  ClL. 
Consequently, we must focus on the creation and content of  that ideal, so as to 
better understand why we understand reality in a particular way. It is only 
from that understanding that we can generate an understanding of  that reality 
as a coherent whole. This can be compared to Koskenniemi's'randomly 
constructed present of  ClL as a social practice. 
2.  Critique of  extant practices of  rule formation. The reality is merely proximate 
to, rather than identical with, the ideal. The ideal functions to make reality 
intelligible, but this will also serve to highlight differences between that reality 
and the ideal. Consequently, the ideal serves as something to which reality 
ought to aspire; it gives focus (and consistency) to the critique of  that reality. 
3.  The identification oflegal norms (in ClL). Although the extant processes 
ought to be critiqued for their distance from the ideal, they are nonetheless 
recognisably law-constitutive processes. Consequently, they are the realisation 
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ideal. Once we know what the ideal is, and how it operates in reality, we can 
use this knowledge to identify the legal norms of  CIL. 
4.  Critique of  extant norms. This is the separation of 'descriptive' and 'censorial' 
jurisprudence. Having accepted that the extant practices of  norm formation, 
although recognisable as such, are flawed, it stands to reason that the norms 
they have produced over time will also be flawed. Consequently, the 
identification of  extant norms also forms the sine qua non of  the critique of 
those norms. This leads to a two-level struggle. Having gone to the trouble of 
identifying extant legal norms, it seems reasonable also to seek their 
application. However, we must also take seriously the critique of  the substance 
of  these norms. The ideal of  CIL is to reflect the wishes of  all states, but in 
practice CIL is hegemonic, privileging the values of  those states with the 
power to act. Consequently, its norms merit extended evaluation and critique. 
However, this critique must function alongside the demands for application. 
Put simply, it is bad enough that the law merely embodies promises reflecting 
the desires of  the powerful; it is much worse when those same powerful states 
then seek to implement legal theories enabling them to avoid even those 
promises; to deny the weak even those crumbs. 
ABSTRACT FUNCTION OF LAW: THE REDUCTION OF COMPLEXITY: 
A Double Reduction of Complexity: The Norm as Legislator-Text and the Law as 
Regulative Ideal: 
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itself  is also a product of  the reduction of  the complexity of  reality. Consequently, 
there are two movements of  complexity reduction: first, certain actions are abstracted 
from the mass of  human activity and are designated as law-creative; second, the laws, 
the legal norms, thus constituted are applied as an epistemic grid to subsequent human 
conduct to determine its 'key features' or 'material facts' and to provide a matrix 
within which that conduct, reconstructed in terms of  those key features, can be legally 
evaluated. These two movements are consecutive but inter-related; the authority of 
the second stage is contingent upon the legitimacy of  the first. This allows us to 
formulate another simple thesis: 
Our responsibility to the law we identify is conditioned by our responsibility 
for the processes by which we assume law is created (and so by reference to 
which it must be identified). 
Nonetheless, the two movements must be studied and analytically reconstructed in 
isolation. Law cannot be understood as a social practice in any real, or empirical, 
sense. This is because the 'social practice' is itselfa reduction in complexity: it is a 
product of  (pre  )theory. This is a necessary epistemic response to the overbearing 
complexity of 'real reality'. Therefore, the first question which must be faced is how 
to reduce the complexity of  reality sufficiently to facilitate the identification of  an 
intelligible entity 'the legal system'. Only then can we begin to identify, recognise, 
elucidate, and apply the norms ofthat system to bring about a structured reduction of 
the complexity of  the remainder of  reality. 
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and such an aim is inherent in an understanding oflaw legitimated by the production 
of  determinate answers - then the reduction of  human conduct to the law-creative 
must also be structured. The understanding of  the legal system as a "regulative ideal" 
provides the structure for the second reduction (the reduction of  the complexity of 
social life by reference to legal norms). However, the understanding of  the ideal idea 
of  the norm as legislator-text, itself, structures the first reduction. It is this, first, 
reduction which constitutes the regulative ideal (i.e. the process or product governing 
the rational reconstruction) itself. 
Only by focussing on this first reduction can we prevent the regulative ideal, and thus 
the 'legal system' itself, from degenerating into a random series of  reductions driven 
by nothing more than the personal preferences ofthe 'norm identifier'. Only in this 
way can we maintain a clear distinction between the Rule of  Law and the Rule of 
Man; most especially in the international arena. 
It is precisely to perform this role, and to initiate the process of  structured reduction 
that an ideal theory of  law (in this case, an ideal theory of  CIL) must be developed. 
This entails the necessity, and thus the possibility, of  a specific form for PILICIL as 
opposed to Koskenniemi's claim of  the necessary 'Formlessness' oflaw: 
From the fact that law has no shape of  its own, but always comes to us in the 
shape of  particular traditions and preferences, it does not follow that we 
309 cannot choose between better or worse preferences, traditions that we have 
more or less hope to realise.
21 
We must seek to universalise not only a tradition, or preference, not only a content for 
law, but also aform oflaw. It is not enough to claim that "law has no shape of  its 
own", because that is precisely the issue at stake: can law have a fixed or set form? 
Absolutely, of  course, the answer is no, but in any given specific setting, the answer is 
that law both can and should be understood as having a fixed form. Consequently, the 
present thesis is precisely directed toward elucidating the possibility that, and the 
conditions under which, law can have a "shape of  its own"; and then toward 
identifying the 'best available' form for PIL. It is to accomplish these tasks that 
attention must be directed to the Form-Purpose Dialectic. 
SYNOPSIS OF THE ONTOLOGY OF PIL: APPLYING THE FORM-PURPOSE 
DIALECTIC: 
As law has no fixed ontology, nor any necessary features, its form in any given setting 
is dictated by the function it is intended to serve. However, law has no more of  a fixed 
function, nor purpose, than it does a fixed ontology. Consequently, the only fixed 
point is the relationship between form and function. This relationship is governed by 
the form-purpose dialectic. The form imposed onto law is a direct consequence of  the 
function the law is intended to serve (the purpose law is intended to fulfil) in the given 
specified social setting. The form of  law is a manifestation of  law's reason for being, 
of  law's purpose. 
21  Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at p. 119. 
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identified; law is a product of  this dialectic. Consequently, the dialectic must be 
applied; schematically speaking, to apply the dialectic we need: 
•  A Purpose for Law 
•  A Specific Social Setting  (International Society) 
•  A Set of  Empirical Assumptions About That Society 
•  A Postulated Mechanism to Link Assumptions to Purpose 
The Purpose ofPIL: 
To create a detenninate ontology for law in any given setting, that law must be 
understood as pursuing one single purpose. However, to repeat an earlier point, this is 
aformal purpose
22 whose concretisation provides the ontology (but not, necessarily, 
the substance
23
)  oflaw in that setting. In regard to PIL, I would suggest the following 
purpose as the most appropriate: 
22 However, some formal purposes, e.g. the realisation of  the liberal-individualist project do entail 
certain substantive contents for law, or at least limit or restrict the possible available contents of  a legal 
system constructed by reference to them. 
23  See Chapter 2, notes 52-6 and accompanying text, supra. 
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'objective' evaluation of State Conduct. 
By separating different aspects ofthis conduct, and in particular by distinguishing 
conduct at the point of  rule formation from that at the point of  rule application, that 
we can identify rules of  ClL which are, simultaneously, concrete (at the point of 
creation) and normative (at the point of  application). The norms ofPlL ought, at the 
point of  their creation, to reflect the wishes, the congruence of  the interests, of  the 
community of  States. As Koskenniemi has noted: 
The fact that international law is a European language does not even slightly 
stand in the way of  its being capable of  expressing something universal.24 
. PlL should pursue the provision of  a common perspective from which the actions of 
states can be (legally) evaluated, that is, international law provides the rules against 
which conduct can be evaluated 'objectively'  .25 As a result, it must also strive to 
produce determinate rules. I adopt this understanding oflaw, which endorses or may 
even actively entail a strict separation between law and politics,26 as an act of  choice; 
because law has neither necessary characteristics, nor a necessary function, but can 
only pursue the best available purpose in the best available manner?7 
24 Supra, note 10, p.  115. 
25 Obviously, this is not an absolute neutrality, it is not an Archimedean point, but an agreed and fixed 
point, a substitute for neutrality. See chapter 1, notes 104-6, and accompanying text, supra. 
26 Though always already under the condition that legal rules are recognised as the congealed outcomes 
of  political struggle. 
27 See ch.s 1-3 generally. 
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desirable function of  PIL. In a legal system lacking centralised institutions, lacking a 
universal morality, and in which no-one has the 'right' to impose their preferred 
morality, acceptable standards can only be those which are agreed amongst the group. 
Moreover, in the absence of  centralised institutions, the rules need to be clear, and to 
the greatest extent possible "auto-interpretative".28 Ifthis is not so, the rules will be 
used merely to legitimate (or describe) and not to evaluate, or regulate, the conduct of 
the more powerful. For this reason: 
in a thoroughly policy-oriented legal environment, formalism may sometimes 
be used as a counter-hegemonic strategy.29 
International society is, at present, precisely such a policy-oriented legal environment. 
In this environment, PIL, and especially elL, are being used to justify the desires of 
the most powerful States. Only by defending the clarity of  the rules, and the (moral) 
neutrality of  the rule formation procedures can we hope to elucidate a legitimate 
international law. 
Empirical Assumptions: 
This purpose is drawn from a particular understanding of  the present state of 
international society. In particular, I believe the following four conditions to be both 
'true' and important. 
28 Pace, Franck, supra, note 2; Koskenniemi supra, note 5 p. 29. 
29 Koskenniemi, ibid, p. 38. 
313 1.  The Redoubtability ofthe State Form: 
The analysis offered is predicated on a strong central presumption that, for good or ill, 
the State exists, and will continue to exist as a major power centre for the foreseeable 
future. As Foucault - who could hardly be called a Statist thinker, let alone an 
apologist for State power - has noted: 
For several centuries, the state has been one of  the most remarkable, one of  the 
most redoubtable, forms of  human government.30 
Moreover, I contend, that PIL does, and should, recognise and respond to this. 
Consequently, this 'empirical assumption' also contains a normative movement:3
! PIL 
should recognise the State as privileged actor as this allows for accountability32 and 
adequate complexity reduction. Consequently, this assumption functions to deny the 
relevance of  non-State conduct. The "disaggregated State" is not an empirical truth 
worth recognising. Pace Slaughter,33 PIL should focus on the unitary State. To do 
otherwise is to introduce too many variables into the definition of  normatively 
relevant conduct, and consequently to tend away from the provision of  determinate 
legal rules. 
2.  The Absence of  Centralised Institutions: 
30 Foucault M. "Omnes et Singulatim" in Faubion J (ed.) Michel Foucault Essential Works o/Foucault 
1954 -1984 vol 3 Power 298 at p. 325. 
31  Of course, this is true of  all 'empirical assumptions' as 'reality' can only be made intelligible through 
reduction; and reduction is driven by normative commitments. 
32 This assumes the efficacy of  the doctrines of  state responsibility; responsibility for the conduct of  all 
of  a state's citizens; including those overseas, and transnational companiess. 
314 The 'international legal system' is a decentralised one, because international society is 
decentralised, and 'officially' structured through horizontal rather than vertical 
relationships. It has no apparent Sovereign and, according to the doctrine of  sovereign 
equality, no hierarchy amongst its (primary) members,34 the states. Moreover, there 
exists in PIL no court of  general and compulsory jurisdiction, nor is there a 
recognised legislature. The UN Security Council does have a degree of  hierarchical 
authority within its own sphere of  competence, but is best understood as an executive 
- and not a legislative nor judicial - body. 
I posit the above purely as empirical 'realities', and maintain a strict normative 
ambivalence on whether to pursue an Institutionalisation Programme. Such a 
programme is neither entailed by, nor incompatible with, my project.35 However, 
were a programme of  institutionalisation to be pursued within the boundaries of  my 
project, it would be an inversion ofthe Hartian or Realist understanding, with the 
competences and (legitimate) actions of  the institution(s) determined by the pre-
existing law. 
3.  The Absence of  Automatic Sanctions for Breach: 
Despite Kelsen's somewhat desperate efforts to prove the contrary,36 it seems 
apparent that - at least so long as PIL is understood as a(n even vaguely) determinate 
body of  rules - there exists no operative mechanism whereby sanctions automatically 
flow from the breach of  its norms. 
33 Supra, note 1. 
34 That is, there is, on the orthodox formal reading, no legal hierarchy amongst states, but states as a 
whole are recognised as hierarchically superior to all other 'subjects' of  intemationallaw. 
35 Koskenniemi maintains a powerful opposition to such projects, see note 16, supra. 
315 The rules ofPIL need not necessarily be enforced, but this means that non-
enforcement cannot (necessarily) be equated with non-breach. Acts can be illegal but 
legitimate, as for example the Independent International Commission concluded in 
relation to the 1999 NATO campaign of 'humanitarian intervention' over Kosovo: 
The Commission concludes that the NATO military intervention was illegal 
but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the 
United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission considers that the 
intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted 
and because the intervention had the effect ofliberating the majority 
population of  Kosovo from a long period of  oppression under Serbian rule.
37 
The implication is that such illegalities ought to be condoned. They mayor may not 
lead to a change in the law; the important point, however, is that the legitimacy, and 
the lack of  enforcement, do not, per se, demonstrate or create legality. Moreover, state 
actions could be illegal, bad, immoral, illegitimate, and still not give rise to 
enforcement. 
4.  The Absence of  an A Priori Universal Morality: 
36 Kelsen H. Principles of  International Law (2
nd ed) pp. 23-64. 
37 Indepcndcntlntemational Commission on Kosovo:  The Kosol'O RepOrT, "Executive Summary" "The NATO Air 
Campaign", available at: http://www.rclicfwcb.int/libqry/doculTIcnts/thekosovorcoort.htm 
The UK House of  Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee said of  the same incident, "we conclude 
that NATO's military action, if  of  dubious legality in the current state of  intemationallaw, was justified 
on moral grounds." Fourth Repoprt, para 138, available at: 
hltp://ww\V.publications.parl;amcnl.uk!na!crn I 999UO/cmsclccticlTI  fitfli'~ sr  80'.  htm 
316 This functions as both an empirical assumption and a normative motor within my 
analysis ofPIL. Obviously, it cannot be positively proven, no absence can. 
Nonetheless, I would contend, at the very least, that no moral system proposed to date 
as universal or unifying has in fact proven to be so. Consequently, I simply assume 
that there exists no system of  morality or ethics which can be taken, a priori, to be 
'true' or universal. 
The Mechanism of  Law as 'Link' from Assumptions to Purpose: 
Of  the various sources of  PIL, I seek only to offer a theory of  Customary International 
Law (CIL). This is because, as demonstrated in chapter 4, this is the area most in need 
of  consistent theorising. Consequently, the ideal theory of  CIL must function as a 
mechanism within which the purpose pursued by PIL - the provision of  neutral, 
agreed, determinate rules against which State conduct can be evaluated - can be 
realised within international society understood in terms of  these empirical 
assumptions. What is required is a technique for the 'articulation' and recognition of 
agreed common standards from anarchy; the identification of 'true universals' without 
recourse to moral theory. 
I believe that this can be achieved only by means of  a variant of  the classic synthesist 
theory of  CIL. We must adopt a technique whereby we can select between state 
actions, and determinately identify those which effect legal change; i.e. those which 
exist not only as 'empirical facts', but are also transposed onto the separate, and 
insulated, ontological plane oflegality. Such a theory must adopt a revised 
understanding of  opinio iuris, which blends the two classic candidates, allowing each 
317 to ameliorate the weaknesses ofthe other. In short, opinio must be understood as a 
combination of  the normative intent of  the acting state, and the reaction to those 
actions by the remainder of  the international community. 
In this way, the classic theory can differentiate breaches of  the law from moments of 
normative evolution; it does not trap the law in perpetual stasis, but nor does it 
deprive the law of  normativity. At least at the level of  ideal, such a theory successfully 
negotiates the tension between stability and change. Both the vicious circle of  stasis, 
and the elimination of  normativity are overcome by understanding the formation of 
CIL as a reflexive process (but, one which generates provisionally fixed and 
determinate rules) in which the law-maker is the International Community as a whole, 
understood as a virtual Sovereign.38 
THE NECESSITY OF THE TEMPORAL AXIS: 
The 'Necessary' Temporal Collapse: 
The most important version of  the Apology critique presented by Koskenniemi is the 
claim that law must inevitably be created at the point that it appears to be 
'identified'  .39 In other words, law cannot accommodate a temporal axis which 
distinguishes law creation from law application, and holds the former prior to, and 
insulated from, the latter. As a result, the 'identification' oflegal rules, being 
constitutive of  those same legal rules, will tend (always) to 'perceive' precisely the 
38 On the idea of  a virtual sovereign, see notes 84-7, and accompanying text, infra. 
39 Supra, note 2, p. 8. 
318 rules the law-applier wishes to find; they will become apologies for his political 
utopia. 
However, what is striking about this claim is that it is identical to the temporal 
collapse Dyzenhaus perceived as undennining positivism as a whole. Both posit an 
inexorable identity between the identification and the creation oflaw. Moreover, in 
both cases, this appears to be predicated on a necessary connection between the 
identification of  the law and the duty to obey the law. From this perspective, law can 
only be that which we do, or ought to have a duty to obey. Koskenniemi is less clear 
on this point than Dyzenhaus,40 but this may be because his critique is one of 
indetenninacy, contrasted to the utopian vision underpinning Dyzenhaus' postulation 
of  the collapse. 
Like Dyzenhaus, Koskenniemi focuses on the identification and application of  the 
law, under the condition that this is synonymous with the duty of  obligation to the 
law, the reason for obedience to, and/or the authority oflaw as such. Thus for 
whatever reasons, Koskenniemi remains fixated on the 'necessary' authority of  the 
law. He appears to assume that law must, by definition, be a socially central and 
authoritative discourse. This leads him to a variation ofDyzenhaus' conclusion: that 
the law must reach correct, rather than merely detenninate, conclusions. 
This may well be an intuitive recognition of  what Motha has tenned "the repetition of 
the sovereign moment" within the act of  judgment, namely the originary violence of 
the self-positing of  the law and the claim to authority4!  If  so, Koskenniemi's error is 
40 It is, however, necessarily implied in his ESIL paper, see, supra note 10, p. 119. 
41  S. Motha, "The Sovereign Event in a Nation's Law" 13 Law and Critique (2002) 311. 
319 to fail to realise that this is a mediate, not an immediate, function ofjudgement.
42 
Moreover, it is a function mediated precisely by the relationship between the decision 
(the judgment) and the law (the rules structuring judgment). The sovereign repetition 
merely restricts the options available within judgment, as the judge cannot question 
the authority oflaw without undermining his own jurisdiction, and so removing his 
capacity to judge. The temporal collapse on the other hand, itself denies an 
independent existence to law. The argument is circular; the collapse is predicated on 
its own conclusion. 
Koskenniemi's theory is not drawn from observation, but instead imposed onto 
observation, in support of  the very Schmittian decisionism Koskenniemi purportedly 
sets out to "unmask". The theory becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, precisely 
because it legitimises methodologically incompatible arguments as each being 
"professionally competent", as each being valid legal arguments. From this 
perspective, Koskenniemi can surely offer no sound reason why lawyers should adopt 
consistent methodological structures even within the same argument. Far from 
castigating synthetic approaches to elL, far even from demanding that theorists, 
academics, or practitioners refrain from moving between theories to justify their 
42 To some extent the actual immediacy of  a relationship portrayed as mediated is precisely the point of 
Motha's critique of the Mabo case in this article. Motha deploys the idea of  anamnesis to bring into 
relief a judicial technique of  reconstructing, or more accurately re-constituting the law within the 
judicial decision. Anamnesis in this sense is the false portrayal of a new concept as a memory, a 
reminder, of  an already extant concept, the construction of  a "future anterior" which can then be 
recalled within the judgment. This passes off change as continuity and disguises the political moment 
in judgement. However, the open question remains, is this an integral feature of  the functioning of 
judicial decision-making, or is it rather a perversion of  judicial decision-making? Motha appears, albeit 
only implicitly, to support the latter understanding, see ibid. On the deployment of  anamnesis in 
scientific thought see Feyerabend P. Against Method, esp. at pp. 73-7, on Galileo's reliance on 
anamnesis as a rhetorical tool in the production, and legitimation, of  scientific "truths" at odds with the 
orthodox scientific paradigm of  his day. 
320 personal or state preferences, Koskenniemi defines their professional competence 
precisely by their ability to do SO.43 
Naturally, from such a perspective, the temporal axis is both irrelevant and 
impossible. This axis is a product of  'pre-theoretical' commitment to making the very 
choices in whose refusal Koskenniemi locates professional competence. The temporal 
axis can only work to the extent that there is a commitment to the production of  an 
internally coherent and authoritative (i.e. orthodox) theory oflaw in any given area of 
legal practice. Condoning the deployment of  inconsistent theories is both an act of 
choice, and a preclusion of  the possibility of  the temporal axis; because the law 
'identifier' must choose between these theories at the moment of  identification, only 
then does the specific norm come into being. However, it is only by reference to this 
axis - and the reduction in complexity entailed by its presupposed adoption of  a 
orthodox theory - that an operative and determinate legal system can be envisaged. 
To understand law as a social practice, it must be given empirical features by which it 
might be identified. This entails perceiving law as authoritative, which entails linking 
the content oflaw to the obligation to obey the law. In tum, this involves 'fudging' 
the reason for this obligation of  obedience, so that all may still agree that the law 
remains socially central (and authoritative). However, if  the content and the obligation 
for obedience are linked, and that obligation is then 'fudged', then the content will 
also be 'fudged'; it will be indeterminate until the decision is made on why the law is 
authoritative in this instance. It is that decision which manifests the temporal collapse, 
43 Supra, note 5, p. 38. 
321 because all the key questions must be answered at once and anew in each 'legal 
judgement'  . 
Once the temporal axis is reintroduced to analysis, the apparent oscillation in the 
identification of  law and the obligation to obey law - which is functionally analogous 
to Dyzenhaus' inexorable slippage from identification to separability theses - is itself 
unmasked and disappears. 
The key is to separate these questions: what does the law demand in this situation? 
And, (why) is the law obligatory in this instance? It is in reconciling the answers to 
these questions that the purposive understanding of  law comes to the fore. We must 
be sure that the demands oflaw do not subvert the purpose oflaw, either in the instant 
case, or in the creation of  a given class of  future possible cases. This entails rigidly 
separating and not confiating questions regarding the duty to obey law and those 
regarding the content of  legal demands. Otherwise, the reason for obedience becomes, 
in itself, the content oflaw - do that which furthers law's purposes. This is where the 
abuse Koskenniemi predicts manifest itself, because conduct and evaluation can no 
longer be separated, law must become either apologetic or utopian. To combat this 
tendency, law as a whole should be understood purposively, but individual rules 
should be identified positivistically.44 
The Possibility ofthe Temporal Axis: 
44 This may actually be a point on which Dyzenhaus and Fuller would have disagreed, as it seems 
probable that Fuller would have separated the two questions, albeit subsequently re-uniting them in the 
conclusion that the rule in question was not a legal rule, as law could only demand that which furthers 
322 The temporal axis is a product of  pre-theoretical commitment in the sense that some 
theories rely on it, while others preclude it. Consequently, the existence or denial of 
the axis depends on which theory is adopted. That is, the functioning of  the axis is an 
act of  choice, and making the axis function pre-supposes a commitment to making the 
ontological decisions which in tum form the first stage in the operation of  the axis 
itself. In other words, the axis only comes into relief when one engages the question: 
what is (customary international) law? 
Empirical (i.e. social practice) and value-centric, theories ofCIL (and, in fact of  law 
as such) are predicated on a temporal collapse; they do not acknowledge the temporal 
dimensions oflaw creation. That is why all such theories tend toward the creation of 
law at the point of  its application. Classic, or positivist, theories generally abhor that 
outcome. Thus the temporal axis in the analysis oflaw must be emphasised. This axis 
has five distinct stages: the choice of  purpose for law; the choice of  mechanism to 
implement that purpose; the period oflaw creation; the period of  potential normative 
evolution; and the period of  law application. The first two stages represent the 
identification of  the legal system, the latter three the functioning of  that system. The 
latter three are immediately relevant to legal reasoning. These must be held rigidly 
separate and, more importantly, the role of  values at each stage must be distinguished. 
The first step in legal reasoning (stage three in the axis), law creation, must and 
ideally should, be value-centric; this should be beyond dispute. The only question 
here is to determine how to recognise particular values as legally relevant (as the basis 
of  norms). That is, under which conditions is an empirical action also transposed to 
its purpose. However, it seems clear to me that for Fuller, the purpose oflaw does place effective limits 
on the scope (though not the content) of law. 
323 the nonnative plane; which "acts of  will", under which conditions, are to be 
recognised as law-creative. At this stage, law, or at least elL, ought to be apologetic. 
That is, good law ought to reflect the values of  its subjects at the point at which it is 
created. However, the following two stages of  the temporal axis ought to be value 
neutral. This allows a law to reflect State will and interest at the point it is fonned (i.e. 
to be concrete), and yet ignore State will and interest at the moment of  application 
(i.e. to be normative). The middle stage is the most awkward, and the central question 
is whether at the moment of  application the nonn has evolved or not. If  it has, then in 
effect stage one is repeated; if  not attention moves automatically to stage three. 
The structure of  the temporal axis can be summarised thus: 
•  fixing the ontology of  law 
•  applying that ontology: creating nonns 
•  altering nonns 
•  identifying ('recognising') relevant nonns 
•  applying those nonns 
Functioning ofthe Temporal Axis: 
324 With the temporal dimension providing a mediation ofthe decision through law, 
positivism, especially within the (properly) anarchic conditions of  (ideal) PIL, has a 
solid foundation on which to build. This is because the apology pole of 
Koskenniemi's critique is conceptually dependent on the inevitable creation of  law at 
the point of  its application, an understanding of adjudication which positivism 
dogmatically rej ects. The point which Koskenniemi' s collapsed analysis misses is that 
- because laws or any other norms are embodiments of  value - at the point of  their 
formation norms must represent someone's values. In Kelsenian terms, the "act of 
will" which constitutes a positive norm is, itself, the embodiment of  a value. This is 
neither controversial
45 nor problematic as long as the temporal axis is respected. Laws 
embody values; they are value laden from the moment of  creation. As long as the law 
itself does not alter at the point of  application, the rule does not serve as an apology 
for the politically motivated action of  those it evaluates; or at least not in the sense 
that Koskenniemi suggests. 
The legal decision would be based on the rules, and would be apologetic (in 
Koskenniemi's second, and especially third senses) only to the extent that the rules 
themselves sanctioned and legitimated 'abhorrent' activities or 'unfair' practices, 
before, during, and after the incident under analysis. The law is not apologetic in 
Koskenniemi's first and important sense unless it changes at the point of application, 
though here the poles of  his critique may meet, as the law would remain apologetic 
whether it changed simply because a state had transgressed (and thus formed a new 
rule), or because the particular transgression was mandated by an external moral code 
(whichever one happened to be symbiotically linked to the law by that author), and so 
45 In none of  its guises does positivism masquerade as a theory for the value free creation of law, but 
only ever as a theory for the value free identification of  norms whose creation is always already 
325 could not be perceived as transgression at all. Thus Koskenniemi's critique of  apology 
is best understood, and of  fundamental importance, as a critique of  form not of 
substance. 
The temporal axis provides the bulwark against this manifestation of  the apology 
critique. Once the temporal axis is reintroduced, it becomes apparent (at least 
analytically46) that law creation, normative evolution, and legal interpretation and 
application are distinct events. This does not rule out the possibility that the duty to 
obey the law is determined by the purpose oflaw, nor that the purpose oflaw can 
affect or limit the substance ofthe law. But it does undermine the claim that the 
purpose oflaw (as such) has to determine the identification and application of  the law 
to the extent that these become synonymous with renewed law creation. The task for a 
positivist theory of  international law is to create a technique for identifying law (the 
actual norms governing the conduct in question) and applying law which both 
recognises the anarchistic nature oflawmaking in PIL and is capable of  determinately 
distinguishing lawful actions from transgressions, and transgressions simpliciter from 
those illegalities containing "the seeds of  a new legality".47 
Moreover, in reintroducing this temporal dimension we can better identify and 
analyse the artificial collapse between the (holding of) transgression of  the law and 
the imposition of  a sanction. This is important for two reasons; first, it allows us to 
analyse the applicability oflaw as such to the "situations" under dispute. The 
applicability of  law can be considered and evaluated before the demands of  the legal 
presupposed. 
46 This is important, as Koskennierni's critique is posed at the conceptual rather than the empirical 
level. 
47 D'  Amato A. The Concept a/Customary Law, p.  12. 
326 rules, and the parties' obedience or disobedience to these, are analysed. The duty 
actually imposed by the norms oflaw, and the background duty to obey the law can 
thus be more easily separated. 
Secondly, the duty also undermines claims to legality through motive, especially the 
neo-Austinian claim "we were merely enforcing the law, and in upholding the system 
we can hardly be claimed to have transgressed it" (i.e. law must have teeth to be law; 
to provide an obligation to obey). Four separate questions can now be identified: what 
did the law demand of  state A?; how did A's conduct compare to this demand?; what 
did the law demand of  state B?; and how did state B's conduct compare with this 
demand? In other words, what the law demands, is clearly differentiated from why or 
whether those demands should be followed, in other words why the law should be 
obeyed. This is particularly important in relation to those theories (perhaps in fact all 
legal theories
48
)  which root the obligation to obey law in the fear of  the consequences 
of  disobedience. 
In summary, the temporal axis serves three distinct functions: 
1.  It mandates us to determine the orthodox theory of  law. 
2.  It allows us to distinguish the three vital periods oflaw creation, normative 
evolution, and law application. 
3.  It allows us to distinguish legal demands from law enforcement. 
48  See Chapters 1 and 2 supra. 
327 This leaves any successful theory of  (legal positivism in) PIL with the burden of 
demonstrating (and so, in a sense effecting) a system for the creation of  law which 
does not conceptually, i.e. necessarily, impose the specific values of  some onto the 
others, but which also avoids uncritically reflecting all that states do in the "rules" of 
law; a law which is both concrete and normative. It is to the elaboration of  such a 
procedure, and the demonstration of  its immunity from both the negative version of 
the apologist pole and the utopian pole of  Koskenniemi's critique that attention must 
now be directed. 
THE IMPACT OF KOSKENNIEMI'S CRITIQUE: 
The present thesis assumes the validity of  Koskenniemi's critique - that both 
apologetic and utopian theories are unworthy ofthe name oflaw - but denies its 
comprehensiveness; there is a theory of  law, even ofCIL, which can be immunised 
from Koskenniemi's destructive dialectic oscillation. Those theses which treat state 
practice and opinio iuris as entirely separate entities must tend toward one pole or the 
other, either descriptive or arbitrarily value-centric.
49 The same is true of  any theory 
which conceives oflaw in social practice or social fact terms. This is why state 
practice must be idealised, moved out of  the realm of  mere conduct, but not into the 
jurisdiction of  specific socio-political theories. State practice must be moved into an 
ideal deontological plane. 
49 See chapter 4, note 82 and accompanying text, supra. 
328 It is precisely the move to such an idealised plane that allows for the re-introduction 
of  Sovereignty to international legal theory. The poles identified by Koskenniemi 
represent the absence and the presence of  a unitary vision of  sovereignty, considered 
to be constitutive of  the field of  sovereignty as such. Koskenniemi does not consider 
the possibility of  the real virtuality of  the sovereign,50 that is, the possibility of  the 
duality of  role between sovereign and subject being internalised within the same 
actors (states). This oversight - alongside the social practice (empirical) methodology 
to which it leads - precludes, for Koskenniemi, the possibility of  the idealisation of 
practice as a normatively separate modality. 
Moreover, the Utopian pole - as portrayed by Koskenniemi - is doubly dangerous, as 
it represents unjustified moral imperialism, and also can provide no criteria to 
determine which morality to imperiously impose. It is therefore unjustified and 
indeterminate, and yet it is absolutely vital in order to prevent theories of elL  based 
on the separation and aggregation of  practice and opinio from becoming apologetic. 
However, the Utopian pole could be rescued by the discovery or advent of  a universal 
socio-political morality. This would, in effect, become a Kantian defence of  value 
imposition. For the imposition of  "true values" cannot really be an imposition, but 
must rather representjreedom.
51 
With the values themselves defined into law, the alienation of  power would be to law 
as such, and not to a transcendent sovereign. Alternatively a named sovereign could 
be accepted as legitimate - as Tasioulas implied when admitting anti-pluralism was 
50 See notes 84-7 and accompanying text, infra. 
5! This, in fact, is precisely the aim, though in my opinion manifestly not the outcome, ofTeson's 
Philosophy of  International Law. 
329 the deeper charge than indeterminacy.  52 This would be tantamount to contemporary 
theories of  US, or "liberal-West", hegemony. At a properly constructed utopian pole 
(effecting either or both law creation and application; simultaneously or 
consecutively) law can work determinately and normatively; all that is lost is that one 
strand of  justification which Koskenniemi terms "social context". This is a vision of 
law analogous to Simpson's notion of  "liberal anti-pluralism,,;53 what is lost is the 
essential pluralism of  the world community. The extent of  this loss is clearly and 
openly a question of  purpose and preference only. 
Koskenniemi's critique covers and undermines all contemporary theories ofPlL; it is 
a destructive, nihilistic analysis denying to each ofthem the dignity oflaw.54 It is vital 
to realise that this is only important ifone adopts Koskenniemi's underlying 
assumption ofthe necessarily normative nature oflaw and the necessarily consensual 
nature ofPlL. To perceive Koskenniemi's critique as valid - as in any sense 
efficacious - one must adopt Koskenniemi's understanding of  law. Whether this 
condition is met or not depends entirely on how one defines law, and this in tum 
depends on the particular purpose ascribed to law. Nonetheless, I accept 
Koskenniemi's challenge, and shall endeavour to outline a theory of  ClL as law 
making in anarchy which avoids both poles and instead posits a consensual, but 
nonetheless normative, legal system of  ClL. 
What is required is a consensual theory of  law which can nonetheless provide a 
normative perspective for the evaluation of  the conduct of  states. This is not 
52 Tasioulas J., "In Defence of  Relative Nonnativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case" 
16 Oxford JLS (1996) 84 at p. 116. 
53  Simpson G., "Two Liberalisms" 12 EJIL (2002) 537. 
54 See ch. 4, supra. 
330 necessarily as paradoxical as it may seem; although the prima facie clash between 
states creating law through their conduct, and yet that very conduct being legally 
evaluable, is a serious one, it is not irreconcilable. What is required is a process of 
consensual law creation which also provides a technique for norm identification. 
We require a technique by which we can identify which political products to 
recognise as law. However, this will be manifested as an epistemological point, as we 
must determine which conduct  to idealise, to recognise as legally relevant, and thus 
to transpose to the insulated ontological plane of  normativity. This can be achieved by 
adopting a neo-Hartian Rule of  Recognition, but only once it is realised that this rule 
is at once a power and a duty; that it applies as both power and duty to the same 
actors, but that this is possible because each individual actor (State) is the bearer of 
two different identities (subject and official); and that it is the form - not the 
substance - of  their conduct which differentiates these roles. 
SUBSTANTIVISING AND DEFENDING THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE IDEAL 
OF elL (IDENTIFYING THE LEGISLATOR-TEXT): 
The Existence and Legality of  Law: PIL and The Rule of  Recognition. 
In order to identify the norms of  any given legal system, we need a technique for 
distinguishing norms from other statements, and legal from non-legal norms. This is 
true regardless of  the legal theory one adopts. That is, one needs a rule for recognising 
laws (of  the system), a Rule of  Recognition in Hart's useful terminology. In effect, the 
grundnorm plays or rather facilitates this recognisory role, but it also does much 
331 more, by underwriting the very existence of  rules or norms at a conceptualleve1. The 
rule of  recognition on the other hand simply tells us how to identify legal obligations; 
as a duty, it tells us that we must identify legal obligations, and how to do so. 
As Bos has noted,55 Hart's theory oflaw appears at face value far more open to 
transposition to PIL than Hart himself assumes; there seems to be no reason why a 
Hartian methodology cannot recognise forms oflaw, rather than institutional 
manifestations oflaw. However, this is overly simplistic. Hartian terminology can be 
transposed to PIL, but Hartian methodology cannot. Thus, to transpose56 the rule of 
recognition to PIL, we must first fundamentally re-work the very idea of  the rule of 
recognition itself. Hart is in fact correct to say that there is no rule of  recognition in 
PIL, at least not in afully Hartian sense. This is because the rule of  recognition can 
exist only as a product of  actual observation. That in tum presupposes centralised 
judicial institutions whose behaviour and rhetoric could be observed in order to 
identify the real existence and content of  the rule of  recognition.  57 
Such centralised institutions are manifestly absent in PIL. Thus we must adapt the 
concept of  the rule of  recognition to the new environment (international society) to 
which we intend to transpose it. For such a transposition to function to produce 
insulated legal rules and argumentative practices, the rule of  recognition must be 
understood counter-factually; it then becomes a substantivised version ofthe 
grundnorm. In short, I use the rule of  recognition to signify the rules by which 
55  See "Will and Order in the Nations-State System" in The Structure and Process of  International 
Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine, and Theory Macdonald and Johnston (eds.) 58 at p. 72. 
56 The, very useful, distinction between transplanting and transposition was developed, and is 
elucidated, by Esin Orucu ; see "Law as Transposition" 51  ICLQ (2002) 205. 
57 Again, it is worth noting, that it is because of  an analogous methodological commitment that 
Koskenniemi is led inexorably to the conclusion of  necessary indeterminacy. 
332 international courts (and all other international actors) ought to recognise (identify) 
legal norms. This has a similar effect to Hart's understanding of  the rule of 
recognition, but no longer relies on the actual practice (and a fortiori the actual 
centrality) of  judicial institutions; nor does it collapse into a description of 
indeterminacy and discretion, a la Koskenniemi. 
Theoretical Vulnerability: 
Nonetheless, even understood counter-factually, the rule of  recognition does have 
problems; even as a theory or technique, it remains analytically vulnerable, and is not 
without its critics. Fuller
58 offers a standard, but apparently devastating, critique: 
Hartians cannot tell whether the rule of  recognition is power-conferring or duty 
imposing; they cannot tell us the status of  their most basic norm. This, we are told, is 
a problem which has plagued Hohfeldian analysis from its inception; and the 
centrepiece of  the Hartian project is precisely a neo-Hohfeldian distinction between 
primary and secondary rules - duties and powers. Thus this apparently illuminating 
intellectual torch turns out simply to darken in practice; to obfuscate rather than 
elucidate. 
Fuller's critique is powerful, but fortunately it is based on a simple mis- (or perhaps 
non-) understanding; it does not recognise the fact that all exercises of  powers entail 
duties. A power is only a power for those entitled to exercise it, while others are under 
the duty to recognise its exercise, as the exercise of  a power re-arranges rights and 
duties. Indeed even those entitled to exercise a power will, in the normal run of 
58 Fuller L. The Morality of  Law pp. 237-8. For Fuller this critique has especial force as it entails his 
claim that as the rule of  recognition involves duties it can be lawfully revoked on breach (ibid). 
333 events, tend to find themselves placed under duties entailed by its exercise. This is 
easily illustrated by the paradigm case of  a private Hohfeldian power, the power to 
alter another's legal relations unilaterally by concluding a contract through the 
acceptance of  an offer. Before the offer was accepted, neither party owed any duties 
to the other. However, the acceptance ofthe offer, which was the exercise of  a power, 
directly entailed the creation and imposition of  duties on both parties - offeror and 
acceptor - to the new contract. 
This may not be acceptable in the strict Hartian model, especially as reformulated by 
Raz. Hart seems at best ambiguous about the status of  the rule of  recognition, he is 
quite clear that it is not duty imposing in the normal sense as compliance with its 
demands "would not amount to obedience in the normal sense ofthat word,,59 and so, 
as Fuller notes, within the bivalent power/duty schema adopted by Hart, the rule of 
recognition must be power-conferring. Raz disagrees. For Raz, "as Hart himself has 
confirmed" to him: 
There is no sense according to [Hart's] theory, in which power conferring laws 
can be customary laws, unless they are part of  a system of  which they are not 
the rule of  recognition. Consequently it must be concluded that the rule of 
recognition is a duty-imposing law. The rule of  recognition should, therefore, 
be interpreted as a D-Iaw addressed to officials, directing them to apply or act 
on certain laws.
6o 
59 Hart Concept p. 113. This is true, for Hart, of  all legal powers, see ibid p. 28. 
60 Raz J. Concept of  a Legal System p. 199 paragraph breaks suppressed, footnote omitted. 
334 This is confirmed by Raz's acceptance of  the bivalence of  powers and duties in Hart's 
scheme.
6l As the rule of  recognition cannot be a power, it must be duty imposing ("a 
D-Iaw"). This analysis seems to miss the question of  who can activate the rule of 
recognition; the question of  who can give content to the duties owed by the system 
officials, and under which conditions this could be accomplished, namely which 
empirical occurrences (manifest objectively relevant acts of  will, and therefore) also 
give rise to legal rules. 
The Rule of  Recognition as Power and Duty: 
There is a tendency amongst neo-Hohfeldian scholars to seek an absolute 
individuation of  rules, and therefore to impose a bivalence between the two primary 
Hohfeldian sets, the bivalence Hart sanctifies in the separation of  primary and 
secondary rules. This may be motivated by a desire to retain purity, by showing that 
neither set reduces to the other; even if  this claim were correct, a central point it 
overlooks is that neither category makes sense in isolation, but rather they 
reciprocally provide each other with context and intelligibility. There is a duality of 
role between powers and duties, and this extends with increased intensity to the rule 
of  recognition. 
Naturally, the duality of  role, as power and creator of  duty, also applies to those 
interacting with the rule of  recognition. For those vested with law-constitutive 
powers, the rule of  recognition is a power - it is precisely the manifestation of  those 
law-constitutive powers; for others (especially lower system officials - e.g. judges, 
61  Ibid. 
335 administrators, the police, etc. - within Hart's, tri-partite, classification
62
)  it imposes a 
duty to recognise the exercise ofthis power. The exercise ofthe  power (the rule of 
recognition) entails a duty to recognise and thus apply, within the bounds of  (the 
authority of) the law, the rule(s) created by that exercise. 
In a truly advanced system, as portrayed by Hart, the rule of  recognition does not 
stand in isolation, but exists in a complex interrelation with the rules of  adjudication 
and change. The rule of  recognition authorises the rules of  change, yet the rules of 
change affect the content ofthe duties imposed by the rule of  recognition. Both thus 
impact immediately on both system officials and the general populace. 
Rules of  adjudication form the third point in this triangle; these empower judges to 
apply the norms determined by the other two rules, and place them under duties in the 
exercise of  this power, should it be exercised. However, judges also have limited 
powers to change or evolve the law, and therefore influence the rule of  recognition 
which 'controls' their activities. Moreover, the rule of  recognition is itself distilled 
(identified) by reference to judicial conduct, and the rules of  change recognised by the 
judiciary. Indeed MacCormick recognises: 
62 That is a distinction between law makers, law appliers, and subjects. It should perhaps be noted here 
that Hart's distinction between system official and subject is too rigid, both components are necessary 
to a concept of  law, but that they be held by discrete actors is not. Moreover, as Kramer shows, Hart's 
minimum is not in fact the minimum level of commitment required for the operation of  a legal system; 
rather system officials could be motivated purely by prudential self-interest, i.e. a belief  that they are 
well off under the system could in fact supplant any necessary belief in the system. See Kramer M. 
Law Without the Frills: A Defence of  Legal Positivism. Interestingly, Hart would actually appear to 
have considered and (incorrectly) dismissed this idea, see Concept pp. 115-6. An alternative possibility, 
however, would be to view this criterion as a minimum empirical demand for afunctioning and 
consequently identifiable rule of  recognition. It is only if  judges are committed to the system that we 
will be able to discern sufficient similarities between their decisions to empirically identify a rule of 
recognition; judicial commitment guarantees the stability of  the legal system. 
336 A problem of  seeming circularity in the interrelationship of  secondary rules of 
"recognition, change and adjudication", [which is] damaging to it even as an 
analytical model ... [because] the rule of  recognition presupposes "judges" 
and "judges" presuppose a rule of  adjudication. Which member of  this logical 
circles of  rules is the ultimate rule of  recognition?63 
Even analytically, the three cannot be separated, nor even brought into hierarchical 
relation. So which are powers, and which are duties, and who cares? When it is 
realised that the rule of  recognition is both power and duty, the need for the other two 
forms of  rule, and their complex, unwieldy, and unmappable interrelations is 
eliminated. 
This point is particularly important to the understanding ofPIL from a Hartian 
perspective. Hart believed PIL to be a primitive set of  primary rules, rather than an 
advanced system of  rules unified by a rule of  recognition into a recognisable legal 
system. This did not, for Hart, make the individual rules any less "law", but simply 
precluded the possibility of  its being a legal system.64 Only systems need unifying 
rules, while: 
The rules of  the basic structure are, like the basic rule of  the more advanced 
systems, binding if  they are accepted and function as such. These simple truths 
about different forms of  social structure can, however, easily be obscured by 
63 MacCormick N. HLA Hart pp. 108-9 paragraph breaks suppressed. Adding the rule of change further 
complicates matters, and MacCormick despite his best efforts in the ensuing pages fails to untangle the 
riddle bequeathed by Hart satisfactorily. Indeed MacCormick concedes that "the concept of  a judicial 
duty does not in fact depend on the pre-existence of  a ... "rule of  adjudication"", ibid p. 111. 
64 For the contrary proposition, that for Hart we can have no 'law' without a legal system, see ch.  1 
note 87 and accompanying text, supra. 
337 the obstinate search for unity and system where these desirable elements are 
not in fact to be found. 65 
Obviously, this is fundamentally at variance with the Kelsenian position which 
equates the existence of  norms with their validity and makes validity an inherently 
systemic quality. Indeed, Hart perceives "something comic" in attempts to find a basic 
rule for primitive legal orders.
66 Norms, in the Hartian model can be derived from 
facts alone, from mere empirical consistency, so long as this supports an "internal 
point of  view". This is innate to Hart's concept of  a rule; from this perspective a non-
functional basic norm, a Grundnorm, is tautological and unnecessary: 
For it says nothing more than that those who accept certain rules must also 
observe a rule that rules ought to be observed. This is a mere useless 
reduplication of  the fact that a set of  rules are accepted by states as binding 
rules.
67 
Deontologically, this claim is open to serious doubt, but it does provide a key insight 
into the Hartian model: the rule of  recognition must have a substantive (as opposed to 
merely formal)function.
68 It must tell us which rules are rules ofthe system, as 
opposed to merely telling us that the rules are valid. For Hart, this is lacking in PIL; 
there is no way of  telling in advance whether a given claim will or will not become a 
65  Concept p. 230. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68  In fairness, this point is implicit in the entire Hartian architectonic, as the rule of  recognition could 
not be a logical hypothesis, nor could it be substantively redundant. These points are simple 
entailments of  the fact that the rule is discovered by observation, and not deduced from principle. To be 
observable, the rule of  recognition must perform a unique function. 
338 rule oflaw. The rule of  recognition fails to serve this purpose, and therefore cannot 
exist. PIL is merely a set of  rules, governing a primitive society: 
In the simpler form of  society we must wait and see whether a rule gets 
accepted as a rule or not; in a system with a basic rule of  recognition we can 
say before a rule is actually made, that it will be valid ifit conforms to the 
requirements of  the rule of  recognition.  69 
The rule of  recognition is designed to bring certainty to the system, and this probably 
explains why Hart tended to seek it out within institutional structures capable of 
delivering determinate answers. Hart is both factually and conceptually inaccurate in 
his analysis ofPIL on this point. Paradoxically perhaps, this confusion, which is the 
result of  Hart's quest to separate the three major secondary rules, can be best 
explained in terms ofthat very division. The problem is that Hart confuses the rule of 
recognition and the rule of  change. This problem is easily avoided once it is realised 
that these are simply the positive and negative manifestations of  the same rule, as duty 
and as power. The rule of  change identifies the process by which a new rule is 
formed; the rule of  recognition merely confirms that successful completion of  that 
process will lead to a valid rule of  the system. 
The source of  the error lies in the relatively open and unpredictable nature of  the rule 
of  change in CIL. The rule of  recognition is relatively clear: state practice plus opinio 
iuris creates recognised rules of  CIL. Thus if  a rule garners sufficient practice and 
opinio it will become a valid rule of  the customary international legal system. Hart, by 
69 Ibid, p. 229. 
339 failing to separate the two rules as his system demands, himself confuses fonn and 
content. In both PIL and municipal law (understood as ideal ideas), we can clearly 
define a rule of  reco gnition; it is in tenns of  change that the two types of  system most 
differ. However, contra Hart, we do not know that any rule properly posed will 
become a rule of  municipal law. 
Only the outcome ofthe procedure can guarantee that. For example, there is no way 
of  knowing, in municipal UK law, whether or not a white paper, or even a bill, 
presented to Parliament will become law, and this is exactly analogous to the fate of  a 
claim under CIL. In each case we can say that if  the process ofnonn creation is 
successfully completed, then the rule will become law, but in neither system can we 
say that the process will be successfully completed. Nonetheless, in both systems, we 
do know what successful completion would look like, and of  course we know what 
effect it would have. Thus, CIL clearly could have a rule of  recognition, albeit that the 
detailed content ofthat rule is still subject to dispute. 
Understood in this way - which is necessarily incompatible with the strict or orthodox 
Hartian project - the rule of  recognition becomes analogous with the first rule of  a 
legal system, the rule immediately below the Grundnorm. In effect it becomes the 
'sources' nonn, the substantivisation of  the Grundnorm. The rule of  recognition as 
power identifies the conditions under which mere conduct is transposed to the plane 
of  nonnativity. The rule of  recognition defines the conditions under which an act of 
will must be expressed in order to have "objective effect"; to signify (and so, effect) 
law-creation or alteration. 
340 Differentiating Change from Breach (1), Identifying Customary International Legal 
Rules, the Subject/Official Dichotomy: 
The evolution of  the law, and the stability of  its historical narrative, form a key 
tension in any living legal system. Law must be stable if  it is to be normative, and to 
form a basis of  action and source of  expectation; yet it must also be dynamic if  it is to 
keep pace with any contemporary society. Thus a legal system must have the ability 
to recognise and incorporate change, but must simultaneously be immune from instant 
change in the face of  breach; breach must be distinguishable from evolution. 
In a centralised legal system, this tension is easily dissolved, or at least hidden, as 
there is a clear demarcation between the officials and the subjects of  the legal system, 
albeit a demarcation which is often hidden behind the fiction of  democratic identity in 
some form. "We the people" who make and obey the laws, do not actually exist as the 
singular univocal entity democracy portrays, despite democracy's conceptual 
dependence upon us. This leads to the requirement that "we the people" be created as 
a fiction, the fiction of  democratic identity. The demarcation remains important as 
officials qua officials effect evolution and change, while subjects provide obedience 
or breach. The roles, and the effects of  the actions, of  each are clearly defined and 
distinguished. 
The difference in PIL is that democratic identity is a fact, not a fiction, and the 
demarcation between official and subject is far more fluid, ifnot absent altogether.
7o 
70 Generally the demarcation is fluid, the state qua state is subject, but qua member ofthe international 
community official; however, it may be entirely absent when the individual state acts as a persistent 
obj ector. Only the international community can exercise the rule of  recognition as a constructive 
power, but the rule of  recognition method can also take account of  the doctrine of  the persistent 
341 This dual role is mediated internally rather than externally; the duality is real, but the 
"modem" tendency to separate the roles physically, and then subsume this separation 
under an evolving fiction - transcendentalism in Negri's sense
71 
- is not necessary. 
This actual identity of  sovereign and subject creates difficulty in the identification and 
elucidation of  the rules ofPIL, as these must be allowed to evolve, but at the same 
time must incorporate mechanisms to identify and react to breaches; yet the activities 
of  the same actors both define or evolve and breach the rules.72 The key problematic 
of  customary international law is that an act can be at the same time both a breach of 
extant customary rules, and the foundation of  a new customary rule. The solution is to 
construct a rule of  recognition capable of  recognising this possibility, and of 
distinguishing situations of  norm evolution from those of  (mere) transgression. 
Method (1): Making the Choices Koskenniemi has Identified: Eradicating 
Commitment (within law) to Competing Values. 
Koskenniemi is clear that the indeterminacy - and sometimes the value - of  PIL flows 
from its commitment to competing values, its internalisation of  value conflicts: 
objector. This is a controversial doctrine within PIL scholarship, but is fIrmly supported by the neo-
liberal foundations, and voluntarism, of  the international legal system. Thus as a persistent objector a 
State may (under certain circumstances) act as a system offIcial despite acting individually, but this 
role is limited and non-constructive in the sense that it does not create rules, but allows for exemptions 
from rules in the process of  being created. On the disputed existence of  the persistent objector rule, see 
Stein T., "The Approach of  the Different Drummer: The Principle of  the Persistent Objector in 
International Law" 26 Harvard International Law Journal (1985) 457 Charney J., "The Persistent 
Objector Rule and the Development of  Customary International Law," 56 BYBIL (1985) 1 
71  Hardt M. and Negri A. Empire pp. 74-8. 
72 An asserted conceptual inability to cope with this collapse of  the distinction between system offIcial 
(sovereign) and subject seems to lie at the heart of  Koskenniemi's pessimistic analysis of  the 
possibilities of an effective PIL. See e.g. supra, note 2, p. 7. A similar proposition - this time drawn 
inter alia from Hobbes and Sieyes - forms the cornerstone of  Loughlin's recent work on the necessarily 
representative (rather than direct) nature of democracy; see Loughlin M., "Representation and 
Constitutional Theory." In Law and Administration in Europe. Craig, P. and Rawlings, R. (ed.s) 47. 
342 It is possible to give a full description of  international law from the 
perspective of  what I call doctrines of  sovereignty and doctrines of  sources. 
The former start from the assumption that international law is based on 
sovereign statehood,  the latter derive the law's substance from the operation 
oflegal sources .... The story about international law's basis in statehood is a 
"hard", historically-inclined narrative that assures the reader ofthe law's suave 
realism, its being not just a compilation of  the author's cosmopolitan 
prejudices. To think of  international law being generated by "sources" opens 
the door for a "softer", cosmopolitan vision focusing on the present "system" 
constituted of  treaty texts, UN resolutions, peremptory norms or general 
principles. Where diplomacy provides the professional horizon for the former, 
the latter's focus is often on formal "system" or notions of  "community": 
where the former appears "ascending", the latter seems "descending" in the 
image of  this book. 
Both approaches are correct; each has resources to ground and explain the law. 
Yet each is vulnerable to criticisms from its opposite ... Much of  20th century 
international jurisprudence may be described as tidal fluctuations of  emphasis 
between sovereignty and sources, sociological approaches and formalism: the 
mainstream may have been grounded in a humanitarian ("sources") critique of 
sovereignty - but that critique has been always followed by a sobering 
rejoinder about the continued centrality of  state power ("sovereignty") .... As 
the century grew old, a pragmatic eclecticism set in. The two merged into one 
another: what "sovereignty" means and when what it creates amounts to "law" 
can only be determined through an external criterion - sources; what "sources" 
343 are and how they operate must depend on what is produced by "sovereignty" 
... And so finally, in the new millennium everyone is both "idealist" and 
"realist", in favour of  "rules" and "facts" simultaneously, learning with every 
position also the critique ofthat position ... As sovereignty and sources 
remain the two grand trajectories through which lawyers come to legal 
problems, each is internally split so as to allow the articulation of  any 
adversity as opposing legal claims.
73 
In short: 
As "sovereignty" and "sources" merge into and yet remain in tension with 
each other, their relationship will ensure the endless generation of 
international legal speech - and with it, the continuity of  a profession no longer 
seeking a transcendental foundation from philosophical or sociological 
h  .  74  t  eones. 
From my perspective, that is precisely the problem. Indeterminacy is an inevitable 
consequence ofthe internalisation of  value conflicts. To facilitate a determinate PIL 
these value conflicts must be resolved. However, that cannot be accomplished by a 
technique of  synthesis, nor by reference to the'  correct' resolution of  the conflicts. 
Value conflicts can be resolved only by making choices between the competing 
values; by privileging one set of  values (one purpose for Public International Law) 
above all others. Moreover, and this is precisely the weakness ofKoskenniemi's 
73 Supra, note 5, p. 13. 
74 Ibid. 
344 thesis, these choices must be made by reference to a grounding in the purity of  a 
philosophical perspective. 
Method (2): Discriminating Normatively Relevant from Irrelevant Actions: 
Ontological Insulation 
On first reading his critique, I responded by suggesting that Koskenniemi's 
understanding of  normativity was fundamentally inaccurate; that normativity actually 
presupposed consonance with, rather than difference from, State practice: 
Thus a norm is a rule directive of  state behaviour, regardless of  will or interest. 
In other words, normativity actually ought to pre-suppose consonance with, 
rather than distance from, state behaviour, as the rule should direct this 
behaviour, or, at least, compel justification or sanction for deviant behaviour. 
It is, however, vital to realise the temporal element in the evolution of  rules: 
although a rule grows initially from state practice, it must - to retain its 
normativity - ultimately direct, rather than merely reflect, subsequent 
practice.
75 
I continued: 
although normativity and concreteness are separate qualities, they are 
intrinsically linked: normativity evolves from concreteness, it does not 
75  Supra, note 4, p. 646. 
345 contradict it. Thus state practice gives rise to the rule, but once this rule has 
entered the legal system - has become normative - its normativity attains self-
sufficiency. This is what provides the stabilising force ofthe norm, it has 
become a rule of  conduct which states ought to obey. In this way it is the 
normativity of  the rule which provides a standard by which subsequent 
conduct may be judged; be this compliance or deviance. 
In short, the flaws in Koskenniemi's argument become apparent when 
normativity is given its proper meaning, directive of  behaviour, which in tum 
presupposes consonance
76 with behaviour and illustrates the illusory nature of 
the alleged paradox.
77 
This, while not inaccurate, is not entirely accurate either. Koskenniemi is in fact 
correct in his suggestion that normativity presupposes difference from state action, 
will, or interest, but this is a difference in kind, not a difference of  substance or 
manifestation. As understood by the theory of  positivism, normativity resides on a 
different level of  being from activity; it is elevated and insulated from the modalities 
of  international life. In other words, the similarities and differences between the 
normative rules and empirical reality are irrelevant to questions of  the rules' 
normativity, and even to their content. This is perfectly encapsulated in Luhman's 
celebrated observation that law "counterfactually stabilises" normative expectations 
even in the face of  cognitive disappointment.
78 
76 Though not, of  course, absolute conformity, as law is a nonnative, not a natural science. On this 
distinction, and its consequences, see Lauterpacht H.  'Kelsen's Pure Science of  Law' in International 
law: being the collected papers of  Hersch Lauterpacht edited by E. Lauterpacht 404  at pp. 404-9. 
77 Supra, note 4, p. 647. 
346 The critical question then is to identify which acts (appearing on the empirical plane) 
are also transposed to (recognised as extant within) the separate ontological plane of 
validity (the ideal plane). Any normatively relevant act then has two ontologies as 
empirical occurrence, and as normative fact. Rules can be created, amended, or 
repealed only through the cumulation of  normatively relevant acts. Even when the two 
are the same, the ontological distinction remains important; as Kelsen has noted 
"equality is not identity".79 This is the distinction between State Practice and mere 
state conduct: State Practice is normatively relevant. It is the cumulation of  State 
Practice (as opposed to the mere actions of  states) which generates the rules of  CIL. 
These rules are then free to evaluate mere actions (empirical occurrences) and are not 
bound to recognise these, or adapt to accommodate them. 
Differentiating Change from Breach (2): Identifying Normatively Relevant Acts, the 
Discriminatory Role of  Opinio Iuris: 
The critical issue then is how we can realise this 'ontological insulation' in practice. 
How can we discriminate between mere conduct, the things states just happen to do, 
and conduct which is, or may be normatively relevant; i.e. conduct which tends 
toward change in the intemationallegal system? 
The mechanism deployed to manage the tension between stability and change in CIL 
is opinio iuris. The presence of  opinio identifies the transformation of  conduct into 
State Practice, and therefore indicates its transposition onto the ontological plane of 
normativity. This is the primary movement of  complexity reduction; the selection of 
78  Luhmann Law as a Social System, pp. 149-51. 
79 Pure Theory of  Law, p. 6. 
347 the additional characteristics particular actions must possess to be deemed relevant to 
law creation; the identification of  the particular circumstances under which politics 
can congeal into law. 
As noted, the meaning of  opinio iuris is far from clear. There is a core of  agreement 
that opinio iuris is a manifestation of  normative intent, that emanates from states, it is 
the normative intent of  states, their belief  in the bindingness (or 'legalness') of  rules. 
Customary PIL is formed by the mixture of  state practice and opinio iuris; it is 
evolved by the actions of  states, and yet it can be breached by the actions of  states. 
From the positivist perspective, however, not all actions of  states have equal 
normative value, and it is in their differentiation that opinio iuris comes to the fore. 
Only those actions motivated by the requisite opinio iuris - on the part ofthe state 
actor andlor perceived-by its peers - form part of  the process of  norm creation or 
evolution.
8o In this regard wilful breach must be distinguished from opinio iuris. This 
is of  crucial importance, as it is from here that the normativity of  a rule flows. Once 
opinio iuris is distinguished from will or interest it becomes apparent that not all state 
actions amount to state practice in the normative sense which tend toward norm 
formation or variation; some state actions are simply breaches of  extant norms ofPIL. 
In this sense, normativity resides on a different ontological plane from that inhabited 
by (State) activity. 
This ontological separation is central to my model of customary intemationallaw. 
Indeed the recognition of  this difference seems to be precisely what inspired Kelsen to 
348 establish a separate ontological state for law, validity. This allows law to be 
understood as a separate category from fact, and yet as one which has empirical 
identifiers. These identifiers are peculiarly legal in nature, and the existence of  a 
category of  valid norms - of  a normative science and the idea of  "normative 
imputation" - is explicitly predicated on a difference between the legal "ought", and 
the "is" of  practice. 
One way of  analysing this distinction between action and state practice would be to 
see in it a (partial) reintroduction of  the demarcation between system officials and 
subjects which plays such an important - ifunarticulated and/or under-theorised-
role in domestic law. This divide is also manifested PIL, where, although the actors 
remain the same, each has two different roles, as official and as subject, and these are 
distinguished by the presence or absence of  opinio iuris. When acting with opinio 
iuris (state practice proper) states (either singularly, or as part of  the 'international 
community,8l) take on the role of  system officials; when simply acting (i.e. without 
opinio iuris) they do so as subjects ofthe system. In this way, the effects of  each form 
of  conduct become analytically identifiable, or at least distinguishable. 
The Nature of Opinio Iuris: 
It should not be assumed that opinio iuris is the sole prerogative of  individual states; it 
is not. Acting individually, states can perform the functions of  system officials only to 
a limited extent; it is only as a collective body 'the international community' that they 
80 This was implicitly recognised by the International Court of  Justice in the Nicaragua case 1986 ICJ 
Reports 14; the assertion that deviations must have been treated as breaches, (para. 186) is reference to 
opinio juris, and its effects on the normative status of  state actions. 
81  See note 69 supra. 
349 fulfil this role absolutely. Thus opinio iuris is only fully operative as a general, or 
community, standard. This is brought clearly into relief  in a key passage of  Judge 
Shahabudeen's dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case. 
Considering the possibility of  a rule of  CIL expressly regulating nuclear weapons, he 
stated: 
In view of  the position taken by the ... proponents of  legality ... over the past 
five decades, it will be difficult to argue that the necessary opinio juris later 
crystallised if  none existed earlier. 
[T]he position taken by the proponents of  illegality would bar the development 
of  the opinio juris necessary for the subsequent emergence of  any such 
permissory rule. 
[It] is reasonably clear that the opposition shown by the proponents oflegality 
would have prevented the development of  a prohibitory rule if  none previously 
existed, and that the opposition shown by the proponents of  illegality would 
have prevented the development of  a rescinding rule if  a prohibitory rule 
previouslyexisted.
82 
What Shahabudeen was adverting to is the impossibility of  the stage of  normative 
evolution if  there is a divide in state attitudes. More abstractly, an individual desire for 
change, or even belief  in change, does not tum a breach ofPIL into an official action 
varying the law; only a general acceptance (be this positive endorsement or silent 
82 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case 1996 ICJ Reps. p. 225 Dissenting Opinion of  Judge Shahabudeen, 
p. 375, at pp. 379-80. 
350 acquiescence) can perfonn this miracle of  transubstantiation. This sets the obvious 
and necessary limit on the voluntary nature of  PIL, and allows the maintenance of 
nonnative expectations in the face of  cognitive disappointment. This can best be 
understood in tenns of  the temporal axis. If  states disagree, opinio cannot be fonned; 
consequently, the rules cannot evolve, and we must consider the situation before that 
divergence arose, to identify the legal rule then, as that cannot have changed. It is for 
this reason that the temporal dimensions of  law - fonnation, evolution, and 
application - must be considered, and held, separate. 
The Nature of  the International Community (as Virtual Sovereign) 
The international community is the true system official, the law creator, or sovereign. 
However, the international community is a virtual sovereign, rather than a physical 
sovereign. The international community becomes a virtual sovereign in the sense that 
it is always there, but not always actual. The community as a whole is the sovereign 
entity, and its values are reflected in the rules. Deleuzean ontology - from which the 
ontological understanding of  the international community (as what Deleuze would 
call a rhizome) articulated above is developed - postulates a doubling of  the Platonic 
categories of  the Potential and the Real to incorporate also the Virtual and the 
Actual.  83  This is a profound alteration in the conceptual terrain, but one which must 
be accurately understood before the virtual presence ofthe (Sovereign) international 
community can be properly appreciated. 
83 See, e.g. Deleuze G., Difference and Repetition pp. 208-14. 
351 The potential is not real, but contains the seeds of  many incipient realities. Once 
realised the potential loses its potential to be other; it becomes fully real. For example, 
a block of stone has the potential to be crafted into part of  a building, or carved into 
many different types of  statue, but once this potential is realised (the block is carved 
into a particular statue) it is also lost (the block cannot then be crafted into a building, 
nor used to create at least some ofthe other statues it had the potential to become). 
The virtual is different, because the virtual is part of  the real.  84 In being real, the 
virtual does not lose its potential; it is (in a sense) real and more than real. The virtual 
is counterpoised to the actual, but it is not so much a virtual reality as a real virtuality. 
The virtual has a real presence, rather than a virtual presence masquerading as real, as 
virtual reality might, but that this presence is generally ephemeral. The virtual always 
(really) exists, but comes into perception (or tangible being) only as it is actualised. 
Deleuze and Guattari offer the rhizome of  the wasp and the orchid as their primary 
example.
85 The wasp and orchid exist as a symbiotic entity always, but this 
relationship is only actualised at the points of  contact; here the wasp feeds and the 
orchid pollinates. However, the rhizome thus formed does not lose its potentiality 
during its actualisation, the wasp could (and can still) pollinate other orchids, and the 
orchid can feed other wasps. 
The virtual loses nothing in its actualisation - in a sense it retains its potential (to be 
other) - and continues to exist, even when it is not (currently) actualised. This is how 
the 'international community' exists and operates. The community is the collective of 
States, and it always exists as such. However, the community is generally virtual, and 
84 Ibid p. 208. 
85 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 9-10. 
352 is actualised only at the points when it is required, e.g. to legislate. It is in this sense 
that the international community can be understood as a virtual sovereign. The 
authority of  the law is rooted in the actual sovereignty of  the international community. 
However, the power to legislate is held exclusively by the community itself  - rather 
than the states of  which it is comprised. Only at the moments where the community is 
actualised does sovereignty become active. Only at these moments can the sovereign 
create new law. 
Metaphorically then, we could see state action (if  motivated toward normative 
change) as (virtually) summoning, and hence (re)constituting the international 
community in its law-constitutive role. The system then functions by the community 
calling itself into existence when it is needed - the plurality existing over the 
singularities - to act as a system official, effectively at the behest of  a system subject, 
and thus subject and official are separated and the system can work without paradox.  86 
This can happen because the community is real; it is always in existence, rather than 
being mere potential(ity), yet the community is not always actual, but rather virtual. It 
is the virtual presence of  the community which must be actualised (as opposed to a 
potential which would be realised) which allows the community, in effect, to flit in 
and out of 'physical' (in the sense of  ontological, actual) existence, and normative 
activity. 
86 It is worth noting that this is not at all the same as saying the system can exist without paradox, but 
only that it can work on a day to day basis by hiding and evading its originary paradox: the creation of 
legality as a category with the initial claim "I am legal" and legal is good. The legality of  the legal 
system cannot subsequently be evaluated, nor indeed the legality of  the legal/illegal divide. But as 
Luhmann observes, all systems are based on (and productive because of) such an original paradox. See 
Luhmann N. "The Third Question: The Creative Use of  Paradoxes in Law and Legal History", Journal 
a/Law and Society 15 (1988) 153. 
353 !ndividual states are no longer law makers, thus their individual consent to the rules is 
no longer required; consequently it cannot effectively be unilaterally withdrawn: as a 
result, the system is not apologetic in the important sense of  descriptive. Moreover, 
opinio can be fully divorced from morality, and it need not differ between classes of 
states. Because opinio is returned to the realm of  factual observation, the system is not 
utopian in either sense. 
Differentiating Change From Breach (3) Opinio Iuris and the Subject/Official 
Dichotomy: 
The rule of  recognition in customary PIL states that "state practice plus opinio iuris 
creates law". It is in the interpretation of  this basic rule, and the definitions of  its 
constituent parts that old and new approaches to PIL clash. From the perspective 
offered here the rule means that state action offers an explicit moment of  reflexion in 
a thoroughly reflexive process of  norm creation. It must be stressed that opinio iuris is 
a general standard and therefore quite distinct from estoppel.
87  It is the action-in-
context (in a wide and temporal sense) which is normative. 
The central point here is that sovereignty does not require a single, timeless bearer, a 
sovereign who is always sovereign; sovereignty itself can be (recognised as) either 
dissipated or relocated. This allows PIL's totally democratic underpinnings to be 
followed through, and something quite interesting happens, the virtual presence of  the 
international community comes into relief. 
87 See chapter 4, note 80 and accompanying text, supra. 
354 The manifestation ofthis community must be properly understood before its 
functioning can be appreciated. The international community is not (necessarily) a 
gathering of  all states as it might be at a conference designed to create a treaty. 
Instead, it is the cumulation of  a 'sufficient' number of  examples oflike conduct, each 
recognised as bearing opinio iuris, and so as state practice. The community is the 
recognition of  this congruence of  interests and desires over time. Consequently, the 
international community is also a type of  ideal idea; it is the actualisation of  the desire 
to conceptualise (understand) certain actions as law-constitutive. Thus, the 
international community represents the embodiment of  a certain type of  politics - the 
cumulation of  enough actions, politically defined as legally relevant, to constitute a 
new legal norm. The community 'exists' during the formation of  this norm. The 
community is the definition of  what makes conduct legally relevant. 
Therefore, when a state acts, its motive - or at least the international perception of  its 
motive - is important, if  this includes (even implicitly), or has imputed to it, a claim 
of  right, then it seeks to activate the rule of  recognition. But no state can activate the 
rule of  recognition alone; as a power, the rule of  recognition can only be exercised by 
the international community, as the community alone is the law creating body. 
Therefore, it is the reaction (the reflexively determined intention) of  the international 
community which is vital. Each individual state, plays a dual role
88
: qua individual, 
and qua constituent component ofthe community. Only qua community is the rule of 
recognition power conferring; qua state it is duty imposing. Thus a counter is offered 
to the suggestion that distillation of  opinio iuris from state practice: 
355 Necessarily implies a vicious circle in the logical analysis ofthe creation of 
custom. As a usage appears and develops, States may come to consider the 
practice to be required by law before this is in fact the case; but if  the practice 
cannot become law until States follow it in the correct belief that it is required 
by law, no practice can ever become law, because this is an impossible 
condition.  89 
There is no vicious circle, there is a reflexive movement within which opinio iuris and 
state practice constitute one another. The apparently paradoxical status of  opinio iuris 
and ofthe rule of  recognition is explained by the fact that states, as members ofthe 
international community, are simultaneously sovereign and subject. 
Therefore, state action gives rise to the reflexive movement which validates, and in 
doing so constitutes, state practice. This reflexive movement consists of  the purposive 
activation ofthe rule of  recognition, or at least the implicit questioning and/or recision 
ofthe 'duty' to enforce the law under the old law (i.e. the immediately preceding 
"momentary legal system"  ,90 or body of  norms). Therefore, state practice and opinio 
iuris are mutually constitutive and together, at a certain threshold level, create 
customary PIL. In other words, state action becomes state practice through contextual 
endorsement, as it is precisely this contextual endorsement which creates the opinio 
iuris which transforms the former into the latter. 
88 It is precisely the intemalisation of  this duality which separates the multitude from a 'people' (etc.) 
and allows for its return to the "ontological plane" as Negri sees it, to (re)produce itself and its 
normative universe. 
89 Thirlway  Customary Law and Codification at p. 47. 
90 Raz J., Concept of  a Legal System pp. 34-5. 
356 Thus it is likely that the initial reaction to conduct intended (or putatively classified) 
as state practice (iffavourable
91
)  will be that the action is tolerated and emulated. It is 
in this period that the norm is created, and therefore, in a sense, the rule of  recognition 
(as duty) really does just recognise an underlying (i.e. already present) commonality-
a norm. However, the idea of  custom linguistically connotes repeated practice, and 
elL also requires repetition conceptually. This is because the creation of  a new norm 
does not occur in isolation, but within the confines of  an extant legal system, an extant 
body of  norms. This entails that the new norm also has an effect on existing norms, 
and indeed that the new norm must ultimately constitute a derogation from an existing 
norm. 
This derogation could be either permissory or prohibitory in nature, but analytically 
the formation process would be identical, albeit in mirror image. I shall focus on the 
generation of  a customary exception to an extant legal prohibition. As noted above, 
state practice is constituted by a synthesis of  action and opinio, to which must also be 
added the response of  others. However, again as noted, the problematic is that an 
unlawful action could be the "seed of  a new legality",92 but it need not be; it could 
equally be a simple transgression of  extant law. In both cases, however, the action 
will breach the extant legal order. Moreover, in the event of  norm evolution, this 
could result in either the extinction or the mere limitation of  the old norm. As a final 
complicating factor, in the event of  non-evolution, the illegality could be either 
condoned or condemned. Not every condoned illegality need necessarily lead to the 
91  There are of  course two mutually exclusive possibilities of initial reaction, either endorsement (to 
some degree) which may lead to activation of  the rule of  recognition - and hence legal change - or 
rejection, classification of  the action as breach. In the latter event, there is no normative evolution, but 
rather an application (and hence implicit endorsement) of  the current law, and so a finding of 
transgression. 
92 D'  Amato, supra note 47. 
357 fonnation of  a new nonn - or at least not of  a new general nonn, or law. The task 
remains that of  distinguishing illegal activities from actions tending toward nonn 
evolution. 
The initial focus then must be the conduct itself, and any claims of  opinio, i.e. the 
actors' interpretation and justification of  its actions. This is an important point; 
physical actions are not auto-interpretative, they are not susceptible of  only a single 
interpretation, or at least they need not be. Acts can be every bit as ambiguous as 
statements.  93 
Next comes analysis ofthe response to the action, and this must be undertaken at both 
the empirical and the conceptual level. What do other states actually do, and why do 
they do so, or what does their response mean (legally)? Again, Kelsen's analytic 
topography is elucidating here. Under the theory of  nonnative imputation, a breach of 
a nonn is the condition of  a sanction, and therefore a sanction ought to OCCUr.
94 If  the 
act in question is intended, and accepted, as law creating (rather than a breach 
simpliciter) then this sanction is unlikely to occur, but, the absence of  enforcement is 
endemic in certain areas ofPIL. Thus a distinction must be drawn within examples of 
the non-occurrence of  the sanction demanded by nonnative imputation. The non-
occurrence could be a result of  either efficacy problems or it could be a conceptual 
issue. The nonn concretisation demanded by Kelsenian theory (the highly concrete 
nonn imposing the sanction) could be either simply ignored or actually suspended. 
93  See discussion ofIHL, chapter 4, note 77 and accompanying text, supra. 
94 Kelsen H., The Pure Theory of  Law pp. 76-82. However, as noted above, I do not adopt Kelsen's 
definition of  law as empirically identified by its relationship to force. This position is not precluded by 
my definition, but neither is it entailed. Thus normative imputation could be read as simply demanding 
that a fmding of  transgression ought to be made, without necessarily leading to the conclusion that a 
358 In the event that the nonnative imputation is suspended, the process of  nonn 
fonnation is initiated. The process is not thereby completed, "instant custom" does 
not result. In Hartian tenninology, the rule of  change (the rule of  recognition as 
power) is activated, but no obligation has yet arisen under the rule of  recognition (as 
duty); as the process of  change has not been completed, there is as yet nothing new to 
recognise. There has been an attempt to activate the rule of  recognition as a power, 
but the extent and success of  that attempt are as yet uncertain. Thus we could perceive 
the initial practice as condoned illegality from a positivist perspective, or as an 
example of  particular legality from a realist perspective (i.e. the law was not 
apparently applied, thus the law which was applied must have been different as law is 
what is in fact applied). However, the positivist perspective brings far more analytic 
clarity to the elucidation of  the nonn evolution process of  elL. 
This is because the realist perspective creates the new nonn too quickly, and the 
resultant nonn is utterly indetenninate; it has no generalisable content. Then again, 
this is precisely the realist claim about rules as such. Nonetheless, from the positivist 
perspective, condoned illegality is merely the suspension of  the demands of  nonnative 
imputation. It is, at this point, neither the abrogation, nor the limitation, of  the general 
nonn in question; in fact, it is not even the suspension of  the general nonn. General 
nonns need classes of cases to which they apply and, as yet, no class of  case has been 
defined or endorsed as that governed by the putative new nonn. It is in the generation 
and delimitation of  new classes of  cases that the repetition of  practice plays its most 
vital role. 
sanction ought therefore to follow. This last step is necessary only because of  Kelsen's dogmatic 
definition oflaw, see ibid pp. 50-4. 
359 There are two issues of  particular importance here. The first is that repetition will be 
non-identical; the second that repetition will not be formally guaranteed acceptance 
during the process of  norm formation. Formal claims to legality presuppose 
membership of  the requisite class of  cases, the identification of 'like cases'. In the 
process of  norm formation, it is the class itself  which is being constructed alongside 
(or within) the rule which governs it. The first time that the concretisation of  a norm 
(be it permissory or prohibitory) is suspended tells us little about any new norm in the 
process of evolving. All that can be said with certainty, is that in any subsequent 
identical, rather than merely analogous, situation, the (same) demand for norm 
concretisation ought to be suspended again. 
The non-identity of  putatively analogous cases allows for the construction of  a class 
of  cases to which a new general norm applies. This is why repetition of  action is  a 
constitutive element of  customary norm formation at the conceptual level, as opposed 
to merely from linguistic usage.
95  Subsequent appeals to the evolving norm may be 
met with disapproval, i.e. rejected as transgressions ofthe original norm which ought 
to attract sanctions, or at least be registered as transgressions,96 and these would bring 
the outer limits of  the new class of  cases into relief. On the other hand, a subsequent 
claim may be perceived asfunctionally analogous to the previous claim(s), and thus as 
fitting within the class under construction. In this event, we learn more about the 
sufficient and necessary features for class inclusion. In both cases, the acts remain 
technically in violation ofthe old norm. It is only when the suspension of  normative 
95 Among others, Thirlway, Charney, and Tasioulas have all recognised the linguistic necessity of 
repetition for the formation of  custom, but none of  them, so far as I can tell, have related this to a non-
semantic conceptual dependency. 
360 imputation itself gives way to legality that we can talk of  the new norm having 
crystallised into an extant norm of  ClL, lex lata. At this point, the process of  evolution 
(the rule of  change) will have been completed and a valid new norm will exist, whose 
authority is mandated by the rule of  recognition. The rule of  recognition then only 
(re)constitutes the norm as a legal, orjuridical, norm. 
Amongst the neo-liberals, it is actually the Hayekians who are correct to this point, or 
at least, are close to the truth. International law does not have a unitary sovereign to 
create and impose norms, rather the law itself  recognises underlying commonalties 
which are constituted as legal norms by the actualised presence of  the international 
community. The creation ofthese underlying commonalties is purposive; it is the 
outcome of  directed human endeavour - this is Fuller's advance over the Hayekian 
framework. Commonality should not be imposed, as the relative normativists might 
wish, but this need not mean that it cannot be agitated for, created and constituted, 
rather than merely discovered, or more often than not, not discovered, as the 
Hayekians argue. This process of  agitating for the recognition of  underlying 
commonality is indeed intrinsic to the rhizome as an active analytic model.
97 
It is also worth noting that the paradox of  self-reference inherent in the concept of 
authorising authority is largely circumvented here. Quite simply, the law is not 
authoritative, and the international community preceded society and the law even 
although the location of  authority in the international community, and the current 
composition ofthe international community require analysis, and critique or 
justification. Given the extended temporal process oflaw creation, and its conclusion 
96 In this event, the law, having been violated, would not perfonn its secondary function oflegitimating 
(morally immunising) the deviant conduct. 
361 in ex post  facto recognition, the (pre)existence of  legal institutions to the law that 
(re)created them is no longer paradoxical. The important critique of  Bentharnite or 
Hartian positivism - that the rules conferring power must pre-exist power, and yet be 
authorised by power - is largely met by the present model. 
The Role ofthe Temporal Element: 
It is, however, also vital to realise the temporal element in the evolution of  rules: 
although a rule grows initially from state practice, it must - to gain and retain its 
normativity - ultimately direct, rather than merely reflect, subsequent practice: 
According to the requirement of  normativity, law should be applied regardless 
ofthe political preferences oflegal subjects. In particular, it should be 
applicable even against a state which opposes its application to itself. As 
intemationallawyers have had the occasion to point out, legal rules whose 
content or application depends on the will of  the legal subjects for whom they 
are valid are not proper legal rules at all but apologies for the legal subject's 
political interest.
98 
Again however, it is the role of  opinio juris - the sense of  legal duty - which should 
safeguard the rule's normativity. The simple fact that a, or all, state(s) agree with a 
given rule does not reduce that rule to a descriptive apology. Indeed there is no 
problem with rules, at the point of  their formation or inception, reflecting state 
97 See Empire, pp. 206-8. 
98 Koskenniemi, supra note 2, p.8. However, content at the point of formation  which does depend on 
the will and interest of  the aggregate oflegal subjects - must be differentiated from content at the 
362 practice (even uncriticalll
9
), and so embodying state desires. All rules, all norms, are 
codifications of  desire, manifestations of  values. 100 The voluntary nature ofPIL 
should, in this regard, be celebrated not lamented. A legal system should seek to 
embody the values of  its host society, rather than attempting to impose its own values 
in order to homogenise - and thus effect - that society. This point is particularly vital 
in a society as decentred and heterogeneous as international society, whether that is 
perceived as a society of  states or ofpeople(s). Moved beyond the temporal collapse 
on which it is predicated, effectively, that the law has no content until it is applied, 
Koskenniemi's critique of  apology can be more readily comprehended as a 
celebration of  democracy, the collapse of  the subject/official distinction in the 
creation (but not the application) oflaw is an inherently good thing. 101 
What makes focus on the temporal dislocation of  laws and normativity so important is 
that fact that the test of  normativity does not arise when states agree with a rule, but 
moment of  application - which is disinterested in the will of  the subj ect(  s) in question; this distinction 
is not apparent in Koskenniemi's argument. 
99 No reflection will ever be truly uncritical or objective of  course, as it will always remain a 
description, and so an incomplete abstraction, there will therefore always be some degree of 
modification. This is simply inherent in the reconstruction of action which underlies customary norm 
formation, and which reappears (with greater force) at the point of articulation of  the new norm. 
100 A point acknowledged even by those (legal) positivists (still) "in their right mind"; see MacCormick 
N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, pp. 233. 
101  However, as Higgins noted, Koskenniemi's critique may be of a far deeper nature here. It is not the 
nature of  agreement in law formation as such, but rather the nature of those whose agreement counts 
(states) which determines that PIL must be apologist. If  states will only agree to that which (as a body) 
is in their interests, then other interests are definitionally excluded from the substantive body ofPIL. In 
a sense then it is not PIL, but an(y) international system based on states which is apologist. Hence the 
desire for Utopian normativity for those seeking to speak for subaltern bodies, groups, or individuals. 
This then really does amount to a critique of  substance, linked to the critique of  form only by the 
question of  why (rather than how) states make law. This must then be based on a presupposition of  the 
illegitimacy of states as such, but this renders Koskenniemi's theory vulnerable to charges of 
irrelevance in a world dominated by states. The standard response to this comes not from critical 
lawyers as such, but from more traditional natural lawyers, who privilege the beliefs and actions of 
certain states in their analysis ofPIL. That is, these authors (noticeably Teson, Slaughter, and those in 
the New Haven Camp) draw a distinction between good and bad states, and pursue a PIL based on the 
values (and thus legitimating even the traditionally unlawful actions) of  those privileged states. 
Naturally this does not escape Koskenniemi's critique, but avoids (some) apologism by retreating to the 
normative pole of  the dialectic and from there destroying the dialectic movement acknowledged as 
destructive. 
363 rather comes into relief at the point of application, especially when one or more cease 
to agree. It is then that the objectivity, the autonomy, ofthe rule comes to the fore. A 
law's normative role will have been fulfilled if  it has provided at least a consideration 
to be weighed against the desire to act, and against which any decision to act can be 
evaluated and criticised by other states and interested actors. This last is a very 
important point, law is not "the application of  neutral rules,,[02 because rules are not 
neutral; they are value-centric, the codification of  values. Law is the neutral 
application of  rules; it is the impartial application of  the same rules to the conduct of 
all subjects which provides the neutrality oflaw itself. 
A rule retains its independence and normativity provided that it does not merely 
change to accommodate deviant practice. Thus consistency, as well as change, in law 
is rooted in 'observable' fact, rather than being left dependant on external moral 
(ethico-political) standards; both consistency and change are internally secured and 
regulated. This does not undermine the roles of  either normativity or validity, but is 
simply an argument that these must be empirically identified, and likewise any 
changes to extant rules must be (empirically) legally identifiable; breach does not 
equal change, because those actions with normative consequences can be empirically 
differentiated from those lacking normative impact. Again, this is clearer from a 
Kelsenian perspective. A norm's existence is attributable (solely) to its validity, and 
so is ontologically separate from both the manifestations of  practice to which it 
corresponds, and so from which it is derived, and from those it is intended to regulate. 
A Final Incentive for Lawful Action: Democratic Identity. 
102 A suggestion Higgins attributes to legal positivism, see Problems and Process p. 7. 
364 Law creation is vitally important to my understanding ofPIL. This is because law 
creation in ideal PIL is the enunciation (iteration) ofthe common standards of 
judgement. The central purpose of  this chapter is precisely to define and defend a 
particular vision of  law creation which I see as the ideal image of  CIL. This purpose 
oflaw is to provide a common position of  (legal) evaluation. Consequently, the 
creation (as opposed to merely the form or substance) oflegal norms is the primary 
point of  concern and potential legitimacy.  103 It is the fact that the standards are 
common (are agreed upon and not imposed) that promotes my conception oflaw; 
even though it is unenforced (or sporadically enforced) law nonetheless demands 
justification for deviation. 
All lawbreakers have reasons for their actions. Some of  these reasons may be good 
reasons, others may sound good regardless, but it is nonetheless more politically 
awkward (at home and abroad) to say, as a state leader, "I am breaking the law 
because ...  " than it is to say "we are not really breaking the law, which, properly 
understood actually demands ...  ". The status of  the conduct (legal/illegal) and the 
excuses/justifications offered for it are more clearly analysable when separated. 
However, sometimes action outside the law will be legitimate, will prove necessary, 
and even beneficial. This is not problematic, as long as such action is legitimated by 
reference to other discourses which do not suffer from law's inherent limitations
104 
(though of course they may not possess law's strengths in clarity and determinacy 
103 C.f. Franck T. Legitimacy; see also his Fairness in International Law and Institutions. 
104 This would also provide an additional defence against the reduction ofCIL into Kitsch. 
365 either, nor its universality) and the legitimation covers not only the action and 
intention, but also the outcomes of  unlawful action. !Os 
One final but important caveat, is to emphasise that I am adopting, promoting, and 
justifying, a particular structure of  CIL. I am attempting to show how CIL could 
work, and so the ideal against which actual CIL should be critiqued. I am not 
(necessarily) defending the actual practice ofCIL, let alone the outcomes of  its 
historical development (the actual substantive norms of  CIL). The content of  CIL may 
be good, it may be bad, more likely it will be mixed, but my present task is merely to 
offer a structure for identifying the particular demands of  (contemporary) CIL which 
is a prelude to the interpretation and application of  the rules. Only when the demands 
have been fully concretised in this sense can critical analysis ofthe content of  CIL be 
initiated. My present task then, has been to define and defend an ideal of  CIL from 
which 'reality' can be identified, against which that reality can be measured, and 
toward which it ought to aspire. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THIS IDEAL: 
Acknowledging the Complexity of  Reality. 
Law is often criticised for being out of  touch with reality: "the law is an ass". 
However, law functions precisely by reducing the complexity of  reality, by not taking 
105 Kant I., On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of  Philanthropic Concerns (reproduced in Grounding 
for the Metaphysics of  Morals (Ellington J. (trans) 3
rd ed. 1993) 63, at 65, "If  you have adhered strictly 
to the truth, then public justice cannot lay a hand on you, whatever the unforseen consequences." See 
also, Korsgaard C., "Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution" in 
Reclaiming the History of  Ethics: Essaysfor John Rawls (Reath, Herman, and Korsgaard ed.s) 297 at 
366 everything into account. This can lead, as Koskenniemi (amongst many others) has 
noted, to laws, legal norms, which appear "over and under inclusive". There are two 
bivalent responses to this charge, either we accept its truth and indeed necessity, or we 
attempt to understand law in a way which circumvents the charge of  over and under 
inclusiveness. I am advocating the first approach. 
What must be emphasised is that all perception is reduction: it is impossible to take 
everything into account. Consequently, there is no answer which will satisfy all; 
understood from this perspective, we can see that all analyses are "over and under 
inclusive". This is equally true of  politics, friendship, economics, ethics, prudence, 
pragmatism, and realism as it is oflaw. The complexity of  reality is inescapable, and 
must be reduced. This means that the only valid question is how to go about this task 
of  reduction. It is here that the distinction between law and these other discourses is 
most apparent. The distinction is not that law reduces - that law fails or-refuses to 
take certain matters into account - and the other theories do not. Instead, the 
distinction is that law attempts to impose a consistent structure on this process of 
reduction, and the other theories do not. 
That distinction is both law's great strength and its Achilles' heel. The attempt to 
impose a structured reduction does create instances where the chosen structure 
appears to be inadequate. However, it is vital to realise that this appearance of 
inadequacy is itself  only visible from another, equally situated, perspective; and that 
perspective is just as reductive as the legal one. Moreover, in seeking a structured 
reduction of complexity, the law minimises the desire to pursue the 'correct' answer, 
p. 320; "For as Kant says, if  you do more or less than the law requires, the consequences are on your 
head." 
367 and that is vital, because there is no correct answer. In the absence of  a 
comprehensive grasp of  reality (which is an impossible ideal) there can be no correct 
answer; only competing answers, based on competing analyses of  relevant and 
irrelevant features. Finally, it is worth noting that the other discourses will tend to 
suffer from an infinite regression of  questions, answers, and considerations. It is that 
which leaves them indeterminate and incomplete. 
Law, like the other discourses, remains incomplete, but it need not be indeterminate. 
Thus the demands oflegality, and the reasons offered for ignoring those demands -
legal evaluation and political expediency - must be strictly separated. What I believe 
angers many people - both within and outwith the so-called liberal alliance - is the 
hypocrisy of a governmental stance that applies strict rules to some, and less strict 
rules to others. This stance assumes the good faith (and legality) of  Western action, 
and structures its definition oflaw around this basic assumption. This is problematic, 
because all law breakers have reasons for their actions, which are sometimes good, 
sometimes bad, but always there. However, when certain states, e.g. the USIUK axis, 
offer their reasons for action these reasons are presented as part of  the law against 
which the conduct in question conduct must be evaluated. 
However, when others offer their reasons, these are portrayed as excuses for unlawful 
action. This leads to the creation of a two track legal system. In some manifestations 
(e.g. Teson or Slaughter), this approach distinguishes between those states who can 
circumvent the rules, and those who must simply obey them. In other manifestations 
(e.g. Tasioulas in his normative mode, or Higgins), the approach mandates a value-
368 centric identification thesis which serves the same function, but calls the first set of 
breaches "new rules" and the second illegalities. Both variants break with the notion 
oflaw as a universal order, the second more subtly, by reducing the right to import 
values (directly) into the identification oflaw either to certain values, or to values of 
certain actors (states, jurists, or writers).  106 
Recapturing the Specificity of  the Legal (the Rule of  Law Exhumed) 
We live, at present, in a uni-polar, hegemonic, world. Many legal theories accept this 
fact and alter either their understanding oflaw, or the hegemon's relationship to law, 
to accommodate this fact while leaving undisturbed the dogmatic stipulation oflaw as 
enforced norms. 107 Once this dogma is given up, the 'fact' of  non-enforcement against 
the hegemon (and indeed in PIL against many others) accrues significantly decreased 
. significance. It is no longer an anomaly which has to be explained away so as to 
protect and continue the dogma. Non-enforcement, in itself, tells us nothing about 
legal demands. 
Law, in my analysis, need be little more than an evaluative perspective (an epistemic 
grid, or way of  observing the world), but this does not mean that it cannot be 
enforced, nor that it should not be enforced. My only claim is that the absence of 
106 Hew Strachan describes this as being founded not on moral imperialism as such, but on a US (or 
western) "axiomatic belief' that their values are the universal values, if only the others would realise it. 
This was suggested at a lecture on the wisdom of  invading Iraq, delivered to the Institute for 
Contemporary Scotland, 15 March 2003. 
107 See e.g. Simpson G. great Powers and Outlaw States. However, the notion of  the non-universality 
of  the allegedly universal law is not restricted to international law, but is also institutionalised in the 
enigmatic figure of  the sovereign in municipal law and legal theory. The sovereign will always enjoy a 
special relationship with the law, be that in deciding upon the exception (Schmitt) or simply in its 
ability to alter the law to its wishes. Law perceived as authoritative command requires a figure of 
authority enjoying at best an ambiguous relationship to law. The sovereign figure (the law creator) is of 
369 enforcement per se neither renders a normative system non-legal, nor adverts to the 
fact that no rule has been broken.  108 Enforcement then is a privilege for 'good' (e.g. 
appropriate, well situated, etc.) law, not a right for all law, let alone althe constituent 
part of  the very definition oflaw. 
When Proudhon famously wrote "all property is theft" he offered a very important, if 
not entirely original, insight into the function oflaw. Behind the polemic, indeed 
presupposed by the polemic, is the legitimising function of  law. Law conditions the 
way the world is perceived; in Kant's terms (which do not go nearly deep enoughl09) 
law shields actions from moral scrutiny,  110 the outcome (be it good or bad) of  that 
which is done according to public right (law) cannot be attributed to (held against) the 
actor. This legitimatory function underwrites, for example, the powerful rhetorical 
distinction between terrorism and authorised armed action (even where that includes 
the (usual) euphemistic "collateral damage). III It  is important that the legal and the 
illegal be clearly identified, because the condition of  this clear distinction being 
maintained provides a powerful incentive toward lawful action. 
course vital to any theory oflaw, and in my conception ofPIL this role is played by the real, but 
virtual, figure of  the international community, in its moments of  actualisation. 
108 In other words, the present approach directly counters the claim that those who thought a rule had 
been breached must have been mistaken, because rule breach leads to enforcement, therefore the 
absence of enforcement entails no rule breach, so the content of  the rule must differ from that 
understood by those postulating breach. 
109 I believe Kant overlooks the way that law structures, or constructs, the situations it then subjects to 
analysis. Law is an inherently simplifying epistemic grid, it actively excludes many things from 
consideration, its most profound effects are not in the act of  judgment, but in the imposition of  its 
specific (distorted) understanding of  the reality as being the totality of  that reality. Law functions, in 
Feyerabend's terms, as an observational language. This is crucially important in, inter alia, the 
evaluation of  human rights discourse as an inherently good thing. See, e.g. Charlesworth, Chinkin and 
Wright "Feminist Approaches to International Law" 85 AJIL (1991) 613. 
110 Supra, note 105. 
III It could also be argued that this function also heads off  analysis of  the 1.5 million or so Iraqi deaths 
caused by the UN sanctions regime coercively imposed upon Iraq from 1991-2003. Though of course 
an absence of  media coverage and consequent knowledge deficit also playa role here. 
370 The disincentive to unlawful action is the requirement to justify both the unlawful 
activity itself, and the totality of  its consequences. This may be particularly important 
in relation to the liberal democracies of  the world (as it turns out, by and large the 
hegemon and its allies) where such justification must be conducted at the level of 
domestic as well as international politics. From a certain perspective, this radically 
reduces the distinctions between my theory and those of  many liberal-illiberal 
imperialists. We posit the same constraint, the tolerance of  the citizens of  democratic 
states. However, rather than calling this (often ignorant) tolerance law, I prefer to 
attempt to use law to structure the evaluations of  the citizens of  democratic nations, 
by refusing to their leaders the shield oflegality as a "floating signifier".ll2 
112 A floating signifier is a word with no inherent content, but great rhetorical force; see Laclau E. and 
Mouffe C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. For an excellent analysis of  "human rights" as precisely a 
floating signifier, see Douzinas C.  The End of  Human Rights, pp. 255-9. 
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